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FOREWORD BY THE CHAIRMAN, DILA
The first issue of the Asian Yearbook of International Law (for the year 1991)
appeared in 1993. This makes 2008 the 15th anniversary of its publication. When the
Yearbook was originally conceived by DILA’s founders, none of them was sure
whether it could survive the vicissitudes of the academic publishing world. There
were only three general editors – indeed there are still only three general editors – to
share the tremendous burden of the work, and hardly any editorial staff to speak of.
Also, none of the Asian foundations approached for funding responded favourably,
and ironically the first few issues were made possible by generous grants from the
Dutch Ministry of Development Cooperation and the Swedish International Devel-
opment Authority, and the risk taken by its original publisher, Martinus Nijhoff.
The survival of so ambitious a publishing enterprise, running on such a small
resource base, was possible only because of the tremendous dedication, industry and
zeal of its general editors of years past. Over the years, the Yearbook has also
received a boost with the creation of the Sata Prize for young scholars, through
the generous donations of Mr Yasuhiko Sata of Tokibo Corporation. DILA and the
international scholarly community owe them a great intellectual debt, for today the
Yearbook has not only survived, but is an established major annual publication in
the field of international law.
Starting with this issue, the Yearbook will be published by Routledge, a division of
publishing giant Taylor & Francis. We are grateful for the many years of productive
association we have enjoyed with Martinus Nijhoff, Kluwer and Brill and now look
forward to an equally productive partnership with Routledge.
The General Editors have decided reluctantly to discontinue the Chronicle section,
mainly because the internet now provides a far more detailed and comprehensive – if
unfiltered – source for major world events impacting international law generally. All
these years, the Chronicle has been put together painstakingly by Professor Ko Swan
Sik, one of DILA’s and the Yearbook’s founding fathers. I wish to place on record
our grateful thanks for his unremitting and dedicated efforts. We have also added
two new sections. The first is the Agora section which will debut in Volume 14.
Though of Greek rather than Asian origin, we feel that the word agora – literally
“open space” or “place of assembly” – best captures the spirit of what we hope to
achieve with this new section. The Greek agora was a marketplace, and for us it will
be an open marketplace of ideas. For this new section, we hope to invite dis-
tinguished scholars to contribute critical pieces (ranging between 4,500 and 6,000
words) on topics of current interest. We have also introduced a new Developments
section, the objective of which is to provide succinct and informative analyses on
xi
international legal developments in relation to Asia (ranging from 1,500 to 4,000
words). The General Editors would be delighted to receive suggestions on possible
topics for inclusion in this section. This year, we have also begun in earnest a
renewed call for contributions, and it is our hope that with the growing ranks of
international law scholars and students throughout Asia, more contributions will be
forthcoming.
In April 2007, an Asian Society of International Law was launched by Judge
Hishashi Owada of the International Court of Justice, in Singapore. A symposium
on the theme of “International Law in Asia: Past, Present and Future” was organ-
ized alongside the launch and it is with great pleasure that we have included a
selection of the papers presented at that event in this volume. Any new organization
to foster the cause of international law should be welcomed and any new organiza-
tion to raise awareness of international law to greater heights in Asia must be cele-
brated. We are thus extremely delighted to have had the opportunity to collaborate
with the newly founded Asian Society of International Law in its inaugural event.
The last 15 years for the Yearbook have been eventful ones. It has brought many
Asian scholars of international law closer together and opened up many conversa-
tions and discourses that continue to foment new scholarship. It is thus with great
hope and optimism that we look forward to the next 15 years. We invite our readers,
friends and fellow scholars to turn this hope into reality.
Kevin Y.L. Tan
Chairman, DILA
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THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF HUMAN RIGHTS




The first decade of the twenty-first century has been characterized by sudden
“wake-up calls” on such serious issues as environmental degradation,1 the futility of
war as a strategy for instituting democratic governance anywhere in the world,2
anti-poverty campaigns, etc. Nonetheless, it is arguable that few subjects have
exercised general public and legal concerns as much as the question of what consti-
tutes an “appropriate, efficient and sufficient” response to the increasing threat of
international terrorism. The response to this threat is the burden of national
governments. Therefore, the “appropriate, efficient and sufficient” test is necessarily
a legal question because conduct of States everywhere is measured always by the
requirements of the rule of law.3
In spite of the fact that the terrorist element is inspired and characterized always
* Research Professor of International Laws, Brunel University, Uxbridge UB8 3PH, United
Kingdom. The author is grateful to the following: the independent referees of the Asian Yearbook
of International Law for comments on an earlier draft; his wife Constance Chigara; and his
sons – Barnabas Chigara and Benedict Chigara Jr for their loyalty and support. Amai – naBaba –
naMbuya – naMukoma – vese ndakavaona, vese handichavaoni.
1 Exotic tactics have been engaged, including the use of international concerts and alarmist
publications. For the “Live Earth Concert” of 7 July 2007 see the Live-Earth website, available at
http://liveearth.org/?p=22 (visited 27/07/07).
2 See Stopwar website, available at http://www.stopwar.org.uk/newsite/index.php (visited 27 July
2007).
3 See Judgments – A (FC) and others (FC) (Appellants) v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department (Respondent) [2004] UKHL 56. Available on UK parliament website, http://
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200405/ldjudgmt/jd041216/a&oth-5.htm (visited 30 July
2007). See also A and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (No. 2) [2005] UKHL
71. For a critique of the rule of law theory, see Dyzenhaus, D., “Recrafting the rule of law” in
Dyzenhaus, D. (ed.), Recrafting the Rule of Law: The Limits of Legal Order, Oxford: Hart
Publishing, 1999, at 1–12.
3
by its resort to extreme means of illegality,4 including incitement and execution of
indiscriminate mass murder of innocent civilians, the United Nations Charter (1945)
enjoins States to use only legal means to counter that threat.5 The consequent duel
between international terrorists on the one hand and States on the other raises the
question of equality of arms. It explains partially why governments may have
quickly resorted in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks on New York on
9/116 and London on 7/77 to what the House of Lords has described as irrational
counter-terrorism legislation that is anathema to both the British instincts of justice
and the British constitution.8
These “duel-equalizing legislative measures” are increasing and not diminishing
in number and intensity. Evidence of this is clear from the number of anti-terror laws
and other measures that have been adopted by democratic States since 9/11. On 20
September 2001 the US established the Cabinet position of the Office of Homeland
Security to oversee internal security arrangements and in October 2001 adopted the
Patriot Act. Australia’s Anti-terror Bill became law on 7 December 2005. The UK
adopted the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act (2001).
The purpose of these and other subsequent related measures is to formalize and
legalize governments’ counter-terrorism strategies. This raises the question of
whether State action could be justified with reference only to previously enacted
enabling national laws. If it were so, then every inhumane act carried out by the
apartheid government in South Africa and the Nazi government in Germany could
not have been impugned under international law because both governments backed
their inhumane activities with legislative force.
However, international law is unequivocally clear that a State may not invoke
provisions of its own constitution or its own laws as an excuse for breach of its
international obligations.9 In its Draft Articles on responsibility of States for
4 See also Baldwin, F. L. Jr, “II. Organized crime, terrorism, and money laundering in the
Americas”, 15 Florida Journal of International Law (2002–2003), at 3.
5 See also “Protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism”,
UN GA Res. of 8 August 2003, A/58/266, para.16.
6 Over 2,600 people lost their lives when hijacked planes crashed into the North Tower of the
World Trade Centre in Lower Manhattan at 08.46 and the South Tower at 09.03. Another 125
people lost their lives when another hijacked plane crashed into the Western face of the Pentagon
at 09.37. A further 256 people lost their lives on the hijacked planes. See the 9/11 Commission
Report, available on US Government Printing Office website, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/pdf/
execsummary.pdf (visited 9 June 2006).
7 The London bombings of 7 July 2005 were a series of coordinated suicide attacks on the public
transport system during the rush hour. Around just after 08.50, three bombs went off within 50
seconds of each other at three different locations on the London underground. A fourth bomb
went off on a bus in Tavistock Square at 09.47. At least 57 people lost their lives and a further 700
were injured in the attack.
8 Judgments – A (FC) and others (FC) (Appellants) v. Secretary of State for the Home Depart-
ment (Respondent), n. 3, para. 97.
9 See Article 13, Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States, IIYILC (1949), at 286.
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internationally wrongful acts, the International Law Commission (ILC) has restated
general international law10 as follows:
Article 12: There is a breach of international obligation by a State when an act of
that State is not in conformity with what is required of it by that
obligation, regardless of its origin or character.
Article 26: Nothing in this Chapter precludes the wrongfulness of any act of a State
which is not in conformity with an obligation arising under a peremptory
norm of general international law.11
Therefore, to purchase legitimacy, national laws, especially those adopted in this
poisoned and hysteric post 9/11 and 7/7 policy-making atmosphere, ought always to
succumb to a higher morality. That morality is encapsulated in international human
rights law. This is also the view of the United Nations. In Resolution 54/110 of 2
February 2000 on measures to eliminate international terrorism, the UN General
Assembly called upon States to take further counter-terrorism measures “. . . in
accordance with relevant provisions of international law, including international
standards of human rights”.12
In Resolution 1368 (2001) of 12 September 2001 adopted at its 4,370th meeting,
the UN Security Council declared its determination to “. . . respond to the terrorist
attacks of 11 September 2001, and to combat all forms of terrorism, in accordance
with its responsibilities under the Charter of the UN ”.13 The UN Declaration on the
Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations14 describes the UN
Charter as the embodiment of the common values and aspirations of humankind.
This is because, firstly, human rights have become the index to the recognition of
the dignity inherent in individuals qua human beings. Secondly, States’ primary
obligation is to ensure the recognition, promotion and protection of that dignity.15
In recent cases that challenged certain UK counter-terrorism strategies, the
House of Lords reached a similar conclusion by holding that while it was the legis-
lature’s prerogative to determine counter-terrorism strategy for the UK, it could not
10 Dixon writes that the reliance by arbitral tribunals on the original ILC Draft Articles on
State responsibility recommends the view that the Draft Articles now represent customary
international law. Textbook on International Law, 6th ed., OUP, 2007, at 254.
11 International Law Commission, 53rd session (2001) submission to the General Assembly of
the United Nations. See UN General Assembly 56th session, supplement No. 10 (A/56/10).
For commentary on these Draft Articles, see especially Harris, D. J., Cases and Materials on
International Law, 6th ed., London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2004, at 504–653.
12 A/RES/54/110, para. 3.
13 S/Res/1368 (2001), para. 5.
14 Available on the UN website, at http://www.un.org/UN50/dec.htm (visited 20 July 2007).
15 See Chigara, B., “To discount human rights and inscribe them with fakeness and unreliability,
or to uphold them and engrave them with integrity and reliability? – UK experiences in the age of
international terrorism”, 25 Nordic Journal of Human Rights (2007), at 1–16.
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exercise that right in a manner that breached the human rights of individuals. Lord
Nicholls stated in Judgments – A (FC) and others (FC) (Appellants) v. Secretary of
State for the Home Department (Respondent):16
In the present case I see no escape from the conclusion that parliament must be
regarded as having attached insufficient weight to the human rights of non-nationals.
The subject matter of the legislation is the needs of national security. This subject
matter dictates that, in the ordinary course, substantial latitude should be accorded to
the legislature. But the human right in question, the right to individual liberty, is one
of the most fundamental of human rights. Indefinite detention without trial wholly
negates that right for an indefinite period. With one exception all the individuals
currently detained have been imprisoned now for three years and there is no prospect
of imminent release.
This article examines the limitations that the law imposes on government’s
strategies to combat international terrorism. These limitations indicate that govern-
ment must act not only to combat terrorism but also to ensure fulfilment of its
obligation to grow and strengthen human rights protection. In this sense human
rights and national security are mutually reinforcing. An alternative view is that the
pair is mutually exclusive and the one will have to be privileged over the other. The
latter view suggests that government has the complex and difficult task of ensuring
national security on the one hand and guaranteeing human rights and freedoms on
the other.
THE CHALLENGE
Malta’s response to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights’ request for
States’ views on human rights and the “War on Terror” succinctly sums up the
problem.
While striking a balance between the need to protect society from the horrifying
effects of terrorism and protecting the fundamental human rights of the individual is
not an easy task, it is indispensable if the personal freedom that terrorism seeks to
destroy is to be preserved. There is therefore a need for reflection on this issue with a
view to articulating agreed guidelines to provide States with clear criteria and elem-
ents upon which to design counter-terrorism measures that do not overstep the
bounds of what is necessary and lawful in the area of human rights protection.17
16 [2004] UKHL 56. Available on UK parliament website, http://www.publications.
parliament.uk/pa/ld200405/ldjudgmt/jd041216/a&oth-5.htm (visited 30 July 2007).
17 UN GA Res. of 8 August 2003, A/58/266, n. 5, para. 10.
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It is arguable that the foremost responsibility of this generation is to move the
human rights project forward and to fulfil the requirements of justice in order to
ensure the rule of law, equality and social justice. The UN Charter (1945) had
already premised the pursuit of international peace and security on human rights.18
However, emergent State practice shows that individuals merely suspected of
involvement in terrorist activity are threatened with a significant reduction of their
human rights qua human beings, including the threat of torture and of being shot
dead in public by law enforcement agents.19 According to the US Department of
Justice’s Inspector General,20 physical abuse of terrorist suspects has in fact
occurred.
The short-term problem this creates is that it perpetuates the public fear already
ignited by terrorism. The long-term problem is that it engenders a cycle of violence
for a miserably unpredictable and long time to come. According to Martin Luther
King Jr, the means by which we fight our battles are themselves seeds that germinate,
grow and colour the seasons of our victories.21 Therefore, we cannot escape violence
in the immediate or remote future if we pursue our causes by violent means. We
cannot expect a human rights-filled future if we sow with anti-human rights counter-
terrorism strategies.
History must find that in spite of the uniqueness, novelty and undesirability
of the challenges posed by the growing threat of international terrorism, this
generation would not compromise human rights. Instead it fought and overcame
terrorism with human rights – the UN’s preferred and foremost strategy for the
pursuit of international peace and security. However, such a favourable finding is at
risk because governments across the world appear to be too eager to apply quick
fixes to the menace of international terrorism. The Secretary-General of the UN
regretted that “. . . international human rights experts, including those of the UN
system, are unanimous in finding that many measures which States are currently
18 Preamble to the UN Charter (1945), 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1153. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (1948) proclaims that human rights are “. . . a common standard
of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of
society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to
promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and inter-
national, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the
peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their
jurisdiction.”
19 See BBC News website, “Shoot to kill policy will remain”, 25 July 2005, available on http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4713199.stm (visited 9 June 2006)
20 Fine, Glenn A., “The September 11 detainees: A review of the treatment of aliens held on
immigration charges in connection with the investigation of the September 11 Attacks”, available
on United States Department of Justice website (2003): http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/testimony/
0506b.htm
21 See Armstrong, J.B. et al. (eds.), Teaching the Civil Rights Movement: Freedom’s Bittersweet
Song (London: Routledge, 2002), at 16.
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adopting to counter terrorism infringe on human rights and fundamental
freedoms”.22
THE PRINCIPAL FUNCTION OF THE STATE UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW
It is beyond dispute that the main function of the State under international law is
to ensure the rule of law.23 That duty includes the protection of human rights of
persons under their jurisdiction. Human rights protection has become the yardstick
for distinguishing between civilized and uncivilized States, so that those that violate
them with impunity or with recklessness find that they court for themselves inter-
national condemnation and possible isolation unless they quickly amend their ways.
This shows that human rights have indeed become the index of human dignity.
Therefore, they should not be altered flippantly.
Except for a few limited and temporary cases,24 international law prohibits
States from limiting the minimum human rights guarantees to individuals.25 In
Articles 3, 6 and 7 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) states
respectively that:
3. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person.
6. Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.
22 See Secretary–General’s keynote address to the Closing Plenary of the International Summit
on Democracy, Terrorism and Security – “A global strategy for fighting terrorism”, Madrid,
Spain, 10 March 2005, available at http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=1345 (visited 20
February 2006).
23 Per Lord Browne-Wilkinson, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte [2000] 1 A.C. 147. For a comprehensive
and succinct examination and analysis of the legal issues, see Woodhouse, D. (ed.), The Pinochet
Case; A Legal and Constitutional Analysis, Oxford: Hart Publishers, 2000; and Sugarman, D., “The
Pinochet case: International criminal justice in the Gothic style?” 64 Modern Law Review (2001),
at 933–44. See also the ILC Draft Articles on State responsibility, UN GA Res. 56/83; Crawford,
J. et al., “The ILC’s Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts:
Completion of the second reading”, 12 EJIL (2001), at 963; and Rosenstock, R., “The ILC and
State responsibility”, 96 AJIL (2002), at 792.
24 See UN Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 29 on Article 4 of the ICCPR
(1966), UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001).
25 The defence of necessity is thoroughly examined in the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on the Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a wall in the occupied Palestine Territory, ICJ Rep. 2004;
Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), ICJ Rep. 1997, at 7. For commentary, see
Rogoff, Martin A. and Collins, Edward Jr, “The Caroline incident and the development of
international law”, 16 Brooklyn J. Int’l L. (1990), at 493. See also Report of the Special Rappor-
teur of the Commission on Human Rights, John Dugard, on the situation of human rights in the
Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967, submitted in accordance with Commission
Res. 1993/2 A. Available on UN website, http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/
(Symbol)/E.CN.4.2004.6.En?Opendocument (visited 26 February 2006).
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7. All people are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to
equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimin-
ation in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such
discrimination.
These obligations are notably impressed upon in the European Convention on
Human Rights (1950) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(1966), the American Convention on Human Rights (1969). They are less fer-
vently solemnized in the Banjul Charter (1981) because of its infamous “claw back
clauses” that appear to take away most of the human rights guarantees previously
recognized.
Jurisprudence of treaty bodies established to monitor State compliance with the
respective universal and regional human rights agreements and of national tribunals
overwhelmingly confirms the view that under modern international law States do not
recognize immunities for States’ acts that oppose the international human rights
agenda. This is because the multilateral26 and regional27 human rights regimes
impose on States the duty to recognize, promote and protect the human rights of
individuals on their territories.
General Comment 18 of 10 November 198928 summarizes the Human Rights
Committee’s jurisprudence on the right to equal treatment of individuals before the
law (Article 26 ICCPR). It states that this right:
. . . not only entitles all persons to equality before the law as well as equal protection
of the law but also prohibits any discrimination under the law and guarantees to all
persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status.
General Comment 8 of 30 June 198229 on the right to life, liberty and security of
the person (Article 9, ICCPR) clarifies the remit of the provision. According to the
Human Rights Committee:
. . . paragraph 1 is applicable to all deprivations of liberty, whether in criminal cases
or in other cases such as, for example, mental illness, vagrancy, drug addiction, edu-
cational purposes, immigration control, etc. It is true that some of the provisions of
article 9 (part of para.2 and the whole of para.3) are only applicable to persons
26 Article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966).
27 See Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (1951); Article 1 of the American
Convention on Human Rights (1969); and Article 1 of the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights (1981).
28 Available on UN website http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/comments.htm (visited 18
February 2006).
29 See ibid.
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against whom criminal charges are brought. But the rest, and in particular the
important guarantee laid down in paragraph 4, i.e. the right to control by a court of
the legality of the detention, applies to all persons deprived of their liberty by arrest
or detention. Furthermore, States parties have in accordance with article 2 (3) also to
ensure that an effective remedy is provided in other cases in which an individual
claims to be deprived of his liberty in violation of the Covenant.
General Comment 20 of 10 March 199230 indicates that Article 7 of the ICCPR
protects both the dignity and the physical and mental integrity of the individual.
According to the Human Rights Committee, high contracting State parties are
obliged:
. . . to afford everyone protection through legislative and other measures as may be
necessary against the acts prohibited by Article 7, whether inflicted by people acting
in their official capacity, outside their official capacity or in a private capacity. The
prohibition in article 7 is complemented by the positive requirements of article 10,
paragraph 1, of the Covenant, which stipulates that “All persons deprived of their
liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the
human person”.
Even more, high contracting States parties cannot derogate from Article 7:
. . . even in situations of public emergency such as those referred to in Article 4 of the
Covenant, no derogation from the provisions of Article 7 is allowed and its provisions
must remain in force. The Committee likewise observes that no justification or
extenuating circumstances may be invoked to excuse a violation of Article 7 for any
reasons, including those based on an order from a superior officer or public authority.
The European Court of Human Rights,31 Inter American Court of Human Rights32
and the African Commission on Human Rights33 all insist on similar standards.
In the Case of Iovchev v. Bulgaria (2006) the applicant alleged inter alia that after
his arrest he had not been brought before a judge or a judicial officer, that his pre-
trial detention had been unjustified and excessively lengthy, and that the criminal
proceedings against him had exceeded a reasonable time, contrary to Article 5(3) of
the European Convention on Human Rights. The European Court of Human
Rights held that Bulgaria had breached Article 5 of the European Convention on
30 See http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/comments.htm (visited 18 February 2006).
31 See Case of Iovchev v. Bulgaria, Application No. 41211/98.
32 See for instance, the Court’s judgment in Bulacio v. Argentina (2003), available at http://
www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_100_esp.pdf (visited 30 July 2007).
33 Alhassan Abubakar v. Ghana, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Comm.
No. 103/93 (1996).
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Human Rights in respect of the applicant because34 the applicant’s detention had
been ordered by an investigator and confirmed by a prosecutor without either of
them having seen the applicant. It could not be imputed from the facts that either the
investigator or the prosecutor was sufficiently independent and impartial as required
under Article 5(3). Moreover:
The persistence of a reasonable suspicion that the person arrested has committed an
offence is a condition sine qua non for the lawfulness of the continued detention, but
after a certain lapse of time it no longer suffices. In such cases, the Court must
establish whether the other grounds given by the authorities continued to justify the
deprivation of liberty. Where such grounds were relevant and sufficient, the Court
must also ascertain whether the competent authorities displayed special diligence in
the conduct of the proceedings.35
In Bulacio v. Argentina (2003) the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
found that Argentina had violated Walter David Bulacio’s right to personal liberty –
Article 7 of the American Convention on Human Rights. The police had illegally
and arbitrarily detained Bulacio during a razzia operation without a court order.
They neither informed him of his rights as a detainee, nor did they advise either his
parents or the Juvenile Judge of his detention.36
In Alhassan Abubakar v. Ghana (1996) the applicant alleged that Ghana had
breached Article 6 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981),
which provides that:
Every individual shall have the right to liberty and security of his person. No one may
be deprived of his freedom except for reasons and conditions previously laid down by
law. In particular, no one may be arbitrarily arrested or detained.
The applicant, a Ghanaian citizen resident in Côte d’Ivoire, had been arrested on 16
June 1985 for allegedly cooperating with political dissidents in Ghana. He was
detained without charge or trial for seven years until his escape from a prison hos-
pital on 19 February 1992. The African Commission found that Ghana had violated
Articles 6 and 7(1)(d) of the Banjul Charter in respect of the applicant.37
Consistency among human rights monitoring bodies regarding the application
of recognized human rights standards recommends the view that modern inter-
national law privileges above everything else the recognition, promotion and protec-
tion of the dignity inherent in individuals qua human beings. Moreover, the majority
34 n. 31, para. 98.
35 Ibid., para.104.
36 n. 32, para. 38(a).
37 Alhassan Abubakar v. Ghana, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Comm.
No. 103/93 (1996), para.15.
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of UN organs and agencies established since 1945 are human rights oriented. This
suggests that conceptions of State authority that oppose human rights may be
unsustainable under modern international law because it is simply not the function
of States to erode, cap or minimize the human rights of individuals. Rather, States
are under the obligation under international law to ensure recognition, promotion
and protection of the dignity that is inherent in individuals qua human beings.
THE THREAT OF TERRORISM
Although the enduring concerns of intra-State conflict, poverty, the quest for lasting
peace in the Middle East and enforcement of international human rights appeared
to have captured international focus at the start of the millennium,38 nothing else has
concentrated the UN’s thinking since quite like the increasing threat of international
terrorism posed by non-State political actors.
Between 11 September 2001 when the terrorist attack on New York occurred
and 11 January 2006, the UN General Assembly discussed and adopted over two
dozen resolutions on international terrorism alone.39 In the same period, the Security
Council discussed and adopted at least 21 resolutions on the matter and established
the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), which is made up of all 15 members of the
Security Council. The task of the CTC is to monitor the implementation by all
States of Security Council Resolution 1373 and to increase the capability of States to
fight terrorism.40 In the same period, the Secretary-General of the United Nations
gave numerous reports on human rights and terrorism.41
International terrorism will not just melt away into its nest and die a natural
death. It has to be addressed, controlled and if possible annihilated from our midst.
But to pursue this goal at the expense of what we hold dearest in a free society would
be suicidal. In the UK, the question of how the State deals with the growing threat
of international terrorism has brought the judiciary and the legislature into a theat-
rical show that law students have hitherto theorized under the doctrine of separation
of powers but not witnessed in this way before. The theme for the two actors is “The
UK’s strategy for combating terror”. The roles are clearly defined.
Parliament is the dominant actor. It must present a coherent, logical and legal
strategy for combating terror and actually implement it. The judiciary has only one
38 See the UN Millennium goals, available on UN website, http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/
index.html (visited 3 March 2006).
39 See UN Action against Terrorism, available on UN website, http://www.un.org/terrorism/
sc.htm (visited 3 March 2006).
40 S/Res/1373 (2001). Available on UN website, http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/
(visited 3 March 2007).
41 The seminal one for this purpose is his report titled “Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism”, 8 August 2003, UN Doc A/58/266.
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part to play, that is to ensure that executive action in the war on terror is legal and
consistent with values of a free and democratic society.
Therefore, the executive retains the authority to determine how the UK will
prosecute the war on terror while the judiciary is mandated to supervize the exercise
of that authority in order to ensure constitutional guarantees of liberty, freedom
and human rights.
CRITERIA UPON WHICH COUNTER-TERRORISM MEASURES SHOULD
BE JUDGED
Although the consensus among States is that terrorism poses the biggest threat to
national security, they have not yet agreed a definition of that threat. The UN
Secretary-General has volunteered an illuminating definition of the threat as
follows:
Action constitutes terrorism if it is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to
civilians and non-combatants, with the purpose of intimidating a population or com-
pelling a government or an international organization to do or abstain from any act.42
In countering this threat, States must not overstep the bounds of what is necessary
and lawful in the area of human rights protection. Counter-terrorism strategies
overstep that mark if they:
(1) are irrational, discriminatory and contrary to the rule of law,43
(2) are disproportionate to the threat sought to be controlled, or
(3) offend democratic values (rule of law, justice, equality before the law).
Prohibition against counter-terrorism strategy that is irrational, discriminatory and
contrary to the rule of law
In Judgments – A (FC) and others (FC) (Appellants) v. Secretary of State for the
Home Department (Respondent)44 the House of Lords held that Part 4 of the Anti-
terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 was irrational, discriminatory and anti-
thetical to the rule of law. If its intended aim was to placate a possible danger to
national security, then its consequences had very much been incongruous to its
purpose because firstly, it deprived the detained person of the protection that a
42 See Judgments – A (FC) and others (FC) (Appellants) v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department (Respondent), n. 3.
43 Ibid.
44 [2004] UKHL 56, para. 86–88. Available on UK parliament website, http://www.publications.
parliament.uk/pa/ld200405/ldjudgmt/jd041216/a&oth-5.htm (visited 30 July 2007).
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criminal trial is intended to afford.45 For that reason, it “. . . is anathema in any
country which observes the rule of law”.46 Secondly, it results in discriminatory
treatment of terrorist suspects principally according to their nationality regardless
of their actual perceived risk to the UK’s security interests. It is arguable that the
legislation’s non-compliance with the basic requirement of equal treatment of per-
sons under international human rights law is its strongest weakness.47 Basic human
rights have been classified as one of the five categories of norms jus cogens
under international law.48 Therefore, legislation that offends basic human rights of
individuals could not be relied upon to establish and maintain national security.
Generally such legislation is repulsive to the instincts of fairness and justice.
Terrorism seeks to frustrate democracy by undermining human freedom.
Counter-terrorism strategies stand to facilitate the terrorist’s effort if they minimize
or erode the rights of individuals. According to the UN Secretary-General:
Every time we advance the protection of human rights, we deal a blow to the evil
designs of terrorists, and we remove a sense of injustice, which can cause the
oppressed to channel their frustration into illegitimate violence. If we compromise on
human rights in seeking to fight terrorism, we hand terrorists a victory they cannot
achieve on their own. If we build on these fundamentals, I believe we can develop a
new vision of global security: a vision that respects human rights while confronting
the threats of our age – including the threat of terrorism.49
The tension between the aim and the effect in practice of Part 4 of the Anti-
terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 makes it an “irrational” piece of legislation.
This piece of legislation empowered the Home Secretary to detain people indefin-
itely without charge or trial. “Nothing could be more antithetical to the instincts and
traditions of the people of the United Kingdom [than]. . . . a power of detention
confined to foreigners . . . [It] is irrational and discriminatory. . . . such a power in
any form is not compatible with our constitution.”50
If the judiciary were so confident about the inappropriateness of this legislation,
why was parliament so confident to pass it? There is no gain to be had from speculat-
ing about parliament’s intention in this or any other circumstance. However, the
fact that it passed this irrational piece of legislation is indicative of the panic and
the desperation that the issue of international terrorism has generated among
45 Ibid., para.74.
46 Ibid.
47 Discussing obligations arising from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948); The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966); and The International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1966), see ibid., paras. 58–65.
48 See Hannikainen, L., Peremptory Norms (jus cogens) in International Law: Historical Devel-
opment, Criteria, Present Status, Helsinki: Finnish Lawyers Publishing, 1988, ch. 7.
49 UN GA Res. of 8 August 2003, A/58/266, n. 5, para. 56.
50 Per Lord Hoffman, n. 44, para. 97.
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governments since 9/11 and 7/7. If the adoption of irrational and discriminatory
legislation continues, then we have more to fear from States where the judiciary has
not yet achieved the high degree of independence that the judicial systems of the free
world enjoy.
The House of Lords had to consider also the question of whether evidence
procured through torture by officials of a foreign State without the complicity of
British authorities was now admissible in UK courts. It is very disturbing that a UK
government should be taken to court to ascertain whether it could rely on evidence
obtained through torture. The jus cogens nature of the prohibition against torture
and the universal application of the principle aut dedere aut punire – either you
extradite or you punish – should have been better applied by the Labour govern-
ment, particularly after the Pinochet decision.51
Firstly, the prohibition against torture is absolute. Chahal v. United Kingdom52
ruled that:
Article 3 enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic society. The
Court is well aware of the immense difficulties faced by States in modern times in
protecting their communities from terrorist violence. However, even in these circum-
stances, the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment, irrespective of the victim’s conduct. Unlike most of the
substantive clauses of the Convention and of Protocols Nos. 1 and 4, Article 3 makes
no provision for exceptions and no derogation from it is permissible under Article 15
even in the event of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation.
This appears to proscribe the possibility that English courts could ever turn a blind
eye to the fruits of torture if presented before them.
Secondly, Article 15 of the Convention Against Torture charges States parties to
the Convention to “. . . ensure that any statement which is established to have been
made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings,
except against a person accused of torture as evidence that the statement was made”.
Moreover, evidence gathered through torture is often unreliable.53 Therefore,
precluding the fruits of torture from legal proceedings enhances significantly the
chances of ensuring a fair trial.
51 For judgment and commentary, see Woodhouse, op. cit., n. 23.
52 23 EHRR (1996), at 413, para. 79. See also A (FC) and others (FC) (Appellants) v. Secretary
of State for the Home Department (Respondent) (2004); and A and others (Appellants) (FC) and
others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (Respondent) (Conjoined Appeals), n. 44,
para. 40.
53 A (FC) and others (FC) (Appellants) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department
(Respondent) (2004), A and others (Appellants) (FC) and others v. Secretary of State for the
Home Department (Respondent) n. 44, para. 39.
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Prohibition against counter-terrorism strategies that conflict with States’ obligations
under international law
In Chahal v. United Kingdom (1996)54 the European Court of Human Rights con-
sidered inter alia the question of whether the threat that a foreign individual might
pose to the national security of the host State entitled the latter to extradite the
former even if that would expose the former to a real risk of being subjected to
torture or to inhumane or degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 of the European
Convention on Human Rights – itself a norm of jus cogens, i.e. a peremptory norm
of general international law that is “accepted and recognized by the international
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted”.55
The Court replied in the negative, stating that the Convention prohibits torture
or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in absolute terms, “. . . irrespect-
ive of the victim’s conduct”. The idea is simple, yet so difficult sometimes for States
to appreciate: where individuals fail (and become public enemy number one, for
instance), the State should not and must not fail in a similar fashion by not recognis-
ing, promoting and protecting the human dignity inherent in the perceived or actual
“public enemy number one” qua human being. Having a bad father does not entitle
one to become a bad son or daughter. According to the European Court of Human
Rights:
Thus, whenever substantial grounds have been shown for believing that an individual
would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 if removed
to another State, the responsibility of the contracting State to safeguard him or her
is engaged in the event of expulsion. In these circumstances, the activities of the
individual in question, however undesirable or even dangerous, cannot be a material
consideration.56
The absolute quality of the prohibition against torture, inhumane or degrading
treatment of individuals under international law of jus cogens compels States to
desist from sacrificing on the altar of national security their duty to recognize, pro-
mote and protect the dignity inherent in all individuals present on their territories.
The free world has for a long time recognized and upheld this view. The threat of
international terrorism appears to be a mere test for modern States’ commitment to
this principle. Their corporate response to this scourge will either devalue or enhance
the international human rights project.
It is desirable that the free world’s response to this evil enhances rather than
devalues the international human rights project because the international human
rights project has become the barometric test for democracy everywhere.
54 23 EHRR 413.
55 See Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), 8 ILM 679.
56 Chahal v. United Kingdom, n. 54, confirmed by the House of Lords in A and others v. Secretary
of State for the Home Department, [2005] 2 WLR 87, para. 9.
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However, if the free world were to respond to the threat of international terror-
ism in a manner that undermined the international human rights project, that would
make the international human rights project a fair-weather friend to be abandoned
at the first appearance of inconvenience. In an extensive analysis and development
of the jurisprudence on fundamental, derogable and non-derogable human rights
standards in Judgments – A (FC) and others (FC) (Appellants) v. Secretary of State
for the Home Department (Respondent),57 the House of Lords ruled that “. . . the
right of personal freedom, fundamental though it is, cannot be absolute”.
Certainly international treaty bodies and national courts of democratic States
regard the international prohibition against torture, inhumane or degrading treat-
ment as a prime example of a non-derogable international human rights standard.
Such standards constrain States’ choices in their design of strategies for countering
international terrorism even at a time of national emergency.
Prohibition against counter-terrorism strategies that are disproportionate to the
mischief or risk, in this case – terrorism
The human rights culture that has evolved until now authorizes States temporary
derogation from its standard provisions but not from its elite and non-derogable provi-
sions and then only in times of national emergency.58 This raises the question of
what qualifies as a national emergency that might entitle a State to justifiably dero-
gate from international human rights law. Since 9/11 only the UK has claimed that
the circumstances justified it to derogate from the European Convention guarantee
to liberty and security of the person, citing a public emergency purportedly gener-
ated by the 7/7 attack on London as a reason.
To pass the test of legality the plea to national emergency requiring derogation
from the European Convention on Human Rights must actually threaten the life of
the whole nation. That situation is reached when “. . . an exceptional situation of
crisis or emergency which affects the whole population and constitutes a threat to
the organized life of the community of which the State is composed”59 has arisen.
Such a situation must also be actual or imminent and exceptional, so that the normal
measures or restrictions permitted for the maintenance of public safety, health and
order are plainly inadequate.60 This dire self-defence come necessity test is not easily
57 [2004] UKHL 56. Available on UK parliament website, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/
pa/ld200405/ldjudgmt/jd041216/a&oth-5.htm (visited 30 July 2007).
58 See, e.g. Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights (1950); Article 4 of the
ICCPR (1966); and Article 27 of the American Convention on Human Rights (1969).
59 See Lawless v. Ireland (No. 3) (1961) 1 EHRR 15, confirmed in A and others v. Secretary of
State for the Home Department, [2005] 2 WLR 87, para. 17.
60 See The Greek Case (1969) 12 YB 1; upheld in A and others v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department, [2005] 2 WLR 87, para. 18.
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assailed.61 The US administration has inspired understanding and application of the
doctrine.
The exchange of notes between the US administration, a neutral power in the
1837 insurrections in Canada, and the British government regarding the destruction
of the American vessel The Caroline and the loss of life and limb to American
citizens, The Caroline Incident62 has set the parameters for the application of the
doctrine of self-defence and necessity.
It will be for that government to show a necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelm-
ing, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation. It will be for it to
show, also, that the local authorities of Canada – even supposing the necessity of the
moment authorized them to enter the territories of the United States at all – did
nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act justified by the necessity of self-
defence, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it. It must be shown
that admonition or remonstrance to the persons on board the “Caroline” was
impracticable, or would have been unavailing; it must be strewn that daylight could
not be waited for; that there could be no attempt at discrimination, between the
innocent and the guilty; that it would not have been enough to seize and detain the
vessel; but that there was a necessity, present and inevitable, for attacking her, in the
darkness of the night, while moored to the shore, and while unarmed men were asleep
on board, killing some, and wounding others, and then drawing her into the current,
above the cataract, setting her on fire, and, careless to know whether there might not
be in her the innocent with the guilty, or the living with the dead, committing her to a
fate, which fills the imagination with horror. A necessity for this, the government of
the United States cannot believe to have existed.63
Similarly, the International Court of Justice referred in the Gabčíkovo-
Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia)64 to the exceptional applicability of the
defence of necessity. More importantly, it referred to the strict application of the
doctrine, which is determined by the cumulative satisfaction of criteria similar to
those listed in The Caroline Incident. Others and not just the State claiming the
justification of necessity must be satisfied that the requisite criteria have been
satisfied.
In The Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory65 the International Court of Justice stated that the action taken
could not be justified under the doctrine of necessity because it was not the only way
61 See also “The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the ICCPR”,
7 Human Rights Quarterly (1985), at 3, endorse also in ibid., para. 19.
62 29 BFSP 1137–1138; 30 BFSP195–6.
63 See also The Avalon Project at the Yale Law School, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/
avalon/diplomacy/britian/br-1842d.htm (visited 3 February 2006).
64 I.C.J. Rep. 1997, at 40, para. 51.
65 ICJ Rep. (2003–2004).
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by which Israel could safeguard “. . . an essential interest against a grave and immi-
nent peril”. Consequently, the construction of the barrier was held to be dis-
proportionate to the exigencies of the crisis. This is consistent with scholarly
opinion. The Siracusa Principles66 recommend that: “The principle of strict necessity
shall be applied in an objective manner. Each measure shall be directed to an actual,
clear, present or imminent danger and may not be imposed merely because of an
apprehension of potential danger.”
In Judgments – A (FC) and others (FC) (Appellants) v. Secretary of State for
the Home Department (Respondent)67 the House of Lords held that an increased
risk of terrorist activity post 9/11 could not on its own justify derogation from
Convention rights. In other words, derogation was a disproportionate reaction to the
challenge of increased terrorist activity.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This essay examines the limitations that the law imposes on governmental strategies
for the combating of international terrorism. It analyzes the dynamic between the
twin objectives of national security and development of the human rights regime.
Both objectives are in contradistinction to the terrorist ideology and risk being
compromized unless the menace is overcome. It shows that the increasing threat of
international terrorism in the new millennium has panicked States into taking short
cuts in their effort to combat terrorism.
The counter-terrorism strategies introduced by the UK parliament in the
immediate aftermath of 9/11 appear to erode, minimize and curtail the human rights
of individuals. This has resulted in a clash between parliament and the judiciary.
While demonstrating deference to parliament’s legislative authority to determine
the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy, the House of Lords has insisted that it has a
constitutional duty to supervize parliament’s exercise of that authority in order to
ensure that the UK does not breach its international law obligations, particularly the
requirements of international human rights law. This makes the role of the judiciary
difficult because in this poisoned policy-making climate practice shows that
governments cannot be relied upon to put the human rights of individuals first.
Decisions of the House of Lords on the matter indicate that in framing counter-
terrorist strategy government ought to respect its constitutional and international
human rights obligations. The House of Lords will not condone counter-
terrorism strategies that are irrational, antithetical to the British notions of justice or
unconstitutional. This means that proportional human rights are out of the question
for the following reasons:
66 “The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the ICCPR”, 7
Human Rights Quarterly (1985), at 3.
67 [2004] UKHL 56. Available on UK parliament website, http://www.publications.
parliament.uk/pa/ld200405/ldjudgmt/jd041216/a&oth-5.htm (visited 30 July 2007).
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(1) The international human rights project has become the barometer for the health
of democracy everywhere.
(2) They are the yardstick for distinguishing between politically and socially
developed States from developing and primitive ones.
(3) Commitment to the recognition, promotion and protection of the dignity
inherent in individuals qua human beings is now recognized as the basis on
which international peace and security will be pursued.
To be valid, counter-terrorism strategies must comply with the rule of law in a
democratic society and with the requirements of international human rights law.
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GREETINGS
Our host, Dean Tan Cheng Han
the Honourable Chief Justice Chan Sek Keong
the Honourable Attorney-General Chao Hick Tin
Judge Hisashi Owada, President of the Asian Society of International Law
Mr Philip Jeyaretnam, President of the Law Society of Singapore
Your excellencies, the distinguished judges of the International Court of
Justice
Esteemed colleagues, ladies and gentlemen.
I am deeply honoured to be here today, on behalf of the Governing Board of the
Foundation for the Development of International Law in Asia (DILA) to congratu-
late you on the formation of the Asian Society of International Law.
First, let me tell you a little bit about DILA. The last time we had such a huge
gathering of international law scholars in Singapore was at the DILA Conference in
2001, and I am truly happy to see so many old friends and familiar faces again.
Just now, our Chief Justice told me that he never knew that we had a Foundation
for the development of international law in Asia right here in Singapore. I had to
inform him, rather embarrassingly, that the foundation for the development of
international law in Asia was not in fact headquartered in Asia but in the
Netherlands.
DILA was established some 20 years ago by a group of Asian emigre legal
scholars based in Holland. Among the leading lights were Professor Ko Swan Sik,
now Professor Emeritus of the University of Rotterday, Professor JJ Syatauw, and
Dr Christopher Pinto, Secretary-General of the US–Iran Claims Tribunal. As Judge
Owada pointed out in his address just now, the need for some kind of an organiza-
tion to promote the study, research, teaching and dissemination of international law
in Asia was long felt and these leading lights worked together to establish DILA.
In deciding on an apporpriate vehicle, the structure and institution of a society
was eschewed in favour of a foundation mainly because at that time, it was felt that
there were insufficient resources and infrastructure available to support and
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coordinate a society across Asia, especially from Holland. As a result, DILA was
registered as a foundation or stifting.
INTERNATIONAL LAW SOCIETIES
The birth of any organization begins with an ideal and an inspiration. The same can
be said about societies of international law. While the practice of international law
has been internationally acknowledged since the fifteenth century – and certainly at
the time Hugo Grotius published his great work On the Law of War & Peace (De Jure
Belli ac Pacis) – communities of international law scholars did not form societies for
the promotion of international law till the latter part of the nineteenth century.
It took the international community a long time to recognize the importance of
international law in the law student’s curriculum. Sitting here in 2007, it is easy to
forget that the first chair in international law at Oxford – the Chichele Chair in
International Law and Diplomacy – was only established in 1859 even though the
university itself dates from the twelfth century. The same can be said of Cambridge,
where the Whewell Professorship in International Law was established 10 years later
in 1869.
THE FIRST SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
The Institut de Droit International
The very first society of international law was formed in 1873 as a result of the idea
of a German scholar (Francis Lieber of Columbia Law School) and the inspired
energies of a Belgian scholar and government official, Gustav Rolin-Jaequemyns.
Rolin-Jaequemyns was then the founding editor of the first scholarly international
law review, the Revue de Droit International (1869). A group of 10 eminent scholars
and Rolin-Jaequemyns met in Ghent in 1873 and there established what is now
known as the Institut de Droit Internationale. These facts are quite well known, but
what is perhaps less known is Rolin-Jaequemyns’ Asian connection.
When the government with which he was affiliated was ousted from power,
Rolin-Jaequemyns found himself jobless and on a trip to Egypt, met Prince
Damrong of Siam who was looking for an advisor from a small country. Rolin-
Jaequemyns served as Special Advisor to King Chulalongkorn from 1892 to 1901
and was made the equivalent of a prince with the title of Chao Phya Abhai Raja, the
highest accolade for a farang or foreigner.
OUR HOPES FOR ASIA
Rolin-Jaequemyns died in 1902, the same year a group of Japanese scholars, led by
Professor Sakuye Takahashi, established the Review of International Law (Revue de
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Droit Internationale) and the Japanese Society of International Law. This was the
very first society of international law to be established in Asia and it is perhaps
fitting that the prime movers and initiators of the Asian Society of International
Law should be our friends from Japan.
My colleagues wish me to say how gratified we are that the same core ideals that
led to DILA’s foundation over 20 years ago have inspired ASIL’s initiators and
promotors to even greater heights. Our hopes and aims are similar, if not identical,
even if we have chosen different vehicles by which to further these ideas. It thus our
hope that as we grow together in the coming years, we will have many opportunities
to collaborate and cooperate on joint projects and meetings. For a start, a selection
of papers to be presented at this conference will be published in the next issue of our
flagship publication, the Asian Yearbook of International Law.
CHALLENGES
Today, as you gather here for two days of discussions of important issues in inter-
national law in Asia, you can take pleasure in knowing that you’ve already done far
more and far better than Rolin-Jaequemyns and his group of 10 in 1873. Yet, a
number of important challenges remain.
The first is one of resources. It is ironic that in a region as populous as Asia with
over 1,000 law schools, there are so few individuals in the who are able to spare the
time and energy to mobilise the international legal community to promote the
research, teaching and dissemination of international law in the region. The causes
and many and varied and it is not my intention to speculate or offer part solutions.
What we need to guard against is the fragmentation of energies and efforts in our
respective quests.
The second is finance. Today, we are fortunate that the promoters of the Asian
Society have secured the support of the Faculty of Law of the National University
of Singapore, as well as the financial assistance of some very generous sponsors. This
is no mean feat as most Asian businesses and corporations do not find a natural
affinity with international law or its objectives. The challenge is to continue to secure
this kind of infrastructural and financial support from the community throughout
Asia.
Finally, the sheer size and diversity of Asia makes it difficult for any organization
to mobilize its members and even more difficult to forge a consensus.
CONCLUSION
That said, it is our sincere hope that the accidental co-location of both DILA’s
principal officers and ASIL’s office in Singapore will prove beneficial to the realiz-
ation of our common aims and purposes. DILA and ASIL can and must cooperate
toward the achievement of our common goals, whether it is to find a common voice
or forge a common philosophy with respect to international law and affairs.
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I started my speech with the remarkable Gustave Rolin-Jacquemyns, so let me
end by quoting him:
The moment appears to have come to found a permanent institution, purely scien-
tific, which, without proposing the realization of far distant Utopias or an immediate
refor, can nevertheless aspire to serve as the organ, in the realm of the law of nations,
of the legal conscience of the civilized world.
It leaves me now to join my colleagues in DILA in wishing ASIL a great beginning.
Congratulations, and may it long serve our peoples.
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INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ASIA: THE LIMITS TO THE
WESTERN CONSTITUTIONALIST AND LIBERAL DOCTRINES
Dr Jean d’Aspremont*
INTRODUCTION
Although the practice of international law pre-existed its inception in European
legal thought, it is not disputed that, as an autonomous set of rules and principles,
international law was conceptualized in Europe.1 It is also uncontested that, follow-
ing its systematization by European scholars, international law was incrementally
extended to non-European nations, sometimes with some imperialistic aspirations.2
It is not only international law that was disseminated around the world on this
occasion but also the European legal thought. The universalization of international
law that was partly achieved following decolonization3 has not totally fettered the
monopoly of the Western legal scholarship as the contemporary international legal
scholarship still borrows extensively from Western legal scholars. There is, however,
one particular aspect of the contemporary Western legal doctrine that fails to per-
meate the international legal scholarship as a whole. This pertains to the importance
ascribed to the role played by values in the international legal order along the lines
* Assistant-Professor of International Law, University of Amsterdam. This paper was presented
on the occasion of the inaugural meeting of the Asian Society of International Law that took
place at the National University of Singapore on 7–9 April 2007 on the topic “International Law
in Asia: Past, Present and Future”. The author wishes to thank Prof. J. Klabbers, Prof. Yasuaki
Onuma and Dr Frank Haldemann for sharing their thoughts with him on this topic.
1 See generally, Onuma, Yasuaki, “When was the law of international society born?”, 2 Journal
of the History of International Law 63–79 (2002). See also Sornarajah, M., “Power and justice in
international law”, 1 Singapore Journal of International Law 28 (1997), esp. at 28–33; Shahabud-
deen, M., “Developing countries and the idea of international law” in MacDonald, R.J. (ed.),
Essays in Honour of Wang Tieya, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1994, at 721–736. See also
Orakhelashvili, A., “The idea of European international law”, 17 EJIL 315–347 (2006).
2 For an emphasis on Asia, see Thomas, J.A., “International law in Asia: An initial review”, 13
Dalhousie L. J. 683 (1990).
3 See, however, the challenging opinion formulated by Koskenniemi, M., The Gentle Civilizer of
Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960, Cambridge: CUP, 2004.
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of the theories of Western constitutionalist and liberal scholars. More particularly, it
is argued in this paper that the liberal and constitutionalist values-oriented views of
the international legal order – which have proven very popular among Western
scholars – have not been unanimously embraced in Asia.
Minimizing the role of values in the international legal order does not equate to
a defiance of the idea that international law can be directed at the promotion of the
public good.4 It is utterly conceivable that one may recognize the extent to which a
significant number of international legal rules nowadays serve the public good with-
out endorsing the idea that these rules rest on global values. This paper does accord-
ingly not challenge the finding that international rules may promote the public good.
It rather zeroes in on the controversy that arises as to foundations of those norms
that serve the wellbeing of all. The first seminal works that alluded to an inter-
national lawmaking directed at the public good are probably those of Wilfred Jenks,5
Schwarzenberger,6 Friedmann7 or R.-J. Dupuy.8 However, their understanding of
the international legal order was already, in a way or another, linked to the existence
of values. Without denying the oversimplification inherent to the following categor-
ization of scholars, this values-oriented conception of the legal order has been
further underpinned by the more recent contributions of Western constitutionalist
scholars9 – or those whose discourse is tinged with constitutionalism – like Christian
Tomuschat,10 Erika de Wet,11 Hermann Mosler,12 Jost Delbrück,13 Bruno Simma,14
4 Simma, B., “From bilateralism to community interest”, 250 RdC 234 (1994-VI). On the
reinforcement of the public character of international law through the promotion of the public
good, see d’Aspremont, J., “Contemporary rulemaking and the public character of international
law”, Institute for International Law and Justice Working Papers Series, 2006/12.
5 Jenks, C. Wilfred, The Common Law of Mankind, London: Stevens, 1958.
6 Schwarzenberger, G., The Frontiers of International Law, London: Stevens, 1962, at 29.
7 Friedmann, F., The Changing Structure of International Law, New York: Columbia University
Press, 1964.
8 Dupuy, R.-J., “Communauté internationale et disparités de développement”, 165 RdC 9
(1979-IV).
9 On constitutionalism in general see von Bogdandy, A., “Constitutionalism in international law:
Comment on a proposal from Germany”, 47 Harv. Int’l L.J. 223 (2006).
10 Tomuschat, C., “International law: Ensuring the survival of mankind on the eve of a new
century: General Course on public international law”, 281 RdC 10 (1999), esp. at  237, 306.
11 De Wet, E., “The international constitutional order”, 55 ICLQ 51–76 (2006); ibid., “The
emergence of international and regional value systems as a manifestation of the emerging
international constitutional order”, 19 Leiden J. Int’l L. 611–632 (2006).
12 Mosler, H., The International Society as a Legal Community, Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff &
Noordhoff, 1980, at 17–18. See also “Der ‘Gemeinschaftliche Ordre Public’ in Europäischen
Staatengruppen”, 21 Revista de Derecho Internacional 523, 532 (1968).
13 See in general Delbrück, J. (ed.), New Trends in International Lawmaking – International
“Legislation” in the Public Interest, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1997), esp. at 18–19.
14 Simma, B., “From bilateralism to community interest”, 250 RdC (1994-VI), at 217–384, esp. at
233.
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Anne Peters,15 Pierre-Marie Dupuy,16 Nico Schrijver,17 George Abi-Saab,18 Verra
Gowland-Debbas,19 Jonathan Charney,20 Robert McCorquodale21 or Joseph
Weiler.22 (Neo-) liberals like Louis Henkin,23 T. Frank,24 Fernando R. Tesón25 or
Anne-Marie Slaughter26 – to name only a few – also analyze the legal order through
the lens of values.
This paper submits that the Asian international legal scholarship provides a
cogent alternative to the aforementioned constitutionalist and liberal approaches as
many prominent Asian scholars base international lawmaking on interests rather
than values. In this sense, many Asian scholars challenge the Kantian or Grotian
conceptions of international law and provide a Vattelian vision of the legal
order.27 It must be acknowledged that any endeavour to devise the international
legal order on interests rather than values inescapably echoes a (neo-) Hobbesian
vision of the legal order. Such a vision of international law has undoubtedly taken
15 Peters, A., “Compensatory constitutionalism: The function of potential of fundamental
international norms and structure”, 19 L. J. Int’l L. 579–610 (2006).
16 See for instance, Dupuy, P.-M., “Some reflections on contemporary international law and the
appeal to universal values: A response to Martti Koskenniemi”, 16 EJIL 131–137 (2005).
17 On the question of the United Nations and the development of global values, see Schrijver, N.,
“The future of the United Nations”, 10 Max Planck United Nations Yearbook of International
Law 1–34 (2006); ibid., “Les valeurs génerales et le droit des Nations Unies” in Chemain, R. and
Pellet, A., La Charte des Nations Unies, Constitution Mondiale? Paris: Pedone, 2006, at 85–88.
See also the research project carried out at Leiden University on the “United Nations and
the evolutions of global values”, http://www.law.leidenuniv.nl/org/publiekrecht/ipr/nieuw_
onderzoeksproject.jsp.
18 Abi-Saab, G., “International law and the international community: The long road to
universality” in MacDonald, op. cit., n. 1, at 31–41.
19 Gowlland-Debbas, V., “Judicial insights into fundamental values and interests of the inter-
national community” in Muller, A.S. et al. (eds.), The International Court of Justice, The Hague:
Kluwer Law International, 1997, at 327–366.
20 Charney, J., “International lawmaking – Article 38 of the ICJ Statute reconsidered” in
Delbrück, op. cit., n. 13, at 171–191, esp. at 189; ibid., “Universal international law”, 87 AJIL 529
(1993).
21 McCorquodale, R., “An inclusive international legal system”, 17 Leiden J. Int’l L. 477–504
(2004).
22 Weiler, J.H.H., “The geology of international law – governance, democracy and legitimacy”,
64 ZaöRV, 547–562 (2004), esp. at 556–557.
23 See Henkin, L., International Law: Politics and Values, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995,
esp. ch. X.
24 Franck, T., Fairness in International Law and Institutions, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995.
25 Tesón, Fernando R., “The Kantian theory of international law”, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 53 (1992).
26 Slaughter, Anne-Marie, “A liberal theory of international law”, 94 ASIL Proc. 240 (2000);
“The liberal agenda for peace: international relations theory and the future of the United
Nations”, 4 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 377 (1994); and “International law in
a world of liberal States”, 6 EJIL 503 (1995).
27 For an account of the various traditions of international law, see Simma, B. and Paulus, A.,
“The ‘International Community’: Facing the challenge of globalization”, 9 EJIL 266–277 (1998).
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the back seat in contemporary Western legal scholarship.28 It is however important
to stress from the start that the Hobbesian understanding of the legal order which
underlies the Asian view of the international legal order is alien to the widespread
(neo-) realist interpretations of Hobbes.29 The (neo-) realist school has always
centred on the Hobbesian “State of nature” as a breeding ground for the vying for
power.30 Even though it does not deny the overarching importance of self-interests
in contemporary lawmaking, this understanding of the international legal order
depicted in this paper is at odds with the (neo-) realist theories and rests on a
conceptualization of Hobbes that focuses on the role played by common interests
– which is a feature that realists like Hans Morgenthau31 or even Neo-Realists like
Kenneth Waltz32 adamantly disputed. It is argued here that Hobbes, although he
might have been “guilty of gross and dangerous crudities”,33 did not rule out that
common interests were playing a role in international relations.34 In that sense, the
Asian approach of the foundations of the international legal order provides an
Hobbesian understanding of the international legal order which somehow bor-
rows from the rationalist approach of the English school of international relations
although the latter has not always be entirely estranged from a Grotian vision of
the world order.35
In the first part, this paper tries to capture the mainstream position on the
role of values and interests within the Asian legal scholarship (1). Building on the
seminal works of some prominent Asian scholars, it then depicts in broad lines
the features of contemporary international lawmaking with a view of demonstrating
28 Ibid.
29 For a criticism of the neo-realist understanding of Hobbes, see Hanson, D.W., “Thomas
Hobbes’s ‘Highway to Peace’ ”, 38 International Organization, 329–354 (1984).
30 Morgenthau, H., Politics Among Nations, 4th ed., New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967, at 113.
31 See the depiction of Realists by Koskenniemi, M., “Image of law and international relations”
in Byers, M. (ed.), The Role of Law in International Politics: Essays in International Relations and
International Law, Oxford: OUP, 2000, at 28.
32 Kenneth Waltz is said to be a neo-realist in the sense that he is not endorsing the conservative
and pessimistic analysis of men and favours a more top-down analysis of international relations
based on the deficiencies of the international system (whereas Morgenthau, Kennan and Niebuhr
construe the behaviour of States as a magnification of the flawed human nature). This said,
Neo-Realists yet treat States as self-interested. For an overview of the different strands of realism,
see Shimko, K.L., “Realism, neorealism and American liberalism”, 54 The Review of Politics
281–301 (1992).
33 Catlin, G.E.G., “Thomas Hobbes and contemporary political theory”, 82 Political Science
Quarterly, 1–13 (1967).
34 In the same vein, see May, L., Crimes against Humanity – A Normative Account, Cambridge:
CUP, 2005, at 14–16. See also Williams, M.C., “Hobbes and international relations: a
reconsideration”, 50 International Organization 213–236 (1996).
35 Bull, H., The Anarchical Society, London: Macmillan, 1977, at 4–5. On the appeal held by
Grotius for Hedley Bull and the discrepancies between the former and the latter, see Kingsbury,
Benedict, “A Grotian tradition of theory and practice?: Grotius, law and moral skepticism in the
thought of Hedley Bull”, 17 QLR 3 (1997–1998).
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that the international legal order does not rest on values but on a particular under-
standing of individual and common interests (2).
ASIAN SCHOLARSHIP AND THE ROLE OF INTERESTS:
A BRIEF ACCOUNT
Asian scholarship is of course not a unitary set of legal scholarship. As there are
many “Asias”, there is not a single Asian scholarship.36 There is inescapably an
ample diversity among authors and it is acknowledged that any portrayal of an
“Asian scholarship” is beset with some overgeneralization. However, to the author
of this paper, it does not seem exaggerated to claim that some common ground can
be found among Asian scholars in connection with their conception of the public
character of international law and, especially, as regards the way in which they
construe the common interest.
There is not much doubt that most Asian international legal scholars acknow-
ledge that modern international law can serve a public interest. Accordingly, they do
not thwart the idea that international law is also public because it is attuned to some
form of public good. However, many Asian scholars discount the idea that inter-
national lawmaking is driven by global values. In that sense, their position differs
from Western constitutionalist and liberal traditions. They arguably lean towards the
belief that rules of international law that serve the public good are the emanation
of individual and common States interests. In that respect, one may say that the
conception of the common interest conveyed by Asian international legal scholars
dovetails with that expressed by most Asian governments.37
36 On this question, see Ghai,  Y., “Asian perspectives on human rights”, 23 Hong Kong L.J. 342
(1993). See also Onuma, Y., “In quest of intercivilizational human rights: ‘universal’ vs. ‘relative’.
Human rights viewed from an Asian perspective”, 1 Asia-Pac. J. on Human Rights & Law 53
(2000), esp. at 55–56.
37 See for instance the Report of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on
Human Rights, Bangkok, 29 March–2 April 1993, A/Conf.157/ASRM/8 and A/Conf.157/PC/59,
7 April 1993: “expressing concern that [international human rights mechanisms] relate mainly to
one category of rights”; “recognize that while human rights are universal in nature, they must be
considered in the context of a dynamic and evolving process of international norm-setting,
bearing in mind the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical,
cultural and religious background.” See more generally the paper issued by the Chinese govern-
ment, “Human rights in China” (1991), 34 Beijing Review (4–10 November 1991), at 9. See also
the statement by Mr Nirupan Sen, Permanent Representative on “Justice and the rule of law: The
United Nations role” at the Security Council on 6 October 2004, available at www.un.int/india
<statement<Security Council<2004: “The UN should play a supportive and facilitating role,
without seeking to impose an outside optic or values of any particular country or group of
countries on the delicate process of establishing the rule of law”. In the same mould, see Statement
by Mr V.K. Mambiar, Permanent Representative on non-proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction at the Security Council on 22 April 2004, available at www.un.int/india <statement-
<Security Council<2004: “India will not accept externally prescribed norms or standards, what
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This is not to say that the scepticism of Asian scholars towards a conception of
legal order based on values merely boils down to a cultural relativism.38 Neither is
their resentment to global values in lawmaking tantamount to the “Asian Values”
argument to which it is occasionally resorted by governments of that region to fend
off criticisms over their human rights policies.39 Indeed, claiming that international
lawmaking is based on individual as well as common interests is not in any way
incompatible with the universality of rules like human rights whether or not global
moral values in lawmaking be felt in Asia as a form of moral or ideological superior-
ity of the West.40
It is not surprising that not all Asian scholars have provided an assessment of
the driving forces of international lawmaking. However, a few of them have clearly
voiced their attachment to the idea that international rulemaking is not driven by
values but rather by interests.
R.P. Anand is probably the Asian scholar that has been the Asian beacon of this
understanding of international lawmaking. Although he has not denied the exist-
ence of a world society, he has rightly construed international rulemaking as the
outcome of a conflict of interests.41 Probably under the influence of Carr, he con-
tended that international law originates in each State’s view of its own interest and
those of the community.42 According to him, interests prevail over values in inter-
national lawmaking.43
When grappling with questions like Antarctica, M.C.W. Pinto has also expressed
ever their source, on matters pertaining to domestic jurisdiction of its parliament, including
national legislation, regulations or arrangements which are not consistent with its Constitutional
provisions and procedures or contrary to its national interests, or infringe on its sovereignty”.
38 Klein, R., “Cultural relativism, economic development and international human rights in the
Asian context”, 9 Touro Int’l L. Rev. 1; Yee, S., “The role of law in the formation of regional
perspectives in human rights and regional systems for the protection of human rights: The
European and Asian models as illustrations”, 8 Singapore Yearbook of International Law 157–164
(2004). For a discussion on the discrepancies between Asian and European values, see Ghai, Y.,
“Asian perspective on human rights”, 23 Hong Kong L.J., 342 (1993), esp. at 351–352. See also
Donnelly, J., Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, Ithaca, New York: Cornell
University, 2003, esp. at ch. 6.
39 On this debate, see Davis, M.C., “Constitutionalism and political culture: The debate over
human rights and Asian values”, 11 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 109 (1998); or Engle, K., “Culture and
human rights: The Asian values debate in context”, 32 NYU J. Int’l & Pol. 291 (1999–2000). See
also Donnelly, op. cit., n. 38, esp. at ch. 7.
40 Yee, loc. cit., n. 38, 163.
41 Anand, R.P., “Attitude of the Asian-African States toward certain problems of international
law”, 15 ICLQ 55 (1966), at 70 and 72.
42 Ibid., at 70. See also ibid., “Role of the ‘New’ Asian-African countries in the present inter-
national legal order”, 56 AJIL 383 (1962).
43 Anand, R.P., “The role of Asian States in the development of international law” in Dupuy,
R.-J., The Future of International Law in a Multicultural World, The Hague/Boston/London:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1984, at 112–113.
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views that bespeak an understanding of international lawmaking based on the self-
interest and common interest rather than on values.44
Although he has voiced his wish for a normative world order45 and has been
close to see Humanitarian Law as reflecting values46, M. Sornarajah has generally
painted the international legal order in terms of interests, being that of the peoples
or the community. Likewise, his conception of justice in the international sphere is
based on the interest of the community rather than international values.47 He has
even claimed that justice must be supported because it stands in the interest of any
hegemonic power.48
More bluntly, Yasuaki Onuma has taken aim at the Westcentric modern civiliza-
tion and criticized the “cultural imperialism”49 that plagues international human
rights law. In doing so, he has artfully spoken of human rights law in terms of
“usefulness”50, highlighting that human rights have proven to be the most effective
way to protect human interests and fulfil the universal quest for human wellbeing.51
When dealing with issues related to the law of the sea and the concept of com-
mon heritage, Wang Tieya did not seem to resort to global values to underwrite what
he deemed to be a welcome development of international law.52 In his writings, he
also refrained from analyzing human rights in terms of values53, a leaning that seems
to be confirmed by his later work as an international judge.54
Although he acknowledges that moral considerations are not necessarily
insignificant, N. Singh has also been a proponent of an international lawmaking
based on the individual and common interest of States, irrespective of any value.55
According to him, the legal order stems from the mutual interests of States which,
although they remain “slave of their own interest”, can be amenable to the
44 Pinto, M.C.W., “The International community and Antarctica”, 33 U. Miami L. Rev. 475
(1978–1979); ibid., “Governance in Antarctica” in MacDonald, op. cit., n. 1, at 587–609.
45 Sornarajah, loc. cit., n. 1, at 40.
46 Ibid., “An overview of the Asian approaches to international humanitarian law”, 9 Australian
Year Book of International Law 238 (1985).
47 Ibid., loc. cit., n. 1, at 33–35.
48 Ibid., at 68.
49 Onuma, loc. cit., n. 36, at 79.
50 Ibid., at 72.
51 Ibid., at 55. Comp. with Donnelly, op. cit., n. 38, at 63–64.
52 “On the concept of the common heritage of mankind”, Chinese Yearbook of International Law
(1984). On the work of Wang Tieya on the Law of the Sea, see Zhang, H., “Professor Wang Tieya
and the law of the sea”, 4 Journal of History of International Law 204–208 (2002).
53 On the work of Wang Tieya on Human Rights, see Heuser, R., “China and developments in
international law: Wang Tieya as a contemporary”, 4 Journal of the History of International Law
142–158 (2002), at 153.
54 See the Joint and Concurring opinion of Judge Wang Tieya and Judge Rafael Nieto-Navia in
the ICTR case Joseph Kanyabashi v. The Prosecutor, ICTR-96-15-A, 3 June 1999.
55 Singh, S.S., “The absence of a sovereign legislature and its consequences for international
law”, 12 Malaya Law Review 277 (1970).
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“community interest”.56 Authors like M.L. Sarin57 and M. Miyoshi58 have also
expressed a similar view.
By the same token, the Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL)
– with which many Asian legal scholars are in line, such as B.S. Chimni – probably
rests on an understanding of the international legal order that is based on the
interests and needs of nations and rather than values.59 Likewise, many of the visions
of the legal order that are reflected in the academic discourse in India seem also
devoid of reference to global values.60
It is worth stressing that, even if he has been a staunch proponent of the uni-
versal foundations of human dignity, Yash Ghai – a prominent Kenyan scholar who
has written much on international law and human rights law in Asia – has asserted,
especially referring to debate about the universality of human rights taking place in
Asia, that human rights boil down to a mechanism for “balancing different interests
that surround the right”61 and has focused on the “function” of human rights.62 Such
a vision of human rights does not primarily rest on global values and leans towards a
more functional understanding of this set of international rules.
Eventually, the contributions of Asian judges in the case-law of various inter-
national judicial bodies reflect the same approach. In some of its opinions
accompanying decisions of the International Court of Justice, Judge Oda has
expressed an understanding of the international lawmaking that falls short of rec-
ognizing world values.63 Likewise, Judge Shi has never voiced any support for the
idea that rules serving a common interest were based on values.64
One can probably not reduce Asian international legal scholarship to the few
aforementioned authors. As previously explained, Asian scholarship is replete with
different strands and some Asian scholars have enthusiastically endorsed the idea of
a legal order based on values. For instance, Judge Ranjeva has expressed the idea
56 Ibid., at 291.
57 Sarin, M.L., “The Asian-African States and the development of international law” in Dupuy,
op. cit., n. 43, at 137.
58 Miyoshi, M., “Curricula for teaching of international law in Asia – an Asian perspective”, 5
Sing. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 355 (2001).
59 Anghie, A. and Chimni, B.S., “Third world approaches to international law and individual
responsibility in internal conflicts”, 2 Chinese J. Int’l L. 77 (2003), esp. at 98.
60 Chimni, B.S., “Alternative visions of just world order: six tales from India”, 46 Harv. Int’l L.J.
389 (2005). See also “Teaching, research and promotion of international law in India: past,
present and future”, 5 Sing. J. Int’l & Comp. Law 368 (2001).
61 Ghai, Y., “Universalism and relativism: human rights as a framework for negotiating inter-
ethnic claims”, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 1095 (1999–2000).
62 Ghai, Y., “Asian perspective on human rights”, loc. cit., n. 38, at 355. See also “Human rights
and governance: the Asia debate”, 15 Australian Year Book of International Law 1 (1994), at 21.
63 See, for instance, the dissenting opinion of Judge Oda in the Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons case, ICJ Rep. 1996.
64 See, for instance, the declaration of Judge Shi, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons case, ICJ Rep. 1996.
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that the law regulating nuclear weapons rests on the values of all the members of the
International community.65 Similarly, Judge Owada has also recognized the existence
of international values in lawmaking although in a pluralistic manner.66 Leaving
these well-respected and distinguished scholars aside, the author of this paper how-
ever believes that, on the whole, Asian scholarship has not espoused the Western
constitutionalist and liberal understandings of international lawmaking, i.e. the
existence of global values in rulemaking. Drawing on the work of Asian scholars
and the practice by Asian States, the next section elaborates on the idea that inter-
national lawmaking is driven by individual and common interests of States rather
than values.
INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING AND THE ABSENCE
OF VALUES
Together with the Asian scholars that have been mentioned above, this paper argues
that values are absent from international lawmaking. This means that rules are made
to serve individual and common interests and, in particular, that those rules that are
dedicated to the public good do not rest on universal values.
It is anything but surprising that States first strive to promote their own interest.
As States are both primary lawmakers and subjects of international law67, they
naturally act to maximize the interest of their constituency given their perception of
the interests of other States and the distribution of State power.68 International
cooperation first stems from a convergence of individual interest as explained by De
Visscher.69 This convergence entices States to cooperate and adopt a multilateral
framework for their action.70 Even liberals – some under the banner of “State
values” – come to terms with this phenomenon.71
65 Ranjeva, M., Individual opinion, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons case, ICJ
Rep. 1996.
66 Owada, H., “Some reflections on justice in a globalizing world”, 97 ASIL Proc. 181 (2003), esp.
at 184–189.
67 Charney, loc. cit., n. 20 (87 AJIL (1993)), at 533.
68 In that sense, I agree with Goldsmith, Jack L. and Eric A. Posner, Limits of International Law,
Oxford: OUP, 2005, at 3 and 6: “State interests are not always easy to determine, because the
State subsumes many institutions and individuals that obviously do not share the identical pref-
erences and outcomes. Nonetheless, a State – especially one with well-ordered political institu-
tions – can make coherent decisions based upon identifiable preferences, or interest, and it is
natural and common to explain State action on the international plane in terms of the primary
goal or goals the State seeks to achieve.”
69 This is discussed by De Visscher, C., Theory and Reality of International Law, translated by P.
E. Corbett, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957, at 144–153; see also Goldsmith and
Posner, op. cit., n. 68, at 13 and 88–90.
70 Shahabuddeen, loc. cit., n. 1, at 733.
71 Henkin, op. cit., n. 23, esp. at ch. VI.
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One should not bemoan the fact that States primarily seek the satisfaction of
their individual interest. Their own interest is not especially that of the State as an
independent abstract entity. It may also come down to the interest of the people
within its constituency, whether it is for the sake of their welfare or the more cynical
desire to gain their support. One could say that the foregoing is consistent with
the essence of representation. It could even be argued that the reinforcement of the
liberal democratic structure of governance at the national level on the heels of
the Cold war72 has enhanced the tendency for a government to strictly advocate the
interest of its people on the world plane, especially in international lawmaking.
This paper does not however construe international lawmaking exclusively
through the individual interest of States. Contrary to what realist theorists have
contended, States are not inherently self-interested.73 They are sometimes prone to
promote the interest of all and not only their pure self-interest. It is nonetheless true
that, in many respects, States promote a common interest because they feel that they
will individually benefit from it also. Such an understanding of the common interest
is probably what Niebuhr depicted as the “wise” or “enlightened” self-interest.74 It is
also somewhat similar to J. Bentham’s famous aggregative definition of the public
interest.75 As has been explained by McDougal and Reisman, “the most important
‘national’ interests of a particular State may be its inclusive (‘international’) interests
with other States”.76 Friedmann himself noted that it is “possible to work for the
strengthening of international law and authority from the standpoint of ‘enlight-
ened national interest’, as being the best or even the only way of ensuring national
survival”.77 This is what I have called somewhere else the “mutualized interests”.78
Even though a common interest may only amount to a mutualized interest, there
72 On democracy in International Law, see d’Aspremont, J., Les Etats non démocratiques et le
droit international, Paris: Pedone, 2008. See also ibid., “Legitimacy of governments in the age of
democracy”, 38 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 877 (2006); See generally Fox, G.H. and Roth, B.R.,
Democratic Governance and International Law, Cambridge: CUP, 2000.
73 Wendt, A., Social Theory in International Politics, Cambridge: CUP, 2004, at 234.
74 Quoted in Good, R.C., “The national interest and political realism: Niebuhr’s ‘Debate’ with
Morgenthau and Kennan”, 22 The Journal of Politics 597–619 (1960), at 601.
75 See Burns, J.H. and Hart, H.L.A., (eds.), An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and
Legislation, London: Athlone Press, 1970, at 12: “The community is an abstract construction,
composed of the individual persons who are considered as constituting as it were its members.
The interest of the community then is, what? – the sum of the interest of the several members who
compose it.” Bentham’s conception of the public interest as a “sum-of-particular-interests” has
usually been criticized for failing to distinguish private interests from the welfare of the com-
munity and leaving no room for the interest of the society. For a rehabilitating understanding of
Bentham, see Gunn, J.A.W., “Jeremy Bentham and the public interest”, 1 Canadian Journal of
Political Science 398–413 (1968).
76 McDougal, M.S. and Reisman, W. M., “The changing structure of international law”, 65
Colum. L. Rev. 810 (1965), at 813. See also Simma, loc. cit., n. 14, at 242.
77 Friedmann, op. cit., n. 7, at 48.
78 D’Aspremont, loc. cit., n. 4.
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are hypotheses where States are truly and genuinely amenable to the interest of all,
irrespective of the benefit that they can reap from the rule concerned. It can be
argued that States sometimes seek to pursue the general wellbeing of human beings,
wherever the beneficiaries may be located. Indeed, all States share the quest for
wellbeing of individuals and can, accordingly, realize, as shrewdly explained by
Yasuaki Onuma79, the “usefulness” of the protection of human beings or that of the
environment to give but a few examples.80 So constructed, the common interest that
may drive international lawmaking is thus devoid of any values-oriented
foundations.
One may question what eventually differentiates values and interests. This is why
it is of the utmost relevance to stress that interests of States are in no way subject to
an objective determination as there are no a priori individual or common interests.81
In particular common interests are not objective standards which can be subject to
some sort of objectivation. This is precisely the essential conceptual difference
between values and interests. It is argued here that what drives international law-
making is the way in which States perceive and construe their interests, the interests
of their peers and the interests of the group. There are probably some structural
individual interests (to Realists, this comes down to survival, autonomy and well-
being82). It could also be said that the maintenance of order is structurally in the
interest of all States.83 But even a structural interest cannot drive the lawmaking if it
is not perceived as such. The subjective perceptions of the parties are thus not irrele-
vant and must be taken into account. This means that, as regards the common
structural interests, for instance, each State has its own understanding of what this
order is or should be. The impossibility of an objectivation of the driving forces of
international lawmaking surely condemns us to a deep relativism. Such a relativism
should, however, not been seem with a dim look as Asian scholars have tried to
convince us.
Having in mind the possibility of diverging perceptions of interests and their
intrinsically relative character, four categories of rules that arguably serve the public
good are examined here with a view of demonstrating that their adoption has
not been dragged by global values. Mention will be made of rules that pertain to
79 Onuma Yasuaki, loc. cit., n. 36, at 76–77.
80 Liberals have made a similar argument. See, for instance, Henkin, op. cit., n. 23, at 284.
81 Oxman, B.H., “The international commons, the international public interests and new modes
of international law making” in Delbrück, op. cit., n. 13, at 27.
82 See, for instance George, A. and Keohane, R., “The concept of national interests: uses and
limitations” in George, R., Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy, Boulder: Westview,
1980, at 217–238. Clinton, D., “The national interest: normative foundations”, 48 Review of
Politics 495–519 (1986), esp. at 497–505. For A. Wendt, see op. cit, n. 73, at 236.
83 De Visscher, op. cit., n. 69, at 71 and 100; See also Tomuschat, loc. cit., n. 10, at 78 (he tends to
make a difference between peace and order). This is also echoed in liberal literature: see Henkin,
op. cit., n. 23, esp. at ch. VI.
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the preservation of peace (a), the efficiency of the international system (b), the
protection of the environment (c) and the protection of human beings (d).
Rules pertaining to the preservation of peace
It is not much disputed that peace constitutes a public good and that rules related to
the preservation of peace serve a common interest. It is submitted here that those
rules, as Anand explained84, do not reflect any value but rest on a mere mutualization
of interests as previously defined.
The prohibition of the use of force is probably the embodiment of this type of
rule. States may have consented to such a rule for self-serving reasons. Indeed,
States whatever their power and their clout seemed to believe that the scourge of war
can, in one way or another, be detrimental to them and their own population. Small
nations which were not backed by any major power must probably have construed
the rule prohibiting the use of force primarily as a means to protect themselves
against greater powers. In that sense, the rules pertaining to the use of force reflect
the interests of the weaker States.85 Major powers – whose might can deter other
powers from threatening them – probably realized that their power could wane or be
insufficient to prevent harmful actions against them. Likewise, they have most likely
understood that violence on the international plane that is geographically remote
from them can also impinge on their prosperity and the wealth of their population.86
Leaving these self-serving motives aside, there are some weighty reasons to believe
that States also agreed to relinquish their right to resort to force to promote the
welfare of all, which is a common interest. Even in this case, it is not a value that has
prompted the consensus on the general prohibition of the use of force, but interests.
Such a view is classically supported by Asian governments.87
There is little doubt that the key rule that serves the preservation of peace, i.e. the
prohibition of aggression, constitutes a rule of jus cogens. Many scholars may
be inclined to believe that the jus cogens character of a norm is the emanation of
moral values.88 Conceiving those norms that serve the public good as based on
84 Anand, loc. cit., n. 41, esp. at 75.
85 Hurrell, A., “Society and anarchy in the 1990s” in Roberson, Barbara (ed.), International
Society and the Development of International Relations Theory, London: Pinter, 1998, 17–42, at
20. See also Friedmann, op. cit., n. 7, at 32–35; or Shahabuddeen, loc. cit., n. 1, at 722.
86 See, for instance, the reactions and speeches formulated on the occasion of the 60th anni-
versary of the International Court of Justice, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/60/index.htm.
87 See the statement by Mr V.K. Mambiar, loc. cit., n. 37: “We believe that meeting new prolifer-
ation challenges requires fresh approaches, pooling together the efforts and resources of the
international community. In the 1992 Security Council Summit on Non-proliferation, in which
India participated, we had called for a new international consensus on non-proliferation. We
renew that call today, with the hope that our endeavors will spur common efforts for mutual
benefit and in the interests of a safe and secure world.”
88 See de Visscher, C., “Positivisme et ‘jus cogens’ ”, 75 RGDIP 5 (1971), at 9.
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interests is, however, not incompatible with the concept of jus cogens. A rule may
well be hierarchically superior and belong to the international public order. This
does not mean that it rests on global values. The “fundamental principles” that they
enshrine are deemed fundamental precisely because they serve the interest of all, and
not because they reflect some sort of values. Moreover and more fundamentally, in
the international legal order, the public order has been created among sovereign
States in a conventional and contractual manner.89 This largely explains why, in the
international legal order, a rule may be hierarchically superior but still rests on
States’ individual and common interests.
There exist other rules which serve a similar purpose and which similarly do not
rest on values. For instance, rules pertaining to the peaceful dispute settlement
mechanisms are intertwined with the prohibition to use force. The settlement of a
dispute certainly serves the interest of the States involved in the dispute.90 As Anand
explained, one of the strictly individual interests that it promotes relates to the
confidence-building effect that a commitment to a binding dispute settlement mech-
anism conveys.91 But these rules also promote a common interest in that they bolster
international peace. These rules are not adopted on the basis of any value (like an
idea of corrective “justice”). They aim at preventing or toning down international
disputes whose fallout could be harmful to all States. It also seems that Asian States
share such an understanding of dispute settlement.92
The situation of mixed dispute settlement mechanisms whereby a standing
is granted to individuals may be different. Indeed, monitoring bodies like the
European Court of Human Rights or the Human Rights Committee – to name only
a few – are not primarily aiming at the maintenance of peace but rather at ensuring
the respect for human rights. The same can be said as regards the international
criminal law enforcement mechanisms which ensure compliance with international
criminal law.93 These mechanisms thus seek to shore up the protection of human
beings, which, as is explained below, do not correspond to value but merely to a
common interest.
Eventually, rules regarding disarmament call for a few remarks as some could
contend that they probably fall into the same category. This is well illustrated by
89 On this point, see Kennedy, D., “A new world order: yesterday, today, and tomorrow”, 4
Transnational Legal and Contemporary Problems 329–375 (1994), esp. at 370.
90 Hobbes, Th. Leviathan, ch. 13.
91 Anand, loc. cit., n. 42, at 403.
92 See Murty, B.S., Diplomacy and Resolution of International Disputes, cited by Rao, P.S. “The
Indian position on some general principles of international law”, in Patel, B.N. (ed.), Indian and
International Law, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2005, at 64.
93 As regards the International Criminal Court, the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia or the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, see in general Sands, P.,
Mackenzie, R. and Shany, Y., Manual on International Courts and Tribunals, London: Butter-
worths, 1999, at 253–300. See also Shabas, W.A., An Introduction to the International Criminal
Court, 2nd ed. Cambridge: CUP, 2004.
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the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone that reflects the
desire of Southeast Asian States to maintain peace and stability in the region.94 To
a certain extent, these rules can be seen as a means to bolster the peace as they
restrict the means available to States to wage disastrous war on each other. But it
could even be argued that disarmament treaties only serve self-interests of States
and are alien to any common interest. When agreeing on a curtailment of their
weaponry, States rather want a constraint to be imposed upon the other parties’
powers. In so doing, one could posit that they can be seen as trying to cut back the
cost of their own weaponry. The purpose of insuring a safer world or enhancing
peace by limiting weaponry is accordingly not necessarily their overriding con-
cern.95 Be that as it may, these rules are not created following the belief of the
States concerned in any sort of values. They originate in their (mostly individual)
interests.
Rules pertaining to the efficiency of the entire system
The international legal order is replete with rules that ensure the stability, the effi-
ciency and the predictability of inter-State relations.96 So are the rules pertaining to
diplomatic or consular relations, for instance.97 The same conclusion probably
applies to the rules providing immunity to heads of States and governments as well.98
On the one hand, there is little doubt that these rules serve a common interest as
explained by the International Court of Justice in the Diplomatic and Consular Staff
94 Beckman, R.C., “South East Asia and international law – I. treaty on the Southeast Asia
nuclear weapon-free zone”, 1 Singapore Journal of International and Comparative Law 414–420
(1997).
95 One could even argue that weapons do not necessarily hamper the peace but can, under some
circumstances, buttress it, as illustrated by the Cold War’s policy of mutual assured destruction
(MAD). See Gray, C.S., “Nuclear strategy: the case for a theory of victory”, 4 International
Security 54–87 (1979); Garthoff, R.L., “On mutual deterrence: a reply to Donald Brennan”, 3
International Security 197–199 (1979); Afheldt, H. and Sonntag, P., “Stability and deterrence
through strategic nuclear arms”, 10 Journal of Peace Research – Special Issue: Peace Research in
the Federal Republic of Germany 245–250 (1973); Art, R.J., “Between assured destruction and
nuclear victory: the case for the ‘Mad-Plus’ posture”, 95 Ethics – Special Issue: Symposium on
Ethics and Nuclear Deterrence 497–516 (1985); and McCanles, M., “Machiavelli and the para-
doxes of deterrence”, 14 Diacritics 11–19 (1984).
96 Charney, loc. cit. (87 AJIL (1993)), n. 20, at 532.
97 See the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961 and the Vienna Conven-
tion on Consular Relations of 24 April 1963. On the interests underlying diplomatic privileges
and immunities, see Henkin, op. cit., n. 23, at 170.
98 Arrest Warrant case (Congo v. Belgium), 12 February 2002, ICJ Rep. 2002, at 22, para. 53. On
this case, see d’Aspremont, J. and Dopagne, Fr., “La loi de compétence universelle devant la Cour
internationale de justice (aff. République démocratique du Congo c. Belgique)”, Journal des
Tribunaux, 13 April 2002, at 282–288.
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case99 in that they help keep the international system working (for instance by
ensuring the protection of high-ranking representatives). On the other hand, it can
be argued that these types of rules merely stem from the individual interest of each
State that predictability and stability of international relations should be ensured. In
that sense, they thus originate in the aggregation of each States’ individual interest as
each State is interested in having its high-ranking representatives protected. Whether
they serve individual or common interest, they are not based on values.
The same conclusion must be drawn as regards the rules of the Law of Treaties.
The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties contain rules that can also be seen
as dedicated to a better functioning of the entire system. On the footing that “the
ever-increasing importance of treaties as a source of international law and as a
means of developing peaceful co-operation among nations, whatever their consti-
tutional and social systems”100, it could be contended that the 1969 Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties for instance “promote[s] the purposes of the United
Nations set forth in the Charter, namely, the maintenance of international peace and
security, the development of friendly relations and the achievement of co-operation
among nations”.101 The codification of the law of treaties is also a means to reduce
the legal uncertainty which previously crippled international conventional rela-
tions.102 In that sense, the Vienna Convention has clarified various aspects of the
conventional relationships ranging from elaboration to termination. For these
reasons, it can be submitted that the adoption of a set of rules regulating treaties has
rested on interests, not on values.
The rules of States’ responsibility fall under the same category.103 Like the rules
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, rules pertaining to international
responsibility – and, probably, all secondary rules of international law104 – have been
adopted to satisfy the same sort of interests as they provide legal clarity as regards
the consequences of a breach.105 The need of all States for legal clarity and legal
security together with the interest that the whole legal system be running efficiently
constitutes the prime motivation for adopting these rules. For that reason, it is
posited here that these rules fall short of enshrining any value.
99 ICJ Rep. 1980, at 43, para. 92: “[The violation by Iran of its obligation under the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations due to the United States] cannot fail to undermine the
edifice of law carefully constructed by mankind over a period of centuries, the maintenance of
which is vital for the security and well-being of the complex international community of the
present day, to which it is more essential than ever that the rules developed to ensure the ordered
progress of relations between its members should be constantly and scrupulously respected.”
100 Preamble.
101 Ibid.
102 Goldsmith and Posner, op. cit., n. 68, at 95–98.
103 Charney, loc. cit. (87 AJIL (1993)), n. 20, at 532.
104 See Combacau, J. and Alland, D., “Primary and secondary rules in the law of State responsi-
bility”, 16 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 81 (1985).
105 See, for instance, the First report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr Roberto Ago (21st session of
the ILC (1969)), UN Doc. A/CN.4/217 and Corr.1 and Add.1.
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Rules pertaining to the protection of the environment
It is commonplace to assert that rules pertaining to the protection of the environ-
ment serve a common interest. Such a belief is probably too all-embracing as there
may be some environmental treaties that serve only individual interests of States. For
instance, those rules dedicated to the prevention of the deterioration of a State’s
environment by activities taking place outside the limits of its jurisdiction do not
necessarily aim at the promotion of a common interest. Some of them are meaning
to avert “transfrontier pollution” as illustrated by the Convention on Long-range
Transboundary Air Pollution of 13 November 1979.106 Instruments of that kind are
understood as protecting States themselves. Leaving this peculiar type of rules, it is
true that most environmental rules serve a common interest and Asian States are
usually attuned to that argument.107
Although these rules serve a common interest, they do not rest on values. This
has been explained by M. Sornarajah, who construes international environmental
law in terms of “advantages”.108 That States want the survival of mankind is not
the upshot of a value judgment. It is merely because it is the interest of all States,
and that of their governments and their peoples, that mankind be preserved. As
explained above, States are capable of seeking the satisfaction of an interest
beyond their own interest as an abstract entity. The most cynical view could sup-
port that lawmaking in the field of environmental law is also a way in which States
satisfy their constituency in alleviating the fears that life on the planet be
hindered.109
To illustrate the idea that environmental law serves individual and common
interests rather than values, one could think of the protection of endangered fauna
and flora110 or the protection of cultural heritage in time of peace.111 It is hard to
infer any global value from these sets of rules. Even the regulation of outer space,112
106 Kiss, A., “The international protection of the environment” in McDonald, R. and Johnston,
D. M., The Structure and Process of International Law: Essays in Legal Philosophy, Doctrine and
Theory, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983, at 1071.
107 See generally, Mushkat, R., International Environmental Law and Asian Values. Legal Norms
and Cultural Influences, Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004.
108 Sornarajah, loc. cit., n. 1, at 38, n. 44.
109 See the comments of B. H. Oxman on the occasion of the International Symposium of the
Kiel Walther-Schücking-Institute of International Law, March 1996, reproduced in Delbrück,
op. cit., n. 13, at 112.
110 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Wash-
ington, 3 March 1973; and Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild
Animals, Bonn, 23 June 1979.
111 UNESCO Convention Concerning the Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage,
Paris, 23 November 1972.
112 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space.
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the moon,113 Antarctic,114 the seabed,115 ozone layer,116 and Kyoto protocol regime117
are not values-oriented.118 They only protect those areas that States believe should be
left untouched. As regards outer space and the Antarctic, this was made clear
respectively by C. Jayaraj119 and M.C.W. Pinto.120
One can focus on the Kyoto Protocol regime in particular.121 States agree to curb
their CO2 emissions because they acknowledge climate change is a global threat.
Even though some States would probably be more affected by it than others, all
States recognize that stemming climate change serves the interest of all, including
their own interest. In doing so, they are not driven by any sort of global value. They
just follow what they perceive to be in the interest of all, including their own interest
and that of their population.
It is the same as regards the seabed provisions of UNCLOS that were so well
known to Professor Wang Tieya122 and to which Asian scholars have widely contrib-
uted.123 States agreed that resources of the seabed are “the common heritage of
mankind”124 and that “the activities in the Area should be carried out for the benefit
of mankind as a whole, irrespective of the geographical location of States, whether
coastal or land-locked”.125 That it has been reaffirmed “that the seabed and ocean
floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction [. . .] are the
common heritage of mankind” and “the importance of the Convention for the
113 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 18
December 1979, article 4: “The exploration and use of the moon shall be the province of all
mankind and shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective
of their degree of economic or scientific development. Due regard shall be paid to the interests of
present and future generations as well as to the need to promote higher standards of living and
conditions of economic and social progress and development in accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations.”
114 Antarctic Treaty, Washington, 1 December 1959 and the Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty of 4
October 1991. See Verhoeven, Joe, Philippe Sands, Maxwell Bruce, The Antarctic Environment
and International Law, London: Graham & Trotman, 1992.
115 See UNCLOS, part IX.
116 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 22 March 1985.
117 See Pardo, A. and Christol, C.Q., “The common interest: tension between the whole and the
parts” in McDonald and Johnston, op. cit., n. 105, at 647.
118 Oxman, loc. cit., n. 81, at 30–33.
119 Jayaraj, C., “The law of outer space and India”, in Patel, op. cit., n. 92, at 265.
120 Pinto, loc. cit. (“The International community and Antarctica”), n. 44; ibid., loc. cit. (“Gover-
nance in Antarctica”), n. 44, at 587–609.
121 All documents are available at http://unfccc.int/.
122 See, for instance, his study, “On the concept of the common heritage of mankind” carried in
the Chinese Year Book of International Law (1984).
123 The UNCLOS III – whose second chairmen were Tommy Koh and Amersinghe – is seen by
many as a watershed moment in the visibility of Asian Scholarship. See Thomas, J.A., loc. cit., n.
2, at 718.
124 Article 136 UNCLOS.
125 Article 140 UNCLOS.
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protection and preservation of the marine environment and of the growing concern
for the global environment” in no way implies that values have constituted the
driving forces of these groundbreaking regulations.126 It is the perception that it was
in the interest of all States that led States to leap towards international protection of
the seabed.127
Last but not least, the concept of sustainable development illustrates this idea
given that it is purporting to strike a balance between opposing kinds of interests
and does not in any way reflect a universal value.128
Rules pertaining to the protection of human beings
The idea that international lawmaking rests on the promotion of value is probably
mostly associated with these rules that protect human beings, namely international
human rights law and international humanitarian and criminal law.129 It is beyond
doubt that these rules serve a common interest.130 In that sense, this paper does not
bear upon realist theories which construe the adoption of human rights regimes as
the outcome of the coercion by mighty States. It is simply argued that such a com-
mon interest does not originate in values but in a common agreement that pursuing
the wellbeing and the welfare of human beings is in the interest of all. The pro-
ponents of the value-approach could be lured by a few pronouncements of the
International Court of Justice. For instance, in the Corfu Channel case, the Court
famously recognized the existence in international law of “certain general and well-
recognized principles, namely: elementary considerations of humanity.”131 Likewise,
in its advisory opinion on the Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Court recognized that the Convention
126 See the preamble of the Agreement relating to the implementation of Part XI of UNCLOS,
available at: http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindxAgree.
htm.
127 See Oda, S., “Some reflections on recent developments in the law of the sea”, 27 Yale J. Int’l L.
217 (2002), at 219–220.
128 See Ambrose, A.D., “International environmental law and India” in Patel, op. cit., n. 118, at
252–255; Chowdhury, S.R., “Intergenerational equity substratum of the right to sustainable
development” in Chowdhury, S.R., Denters, E. M. G., and de Waart, P., (eds.), The Right to
Development in International Law, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1992, at 234. See generally
Schrijver, N., Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties, Cambridge: CUP,
1997.
129 See, for instance, the liberal theories of international law, loc. cit., nn. 23–26. See also Judge
Owada, Hisashi, loc. cit., n. 66, or Seita, A.Y., “Globalization and the convergence of values”,
30 Cornell Int’l L. J. 429 (1997).
130 Friedmann, op. cit., n. 7, at 63 and 69.
131 ICJ Rep. 1949 at. 22.
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endorsed in legal form “elementary principle of morality”.132 A similar statement
was made in the Nicaragua case as regards the fundamental general principles of
humanitarian law.133 The advocates of the idea that international lawmaking is
driven by values, especially when human rights are at stake, may be inclined to find
further support in the declaration of the Court in the South West Africa cases
according to which “humanitarian considerations may constitute the inspirational
basis for rules of law”.134
This paper argues it would be misleading to infer from the aforementioned
dictums of the courts that rules pertaining to the protection of human beings were
adopted to promote values. It is submitted here that the Court only meant that these
instruments were not serving individual States’ interests but a common interest. As
stressed by the Court itself in its opinion on the Reservations to the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the “States do not have any
interests of their own; they merely have, one and all, a common interest”.135 More-
over, even if the Court also asserted that the aforementioned rules mirror some kind
of existing international moral principles, it did not claim that values had been the
driving force for adopting the rules concerned. Indeed, that the moral principles
“constitute the inspirational basis for rules of law” does not mean that States
adopted these rules to promote any corresponding values. Various normative orders
can coexist without interfering with each other.136 Should there be global moral
values as regards human dignity and the protection of human beings – what is far
from certain – corresponding international legal norms are not necessarily an off-
shoot of them. In other words, global moral principles do not automatically consti-
tute what prods the international lawmakers to act when they adopt corresponding
legal principles. In adopting rules that enshrine “elementary considerations of
humanity”, States simply believe that promoting humanity is in all States’ interests
as well as in the interest of all individuals.
More importantly, it is posited here that construing the common interest that
permeates the entering into a treaty related to the protection of individuals as based
132 ICJ Rep. 1951, at 23: “The Convention was manifestly adopted for a purely humanitarian and
civilizing purpose. It is indeed difficult to imagine a convention that might have this dual char-
acter to a greater degree, since its object, on the one hand, is to safeguard the very existence of
certain human groups and, on the other, to confirm and endorse the most elementary principle of
morality. In such a convention, the contracting States do not have any interests of their own; they
merely have, one and all, a common interest, the accomplishment of those high purposes which
are the raison d’être of the convention. Consequently, in a convention of this type, one cannot
speak of individual advantages or disadvantages to States, or of the maintenance of a perfect
contractual balance between rights and duties.”
133 ICJ Rep. 1986, at 112–114.
134 (Second Phase), Judgment, ICJ Rep. 1966, at 34.
135 ICJ Rep. 1951, at 23.
136 On the coexistence of normative order, see Klabbers, J., The Concept of Treaty in International
Law, The Hague: Kluwer International, 1996, at 121–156. See contra Gowlland-Debbas, loc. cit.,
n. 19, at 344–347.
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on global values is fundamentally flawed. The most serious flaw of such an assertion
relates to the presupposition that there is something like global values. It is con-
tended here that there is no agreement on what constitutes global values. Even the
provisions like the prohibition of torture that is almost unanimously accepted do not
reflect pre-existing values. If there were such global universal values pertaining to
human rights, how to explain that there are so many reservations to the treaties
where these rules are enshrined? As shrewdly explained by J. Klabbers, we can well
in abstracto agree that torture is bad and should be prohibited without neces-
sarily agreeing in concreto on what justifies that it be prohibited.137 It is accordingly
submitted here that human rights only reflect an agreement on the quest for human
wellbeing, not an agreement on any sort of values.138 In other words, the pursuit of
the wellbeing of human beings cannot, as such, be considered as a value.
If the ratio of regulations protecting human beings is thus interest and not value,
it remains to expound what are the individual and collective interests that drive
lawmaking with respect to human rights. This paper does not attempt to exhaust this
question that deserves a more extensive empirical analysis. Only a few ideas are
sketched out in the following paragraphs.
The existence of interests in international human rights lawmaking undoubtedly
hints at Andrew Moravcsik’s theory whereby he construes human rights as the result
of instrumental calculations about domestic policies. Drawing on the experience of
the postwar European democratization, Moravcsik argues that States are ready to
relinquish a part of sovereignty by adhering to human rights regimes in order to
constrain the behaviour of subsequent domestic governments. Applying his theory
beyond the European framework, he claims that newly established democracies use
human rights regimes – in the broad sense – to “lock in” credible domestic policies
through international commitments.139 It is probably true that some States adopted
international human rights law with a view to ceasing to be pariahs and to be able to
join the “family of Nations”.
Moravcsik’s theory is, however, insufficient to explain all the motives lurking
behind human rights lawmaking. The interests of States in human rights law surely
go beyond that hypothesis as other sorts of interests may constitute an enticement.
For instance, States may be induced to make, sign and ratify human rights conven-
tions because of the image conveyed by these instruments. In an era where dem-
ocracy and human rights are among the significant criteria of “good governance”,
there is little doubt that refusing to adhere to the major human rights conventions
137 Klabbers, J. “On human rights treaties, contractual conceptions and reservations” in Ziemele,
E. (ed.), Reservations to Human Rights Treaties and the Vienna Convention Regime: Conflict,
Harmony or Reconciliation, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2004, at 155.
138 Onuma, loc. cit., n. 36, at 76.
139 Moe, T., “Political institutions: the neglected side of the story”, 6 Journal of Law, Economics
and Organizations 227 (1990); and Moravcsik, A., “The origin of human rights regimes: demo-
cratic delegation in postwar Europe”, 54 International Organization 217–252 (2000).
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makes a State run the risk of becoming a pariah on the international plane and
undermining the international legitimacy of its government.140 This is why it is plaus-
ible that some States, reluctant to be bound by those kinds of rules, will finally
consent to them in order not to be labelled in such a way.
States may also feel that it serves their interest to promote human rights, as
massive violations of human rights may prove destabilizing and debilitating. These
violations can also change the structure of societies whose conservation is sought by
every State.141 Likewise, infringements on human rights can sully the reputation of
allies with which it can then prove politically difficult to cooperate. Abuse of indi-
vidual rights can also shock the conscience of each State’s population which may
feel uncomfortable with the view of blatant violations of human rights. There is
probably some grain of truth in the argument that respect for human rights bolsters
peace and security in which each State is interested.142 Eventually, the decision-
makers of each State may wish to soothe their conscience and appear as the guard-
ian of some sort of international morality. If the foregoing is true, there is hardly any
global value in human rights lawmaking. There is only the belief that it is in the
interest of the international lawmakers that human dignity and fundamental human
rights be respected.
The interests of States as autonomous abstract entities do not suffice to explain
all the dimensions of contemporary lawmaking in the field of the protection of the
rights of individuals. On top of the aforementioned self-serving motives, States are
capable of seeking the satisfaction of the interests of those individuals “under their
jurisdiction”. In that sense, States can be driven by the desire to protect their own
population and to make sure that it never suffers from violations by any future
government. As liberals are also arguing, it may be in the interest of States to ensure
the respect for human rights.143 There is nothing astounding in the finding that most
States wish to improve the quality of life of their own population.144 Furthermore,
and probably more cynically, it could also be asserted that States can wish to offer
protection to individuals to stifle the entreaties of groups or minorities living on their
territory.145
140 Roth, B., Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law, Oxford: OUP, 2000; see d’Aspre-
mont, J., “Legitimacy of governments in the age of democracy”, op. cit., n. 72, at 877; See also
ibid., Les Etats non démocratiques et le droit international, Paris: Pedone, 2008.
141 See, for instance, the preamble of the SAARC Convention on Regional Arrangement for the
Promotion of Child Welfare in South Asia that recognizes the need to protect families as the
fundamental unit of society.
142 Sharma, V. D., “International criminal law: crime prevention and punishment”, in Patel, B.N.
(ed.), India and International Law, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2005, at 189–190.
143 Henkin, op. cit., n. 23, at 284.
144 See the preamble of the Charter of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation,
available at http://www.saarc.sec.org.
145 On the relationship between protection of minorities and human rights, see generally
Verhoeven, J., “Les principales étapes de la protection internationale des minorités”, Revue
trimestrielle des droits de l’homme 177–203 (1997).
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More or less the same interests prod States to adopt rules related to the conducts
of belligerents during hostilities – which are a lex specialis of human rights law
according to the International Court of Justice146 – as well as rules pertaining to the
international criminalization of a string of individual behaviours (international
criminal law).147 In the field of international human rights and criminal law, the
protection of each States’ soldiers and people148, the will to alleviate public opinions’
concerns and the insurance not to be accused of some form of complicity have
convinced States to set up rules and institutions to judge war criminals.149
As alluded to earlier, it is not denied here that, ultimately, States are capable of
pursuing the general well-being of human beings, wherever the beneficiaries may be
located. It could even be cogently argued that the quest for wellbeing of individuals
is shared by all States and that they all come to realize, as shrewdly explained by
Yasuaki Onuma, the “usefulness” of human rights law. It is in the interest of all that
wellbeing and welfare be improved, human rights being only one of the many
instruments to reach that goal.150 Human rights could even constitute the most
effective legal mechanisms ever found so far to achieve that end.151 If conceived
along these lines, human rights can thus be thought in terms of “usefulness” and
interest. It thus becomes possible to strip the human rights lawmaking of all its
value-trappings and envisage a legal order that is really universal.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Drawing on the driving forces of international lawmaking, this paper has tried to
capture an alternative understanding of the international legal order that differs
from the Western constitutionalist or liberal views. In doing so, it has relied on the
work of Asian scholars with a view to construing a legal order based on individual
and common interests rather than values. In particular, it has showed that Asian
scholars have been more amenable to the idea that international lawmaking, even
in the field of human rights and the protection of the environment, is driven by
interests, thereby rejecting values as the foundations of the international legal order.
The interests-based understanding of the lawmaking offered by Asian scholars
ultimately requires scholars to come to terms with the inter-subjective and fickle
146 Advisory opinion of 8 July 1996 on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ICI
Rep. 1996, at 240, para. 25; see also Advisory opinion of 9 July 2004 on the Legal Consequences of
the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, ICJ Rep. 2004, paras. 105–106.
147 Friedmann, op. cit., n. 7, at 167.
148 This is also acknowledged by liberals like Henkin, op. cit., n. 23, at 171.
149 See Mégret, F., “The politics of international criminal justice”, 13 EJIL 1261–1284 (2002).
See also Beigbeder, Y., Judging War Criminals: The Politics of International Justice, New York: St
Martin’s Press, 1999.
150 This idea can also be found in Donnelly, op. cit., n. 38, at 63–64.
151 Onuma, loc. cit., n. 36, at 76–77.
48 Asian Yearbook of International Law
character of the forces that drive the lawmaking and underlie the international legal
order. Such an approach inevitably leads to some sort of relativism as it inextricably
calls for a continuing debate about what the public good is. This is precisely what the
proponents of values-oriented approaches of the international legal order like West-
ern constitutionalists and liberals fear or bemoan. Avoiding this debate may even
constitute the very motive why they advocate an unchallengeable and intangible
table of values. It is argued here that the view of the international legal order which
is backed by many prominent Asian authors, on the contrary, teaches us that inter-
national legal scholars, instead of trying to bridle the debate about what constitutes
the public good, should rather devote their energy to devizing the tools that ensure
its transparency. In that sense, one of the greatest lessons that can be inferred from
the Asian legal scholarship is that an ongoing discussion about what constitutes the
public good offers a more significant leverage to promote the universality of inter-
national law than any predefined table of allegedly global values which inextricably
contains imperialist overtones.
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REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND THE PROMOTION AND




In 2007 the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) celebrated its 40th
anniversary as a regional arrangement. It is a time to mark the accomplishments to
date but it is also a time of numerous changes and challenges facing the region and
its organizational architecture. The challenges facing the region are multifarious and
are not necessarily unique to ASEAN and its Member States as they involve issues
facing States, regional arrangements and the international system as a whole. A
crude summarization of these challenges would be the impact the forces of global-
ization is having upon the way in which societies are governed. It is clear that discrete
territorially bound State units cannot act in isolation and no longer have exclusive
control over the processes of governance pertaining to the societies that live in a
particular bounded territory. In turn it is necessary to find appropriate responses to
these challenges.
In this regard there are two prevailing trends in the international system which
will be examined in this contribution. These trends are the ever increasing range of
integration activities among States in order to deal with the challenges in the inter-
national system and the ongoing concern for democracy as a legal obligation and
principle in international relations. Writing in the American Journal of International
Law, Eric Stein examined these trends and, as the title of his article makes clear,
there is “no love at first sight” between the two. Increased integration is seen as a
necessary pursuit for States, but at the same time it is commonly associated with a
lessening or weakening of democracy.1 The question then becomes how to reconcile
the two?
The diminution of democracy appears inevitable when international organiza-
tions or supra-State institutions become involved in governance. At the same time,
* Director, McCoubrey Centre for International Law, Law School, University of Hull, Hull
HU6 7RX, UK, Tel. 44-1482-465725 (email: r.m.burchill@hull.ac.uk).
1 Stein, E., “International integration and democracy: no love at first sight”, 95 AJIL 489
(2001).
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there is no natural connection between increased integration and a lessening of
democracy.2 In fact it is possible to argue that integration projects provide for
increased opportunities for democratic governance through the creation of multiple
institutional frameworks accessible to individuals and groups. Furthermore, cooper-
ation and integration projects among States are commonly built upon constitutive
treaties that elaborate a range of norms and principles to guide behaviour.
Increasingly the norms and principles being elaborated include the promotion and
protection of democracy and human rights as fundamental priorities. As these
trends continue it is imperative to address the influence and role of democratic
principles in the development of integration projects and the impact these forces
have upon the ways in which societies are governed and the prospects they hold out
for human development. To this end this paper will use the recent developments
regarding ASEAN to demonstrate how future integration activities do not necessar-
ily weaken democracy but in fact can work to further promote and protect
democracy in the region.
At the present moment ASEAN finds itself at a major point in its development
as it begins to move from a loose cooperation arrangement that has been more about
diplomatic relations among the Member States’ governments, or more accurately,
the individual leaders of those States, towards the furthering of integration and
deepening of involvement in governance based upon democratic principles. This
process has been building for a number of years and took a major step with the 2006
Report of the Eminent Persons Group on the ASEAN Charter (ASEAN Charter
Report) which set out a bold vision for the future of the organization and directly
addressed a number of crucial issues regarding democratic governance in the
region.3 The recommendations in the Report are substantial for the importance
given to the promotion and protection of democracy and human rights in the con-
text of preserving the social and cultural characteristics of the region based on the
idea of a people-orientated approach to regional integration and governance.
In November 2007 ASEAN adopted the Charter of the Association of South
East Asian Nations (ASEAN Charter).4 In its final form the ASEAN Charter is not
as bold as the ASEAN Charter Report, but at the same time it does commit the
Member States to a range of obligations regarding democratic governance in the
overall context of increased integration. Even though these commitments are feeble
in many respects, especially with regard to compliance measures, they remain
important for the future of governance in the region and are bound to have an
influence on future developments. The States of ASEAN do not have a strong
2 This rather simplistic correlation is directly due to the continued prominence of the State unit.
For a general overview of this issue, see Goodhart, M., Democracy as Human Rights: Freedom
and Equality in the Age of Globalization, London: Routledge, 2005, part I.
3 Report of the Eminent Persons Group on the ASEAN Charter (December 2006) (hereinafter
ASEAN Charter Report) available at http://www.aseansec.org/19247.pdf.
4 A copy of the Charter and related documents may be found at http://www.aseansec.org/
AC.htm.
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historical record of democratic or people-orientated approaches to governance,
something that was further demonstrated by the lack of any widespread consult-
ation on the Charter. But now the Member States have publicly agreed to inter-
national legal obligations on the promotion and protection of democracy and
human rights along with the establishment of institutional structures for integration
and regional governance. The adopted ASEAN Charter may be more about window
dressing than an actual commitment to democracy but it has at least introduced a
rhetoric in favour of democracy and human rights that will now become part of the
discussions about governance in the region.
MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION
The dominant trends in the international system of increased integration and
concerns for democracy are inextricably tied up with the broader phenomenon
commonly described as globalization. There exists a wide range of views about what
globalization is – for the purposes here it is understood as the “shift or transform-
ation in the scale of human organization that links distant communities and expands
the reach of power relations across the world’s regions and continents”.5 It is both as
a response to, and as a result of, these shifts that concerns over governance and
democracy have arisen. As two leading commentators on globalization and the
international system accurately summarize – “the globalization debate projects, into
a new context, the cardinal questions of political life concerning power and rule”.6
A major factor in the ongoing process of globalization is the presence of inter-
national organizations. On the surface it appears that international organizations
propagate globalization and with respect to many well-known international organ-
izations, such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund or even the United
Nations, they are seen as responsible for the negative impacts that ensue. Further-
more when international organizations take on supranational responsibilities and
authority, such as the European Union or the International Criminal Court, they are
seen as threats to State power and as undermining democracy. All of this leads to
concerns about the position of international organizations as they appear to under-
mine the link between society and the ability to hold decision-makers accountable
and ensure they are responsive to the needs of society, when it comes to the exercise
of power.
At the same time international organizations may be seen in a different light, as
bodies that contribute to the strengthening of democratic governance. International
organizations support the promotion and protection of democracy through the
articulation and elaboration of legal obligations and principled statements and dec-
larations of commitment. For example, the Council of Europe requires all Member
5 Held, D. and McGrew, A., Globalisation/AntiGlobalisation, Oxford: Polity, 2002, at 1.
6 Held and McGrew, op. cit., n. 5, at 58.
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States to be democratic and adhere to the European Convention on Human Rights.7
The European Court of Human Rights, as the monitoring body for the European
Convention, works to ensure the promotion and protection of democracy in the
Member States as the most effective means for meeting their Convention obliga-
tions.8 These efforts, alongside the European Union’s proclamations on the import-
ance of democracy and its own membership requirements,9 have created a regional
norm of democracy.10 This norm is not confined to States only as it has proven to be
equally applicable to the regional organizations directly involved in governance.11 In
this respect international organizations have an important role to play in norm
creation and ensuring compliance with obligations concerning democratic
governance.
As with globalization, governance can mean many things. For the purposes here
governance is understood as:
the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage
their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse
interests may be accommodated and co-operative action may be taken. It includes
formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal
arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in
their interest.12
Governance consists of the variety of channels that exist where individuals and
groups pursue goals and policies.13 By speaking of governance rather than govern-
ment it is possible to understand more clearly the fragmentation of authority and
policy activities across the various actors involved and the attempts to coordinate
these activities.14 The actual nature and structure of a government is central to the
7 Statute of the Council of Europe (3 August 1949), Articles 3 and 8, CETS No. 001, available at
http://conventions.coe.int
8 For more on the work of regional human rights courts see Burchill, R., “The role of democ-
racy in the protection of human rights – lessons from the European and Inter-American
human rights systems” in Forsythe, D. and McMahaon, P. (eds.), Human Rights and Diversity:
Area Studies Revisited Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2003, at 137–156.
9 Treaty of European Union (1992), Articles 6 and 7, OJ C 191 (29 July 1992).
10 Wheatley, S., “Democracy in international law: a European perspective”, 51 ICLQ 225–248
(2002).
11 For discussion see Burchill, R., “The European Union and European democracy: social
democracy or democracy with a social dimension?” 17 Canadian Journal of Law and Juris-
prudence 185–207 (2004).
12 Commission on Global Governance, Our Global Neighbourhood, New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1995, at 2.
13 Rosenau, J., “Governance in the twenty-first century”, 1 Global Governance 13–14 (1995);
Weiss, T., “Governance, good governance and global governance: conceptual and actual
challenges”, 21 Third World Quarterly 795–798 (2000).
14 See Krahmann, E., “National, regional, and global governance: one phenomenon or many?”,
9 Global Governance 331 (2003).
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overall tenor of the process of governance, but as the discussion here is concerned
with a wide range of factors involving power and rule, giving attention to the wider
phenomenon of governance is more appropriate.
International law has not easily grasped the idea of governance as it remains tied
to the idea of the discrete State entity as the fundamental source of power and
authority over individuals and societies in territorially bound units. Even though
human organization and interaction has taken on global dimensions the State con-
tinues to be a primary focus for much of the exercise and study of governance and
authority. The position of the State with regard to the human condition remains
crucial, but it is also necessary to account for the political, economic and social
forces beyond the State that impact upon individuals and society. International law is
slowly coming to grasp this reality of social organization beyond the State. As
international law is concerned with the welfare of individuals and society, be it
through trade measures, environmental protection or human rights, it has become
necessary to look beyond State governments and to deal with the existence of power,
as well as responsibility for the exercise of power at a variety of levels. A concern for
multi-level governance is not a major conceptual leap for international law as many
of the existing principles international law seeks to uphold are applicable.
The creation of the United Nations was seen as a major first step towards some
system of global governance; but the pursuit of global governance on a universal
scale has proven difficult. On the other hand, regional arrangements that have con-
cerned themselves with governance, such as ASEAN, the Organization of American
States, the African Union, the European Union, Council of Europe and Organiza-
tion for Security and Cooperation in Europe, have, with mixed results, carved out
particular positions in the process of governance and have established various forms
of institutional architecture based on expressed norms and principles. The pursuit
of governance at the regional level is a more limited approach than universal global
governance but does provide tangible and workable alternatives for addressing the
various concerns prominent in the world today. In particular it is at the regional
level where international legal obligations for the promotion and protection of
democracy, as well as human rights, are the most developed.
Pursuing international organization at the regional level has a number of posi-
tive and negative considerations. On the positive side regional arrangements will
often be more conducive for agreement and action as the States involved will often
possess common history, traditions and cultures and characteristics giving rise to
greater levels of cooperation.15 Due to size, proximity and shared beliefs and values
regional arrangements possess a higher degree of flexibility in the pursuit of activ-
ities which may be missing from the actions of a global body. Commonly, the rela-
tively small geographical area involved with a regional arrangement allows for a
15 Frey-Wouters, E., “The prospect for regionalism in world affairs” in Black, C. and Falk, R.
(eds.), The Future of the International Legal Order, vol. 1., Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1969, at 553–554; MacFarlane, N. and Weiss, T., “The United Nations, regional organizations
and human security: building theory in Central America”, 15 Third World Quarterly 283 (1994).
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more efficient allocation of resources and delegating of tasks when it comes to
problem solving procedures.16 Governments and people will likely be more inclined
to follow the directives of a regional arrangement since the supervisory bodies cre-
ated will possess greater legitimacy being seen as having a greater understanding of
the local conditions.17 The inability of a global arrangement to understand or take
into consideration the particularities unique to the members of a regional arrange-
ment often results in action being seen as outside interference.18 Regional arrange-
ments increase the range of options available for addressing common problems
or for pursuing common objectives and encourage a greater sense of lasting
commitment to achieve these goals.19
While these are the attractive possibilities of regional arrangements there are
equally a number of negative factors to consider.20 Within regions the actual com-
mitment of the Member States is not always as deep as perceived, for States may
selectively use regional or universal organizations depending upon individual needs.
Homogeneity among States and societies is not a given within any region and the
closeness of States may result in deep-seeded antagonisms and continued physical
conflict.21 Regional superpowers may be able to manipulate the regional arrange-
ment in the pursuit of their own self-interested goals.22 Regional arrangements may
not always possess the necessary resources and knowledge that would be available
with a global organization.23
The positive and negative considerations above will exist in varying degrees
within all regional organizations and despite the potential drawbacks of regional
organizations there continues to be concerted action in pursuing and developing
regional integration arrangements to achieve common purposes and respond to
common challenges.24 However, as increased integration at the regional level con-
tinues, there are equally increasing concerns about democratic governance. In this
regard the ability of international law to provide for the promotion and protection
of democracy in an effective manner is crucial.
16 Schema, R., “The OAS and the quest for international co-operation: American vision or
mirage”, 13 Case Western Reserve J. Int’l L. 101 (1981).
17 Robertson, A.H. and Merrills, J.G., Human Rights in the World, 3rd ed., Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1992, at 223–224.
18 Donnelly, J., “International human rights: a regime analysis”, 40 International Organization
637 (1986).
19 McCoubrey, H. and Morris, J., Regional Peacekeeping in the Post Cold-War Era, The Hague:
Kluwer, 2000, at 212 and 224.
20 Nye, J., “Regional Institutions” in Black and Falk, op. cit., n. 15, at 433–436.
21 Schreuer, C., “Regionalism v. universalism”, 6 EJIL 479 (1995).
22 McCoubrey and Morris, op. cit., n. 19, at 39.
23 Schreuer, loc. cit., n. 21, at 479.
24 Beeson, M., “Rethinking regionalism: European and East Asia in comparative historical
perspective”, 12 Journal of European Public Policy 971 (2005).
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THE PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF DEMOCRACY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Democracy is often viewed as a term with no determinate content, or an essentially
contested concept that precludes any widespread agreement.25 It is primarily for this
reason that no coherent understanding of democracy took hold in international law
prior to 1989. During the Cold War democracy came to mean anything and every-
thing, despite its grounding in a limited, but significant, range of international legal
instruments (see below). Due to the definitional difficulties involved with democracy
there is a tendency to understand it in minimal terms; the holding of elections, the
existence of certain governmental institutions and the legal protection of a limited
range of civil and political rights.26 A minimalist conception of democracy perhaps
provides the easiest way of verifying the existence of what is understood to be
democracy and may also be the maximum level of agreement possible in the inter-
national system.27 However, as has been identified by a number of scholars, both
within and outwith international law, the reliance upon a minimalist conception of
democracy undermines the emancipatory potential inherent in the idea and fails to
harness its full potential as a major force in the development of individuals and
society. Minimalist understandings of democracy fail to live up to the ideas and
ideals that have long been the hallmark of democracy. Instead, minimalist forms
may actually lead to a lessening of freedom and the maintenance of unequal power
relations.28
It is necessary to be explicit as to the understanding of democracy being used in
this paper. In this analysis democracy is understood as – the ability of individuals, on
an equal basis to take part in those processes and decisions that impact upon their
lives and to be given the opportunity to realise their full potential.29 Admittedly, such
a definition is vague and has the potential to be infinitely malleable. However, it does
provide a basic framework for understanding democracy as an emancipatory project
that allows for the development of individuals and society based upon widespread
25 Ball, T. and Dagger, R., Political Ideologies and the Democratic Ideal, New York: Harper
Collins, 1991, at 22–23; Bollen, K., “Political democracy: conceptual and measurement traps”
in Beetham, D. (ed.), Defining and Measuring Democracy, London: Sage, 1994, at 5.
26 For further discussion see Beetham, D., Democracy and Human Rights, Cambridge: Polity
Press, 1999, ch. 5.
27 Franck, T., “Democracy as a human right” in Henkin, L. and Hargrove, J. (eds.), Human
Rights: An Agenda for the Next Century, Washington: American Society of International Law,
1994, at 75.
28 Marks, S., “The end of history? Reflections on some international legal theses”, 8 EJIL 450
(1997). Also Zakaria, F., The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad, New
York: W.W. Norton, 2003.
29 The basis of this definition is derived from the following works: Marks, S., The Riddle of All
Constitutions: International Law, Democracy and the Critique of Ideology, Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2003; Beetham, op. cit., n. 26; and Held, D., Models of Democracy, 3rd ed., Oxford:
Polity Press, 2006, chs. 10 and 11.
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and active participation in a system that places the interests of individuals and
society as the paramount consideration in the pursuit of governance. A wide range
of institutions and practices are able to serve this definition effectively, with the
result that there is no one institutional model of democracy to be adhered to by all.
This does not leave open the possibility that any form of social organization can be
claimed as democratic as the basic principles articulated above have to be real and
obtainable. By starting with a statement of broad principles it is possible to formu-
late an understanding of democracy that moves beyond the predominant minimalist
form to reach beyond the narrow political sphere of society and incorporate the
socio-economic and cultural aspects of society as well. The human condition is not
confined to the political sphere and if the pursuit of democracy is about bettering
the human condition it is necessary to account for the full experience involved.
Furthermore, the broad principles stated above allow us to address the existence
and exercise of power wherever it is exercised providing an approach to democracy
that is not confined to the State and may be utilized in addressing the impact of
globalization and the proliferation of multi-level governance.
International law’s concern with democracy is a recent phenomenon, only truly
emerging from the end of the Cold War, despite a number of historical precedents.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted in 1948 stated that the will of
the people shall be the basis of authority for government.30 The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights adopted in 1966 provides protection for a
wide range of civil and political rights suggesting that all signatories must have in
place at least a basic democratic system.31 However, these developments were over-
shadowed by the ideological divide which developed soon after the founding of the
UN and led to the strong adherence to the principle of sovereign equality among
States and non-intervention into domestic affairs based on the traditional view that
international law had no concern with the way government or governance within
States was carried out. In this environment international law made no substantial
effort to concern itself with the nature of government and governance. All forms
were accepted as legitimate and, outside the limited range of treaty-based inter-
national human rights obligations, there did not exist any accepted principles by
which the nature of government and governance was judged.32
The end of the Cold War led to an upsurge of attention given to democracy as
an international legal principle. In 1992 the Secretary-General of the UN presented
30 General Assembly resolution 217 A (III): “Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (10
December 1948), Art. 21.
31 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (23 March 1976), 999 UNTS 171. Nowak
makes the claim that for a State to adhere to its obligations under the treaty it is necessary to be a
democracy. Nowak, M., United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commen-
tary, Kehl am Rhein: Engel, 1993, at 441.
32 For example see UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. General Comment
No. 3 (1990), UN Doc. E/1991/23, stating that the International Covenants were neutral as to the
form and nature of government.
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the Agenda for Peace report where it was stated that “[r]espect for democratic prin-
ciples at all levels of social existence is crucial: in communities, within States and
within the community of States.”33 This was followed by two more reports, the
Agenda for Development34 and the Agenda for Democratization,35 which emphasized
that peace, development and democracy are inextricably linked and that the UN has
a major role to play by assisting States involved with the democratization process.36
The Secretary-General also expressed the view that the ideas of self-determination
and human rights as contained in the Charter provide a basis for democracy, and
that the Charter is flexible and capable of incorporating change, such as an inclusion
of democracy.37 The Secretary-General saw the UN as having a major role in assist-
ing in the creation of a “culture of democracy” allowing for the participation of all
individuals in the decision-making process on issues which affect their lives.38 The
UN at this time became actively involved in election monitoring and other activities
aimed at the promotion and protection of democracy.39
UN human rights institutions also began actively promoting democracy as a
legal obligation in its own right and as the most effective means for realizing the
obligations States have with regard to human rights. In 1993 the World Conference
on Human Rights stated in its Final Declaration:
“The international community should support the strengthening and promotion of
democracy, development and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in
the entire world” and that “democracy, development and respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms are interdependent and mutually reinforcing”.40
The Commission on Human Rights followed up on this through a number of signifi-
cant resolutions that describe democracy as a fundamental right as well as providing
an elaboration of what democracy entails.41 Treaty-based human rights monitoring
bodies also took a more proactive stance on the importance of democracy for
33 An agenda for peace: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping. UN Doc. A/47/
277-S/24111, paras. 19 and 82.
34 An agenda for development. UN Doc. A/48/935 (1993).
35 An agenda for democratization. UN Doc. A/51/761 (20 December 1996).
36 Agenda for Democratization, paras. 118 and 126.
37 Agenda for Democratization, paras. 26–35.
38 Agenda for Democratization, para. 24.
39 White, N., Keeping the Peace: The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace
and Security, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997, at 196–199.
40 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, UN Doc. A/CONF.157/24 (1993), para. 8.
41 For example see Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1999/57, “Promotion of the right
to democracy”, UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1999/57 (28 April 1999); Commission on Human Rights
Resolution 2000/47, “Promoting and consolidating democracy”, UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2000/47
(25 April 2000); and Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2001/36, “Strengthening of
popular participation, equity, social justice and non-discrimination as essential foundations of
democracy”, UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2001/36 (23 April 2001).
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fulfilling treaty obligations.42 These developments have not led to an absolute or
customary law requirement that all States must adhere to democracy,43 but they have
provided significant support for the idea that democracy has become the standard
for assessing the legitimacy of governance.
There is further support for this assertion in a number of recent UN
proclamations. The General Assembly has declared the protection of freedom as a
fundamental value of the UN which is best protected through “democratic and
participatory government based on the will of the people”.44 In 2005 the Secretary-
General released a report, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and
Human Rights for All,45 where democracy holds a very prominent position with
regard to the goal and objectives of the UN. In the report it is stated that:
The protection and promotion of the universal values of the rule of law, human
rights and democracy are ends in themselves. They are also essential for a world of
justice, opportunity and stability. No security agenda and no drive for development
will be successful unless they are based on the sure foundation of respect for human
dignity.46
The 2005 World Summit produced a final outcome statement which proclaims that
the UN is based on common fundamental values such as freedom, equality, toler-
ance and respect for all human rights,47 and that the Member States declared a
commitment to ensure the effective promotion and protection of human rights, the
rule of law and democracy.48 The Summit also declared democracy is a universal
value with the common feature being the ability of people to determine their own
42 For example see the Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 25, “Article 25
(Participation in Public Affairs and the Right to Vote)”, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7 (12
July 1996), para. 1; Report of the Human Rights Committee, v. 1 GAOR 49th Sess., Supp. No. 40
comments on Azerbaijan, para. 304; and Decision of the Human Rights Committee decision in
Peter Chiko Bwalya v. Zambia. Communication No. 314/1988, UN Doc.CCPR/C/48/D/314/1988.
With regard to the monitoring of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, see Burchill, R., “Democracy and the promotion and protection of socio-economic
rights”, in Baderin, M. and McCorquodale, R. (eds.), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in
Action, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, at 361–387.
43 See Murphy, S., “Democratic legitimacy and the recognition of States and governments”, 48
ICLQ 545–581 (1999). But for a contrary argument as to the legitimacy of non-democratic
arguments see Reisman, M., “Sovereignty and human rights in contemporary international law”,
84 AJIL 866–876 (1990).
44 UN General Assembly Resolution: “United Nations Millennium Declaration”, UN Doc.
A/Res/55/2 (8 September 2000).
45 UN Doc. A/59/2005 (21 March 2005).
46 In Larger Freedom, para. 128.
47 UN General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome, UN Doc. A/60/L.1 (15 September 2005),
para. 4.
48 2005 World Summit Outcome, para. 119.
60 Asian Yearbook of International Law
political, economic, social and cultural systems through the full participation of
individuals in all aspects of their lives.49
Further developments in the promotion and protection of democracy in inter-
national law have come from a wide range of regional arrangements. The European
Union has formulated membership obligations based on democracy along with
detailed criteria for enforcement.50 The Organization of American States also con-
tains treaty-based membership obligations that have been supplemented by extensive
elaboration of what democracy consists of and the creation of monitoring and
support mechanisms.51 The African Union is also moving in the direction of requir-
ing democratic governance as democracy is a significant objective and principle of
the organization. The significance of these regional efforts has been recognized in
the Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change where it is
suggested that the UN build upon the experiences of regional arrangements and
develop mechanisms for promoting and protecting democracy.52
The development of democracy as an international legal principle has come
from a wide range of international concerns and has been furthered by international
organizations at both the regional and global level. The multiple influences feeding
into international law’s understanding of democracy helps to formulate common
ground for understanding the basic principles of democracy, demonstrating that it is
a principle that has universal application. There are two important issues to note
with regard to the developments discussed above. The first is that the type of dem-
ocracy that emerged out of international practice immediately following the Cold
War was mainly minimalist in form. Despite the euphoria attached to the so-called
“victory of democracy” it quickly emerged that the type of democracy being
promoted was limited in many respects. Democracy had become synonymous with
free market capitalist systems based on neo-liberal beliefs. This was a problematic
development as the ideas and ideals inherent in democracy discussed above were not
being realized for neo-liberalism relies upon and strongly reinforces minimalist con-
ceptions of democracy. The trend does appear to be changing as approaches to
democracy, such as the one being pursued by ASEAN, are taking a more substantive
approach to go beyond the minimalist forms.
The second issue to emerge from international law’s embrace of democracy was
the claim that the type of democracy being pursued was not universal, being particu-
lar to Western societies. This view was expressed by a President of the UN General
Assembly from Malaysia who stated in 1997 that there had been a politicization of
liberal global values such as human rights, democracy and free markets which were
49 2005 World Summit Outcome, para. 135.
50 Treaty of European Union, Articles 6 and 7.
51 OAS Charter (as amended), Article 9, OAS Treaty Series, Nos. 1-C and 61. For an overview of
activity in this regard see “Key OAS issues: the democratic commitment”, available at http://
www.oas.org/key_issues/eng/KeyIssue_Detail.asp?kis_sec=1
52 Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our
Shared Responsibility (2004), available at http://www.un.org/secureworld/
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being promoted as the answer to all of humankind’s problems. In his view such
values were not widely accepted in Asia or in a great number of other States in the
world.53 The non-applicability argument is based on the idea that democracy has its
origins in Western societies and that Asian social systems differ dramatically from
the West and are based on a strong adherence to hierarchy, respect for authority and
that concerns for wider society take primacy over the interests of the individual. All
of which makes the promotion and protection of democracy and human rights, as
currently understood, not compatible with these systems. The incompatibility argu-
ment has been further bolstered by the belief in developing countries that adherence
to rights commonly associated with democracy get in the way of development and
should be limited to ensure prosperous development. This position has been used by
individual ASEAN States, or more appropriately, their leaders, to counter any sort
of external scrutiny concerning their domestic systems.54
The idea that international law is supporting an understanding of democracy
that is applicable only to certain societies is an inaccurate interpretation that says
more about the attempts of certain leaders to maintain their domestic position than
it does about any true concern for the development of society. Recent research
questions the coherence and applicability of the view that Asian values are contrary
to democracy: understood as an idea and practice of Western origin. Studies
have shown that while particular leaders will espouse Asian values that favour
authority and hierarchy, the actual individuals who make up these societies are
less inclined to believe this way.55 Thinking has also turned around with regard to
the issue of development and applicability of democracy and human rights. It has
been stressed that development relies upon participation from all individuals in
society along with human rights protection and cannot be used as an excuse to limit
either.56 Commentators have shown that there exists no clear and direct correlation
between development and the need for the suppression of democracy and human
rights.57
As discussed above the primary purpose of democracy is “to provide conditions
for the full and free development of the essential human capacities of all members of
53 4 UN Chronicle 13 (1997).
54 Öjendal, J., “Back to the future? regionalism in South-East Asia under unilateral pressure”, 80
International Affairs 525 (2004); Acharya, A., “Democratisation and the prospects for partici-
patory regionalism in Southeast Asia”, 24 Third World Quarterly 375 (2003).
55 Dalton, R. and Ong, N.-N., “Authority orientations and democratic attitudes: A test of the
‘Asian values’ hypothesis” (February 2004), available at Centre for the Study of Democracy,
www.democ.uci.edu
56 For example see “Consideration of the relationship between development, democracy and the
universal enjoyment of all human rights, keeping in view the interrelationship and indivisibility
of economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights”, UN Doc. A/CONF.157/17 (23 June 1993),
paras. 1–4.
57 Sen, A., “Human rights and Asian values”, 16th Morgenthau Memorial Lecture on Ethics and
Foreign Policy 10–13 (1997), available at http://www.cceia.org/media/254_sen.pdf
62 Asian Yearbook of International Law
the society”.58 This needs to be understood as the central feature for governance in
general and is not particular to any society or level of development. As the United
Nations Development Programme explains, it is essential to have “a conducive
environment for people, individually and collectively, to develop their full potential
and to have a reasonable chance of leading productive and creative lives in accord
with their needs and interests”.59 To achieve this goal it is necessary to ensure that
“[p]olitical, social and economic priorities are based on a broad consensus in
society and that the voice of the poorest and most vulnerable are heard in the
decision-making over allocation of development resources”.60 Furthermore, as the
Commission on Human Rights has explained:
Transparent, responsible, accountable and participatory government, responsive to
the needs and aspirations of the people, including members of vulnerable and mar-
ginalized groups, is the foundation on which good governance rests and that such a
foundation is a sine qua non condition for the full realization of human rights,
including the right to development.61
Values and principles such as these are not particular to any culture or society and
efforts to move to the realization of these values and principles cannot be frustrated
by arguments of incompatibility. As a former Director of the Singapore Inter-
national Foundation has pointed out, the debate about democracy and human rights
is not essentially a difference in ideology or foundational beliefs as everyone is
“reaching for the same thing: the right mix of values which makes for good govern-
ment and a good political community”.62 The practice emerging from the UN is an
understanding of democracy that is universal in its principles and given that this has
come from the UN, the argument that it is not universally applicable becomes more
difficult to sustain.63
Based on this it is asserted that if ASEAN is going to pursue a course of
increased integration along with a more developed role in governance, there is a
strong expectation, if not requirement, that democratic forms are to be adopted at
all levels. In many respects this will require a major shift in the way in which govern-
ance has been viewed in the region as it is commonly associated with semi-
authoritarian, elite-led systems. Recent developments in ASEAN have demonstrated
58 Macpherson, C.B., The Real World of Democracy, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966, at 37.
59 UNDP, Human Development Report (1990), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990, at 1.
60 Weiss, F. and de Waart, P., “International economic law with a human face: an introductory
view” in Weiss et al. (eds.), International Economic Law with a Human Face, The Hague: Kluwer,
1998, at 9.
61 Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2005/68, “The role of good governance in the
promotion and protection of human rights” (20 April 2005), para. 4.
62 Quoted in de Jonge, H., “Democracy and economic development in the Asia-Pacific region:
the role of parliamentary institutions”, 14 Human Rights Law Journal 302 (1993).
63 Joyner, C., “The United Nations and democracy”, 5 Global Governance 333 (1999).
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a significant shift in viewpoints providing a solid base for democratic governance in
the region. Crucially the type of democracy that is being asserted is one of a sub-
stantive nature that depends upon wide-based and active participation in all spheres
of society. If the ongoing rhetoric in the region concerning democracy is imple-
mented and realized in practice, ASEAN will provide a leading model for multi-level
democratic governance that overcomes the focus on the territorially bounded State
and embraces a view of democracy that moves beyond the minimalist conceptions
to a more substantive view that is true to the emancipatory ideals inherent in
democracy.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF ASEAN AND REGIONAL GOVERNANCE
ASEAN was officially created in 1967 when the Foreign Ministers of Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand signed the Bangkok Declaration
recognizing that “mutual interests and common problems” necessitate cooperation
among States in a world that was becoming “increasingly interdependent”.64 The
Declaration set out a belief in “the cherished ideals of peace, freedom, social justice
and economic well-being” which, it is stated, are best attained through “good under-
standing, good neighbourliness and meaningful cooperation”.65 The Declaration
also set out the aims and purposes of ASEAN which included the acceleration of
economic growth, social progress and cultural development through joint
endeavours, the promotion of “regional peace and stability through abiding respect
for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region and
adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter” and the promotion of
“active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common interest in the
economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields”.66 At first
glance the Bangkok Declaration sets out, albeit in general terms, a strong commit-
ment to an integration project that is wide ranging and holds human values, such as
freedom, social justice and economic wellbeing as central guiding principles. How-
ever, the development of ASEAN took a different course based more on the interests
of the leaders of the Member States than a concern for greater cooperation or a
pursuit of human values.
At the outset ASEAN’s commitment to integration is brought into question by
the fact that the initial Declaration was agreed at the ministerial level and not head
of State level. The first head of State summit was held in 1976 where the Treaty of
Amity and Cooperation in South-east Asia was adopted, a document which further
established basic principles that would guide the development of ASEAN in a direc-
tion that did not embrace a strong integration project influenced by human values,
64 The ASEAN declaration (8 August 1967), available at http://www.aseansec.org/1212.htm
65 The ASEAN declaration, preamble, indent 3.
66 The ASEAN declaration, para. 2.
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preferring instead to protect the interests of the individual Member States. Article 2
of the treaty sets out the “fundamental principles” to guide the relations among the
Member States. These include:
(a) mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity
and national identity of all nations;
(b) the right of every State to lead its national existence free from external
interference, subversion or coercion;
(c) non-interference in the internal affairs of one another;
(d) settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means;
(e) renunciation of the threat or use of force;
(f ) effective cooperation among themselves.67
These principles are based strongly on respect for State sovereignty and non-
intervention in domestic affairs and when taken to a logical conclusion they are
inimical to the promotion of human interests. This resulted in an integration project
that was only loosely constructed with a lack of binding obligations or significant
institutional machinery and little concern for human security and development. This
is evidenced by the creation of a High Council as a dispute settlement mechanism,
but only with the authority “to take cognizance of the existence of disputes or
situations likely to disturb regional peace and harmony”68 and only recently has the
body adopted its own rules of procedure. On the other hand, the protection of State
sovereignty through respect of non-interference in domestic affairs has three explicit
mentions in the Treaty.69
Given the political context of the region the foundations of ASEAN are
unsurprising. During the post-colonial period and through the Cold War the indi-
vidual States of the region faced a number of threats to their independence and
security, coming from the superpowers, their own neighbours and internal insur-
gency. It has been remarked that the only real common ground among the States was
a common reaction to the threat posed by communist insurgent groups and a rejec-
tion of outside, mainly Western, influences in the region.70 This means that the first
couple of decades of ASEAN’s existence saw minimal concern for an integration
project and more attention to managing relations among members with ASEAN
acting only as a forum for diplomatic cooperation.71 This path for regional cooper-
67 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (24 February 1976), available at http://
www.aseansec.org/1217.htm
68 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, Art. 14.
69 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, Arts. 2, 10 and 11.
70 Acharya, loc. cit., n. 54, at 379.
71 Kahler, M., “Legalization as strategy: the Asia-Pacific case”, 54 International Organization 551
(2000); and Acharya, A., Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the
Problem of Regional Order, London: Routledge, 2001, at 47.
Lessons from ASEAN 65
ation meant a strong reluctance against any sort of external scrutiny to the nature
of the political systems of the Member States which had a direct impact on the
ability of the organization to be involved in democracy and promote democracy and
human rights in the region.72
The development of ASEAN with its strict adherence to respect for sovereign
equality and non-intervention into domestic affairs led to a particular way of doing
things in the organizational setting which has come to be labelled the ASEAN Way.
This particular method of interaction has been subject to a number of interpret-
ations but common features include the practice of mutual respect among members,
respect for the sovereign equality of States, non-intervention into the domestic
affairs of States, the use of discussion and dialogue over confrontation, and achiev-
ing agreement through consensus and informal discussions.73 Adherence to the
ASEAN Way has resulted in regional cooperation being based on loose integration,
no strong institutional mechanisms and no commitment to any sort of values or
principles that may have impacted upon State sovereignty. While the ASEAN Way
has been attributed with success in a number of ways, it has also been seen as “a
euphemism for ‘talk only’, for the pursuit of a hopelessly anachronistic non-
intervention policy” that is more about “national elites protecting themselves against
a possibly rebellious populace”.74 Commentators have emphasized that adherence to
the ASEAN Way is more about elites ensuring regime survival. The obvious result of
this is that there has been no real commitment to an integration project that would
limit State sovereignty. The principles of regional organization based on the ASEAN
Way will not have the connection to the people that is necessary for success and will
not gain the legitimacy necessary for the organization to have a significant role in
governance.75 It is worth noting that even though the ASEAN Way is often charac-
terized as a particular socio-cultural approach it has been clearly based on prevailing
principles and practices of general international law – a strong adherence to sover-
eignty, consensus decision making amongst States and non-intervention in domestic
affairs. But as the international system has generally undergone a recent evolution in
how areas such as sovereign equality and non-intervention are understood, the
foundations of ASEAN will also need to move away from the State- or elite-centric
view inherent in the current understanding of the ASEAN Way in order to engage
in cooperative activities based on human values – something for which there is
substantial evidence in recent practice.
As ASEAN evolved from its early beginnings, concern for democratic govern-
ance and human rights protection within Member States and for the organization
itself was not a priority. The political and social systems of the Member States were
maintained through strong, quasi-autocratic regimes where there was an acceptance
72 Acharya, loc. cit., n. 54, at 375 and 378.
73 See Acharya, op. cit., n. 71, at 63–70.
74 Öjendal, loc. cit., n. 54, at 523.
75 Acharya, loc. cit., n. 54, at 376; and Kahler, loc. cit., n. 71, at 549.
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of strong government in the name of stability and economic performance.76 At the
regional level the emphasis was upon ensuring good relations among members and
avoiding any sensitive issues that may create conflict.77 However, at the Third Heads
of State Summit in 1987 there were a number of statements directly related to
ASEAN’s role in governance, along with principled commitments to democracy. In
the Manila Declaration it was stated there was a need to “promote increased aware-
ness of ASEAN, wider involvement and increased participation and cooperation by
the peoples of ASEAN”.78 It was further stated that greater effort was needed to
ensure the participation of women and young people in the development process and
“that ASEAN has to develop strong and efficient public administration in the region
to ensure balanced and systematic coordination among economic development,
social development and the environment of the region”.79
This Declaration was significant for a number of reasons. In a region where
participation of individuals and groups and a concern for the marginalized were not
prevalent, a public declaration on the importance of widespread and active partici-
pation is noteworthy, even if it was just rhetorical posturing. Also in 1987 the inter-
national system as a whole had not taken much concern for the promotion and
protection of democracy as the full-scale demise of communist regimes was still
about two years away. Finally the expressed commitment to increased participation
from individuals generally, and subaltern groups in particular, is a major step
towards substantive democratic principles and a human-centred approach to inte-
gration, and a rejection of minimalist forms of democracy. In some respects the
Manila Declaration was a prescient observation on the future of ASEAN’s
approach to governance in the region.
The Manila Declaration did not spur on any immediate developments in the
region and the changes to the international system at the end of the Cold War with
regard to the emergence of democracy as an international legal principle did not
immediately have an impact upon the actions of ASEAN. In 1997 the adoption of
ASEAN Vision 2020, which set out a plan for the future direction of regional organ-
ization among the Member States, marks a significant point for governance in the
region.80 Vision 2020 expresses the need to “develop and strengthen ASEAN’s
institutions and mechanisms to enable ASEAN to realize the Vision and respond to
76 Turnbull, C.M., “Regionalism and nationalism” in Tarling (ed.), The Cambridge History of
Southeast Asia. From World War II to the Present, Vol. 4, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999, at 306.
77 Acharya, loc. cit., n. 54, at 380; and Narine, S., “ASEAN in the aftermath: the consequences of
the East Asian economic crisis”, 8 Global Governance 180 (2002).
78 Manila Declaration of the Third ASEAN Summit (15 December 1987), para. 4, available at
http://www.aseansec.org/5117.htm
79 Joint Communiqué of the Third ASEAN Summit (14–15 December 1987), paras. 48 and
52–53, available at http://www.aseansec.org/5107.htm
80 ASEAN Vision 2020, 2nd informal ASEAN summit (14–16 December 1997), available at
http://www.aseansec.org/5228.htm
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the challenges of the coming century”. The main idea behind Vision 2020 is the
creation of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, along with a commitment to
greater economic integration, the full implementation of the ASEAN Free Trade
Area, further liberalization and increased cooperation in a range of areas. Within
this there is a commitment to address poverty and socioeconomic disparities and the
belief that peace and stability is only possible “where the causes for conflict have
been eliminated, through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law”.
The most important part of Vision 2020 is the idea of a Community of Caring
Societies. The Community of Caring Societies is based on the creation of conditions
“where all people enjoy equitable access to opportunities for total human develop-
ment regardless of gender, race, religion, language, or social and cultural back-
ground” and “where the civil society is empowered and gives special attention to
the disadvantaged, disabled and marginalized and where social justice and the rule
of law reign”. Crucially it is stated that within this future vision of ASEAN, govern-
ance will be based on the consent and greater participation of the people, along with
a “focus on the welfare and dignity of the human person and the good of the
community”.
Vision 2020 has become a blueprint for all future action taken with regard to
regional cooperation and its broad principles have been repeated and reinforced in a
variety of declarations and commitments. At the 1998 Hanoi Summit it was stated
that “the ultimate objective of economic development is to raise standards of living
and to promote human development in all its dimensions, so as to enable the people
of ASEAN to have the fullest opportunity to realize their potential”.81 The Hanoi
Plan of Action calls for the “exchange of information in the field of human rights
among ASEAN Countries in order to promote and protect all human rights and
fundamental freedoms of all peoples” in line with international human rights law.82
This measure is significant at two levels. It represents one of the first attempts by
ASEAN to coordinate activities of the Member States with regard to human rights
protection. Secondly, it places the regional protection of human rights firmly in line
with the international system demonstrating there is not a substantive divergence
between the two.83 The Hanoi Summit also expressed support for the traditional
principles of ASEAN with a declaration that ASEAN’s success in ensuring regional
peace and stability was due to the “cardinal principles of mutual respect, non-
interference, consensus, dialogue and consultation”. Now these State-centric
81 Hanoi Declaration of the Sixth ASEAN Summit (16 December 1998), para. 21, available at
http://www.aseansec.org/8752.htm
82 Hanoi Plan of Action, paras. 4.8–4.9, available at http://www.aseansec.org/8754.htm
83 There is no consistent position among ASEAN States with regard to participation in and
engagement with international human rights law. Cambodia, the Philippines, Thailand and
Vietnam have signed both international Covenants along with some of the other major UN
human rights treaties. With regard to other States in Asia, it is important to note that Japan,
China and Korea have subscribed to the major UN treaties, making claims that international
human rights law is not applicable to Asian societies difficult to sustain.
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principles are being interpreted alongside principles that work to promote and
protect human values.
Two years after the adoption of the Vision 2020 a report was released by an
Eminent Persons Group (Vision 2020 Report) setting out what is needed for Vision
2020 to be realized.84 The Report makes its overall tenor clear at the outset where it
states that:
the peoples of ASEAN must themselves be involved, i.e., take ownership, of the
ASEAN Vision 2020, and that ASEAN matters should not only be the prerogative of
governments, but also of businesses, the civil society and ultimately, the people. We
believe that the long-term aim has to be the realization of human security and devel-
opment in the whole ASEAN region.85
Vision 2020 introduced the idea of supporting participation and, through the idea of
a Community of Caring Societies, fostering a human-centred approach to govern-
ance. The Vision 2020 Report takes this even further by placing people at the centre
of the cooperation project and placing the aim of regional integration as the realiz-
ation of human security. The concept of human security is important for building a
system of regional governance that is based on human needs and in line with the
principles of democracy discussed above. As the Vision 2020 Report explains,
the concept of human security and development means “that the ultimate aim of
all [ASEAN] endeavours is to improve the quality of life of ASEAN’s peoples in all
its aspects”.86 The Report is extremely forthright in promoting the need for dem-
ocracy by stating that the leaders of the Member States need to allow for greater
participation for individual processes of governance. It explains:
When there is association, people experience a sense of belonging and neighbourli-
ness – we have the desirable social values of identity, community and social cohesion.
Finally, when there is participation, and people feel involved in public affairs, and feel
that they are being listened to, we will have a society that is inclusive, just and
equitable.87
The views of the Vision 2020 Report are significant as they set out an approach to
democratic governance that is in line with developments at the international level but
placed in the context of the social and cultural conditions of the region.
Further developments in the integration project continued with the adoption of
84 Report of the ASEAN Eminent Persons Group on Vision 2020 the people’s ASEAN (herein-
after Vision 2020 Report) (22–25 November 2000), available at http://www.aseansec.org/
5304.htm
85 Vision 2020 Report, Exec. summary, para. 4 (emphasis in the original).
86 Vision 2020 Report, section 2.4.
87 Vision 2020 Report, section 7.
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ASEAN Concord II in 2003.88 This marked a major step in the regional integration
project calling for the establishment of an ASEAN Community based on three
pillars consisting of political and security cooperation, economic cooperation and
socio-cultural cooperation. Concord II retains much of the past approach to
regional relations as it confirms the importance of non-interference and consensus
in decision-making. As with past agreements the Concord II did not set out specific
details or obligations. Its importance lies in the expressed commitment to further
ASEAN’s role in regional governance and when read in the context of other docu-
ments adopted around this time, it does leave the door open for the fostering of
democratic governance as a guiding principle for the region.89
The ideas of Concord II were further articulated in the Vientiane Action
Programme (VAP) where there are calls for comprehensive integration, a further
strengthening of ASEAN’s institutional framework and, as a major factor in
developing a more coherent approach to integration, the adoption of an ASEAN
Charter. The VAP also sets out further details concerning the creation of the three
communities agreed to in Concord II. There is also an explicit pledge to democracy
in the VAP through the ASEAN Security Community (ASC) which “embodies
ASEAN’s aspirations to achieve peace, stability, democracy and prosperity in
the region”.90 There remains reference to the well-established principles of non-
intervention in domestic affairs, consensus-based decision-making and respect for
the national sovereignty, but these have now become less intransigent through the
continued reference to various human-centred norms and values that have clearly
become part of ASEAN’s aspirations at this stage. This is further supported through
the action plan for the ASC which specifically States the need for the “promotion of
a just, democratic and harmonious environment and for the promotion of human
rights in the region”.91 One of the key aspects of the action plan for ASC is the
promotion of popular participation in political systems along with the exchange of
experiences in order to enhance the efforts of fostering popular participation.92 This
suggests not only the importance of fostering democracy within States but also
brings in a transnational element that will influence regional developments as well.
At the 2005 ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur the Member States took a major
step in regional integration and governance by formally starting the process for an
ASEAN Charter leading to the creation of the ASEAN Community.93 The Charter
88 Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (7 October 2003), available at http://www.aseansec.org/
15159.htm
89 Ferguson, J., “ASEAN Concord II: policy prospects for participant regional ‘development’ ”,
26 Contemporary Southeast Asia 399–400 (2004).
90 Vientiane Action Programme, 10th ASEAN Summit (29–30 November 2004), at 6, available at
http://www.aseansec.org/VAP-10th%20ASEAN%20Summit.pdf
91 The ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Plan of Action, 10th ASEAN Summit (29–30
November 2004), available at http://www.aseansec.org/16829.htm
92 Vientiane Action Programme, at 29.
93 Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN Charter (12 December 2005),
available at http://www.aseansec.org/18030.htm
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is described as a necessary development in order to evolve and adapt to the political
and economic changes and challenges facing the region. The Charter is envisaged as
providing the necessary legal and institutional framework for ASEAN to realize its
goals and objectives. It is declared that the Charter will reaffirm the principles, goals
and ideals of ASEAN as set out in the major agreements to date, “as well as the
principles of inter-State relations in accordance with the UN Charter and estab-
lished international law that promote and protect ASEAN community interests as
well as inter-State relations and the national interests of the individual ASEAN
Member Countries”.94 This is a peculiar statement as it appears the leaders are
claiming that only certain parts of international law will be applicable to the integra-
tion project. The Declaration goes on to list particular areas of international law and
the list is wide ranging.95 For the purposes here there are a few points worth high-
lighting. There is an express commitment to the “promotion of democracy, human
rights and obligations, transparency and good governance and strengthening demo-
cratic institutions” and a pledge to ensure that the States in the region “live at peace
with one another and with the world at large in a just, democratic and harmonious
environment”. At the same time there is a call for “Mutual respect for the independ-
ence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations”
and “The right of every State to lead its national existence free from external inter-
ference, subversion or coercion and non-interference in the internal affairs of one
another”. It would be hard to judge if the listing of international law commitments
in the Declaration is done with any sort of priority or hierarchy but these latter
principles come well down the list. In previous ASEAN Declarations they were the
first points to be made. The latter points are well established principles of inter-
national law and the promotion and protection of democracy is still an emerging
area with imprecise obligations in international law. The extent to which the leaders
of ASEAN have committed themselves to democracy in the Kuala Lumpur Declar-
ation has set the scene for the next stage in the integration project through the
adoption of an ASEAN Charter.
The Kuala Lumpur Summit appointed an Eminent Persons Group to start the
process towards the adoption of an ASEAN Charter. The Report of the Eminent
Persons Group on the ASEAN Charter (ASEAN Charter Report) was released in
December 2006 and using its own terminology, it sets out a number of “bold and
visionary ideas”.96 The Report is a combination of proposed institutional archi-
tecture, practical suggestions for future action and an elaboration of principles to
guide the future of regional integration. In terms of structure the Report calls for the
creation of an ASEAN Council consisting of heads of State and government as the
supreme policy-making organ; a Secretary-General and a significantly enhanced
Secretariat;97 and three Councils of the ASEAN Community to deal with the three
94 Ibid., para. 4.
95 See Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN Charter, n. 93, para. 4.
96 ASEAN Charter Report, exec. summary, para. 1.
97 ASEAN Charter Report, paras. 36–37.
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pillars of political, security and legal affairs, economic and financial affairs and
socio-cultural affairs.
In the ASEAN Charter Report the importance of international legal rules and
norms is continually reinforced. When charting the historical development of
ASEAN integration it is noted that principles such as the sovereign equality of all
Member States, respect for independence and territorial integrity, non-use of force
and non-interference in internal affairs have served the organization well. It is then
noted that changes in the international system have necessitated change by ASEAN
and its Member States in both practical and principled terms.98 It is recommended
that the Preamble of the ASEAN Charter should set out the basic principles and
objectives of ASEAN which are a commitment to democracy, respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law. These are seen as indispensable
conditions for stability, peace and development in the region.99 Under the heading
Objectives it is suggested that the Charter “should reaffirm and codify the principle
objectives contained in ASEAN’s milestone declarations, agreements, concords and
treaties”.100 The first such objective listed is the enhancement of peace, security,
stability, democracy, good governance and equitably shared prosperity.101 The inclu-
sion of democracy and good governance demonstrates the shift in objectives that has
occurred in ASEAN in recent years as these do not have a long history in the
region’s priorities.
Under the heading of Principles conflicting norms are set out as there is an
attempt to combine the more traditional principles of international law with ones of
much more recent nature. The first principles articulated include respect for sover-
eign equality, national identity and freedom from external interference. These are
then followed by respect for human rights and “rejection of unconstitutional and
undemocratic changes of government”. Also included in the list of principles is a
“commitment to develop democracy, promote good governance and uphold human
rights and the rule of law, and to establish appropriate mechanisms for these pur-
poses”. In this regard the Charter proposals also include establishing mechanisms
for the monitoring of membership obligations and measures for ensuring compli-
ance with the principles and objectives of the Charter. A monitoring system at the
regional level is a noteworthy development given the long entrenched adherence to
non-intervention. Monitoring systems in international organizations vary in their
intensity and scope. The proposals in the Charter Report call for the use of settle-
ment mechanisms with regard to a wide range of obligations, including democracy,
with the potential for suspension.102 There is also the suggestion of creating a human
rights mechanism for the region.103 The ASEAN Charter Report provides a relatively
98 ASEAN Charter Report, para. 7–10.
99 ASEAN Charter Report, para. 55.
100 ASEAN Charter Report, para. 57.
101 ASEAN Charter Report, para. 58.
102 ASEAN Charter Report, paras. 31–32.
103 ASEAN Charter Report, para. 47.
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decent balance between maintaining the interests of the Member States while
attempting to address the need for democratic governance in the integration project.
Following the Charter Report a High Level Task Force was appointed to draft a
Charter document for discussion at the November 2007 ASEAN Summit.104 The
Summit adopted the ASEAN Charter, a document which takes on some of the
suggestions from the ASEAN Charter Report but is more of a compromise between
new principles and old practices with the old practices having the more prominent
role. At the same time the ASEAN Charter does recognize, in a legal text, the
importance of democracy, human rights and more people-centred governance for
the region. The Charter consists of 13 chapters and 55 articles setting out the prin-
ciples and purposes of the organization, the institutional structure for ASEAN,
along with provisions on decision making and dispute settlement. In the preamble
the need for further regional integration is recognized as a means to respond to
current and future challenges. The preamble also refers to the “collective desires” of
the States in the region to live peacefully, to promote their interests and security,
and to ensure sustainable development along with the wellbeing, development and
welfare of the societies in the region.
Article 1 contains the purposes of ASEAN with fifteen different points set out
ranging from broad, general purposes to very specific objectives. There is the main-
tenance of peace and security, greater regional cooperation in political, security,
economic and socio-cultural fields, and increased economic integration through the
creation of a single market in the region with free movement of goods, services,
capital and labour. The expressed purposes also contain a range of new areas dir-
ected at human interests and concerns. There is a commitment to “strengthen dem-
ocracy, enhance good governance and the rule of law, and to promote and protect
human rights and fundamental freedoms” and to the enhancement of the well-being
and livelihood of people through “equitable access to opportunities for human
development, social welfare and justice”. There is also a commitment to promote a
“people-orientated ASEAN” whereby all individuals are encouraged and able to
participate in the process of integration.
Article 2 sets out the principles that will guide the pursuit of the Article 1
purposes. There is a standalone entry that sets out a general reaffirmation of adher-
ence to the fundamental principles of ASEAN as expressed in previous declarations,
agreements, treaties, concords and other instruments. This is then followed by a
list of 14 particular principles many of which reiterate the fundamental principles
already alluded to, such as respect for independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial
integrity and national identity among the Member States; an emphasis on the peace-
ful settlement of disputes; non-interference in internal affairs; and the right of every
Member State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subver-
sion and coercion. These State-centric principles will minimize the impact of the
104 “Cebu Declaration on the Blueprint of the ASEAN Charter” (13 January 2007), available at
http://www.aseansec.org/19257.htm
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ASEAN Charter as they can be referred to by the Member States in order to deflect
any scrutiny or criticism from the regional institutions. At the same time newer
principles are also articulated that mark a move away from the past State centre
orientation, such as adherence to the rule of law, good governance, democracy
and constitutional governance along with respect for fundamental freedoms, the
promotion and protection of human rights and social justice.
The extent to which the Charter marks a change in the way governance in the
region is carried out will depend heavily on the actions of the Charter institutions.
The Member States retain overall control of the integration project through the
ASEAN Summit which is the “supreme policy-making body of ASEAN” consisting
of heads of State and government. The Summit has responsibility for overall policy
guidance and decisions on key issues, including adherence to the Charter obliga-
tions.105 Article 5 provides that the Member States “shall take all necessary measures,
including the enactment of appropriate domestic legislation, to effectively
implement the provisions of this Charter and to comply with all obligations of
membership”. The ASEAN Secretary-General is responsible for monitoring the
implementation of ASEAN agreements and efforts have been made to ensure the
neutrality of the office. It stated that the office is not to “seek or receive instructions
from any government or external party” and there is an undertaking by the Member
States not to influence the Secretary-General in any way. At the same time, the
Charter also provides that the Secretary-General serves at the pleasure of the heads
of State and governments, which leaves open the potential of political consider-
ations determining the functioning of the role. The extent to which Article 5 has any
impact will depend on the forthrightness of the Secretary-General and how this
aspect of the office is approached in practice. Article 20 deals with “serious”
breaches of membership obligations where the matter will be referred to the ASEAN
Summit for a decision on what action is to be taken.
For the purposes here one of the more significant developments is the call for the
creation of an ASEAN Human Rights Body. It is stated that this is a necessary
development for conforming to the principles and purposes of the Charter.106 There
are no further details provided as the specific terms of the body and its mandate are
to be decided later by the ASEAN foreign ministers. This is likely to be one of the
more closely watched developments of the ASEAN Charter process, for if a human
rights monitoring mechanism based on international law is created it will be the first
of its kind in the region and is likely to have a substantial impact on the nature of
governance in the region.
The adopted Charter is not as bold in its approach to governance as the version
prepared by the Eminent Persons Group. In the adopted version State values pre-
dominate and the emphasis given to democracy, human rights and participation in
the ASEAN Charter Report have been toned down considerably. This is disappoint-
ing given the prominent role given in the various declarations leading up to the final
105 ASEAN Charter, Art. 7.
106 ASEAN Charter, Art. 14.
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Charter to the fostering of widespread participation among individuals and groups
in the process of governance at multiple levels in the region. In the Charter Report,
respect for democracy and human rights is seen as a fundamental principle and
central to the objectives for the region based on the idea of ASEAN becoming a
“people-centred organization”.107
The Charter has started off on very weak ground with regard to the idea of a
people-centred organization. There was very little public consultation or involve-
ment in the drafting of the Charter and given the unrepresentative nature of many
of the Member States it was a process that was wholly elite led. This runs contrary
to the Charter Report where there are several references to the need for ensuring
individuals and societies have an active role to play in the region and for ensuring
that the integration project works to the benefit of all individuals and not to their
detriment. The Charter Report suggested the establishment of various channels
allowing for differing forms of consultation, participation and interaction among
various groups and actors,108 but there is no evidence that this has been acted upon.
In fact the government of Burma (Myanmar) was allowed to the Charter despite the
recent events in that country which appear to be contrary to many of the Purposes
and Principles proclaimed in the document.
It appears that the Charter has not brought about any immediate changes to the
overall approach to governance in the region. If the integration project continues to
be dominated by the regional elite it is unlikely it will receive the widespread support
envisaged in the various declarations adopted in the run-up to the Charter. This will
be further exacerbated by the pursuit of a single market based on market liberaliza-
tion and competitive free-market economies.109 If ASEAN follows the dominant
trends in the international system this means the neo-liberalism will have a strong
influence on future developments, and democracy with regards to governance will be
understood in minimalist terms. A strong and unquestioning adherence to free mar-
ket forces and the quest for competitiveness potentially compromise the political and
social dimensions of democracy as technocratic elites pursue policies and objectives
at a considerable distance from those most affected and often without regard for the
impact these policies and practice have on individuals. The experience of the Euro-
pean Union has demonstrated that an elite-led project based on free-market ideas
will result in widespread disillusionment and bring the entire integration project into
question. As a result the EU has made attempts to address concerns over democracy
and the impact of neo-liberalism but it has not been done in a comprehensive
manner and appears more as an afterthought.110
In one sense ASEAN has already addressed this problem, as calls for greater
economic integration have been accompanied by an emphasis on greater participa-
tion by the people of the region and the upholding of social welfare provisions. The
107 ASEAN Charter Report, para. 47.
108 ASEAN Charter Report, paras. 47–48.
109 Vision 2020 Report, section 3; and Vientiane Action Programme 9.
110 See Burchill, loc. cit., n. 11, at 198.
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expressed commitment to ensure a Community of Caring Societies is important so
long as it is constructed in a concrete way ensuring “equitable access to opportun-
ities for total human development regardless of gender, race, religion, language, or
social and cultural background”.111 This will require the idea of a Community of
Caring Societies being an equal priority to economic integration so that it ensures
the process as a whole is undertaken “with the consent and greater participation of
the people with its focus on the welfare and dignity of the human person and the
good of the community”. In some respects there appears to be a strong commitment
to ensuring human values are at the core of the integration project and that indi-
viduals are given the opportunity to participate in the processes that impact upon
their lives.112
However, as already stated, the Charter does not mark a major shift in this
direction. If the Vision 2020 agenda is to be realized two things need to occur in the
region – ASEAN as a regional arrangement needs to take an active stance in govern-
ance and the Member States need to take their commitments and obligations ser-
iously. This is going to require a major shift in attitudes and practices in the region as
the Member States have long resisted any form of intervention in their affairs.113 The
Charter Report recognizes this challenge and concludes with the view that:
ASEAN Member States need to accord higher national priority to ASEAN in their
domestic agendas as well as make a conscious effort to promote the benefits of closer
regional integration.114
In the ASEAN Charter the regional organization is only given a central role with
regard to external affairs.115 Only time will tell the extent to which the Member States
take seriously the principles and purposes contained in the Charter. As there is a mix
of State-centric and human-centred approaches in the Charter it will be up to the
institutions of ASEAN to move the region in the direction of human-centred
governance based on principles of democracy and human rights as set out in inter-
national law. Given the nature of the final Charter document and the past history of
the region this would appear to be an insurmountable task. However, the continued
reference to democracy and human rights that is already in place cannot be ignored
as it will become more and more difficult for State leaders and the organization itself
to ignore what has been said and agreed to. Studies have shown that over time broad
rhetorical principles become more influential and place increasing pressures on
States to comply.116 Over the past 10 years of so there has been an increasing
111 Vision 2020.
112 See Vientiane Action Programme, 17.
113 Narine, loc. cit., n. 77, at 186.
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momentum in support of the promotion and protection of human rights in the
region, which follows on from similar developments in the international system more
widely. The Charter does articulate the need for the promotion and protection of
democracy and human rights in the region providing a basis for change.
THE FUTURE OF ASEAN AND REGIONAL GOVERNANCE
As part of ASEAN’s 40th anniversary celebrations it was stated that the creation of
an ASEAN Charter would be a crowning achievement.117 It would be hard to con-
clude that the agreed Charter is of this nature as it adheres strongly to past principles
and practices. If the Member States are serious about entering into a new phase of
regional integration it will be essential to make a clear break with the past and the
traditional understanding given to the ASEAN Way – commonly understood as a
façade of regional cooperation as a veil to cover the more substantive pursuit of
individual national interest by the Member States.118 The various reports and declar-
ations leading up to the ASEAN Charter have brought into question the traditional
approach to the ASEAN Way and have called for it to be substantively reconsidered.
The Vision 2020 Report explains that for the future of regional integration the
ASEAN Way is not sufficient and the time has come to shift from processes to
institutional structures that will allow a more coherent approach to integration and
cooperation in the region.119 The ASEAN Charter Report calls for the need to
improve on the ASEAN Way with less emphasis on non-interference and increased
emphasis on greater cooperation in the pursuit of the common interest.120
This does not mean that the ASEAN Way is now a discredited idea. Instead
there needs to be a commitment to revising it so that it not only consists of the
traditional core values that have brought the region to its current position but so that
it also embraces the range of human values that have been articulated in the ASEAN
Charter Report and other documents. If the ASEAN Charter is to evolve into the
manner suggested in the Charter Report then the ASEAN Way will become a model
for other regional and universal integration projects as it strives to balance the
interests of States with the interests of individuals and groups in society. As
explained above, the prominence of human values in the form of substantive human
rights protection, an emphasis on democracy at all levels and attention given to
marginalized groups in society provide a solid foundation for the future of govern-
ance in the region. The Vision 2020 Report makes clear that these values and prac-
tices have to be placed as the centre of the integration project and not be seen as
peripheral measures:
117 Cebu Declaration on the Blueprint of the ASEAN Charter (13 January 2007), available at
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We would add that the empowerment, participation and involvement of the people in
ASEAN towards building a resilient and highly cohesive and competitive ASEAN
in the global environment must be implemented with the greatest sense of urgency.
The forces of globalization, which may give rise to undesirable effects, should be
countered by a conscious effort to cater to human security and development in all its
dimensions.121
ASEAN now has a broad range of expressed principles and values that involve a
communal approach to governance based on the needs and interests of the indi-
viduals and societies in the region. These principles and values have strong founda-
tions in existing international law where they are slowly overtaking the primacy of
State interests.122 In the global context the Commission on Human Rights has
declared that “the widest participation in the democratic dialogue by all sectors
and actors of society must be promoted in order to come to agreements on
appropriate solutions to the social, economic, and cultural problems of a society”.
The Commission has also called for democratic systems that are
inspired by the recognition of the inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable
rights of all members of the human family, promotes people’s welfare, rejecting all
forms of discrimination and exclusion, facilitates development with equity and just-
ice, and encourages the most comprehensive and full participation of their citizens in
the decision-making process and in the debate over diverse issues affecting society.123
The approach of ASEAN towards a people-centred organization, if manifested in
practice, will provide crucial lessons for the future of governance throughout the
international system.
The move from rhetoric to actual practice will not be an easy journey. The region
has a long history of avoiding binding legal obligations or confronting Member
States that act contrary to agreed principles and practices. There has been a gradual
evolution of monitoring mechanisms in some areas, but these have not been utilized
to any great degree and views are mixed on the impact they have had on the
traditional principle of non-intervention.124 When Thailand experienced a non-
121 This may be contrasted with the recent steps taken by the Pacific Islands Forum in furthering
integration in that part of Asia-Pacific. In the action plan agreed to, considerations of democracy
and human rights do not receive the same sort of priority expressed in ASEAN initiatives. See
Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, “A pacific plan for strengthening regional cooperation and
integration” (September 2005), available at http://www.pacificplan.org
122 For a broad overview of developments of this nature, see Meron, T., The Humanization of
International Law, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2006.
123 Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2005/29, para. 14.
124 Haacke, J., “ASEAN’s diplomatic and security culture: a constructivist assessment”, 3 Inter-
national Relations of the Asia-Pacific 60–61, 74–75 (2003); and Solingen, E., “ASEAN cooper-
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78 Asian Yearbook of International Law
democratic change of government in 2006, ASEAN and its Member States remained
silent. The situation in Burma has long been a delicate issue for the organization.
Burma was due to hold the ASEAN chairmanship in 2006 but after a great deal of
pressure from international actors and, it appears, other Member States, the gov-
ernment voluntarily decided to postpone its chairmanship. During this time ASEAN
as an organization and the Member States were reluctant to speak publicly about
Burma’s position.
Things have been slightly different in response to the events at the end of 2007.
ASEAN foreign ministers released a public statement condemning Burma’s crack-
down in uncharacteristically strong terms. The statement says the ministers were
“appalled” at the actions taken by the government and expressed their “revulsion”
with regard to reports on the use of violent force and resulting deaths. They further
called on Burma’s leaders to work towards a peaceful transition to democracy,
emphasizing that the developments in Burma have a “serious impact on the reputa-
tion and credibility of ASEAN”.125 The message that Burma’s recent actions are
contrary to ASEAN principles has been reinforced by individual ASEAN members
in Security Council deliberations on the matter. The representative of Indonesia
expressed the view that Burma has been an active participant in the regional
arrangement’s developments towards democracy making the current actions all the
more difficult to understand. He went on to say: “We cannot look the other way,
because it is impossible to advance together if a member fails to honour the values
espoused by the group.”126 However, the fact that Burma signed the ASEAN Charter
in November 2007 raises some serious questions about the communal commitment
of the region to governance based on democracy and human rights.
The history of ASEAN as a regional integration project has been described as
reactionary, not purposive, an organization with no collective vision, just a collec-
tion of Member States pursuing their own self-interests.127 The ASEAN Charter
Report observes that “ASEAN’s problem is not one of lack of vision, ideas and
action plans. The real problem is one of ensuring compliance and effective imple-
mentation of decisions.”128 And in a rather forthright fashion the Report makes
plain that the Member States have to start taking a communal approach to
regional organization, and that this entails no longer placing a strong adherence on
individual self-interest.129 The ASEAN Charter provides the opportunity for this,
but at the same time also provides for the continuance of past practices. Signifi-
cantly the vision of democracy and human rights that the ASEAN Charter Report
and other ASEAN documents portrays is one that is based on human interests and
125 Statement by ASEAN Chair Singapore’s Minister for Foreign Affairs George Yeo (27
September 2007), available at http://www.aseansec.org/20974.htm
126 Meeting of the UN Security Council, 5 October 2007, UN Doc. S/PV.5753, 7.
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not merely State interests. The emphasis on wide-based participation, the concern
for marginalized groups and the overall tenor of the Community of Caring Soci-
eties in the context of regional integration offers a substantive model of dem-
ocracy that, if implemented, will offer considerable lessons for integration projects
elsewhere.
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EXPORT OF WAR: ISSUES OF INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL
AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY
H. Harry L. Roque, Jr*
Frankly, I’d like to see the government get out of war altogether and
leave the whole feud to private industry.
Major Milo Minderbinder, Joseph Heller, CATCH 22
INTRODUCTION
The US involvement in Iraq now entails the hiring of private security forces (PSF)
to guard its premises and personnel. Hiring is done through a security contractor
with privity of contract with the US government. In turn, the US contractor hires
the individuals to act as security forces. Among those recruited into this PSF are
Filipinos. The recruitment is done openly and with the knowledge of the Philippine
government.
The deployment of PSF to an occupied territory gives rise to the following issues:
(1) Are the private security forces combatants or mercenaries?
(2) Are the private security forces agents of the sending State or the retaining State?
and
(3) Is the sending of mercenaries by a State illegal under international law? Will it
give rise to individual criminal liability?
RECRUITMENT AND PLACEMENT OF FILIPINOS OVERSEAS
The primary laws regulating the activities of private employment agencies in the
Philippines are the Labour Code (Presidential Decree No. 442), the Migrant Work-
ers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995 (Republic Act No. 8042) as well as the rules
and regulations on local and overseas Filipino employment.
* Of the Philippine Bar. B.A. (University of Michigan); L.L.B. (U.P.); LL.M. (London School of
Economics); Assistant Professor, University of the Philippines College of Law; Director, Uni-
versity of the Philippines Law Center Institute of International Legal Studies; Name Partner,
Roque Butuyan Law Office.
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The Labour Code and its subsequent amendments prescribed a stringent
system for licensing and regulating private recruitment agencies. Only Filipino
citizens or corporations whose authorized and capital stock are owned by Filipino
citizens1 and that have substantial capitalization were qualified to receive licences to
recruit and deploy workers.2 The Secretary of Labour was granted full powers to
suspend or withdraw the licence of private recruitment agencies that violated the
law3 as well as restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of these
agencies.4
The Labour Code also established corresponding mechanisms for regulating the
activities of recruitment agencies. These mechanisms included, among others, a ban
on the direct hiring of workers by foreign employers,5 regulation of the collection of
placement fees by recruitment agencies from workers,6 and requirement of a deposit
of cash and surety bonds by recruitment agencies to guarantee compliance with the
law and to ensure satisfaction of liabilities to workers.7
The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) is the sole
government agency for the formulation and implementation of policies and
programmes for the systematic deployment of Filipino workers overseas.8
The POEA closely supervises and monitors private recruitment agencies and
their compliance with the conditions imposed under their licence and the undertak-
ings made by the licence holder.9 A pre-licensing inspection and regular inspections
of the office and of the agency’s records are conducted as part of the monitoring and
regulation measures.10
A licence, being a privilege granted on the basis of qualifications provided by
law, cannot be transferred to another person or company in order to circumvent the
prohibition against certain individuals and entities from participating in the overseas
employment programme.11 The recruitment activities of a licensee may be conducted
only in the place indicated in the licence and only by the person or entity to which
the licence was issued.12 If the licence holder needs to conduct special recruitment
activities outside the office, prior approval must be obtained from the POEA.13
1 Presidential Decree No. 42 (hereinafter cited as Labor Code), Art. 27.
2 Labor Code, Art. 28.
3 Labor Code, Art. 35.
4 Labor Code, Art. 36.
5 Labor Code, Art. 18.
6 Labor Code, Art. 32.
7 Labor Code, Art. 31.
8 Republic Act No. 8042 (hereinafter cited as RA 8042), § 23 b.1.
9 POEA RULES AND REGULATIONS ON THE RECRUITMENT AND EMPLOYMENT
OF LAND-BASED WORKERS, Part II, (hereinafter cited as 2002 Rules), available at http://
www.poea.gov.ph/rules/POEA%20Rules.pdf
10 2002 Rules Part II RULE II § 3.
11 2002 Rules RULE II § 7–9.
12 2002 Rules Part II RULE VI.
13 Ibid.
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Only a licensed employment agency may secure registration or accreditation,
whichever is appropriate, of the foreign principal or employer from the POEA.14 To
be registered, employers or principals must submit certain documents for verification
by the Philippine Overseas Labour Office (POLO).15
A private recruitment agency may not deploy a worker who is not covered by an
employment contract in accordance with the master employment contract submitted
to and approved by the POEA.16
It is the foregoing regulatory regime which makes the issue of possible State
responsibility of the Philippine government for the acts done by PSF problematic.
While they may not be, properly speaking, part of an official State organ, still they
are deployed with the acquiescence, if not outright consent, of the Philippine
government. Whether this will be sufficient basis for attribution will be discussed
in a later part of this article.
RECRUITMENT OF FILIPINOS IN IRAQ
Filipinos are taking up work at US-run facilities in Iraq, providing the US military
and its affiliated contractors cheap, English-speaking manpower.17 This circumvents
an official employment ban by the Philippine government to Iraq since 13 July 200418
after the Philippines recalled its small humanitarian contingent following the threat
by militant captors to behead truck driver Angelo de la Cruz unless Philippine
troops left by 20 July 2004.19 Two years later, an estimated 3,000 out of the total
7,000 Filipinos serving at four US military-run camps in Iraq were undocumented
workers, according to Philippine labour officials.20 Comparatively high wages have
been a push factor: Filipinos in Iraq earn monthly salaries from the US military and
its affiliated business interests ranging between US$600 to $1,000 excluding special
allowances, according to the labour official.21
Despite the “not valid for travel to Iraq” advisory stamped into every Philippine
passport, thousands of Filipinos are openly defying the ban and government offi-
cials are either hard-pressed or unwilling to find a solution to the subversion of the
ban.22 While Philippine labour officials openly admit that many overseas Filipino
workers (OFW) stole into Iraq after the ban was imposed and now work openly
14 2002 Rules Part III Rule I § 3 and § 5; and 2002 Rules Part III RULE II.
15 2002 Rules Part III RULE I § 1 and §4.
16 2002 Rules Part III RULE § 2 (b); and 2002 Rules Part V RULE I.
17 Jimenez, Cher S., “US outsources war to Filipinos”, Asian Times Online, 15 July 2006 (herein-
after cited as Jimenez, C.).
18 http://www.poea.gov.ph/html/adv10_iraqBan.html
19 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3898875.stm
20 Jimenez, C., supra n. 17.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
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at US-run military facilities, they do not have hard evidence to confirm that US
government or wayward Philippine officials are behind the illegal deployment of
workers.23 Former Philippine Labour Secretary Patricia Santo Tomas said many
Filipinos evade immigration authorities by using secret passage points in Dubai in
the United Arab Emirates, in Kuwait and in Jordan. The Philippine government has
a standing agreement with all of these countries to block OFW from travelling or
crossing into Iraq.24
Reports from the first half of 2006 have filtered out of the Middle East about
Filipinos working for “a private army” in Iraq. Further snooping by newsmen has
revealed that Blackwater USA – once a small private security agency in North
Carolina – has been recruiting Filipinos for high-paying (in Philippine terms) jobs as
security operators in Afghanistan and Iraq.
In fact, Blackwater is just one of 25 contractors operating in Afghanistan and
Iraq. Other companies may actually have recruited more Filipinos.25 By the nature of
their operations, security contractors are not known to exercise transparency.26
One Manila TV report placed a typical Filipino operator’s monthly salary at
“anywhere between $1,500 and $2,500”.27 In contrast, his American counterpart can
earn as much as $20,000 – and a good number of them do.28
Jason Cruz, a 40-year-old warehouseman, and Ernie de Leon (not their real
names), a 23-year-old lifeguard, told Asia Times Online that they were able to enter
Iraq illegally through Dubai.29 Cruz said he flew to Dubai on a visit visa and
then later applied for work through United Arab Emirates-based Prime Projects
International (PPI), a subcontractor of US military contractor Halliburton, which
provides support services to US armed forces in Iraq. Both men said they travelled to
Iraq from Dubai without any hitches and suggested that this was at least partly due
to their employer’s known connection to the US military.30
According to Iraq Coalition Casualty Count,31 an independent organization
that monitors conflict-related deaths in Iraq, a number of Filipinos have been killed
in Iraq since the 2004 ban was imposed. Rey Torres, a driver and security guard with
Qatar International Trading Company, was shot and killed outside Baghdad on
18 April 2005. Ponciano Loque and Benjie Carreon were killed on 11 November
2005 in a roadside bomb in eastern Baghdad. The organization listed their profes-
sion and employer as “unknown”. The following week, on 18 November, Alexander
Mesa Ilocto was killed in a road accident between Iraq and Kuwait. His position and
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.




29 Jimenez, C., supra n. 17.
30 Ibid.
31 iCasualties.org, Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, available at http://icasualties.org/oif/Civ.aspx
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employer were likewise listed as “unknown”. On 13 August 2006, a roadside bomb
killed Rogelio Saradia, a “security specialist” for AIM Group.
Recent reports have revealed that a syndicate operating through the Philippines’
Department of Foreign Affairs was selling “clean” passports for P5,000 to P25,000
($100 to $500) to OFWs, with the rate scale depending on how fast the applicant
desired to leave the Philippines. However, the tide of OFW flowing into Iraq has
recently kicked up a legal fuss back in the Philippines.32
Mark Villacruzes, who has previously claimed to represent US contractor Triple
Canopy, a private security and special operations firm founded in 2003 by former US
Delta Forces, allegedly recruited former members of the Philippine armed forces
after the ban was imposed to work as security personnel for US officials and
facilities in Iraq.
Villacruzes, who is now out on bail on charges of illegal recruitment, is alleged to
have employed about 300 former Philippine soldiers for Triple Canopy’s operations
in Iraq since the Philippines government ban was first imposed in 2004.33 Most of
the recruits came from the Subic Naval Base, a former American facility in the
Philippines.34
Before the ban, Villacruzes ran a brisk recruiting business through Armstrong
Resources Corporation, a licensed recruitment firm based in east Manila.35 In March
2003, he allegedly recruited 21 former Philippine soldiers to work for Triple Canopy
in Iraq.36 That batch of recruits was reportedly offered six-month contracts on a
$1,000 per month salary, $150 in special allowances and free accommodation basis.37
While attractive by Philippines’ standards, the wages and benefits are considerably
less than US national recruits receive.38
In June 2006, Villacruzes was charged with illegal recruitment and breach of
contract for failing to pay war compensation payments, which amounted to $9,000
for each of the 21 returnees who sued him before the POEA.39 They have also asked
the POEA to put Armstrong Resources Corporation under preventive suspension
and bar Triple Canopy from participating in Philippines overseas employment
programmes.40
At least three American private security companies have reportedly recruited
about 300 Filipino “private security operators” or “independent contractors” (the
current euphemisms for mercenaries) for deployment in Afghanistan and Iraq.41









41 Mariano, D., “Big deal: whores of war”, The Manila Times Internet Edition, 28 June 2006,
available at http://www.manilatimes.net/national/2006/june/28/yehey/opinion/20060628opi2.html
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Published reports on the Filipino mercenaries have also mentioned Triple Canopy
and Dyncorp, but it is Blackwater that has drawn the greatest attention.42
Blackwater president Gary Jackson was recently quoted by the online service
Virginian Pilot43 as saying his company has acquired about 25 acres, or about two
hectares, in the former US naval base at Subic Bay and will have access to an
adjacent jungle for conducting survival training. An application to lease the land has
been submitted to the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority by Satelles Solutions Inc.,
the local partner of Greystone Ltd., which in turn is described as the “international
affiliate” of Blackwater. Satelle/Greystone’s business plan envisions training as
many as 1,000 recruits monthly at the leased property in Subic prior to their
deployment overseas, presumably in Afghanistan and Iraq.44
These reports had led to a Philippine Senate investigation on the matter. Senator
Rodolfo Biazon, a former armed forces chief of staff who now heads the Senate
Committee on National Defence, said he is set to begin investigating reports about
the recruitment of former soldiers and policemen to serve as mercenaries in Iraq and
Afghanistan.45 Biazon said he has secured a copy of a contract between the Subic
Bay Metropolitan Authority and Blackwater for the use of freeport grounds for the
combat training of Filipino recruits.46 He said the alleged contract gives premium
to applicants with military and police background. He added Blackwater has
manpower contracts with the Pentagon.47
The United Nations report disclosing the presence of Filipino mercenaries in
Iraq will be formally made public in March 2007.48 The chief of the UN working
group on the use of mercenaries, Jose Luis Gomez del Prado, who gave the press
advance knowledge of the report, said that many of the recruits stem from former
police and military forces in the Philippines, Peru and Equador. “They are trained
quickly but not prepared for armed conflict situations,” Gomez del Prado said.
“They are sent there, they receive M16 (assault riffles) and are placed in very
dangerous areas like the Green Zone (in Baghdad), convoys and embassies,” he
added.
42 Ibid.
43 Sizemore, B., “Backwater USA to open facilities in California, Philippines”, Pilotonline.com,
16 May 2006, available at http://content.hamptonroads.com/story.cfm?story=104492&ran=12576




47 Cortes, C., “Iraq and Afghan jobs under scanner”, Gulfnews.com, 17 June 2006, available at
http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/06/06/17/10047459.html
48 “Pinoys recruited as mercenaries in Iraq”, Philippine Star, 27 February 2007.
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PSF: COMBATANTS OR MERCENARIES?
Even from a US perspective, there is no controversy that its occupation of Iraq is
governed by International Humanitarian Law pursuant to Article 2 of the Geneva
Convention.
In turn, mercenaries are defined under Article 47 of the Geneva Convention
Protocol I. There, the definition of a mercenary is any person who: (a) is specially
recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict; (b) does not in fact
take part in the fighting; (c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by
the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a party to the
conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to
combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that party; (d) is
neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a
party to the conflict; (e) is not a member of the armed forces of a party in conflict
and (f ) has not been sent by a party which is not a party to a conflict on official
duty as a member of its armed forces. The same provision does not prohibit the use
of mercenaries, although it provides that they “shall not have the right to be a
combatant or a prisoner of war”.
Accordingly, mercenaries are protected by common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions and the principle of protection, but are not immune from criminal
prosecution under domestic law. In fact, only combatants are entitled to such
immunity from domestic prosecution. Likewise, they also do not have the right
to be released upon cessation of hostilities by express provision of the Geneva
Conventions; neither are they entitled to prisoner of war (POW) status.
Thus, in international armed conflicts, they may, when captured in battle, be
treated as criminals and may be prosecuted for treason, rebellion and murder. This is
the consequence of their classification as “unlawful combatants”. They continue to
be protected though by common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and by inter-
national human rights law.
In 1989, the UN established the International Convention against the
Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries (1989 Convention) to
ameliorate these problems.49 It defined the actions in its title as offences and set up
extradition arrangements to deal with those who violated the Convention.50 Article 1
of the 1989 Convention States the definition of a mercenary:
(1) A mercenary is any person who:
(a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict;
(b) Is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private
gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a party to the conflict,
material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to
49 International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of Mercenar-
ies, 4 December 1989, UN GAOR, 72d plen. mtg, UN Doc A/Res/44/34 (1989).
50 Singer, Peter Warren, “War, profits and the vacuum of law: privatized military firms and
international, law”. 42 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 521 at 529 (2004).
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combatants of similar rank and functions in the armed forces of that
party;
(c) Is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of territory
controlled by a party to the conflict;
(d) Is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict; and
(e) Has not been sent by a State which is not a party to the conflict on official
duty as a member of its armed forces.
(2) A mercenary is also any person who, in any other situation:
(a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad for the purpose of participating in a
concerted act of violence aimed at:
(i) Overthrowing a government or otherwise undermining the consti-
tutional order of a State; or
(ii) Undermining the territorial integrity of a State;
(b) Is motivated to take part therein essentially by the desire for significant
private gain and is prompted by the promise or payment of material
compensation;
(c) Is neither a national nor a resident of the State against which such an act is
directed;
(d) Has not been sent by a State on official duty; and
(e) Is not a member of the armed forces of the State on whose territory the act is
undertaken.
While the 1989 Convention for the first time makes the act of mercenaries a
crime, the Convention criminalizes only the use of mercenaries where it is for the
purpose of defeating the right of self-determination and the territorial integrity of
a State. Therefore, the use of mercenaries for purposes outside of these may be
considered still as being legal.
Unfortunately, the 1989 Convention came out just as the private military trade
began to recreate itself to one being dominated by private companies today and did
little to clarify the situation. Industry analysts have found that the Convention,
which lacks any monitoring mechanism, has merely added a number of vague,
almost impossible to prove, requirements that all must be met before an individual
can be termed a mercenary and few consequences thereafter.51 In fact, the consensus
is that anyone who manages to get prosecuted under “this definition deserves to be
shot – and his lawyer with [him]”.52
Because of inherent flaws, the Convention was ratified in September 2001 by a
small number of signatories none of which was a major State player. This, as Singer
concludes, “. . . combined with the fact that no one has been prosecuted under the
law, the list of signatories acts almost as a form of jus cogens that runs counter to the
51 Brooks, D. and Solomon, H., Editorial, Conflict Trends 1, 2 (2000), available at http://www.
accord.org.za/ct/2000-1/CT%201_2000%20editorial.pdf
52 Best, G., “Humanity in warfare: the modern history of the international law of armed
conflicts”, 57 International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs) 328 (summer 1981).
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treaty – in a sense, an ‘anti-customary law’ – and further weakens the treaty’s legal
impact”.53
Thus, given the murky legal waters on which Private Security Forces (PSF’s)
wades, no one should be surprised about the proliferation of PSF and MPI as well as
mercenaries, whose acts are often lumped together or intertwined. This confuses
even the United Nations as can be seen in the reports made by the UN Special
Rapporteur on Mercenaries in the succeeding paragraphs.
Mr Enrique Bernales Ballesteros, UN Special Rapporteur on the question of the
use of mercenaries, concluded:
. . . [i]n submitting his final report to the Commission on Human Rights, the Special
Rapporteur notes that despite efforts by the United Nations and inter-State regional
organizations to combat mercenary activities and curtail them as far as possible, such
activities have not disappeared. On the one hand, the traditional type of mercenary
intervention which impedes the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination
remains; on the other hand, there are the beginnings of a process of change, in which
the mercenary becomes a multi-role, multi-purpose professional, recruited, hired and
trained to commit criminal acts and violate human rights.
64. Mercenary activity contravenes international law and involves a transaction that
can affect persons, people and countries in terms of their fundamental rights. What-
ever the modality, the use of mercenaries and mercenary activities themselves must
be prohibited. Such prohibition must include effective sanctions against those who
recruit, hire, train, finance and allow the gathering, assembly or transit of mercenaries.
. . .
. . . [p]rivate companies offering military assistance, consultancy and security services
on the international market should be regulated and placed under international
supervision. They should be warned that the recruitment of mercenaries constitutes a
violation of international law. Accordingly, the legal instruments that allow effective
legal prosecution of both the mercenary agent and of the company that hires and
employs him must be refined. A particular concern must be for the crimes and
offenses committed by employees of such companies not to go unpunished, as is
usually the case.
In view of the persistent use of mercenaries for the commission of terrorist acts and
various criminal activities, the mechanisms and procedures existing in various United
Nations bodies and in regional organizations to combat the presence and use of
mercenaries must be strengthened. This strengthening must include such aspects as
the link between mercenaries and terrorism, and the participation of mercenaries in
organized crime and illicit trafficking.54
53 Singer, P.W., “War, Profits and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms and Inter-
national Law”, 42 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 521 (2004) at 531.
54 Ballesteros, E. B., Special Rapporteur, “The right of peoples to self-determination and its
application to peoples under colonial or alien domination or foreign occupation: use of
Export of War 89
The Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights
and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination in Lima, Peru
issued the following statement on 2 February 2007:
The Working Group has observed that weak or insufficient national legislation, regu-
lation and control of private security companies encourages companies operating in
the international market to seek to recruit individuals from other countries as security
guards in areas of armed conflict. It has, therefore, urged States to strengthen
domestic legislation against these new forms of mercenarism-related crime. It would
appear that the absence of measures to control private security companies has
enabled the recruitment of large numbers of Peruvians.55
It was further reported that:
The information received demonstrates serious omissions and shortcomings in
complying with obligations under international law, including labor standards, and
calls into question the constitutionality of these activities. The unfavorable socio-
economic situation and high unemployment which have made this sort of contract
attractive in no way diminish the government’s responsibility. The Working Group is
concerned at the failure to act of State bodies, especially the Ministry of Labour and
the National Prosecutor’s Office, since this is a massive phenomenon which is com-
mon knowledge and widely reported in the media. The Ministry of Labour should at
some stage have monitored the contracts to ensure that possible claims for breach of
labour rights were admissible; have issued an opinion on the provisions and condi-
tions of the contracts; and as far as possible have tried to frame the contracts under a
bilateral agreement guaranteeing health services, social security and labour rights for
all employees.56
Among the preliminary recommendations presented by the Working Group are the
following:
• That, in the process of bringing Peru’s legislation in line with the International
Convention, Peru should adopt the broadest possible legal interpretation, to
cover not only the traditional offence of acting as a mercenary but also
mercenary-related activities. It would therefore be important to involve in the
mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of
peoples to self-determination; report submitted”, United Nations Economic and Social Council,
Commission on Human Rights, Sixtieth session, Item 5 of the provisional agenda, E/CN.4/2004/
15, GE.03-17313 (E) 100204 120204, 24 December 2003, at 20.
55 United Nations, “UN Working Group on Use of Mercenaries concludes visit to
Peru”, 5 February 2007, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view01/
3DECD663E807F07AC125 7279003494FE?opendocument
56 Ibid.
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drafting process the various Ministries and government bodies concerned, as
well as . . . sectors of civil society working to protect human rights;
• That the authorities maintain transparent registers of private security com-
panies including all matters concerning ownership, statutes, purposes and func-
tions as well as a system of regular inspections. The authorities should also
adopt legislation and regulations to avoid possible conflicts of interest when
serving State officials act as owners or managers of these companies;
• That the competent authorities promptly provide the information requested of
them by the oversight bodies charged with investigations to determine the
respective responsibilities of the State and the private security companies and
individuals concerned, bearing in mind possible issues of extraterritorial
jurisdiction.57
It appears though that while International Humanitarian Law and treaty law
deprive mercenaries of “combatant” status and thus of “POW” status, the law itself
does not expressly prohibit the use of mercenaries. In fact, in the Nicaragua case, the
court did not dwell on the legality per se of the “contras”. Instead, it ruled that the
low level of support granted to the group by the US could not result in attribution
since it was bereft of “effective control” and consequently could not be characterized
as an “armed attack” on the territory of Nicaragua.58
The shortcomings of the treaty regimes on mercenaries become even more
apparent when applied to PSF. In short, the privatized military industry lies outside
the full domain of all of these existing legal regimes.59 For example, PSF recruits
employees for long periods or work on contracts not tied to a specific armed conflict.
This goes around the assumption that the agent will be linked to a specific conflict on
the definition on the hiring of the private agent. Thus, Blackwater, one of several
private security firms employed following the invasion of Afghanistan by the United
States found violating government regulations60 prior to its involvement in Iraq,
could not be considered mercenaries covered by international law.
Note that PSF carry out military-type functions in conflict zones, often against
armed groups not part of the armed forces of the State in which PSF operate.61
Because they are not part of the military, the legal codes, which seek to create a
sharp delineation between civilians and soldiers, are not readily useful.62 Neither do
57 Ibid.
58 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of
America), Merits, ICJ Rep. 1986 (hereinafter cited as Nicaragua).
59 Abraham, G., “The contemporary legal environment” in Mills, G. and Stremlau, J. (eds.), The
Privatisation of Security in Africa, Braamfontein: South African Institute of International
Affairs, 1999, at 99.
60 Witte, G., “AFGHANISTAN: Blackwater Broke Rules, Report Says”, Washignton Post 5
October 2005, available at http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=12693
61 http://www.odi.org.uk/HPG/papers/hpgreport21.pdf
62 Singer, P.W., “The Private Military Industry and Iraq: What have we learned and Where to
Next?”, available at http://www.dcaf.ch/_docs/pp04_private-military.pdf
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PSF meet the international definition of a “mercenary” in either legal or analytical
terms, thus creating a legal vacuum.63
It also means that PSF may not always receive the rights and protections
afforded to participants in armed conflict.64 If PSF are not incorporated into the
armed forces of a State but nonetheless carry out activities that amount to taking a
direct part in hostilities, they could be judged to be “unlawful combatants”.65 If they
were captured during an international armed conflict, they would be entitled to the
protection of the Fourth Geneva Convention or Article 75 of Additional Protocol I.
If captured during a non-international armed conflict, they are entitled to the pro-
tection of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol II if
applicable and the rules of international humanitarian law applicable in non-
international armed conflict. Thus, their status, and how to interpret it, would be up
to their captors; as the designation of inmates by the United States at Guantanamo
Bay as “unlawful combatants” has shown, such interpretation is a matter of dispute.
If PSF commit a crime or undertake an action that causes local harm, it is
unclear how far responsibility extends.66 Another open legal area concerns how far
contract law extends into conflict zones.67 Given that there is no legal precedent on
PSF, the civil courts are grappling with these legal areas, as the lawsuits are being
filed against these PSF. Current cases range from Iraqis suing CACI and Titan for
their role at Abu Ghraib, to a lawsuit against Blackwater launched by the families of
employees killed in Fallujah.68
Another aspect of defining PSF is the exact nature of membership in the armed
forces. PSF are part of corporations that organize their activities and are liable to
superiors bound by formal contracts with the corporation’s clients. Thus, arguably,
the firms “represent quasi-State actors in the international arena, which takes them
outside the mercenary concerns of the international community”.69
Further, the methods used by private Western security companies to recruit
mercenaries in poor countries and send them into dangerous areas like Iraq are
deeply worrying, according to the UN report mentioned previously. Private security
guards employed by Western companies make up the second highest number of
armed forces currently posted in Iraq, after the US military but ahead of British
63 Ibid.
64 “Resetting the Rules of Engagement Trends and Rules in military-humanitarian relations”,
Humanitarian Policy Group Research Report No. 21, March 2006, edited by Victoria Wheeler
and Adele Harmer, at 76, available online at: http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/hpg-publications/
reports/21-rules-engagement-trends-issues-millitary-humanitarian-relations.pdf
65 Singer, P.W., “The Private Military Industry and Iraq: What have we learned and Where to
Next?”, available at http://www.dcaf.ch/_docs/pp04_private-military.pdf
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 Singer, P.W., “Humanitarian principles, private military agents: Some implications of the
privatized military industry for the humanitarian community” in Resetting the Rules of Engage-
ment, available at http://www.odi.org.uk/hpg/papers/hpgreport21_singer.pdf, at 73.
69 Zarate, J. C., “The emergence of a new dog of war: private international security companies,
international law, and the new world order”, 34 Stan J. Int’l L. 145 (1998).
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troops, according to Jose Luis Gomez del Prado, the head of a United Nations
working group on the use of mercenaries. He further stated on the sidelines of a
second working group session in Geneva in February 2007:
At least 160 companies are operating in Iraq. They probably employ 35,000 to 40,000
people . . . More than 400 of these private employees have died in Iraq since 2003,
putting their casualties below the number suffered by US armed forces but ahead of
British military deaths . . . And a lot more have been injured.70
Americans and Europeans working in war zones for private security companies
often make as much as $10,000 ( 7,600) a month. One firm pays Filipino mercenar-
ies $60,000 to $80,000 a year, half of what it pays American mercenaries with equiva-
lent qualifications and for the same assignments (although this is still more than the
salaries of most active duty US military personnel). An interview by ABS-CBN, a
leading Filipino television station, in June 2006 confirmed that 3,000 Filipinos are
currently employed in Iraq as “shotgun riders” (security back-up) for supply con-
voys. Sniper (an alias used by the source) said that they earn as much as $2,500 a
month. He added that they are no different from US military personnel and serve as
augmentation security forces. Sniper said that there are more openings for “security
aides” and encourages Filipinos to try to apply for these jobs. However, he added
that the “job” is quite dangerous and that he recently lost a driver during a “milk
run”. Fire-fights are common and they too have to fend off their ambushers
from time to time. He stressed that with the lack of opportunity in the Philippines,
Filipinos would be enticed by the high pay their employers give them.71
The number of private security companies working in war zones like Iraq has
exploded in recent years, with one private security employee for every four US
soldiers currently stationed in Iraq. According to Gomez del Prado, that number is
up from one private security guard for every fifty American soldiers who took part in
the first Gulf War in the early 1990s.72
PSF AND THE PRINCIPLE OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY
Sovereign States stand on equal footing in terms of rights as well as the correspond-
ing duties to respect the rights of other States. When a State violates the rights of
another State and causes injury, the former is responsible for the injury and must
fully compensate the latter for damages incurred. As held by the Permanent Court of
70 “Mercenaries in Iraq include Filipinos”, The Manila Times, 27 February 2007, available at
http://www.manilatimes.net/national/2007/feb/27/yehey/top_stories/20070227top1.html
71 “Shadow warriors: soldiers of (mis)fortune”, 9 June 2006, available at http://schumey.blogspot.
com/2006_06_01_archive.html
72 ABS-CBN Interactive, “UN raises alarm on mercenary recruitment by Western firms”, avail-
able at http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/storypage.aspx?StoryId=68103
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International Justice in Chorzow:73 “It is a principle of international law, and even a
greater conception of law, that any breach of an engagement involves an obligation
to make reparation.” State responsibility had been codified into the Draft Articles
on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001).74 This codifica-
tion is a reflection of customary international law that binds all States.75 These
provide that “every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international
responsibility of that State”.76
The responsibility arises from conduct that (1) is attributable to that State under
international law and (2) constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the
State.77 Failure to satisfy these requirements creates no internationally wrongful act
and the State cannot be held responsible for the action in question. Thus, it must first
be established that a person has acted as an agent of a particular State and his acts
qualify as action of that State.
Traditionally, the conduct of non-State entities is not attributable to the State
under international law.78 However, where the State has a duty to prevent private
harm or to abstain from any support for it, its responsibility is engaged when it
violates these obligations.79
In case of PSF, it is often difficult to make that determination. If the forcible acts
of a PSF are appropriately attributable to the State, it follows that the State of origin
of PSF employees has violated its duty not to use armed force in its relations with
other States and the injured State may have a legitimate justification to use armed
force as self-defence against the State where the PSF is incorporated, the PSF itself
and against the State of origin of PSF employees. It is true that self-defence has
generally been associated with inter-State relations, but there is no reason that the
right of States to defend themselves should be confined solely to response to attacks
launched originally by States.80
At this juncture it can be theorized that both the Philippines and the United States
may be held responsible for the illegal and violent acts committed by employees of
PSF. The United States can be held liable because it employed them indirectly through
Blackwater and other corporations providing security services in Iraq.
According to Lillich and Magraw, there are three existing rationales that under-
73 Judgment, The Factory at Chorzów (Germany v. Poland) – PCIJ Series A, No. 17 (1928) 4, at 29.
74 General Assembly Resolution 56/83, 28 January 2002, Annex (hereinafter cited as Draft
Articles), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/
9_6_2001.pdf
75 Wolfrum, R., “State responsibility for private actors: an old problem of renewed relevance” in
Ragazzi, M. (ed.), International Responsibilit Today, Leiden: Brill NV, 2005, at 424.
76 Draft Articles, Art. 2.
77 Draft Articles, Art. 3.
78 Oppenheim’s International Law, 9th ed., Vol. 1, Harlow: Longman 1996, at 502–503.
79 Becker, T., Terrorism and the State: Rethinking the Rules of State Responsibility, Oxford: Hart
Publishing, 2006, at 3.
80 Greenwood, C., “International Law and the Pre-emptive Use of Force: Afghanistan,
Al-Qaida, and Iraq”, San Diego International Law Journal 2003 (4), at 16–18.
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lie the rules of attribution:81 (1) the search for agency, (2) encouragement of control
by the State of actors de facto exercising governmental authority and (3) encourage-
ment of lawful behaviour through support of the continuity of responsibility, which
covers the conduct of insurrectional movements. The main focus will be on the
search for agency. However, reference will also be made to the encouragement of
control by the State of actors exercising governmental authority.
The primary principle inherent in the rules of attribution is the search for
agency. In searching for agency, one searches for a bond between the non-State actor
and the State where the former may be said to have acted for, or at the direction of,
the State.82
Article 5 of the Draft deals with the conduct of bodies that are not State organs
under Article 4 but are authorized by municipal law to exercise governmental
authority, as stated below:
The conduct of a person or entity which is not an organ of the State under Article 4
but which is empowered by the law of that State to exercise elements of the govern-
mental authority shall be considered an act of the State under international law,
provided the person or entity is acting in that capacity in the particular instance.
Article 5 takes account of non-State entities that exercise elements of govern-
mental authority in place of State organs.83 It also covers situations where former
State corporations have been privatized but retain certain public or regulatory
functions.84 Instances where this may occur is, for instance, when private companies
(such as PSF) have been contracted to act as prison guards and, in that capacity, may
exercise public powers like powers of detention and discipline. Another example is
when private or State owned airlines might have delegated to them certain powers in
relation to immigration control and quarantine.85 Anything related to armed forces,
penology and law enforcement is included in this category.
Even though the phenomenon of PSF is fairly modern, the principle embodied
in Article 5 was long before recognized.86 As early as 1930 at the League of Nations’
Conference for the Codification of International Laws, the support from govern-
ments for the attribution to the State of conduct of autonomous bodies exercising
public functions was strong.87 For example, the German government held that:
[. . .] [W]hen, by delegation of powers, bodies act in a public capacity, e.g., police an
area . . . the principles governing the responsibility of the State for its organs apply
81 Lillich, R. B. and Magraw, D.B., The Iran-US Claims Tribunal: Its contribution to the law of
State responsibility, New York: Transnational Publishers, 1998, at 128.
82 Ibid., at 129.
83 Commentary to the ILC Draft, art. 5, para. 2.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid., art 5, para. 1.
86 Ibid., art 5, para. 4.
87 Ibid.
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with equal force. From the point of view of international law, it does not matter
whether a State polices a given area with its own police or entrusts this duty, to a
greater or less extent, to autonomous bodies.88
The justification for making conduct of non-State entities imputable to the State
under international law is the fact that the State has conferred on the entity in
question the exercise of certain elements of the governmental authority.89 Undoubt-
edly, provision of security provided by PSF is integral to the police powers of a
State.90 Further, the United States conferred such functions when, acting through its
Department of Defense (DoD), contracted with the PSF. The United States also
conferred authority upon the PSF, when its government, through the DoD,
approved the security services contracts with the PSF. As held in the case of Yeager:91
[. . .] [T]he attributability of acts of the State is not limited to acts of organs formally
recognized under internal law. Otherwise a State could avoid responsibility under
international law by invoking its internal law. It is generally accepted in international
law that a State is also responsible for acts of persons, if it is established that those
persons were in fact acting on behalf of the State.
Further, the United States is and can hold PSF accountable indirectly through
the DoD, and directly by monitoring and regulating its conduct as an incorporated
entity under its laws.92 Finally, the failure of the United States to immediately put an
end to the activities of the PSF indicates a knowing approval of its activities,93
confirming the broad mandate the United States government granted to PSF.
Simply put, under the circumstances where the conduct of the PSF is attribut-
able to the United States under Article 5, ultra vires acts do not prevent attribution.94
Assuming arguendo that the PSF do not meet the criteria of Articles 4, 5, 6 and 7
of the Draft or if those criteria cannot be determined with certainty, their conduct is
still attributable to the United States, this time under Article 8 of the Draft as stated
below:
88 League of Nations, Conference for the Codification of International Law, Bases of Discussion
for the Conference drawn up by the Preparatory Committee, Vol. III: Responsibility of States
for Damage caused in their Territory to the Person or Property of Foreigners (Doc.
C.75.M.69.1929.V.), at 90.
89 Ibid., art. 5, para. 5.
90 See Cleaver, G., “Subcontracting military power: the privatization of security in contemporary
sub-Saharan Africa”, 33 Crime, Law and Social Change 131–149 (March 2000).
91 Yeager v. The Islamic Republic of Iran (Partial Award), Award No. 324–10199–1, 17 Iran-US
CTR 92 (1987), 42.
92 Page, M., Rynn, S. and Taylor, Z., “SALW and private security companies in South Eastern
Europe: a cause or effect of insecurity?”, SEESAC (2005); Prenzler, T. and Sarre, R., “Regulating
private security in Australia” in Australian Institute of Criminology: Trends and Issues in Crime
and Criminal Justice (1998); see also Australian Private Security Act.
93 Yeager, loc. cit., n. 46, at 43–44.
94 See Commentary to the ILC Draft on State Responsibility, art. 7, para. 10.
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The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State
under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the
instructions of, or under the direction or control of that State in carrying out the
conduct.
When the conduct is authorized by the State it does not matter whether the
persons engaging in the conduct are private actors or whether their conduct involves
“governmental activity”.95 When acting on the instructions of the State, the conduct
is attributable to that State under international law.96 Most commonly cases of that
kind arise where State organs supplement their own action by recruiting or instigat-
ing private persons or groups of persons who act as “auxiliaries” while remaining
outside the official structure of the State.97
Imputability of the acts of a non-State entity to the State because of conduct
that has been directed or controlled by the State is more complex in nature than
imputability because of instructed behaviour. Only if the State directed or controlled
the specific operation and the conduct complained of was an integral part of that
operation can the conduct be attributable to the State under this article.98
In both cases of Nicaragua99 and Tadic,100 the question of the degree of control
required for the conduct to give rise to State responsibility was decided: in Nicaragua,
it was attributing the conduct of the contras to the United States so as to make it
responsible for all the acts of the contras. The International Court of Justice (ICJ)
held that in order for the United States to be responsible for all acts of the contras, it
“had to be proved that that State had effective control of the military or paramilitary
operations in the course of which the alleged violations were committed”. A general
situation of dependence and support for the contras was not sufficient to attribute
the conduct to the State.101 Thus, the ICJ in Nicaragua required a high degree of
control. In Tadic, the Appeals Chamber required a degree of control distinct from
Nicaragua. The Appeals Chamber reached the conclusion that “overall control” was
enough to attribute the acts of private persons to the State.102 In any event, it is a
matter for appreciation in each case, whether particular conduct was or was not
carried out under the control of a State.103
Thus, under Article 8 State responsibility occurs when a State has in fact author-
ized, directed or controlled the conduct complained of. This would be evaluated on a
case-to-case basis, in particular those concerning the relationship between the
95 Ibid., art. 8, para. 1.
96 Ibid., art. 8, para. 2.
97 Ibid., art. 8, para. 2.
98 Ibid., art. 8, para. 3.
99 Nicaragua, n. 23, at 14.
100 Case IT-94–1, Prosecutor v. Tadić, 38 ILM 1518 (1999).
101 See Commentary to the ILC Draft on State Responsibility, art. 8, para. 4.
102 Ibid, art. 8, para. 5.
103 Nicaragua, para. 115.
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instructions given or the direction or control exercised and the specific conduct
complained of.104 The terms “instructions”, “direction” and “control” are dis-
junctive, meaning that it is sufficient to establish either one of them for the conduct
to be attributed to the State.105 The instructions, direction or control must, however,
relate to the conduct that has amounted to the breach of an international obliga-
tion.106 The phrase “person or group of persons” is intended to cover both natural
and legal persons, such as a private entity or corporation.107
Until 2000, private military contractors enjoyed a loophole in the federal law of
the United States that shielded them from criminal liability for their actions occur-
ring overseas.108 Contractors that violated US law abroad could essentially avoid
court-martial jurisdiction and most criminal jurisdictions in US federal courts.109
The United States Congress closed this loophole in 2000 with the passage of the
Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA).110 Under the MEJA, many US
criminal laws extend to certain locations, such as military bases in other countries.111
The MEJA also broadens these laws to include civilian and contractor personnel
accompanying US forces abroad.112 Despite implementation of the MEJA and its
subsequent amendments, some have argued that other loopholes still exist.113
Thus, the failure of the United States to regulate114 the activities of PSF consti-
tutes a grave breach115 of its obligations under international humanitarian law to
protect other States and their nationals against injurious acts by individuals with-
in their jurisdiction116 and its correlative duty to prevent injury117 and punish
wrongdoers.118
104 Commentary to the ILC Draft, n. 49, art. 8, para. 7.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid., art. 8, para. 8.
107 Ibid., art. 8, para. 9.
108 Perlak, Major J.R., “The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000: implications for
contractor personnel”, 169 Mil. L. Rev. 92, 93 (2001).
109 Ibid.
110 18 USC§§ 3261–3267 (2000).
111 Major T.J. Harder, “Recent developments in jurisdiction: is this the dawn of the year of
jurisdiction?”, Army Law 2 (2001), at 12 (detailing the MEJA’s implementation and coverage).
112 18 USC§ 3261.
113 See Stein, F.A., “Have we closed the barn door yet? A look at the current loopholes in the
Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act”, 27 Hous. J. Int’l L. 579 (2005), at 606 (identifying at
least five major MEJA loopholes and calling for additional amendments).
114 The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social Rights
v. Nigeria, African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, Communication 155/96.
115 Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts: Report of the ILC on the work of
its 53rd sess., GAOff. Rec., 56th sess., Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), chp. IV.E.1, § 44(b).
116 Lillich, R.B. and Paxman, “State responsibility for injuries to aliens occasioned by terrorist
attacks”, 26 Am. U. L. Rev. 225–230 (1997).
117 Zafiro Claim, 6 RIAA 160.
118 Christenson, G.A., “Attributing acts of omission to the State”, 12 Mich. J. Int’l L. 324 (1991);
and Eagleton, C., The Responsibility of States in International Law, New York: New York Uni-
versity Press, 1928, at 87–89.
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The Hague and Geneva Conventions as well as the Additional Protocol make
clear that grave breaches must be punished. However, they do not themselves set out
specific penalties nor do they create a tribunal to try offenders. Instead they expressly
require States to enact criminal legislation to punish those responsible for grave
breaches, which are considered as war crimes.
States are also required to search for persons accused of grave breaches, and
either to bring them before their own courts or to hand them over for trial in another
State.119 States must ensure compliance with all provisions of humanitarian law
including those applicable to non-international armed conflict and those regulating
the use of weapons.120 States must ensure compliance with rules arising under
customary international law, as well as those set out in international agreements.121
States must take whatever measures are necessary to prevent and suppress all viola-
tions thereof.122 Such measures may include military regulations, administrative
orders and other regulatory measures.123 However, criminal legislation is the most
appropriate and effective means of dealing with all serious violations of inter-
national humanitarian law.124 A number of States have already enacted criminal law
to punish violations of the provisions of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conven-
tions and Additional Protocol II which apply to non-international armed conflict.125
States are required to fulfil these obligations in times of peace as much as in time
of armed conflict. In order to be effective the above measures must be adopted
before grave breaches have the opportunity to occur126.
In sum, a State’s criminal law only applies to acts committed within its territory
or by its own nationals. However, international humanitarian law goes further. It
requires States to search for and punish all those who have committed grave breaches
regardless of the nationality of the perpetrator or where the crime was committed.
The principle of universal jurisdiction is a key element in ensuring the effective
repression of grave breaches.
The principle of universal jurisdiction is applicable here because of the failure of
the United States to enact legislation, aside from the MEJA, that will effectively
prevent future illegal and violent acts of PSF in Iraq as well as search and punish the
perpetrators of said grave breaches from the time the United States occupied Iraq.
Moreover, the International Criminal Court (ICC) is competent to try the grave
breaches of international humanitarian law that constitute war crimes. The ICC has
jurisdiction over individuals accused of these crimes. This includes those directly
responsible for committing the crimes as well as others who may be liable for the
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crime. The latter group also includes military commanders or other superiors whose
responsibility is defined in the Statute.127
The ICC unfortunately does not have universal jurisdiction.128 The ICC may
only exercise jurisdiction if:
(1) The accused is a national of a State Party or a State otherwise accepting the
jurisdiction of the Court;
(2) The crime took place on the territory of a State Party or a State otherwise
accepting the jurisdiction of the Court; or
(3) The United Nations Security Council has referred the situation to the Prosecu-
tor, irrespective of the nationality of the accused or the location of the crime.129
The jurisdiction of the ICC is further limited to events taking place since 1 July
2002.130 In addition, if a State joins the ICC after 1 July 2002, the ICC only has
jurisdiction after the Statute entered into force for that State.131 Such a State may
nonetheless accept the jurisdiction of the ICC for the period before the Statute’s
entry into force.132 However, in no case can the ICC exercise jurisdiction over events
before 1 July 2002.133
Thus, the ICC, assuming that either one of the three requisites mentioned in the
previous paragraph is met, can step into the grave breaches of international humani-
tarian law committed by PSF only after 1 July 2002, and the subsequent failure of
the United States to prosecute and punish them can be considered as grave breaches
of international humanitarian law or war crimes under the Rome Statute. If not,
States like Belgium and Spain could perhaps prosecute and punish these individuals
under their national legislation on universal jurisdiction. Further, the United
Nations Security Council can refer the situation to the Prosecutor of the ICC as it
did in the situation in Darfur. But the latter proposition may be difficult to pursue as
the United States, as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council,
has veto power over decisions made by the Security Council.
The Philippines can also be held liable for allowing the deployment of its
nationals. First, it failed to prevent it in strictly enforcing its own employment ban in
Iraq. Second, it even allowed an affiliate of Blackwater to operate a training facility
in the Subic Freeport, which is operated by the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, a
body corporate created by law134 whose chairman is a presidential appointee. Third,








134 § 13 Republic Act No. 7227.
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POEA it is impossible for the Philippine government not to be even remotely aware
of the existence of these PSF operating in the country. This implied acquiescence to
the sending of Filipinos as employees of PSF would render the Philippines liable
under public international law.135 Furthermore, the Philippines in fact ratified the
activities of the PSF in the Philippines when it did not immediately put an end to the
illegal practices of the PSF.136 As of yet, the Philippines has not initiated any action
to repatriate Filipinos who have become PSF employees; neither has it prevented the
migration of Filipinos as employees of PSF by stringent implementation of its
deployment ban in Iraq or by closing down the training facility for Blackwater in the
Subic Freeport. Such failure would create an instance of private individuals being
allowed to act as agents of the Philippines under the discussions earlier about ILC
Draft Article 8.
CONCLUSION
Clearly, the problem is that there is no clear-cut regulation, much less prohibition, of
PSF. Under public international law, the very definition used to identify mercenaries
precludes PSF from being classified as such. Thus, existing legal instruments do not
prohibit their operations and merely attempt to regulate them. While regulation of
the firms at the municipal level, in particular by the United States, offers some hope
of both superior legal definitions and enforcement, the international nature of the
PSF obviously undermines the success of the one-country approach. This in turn
leads to the haphazard nature of regulating the PSF.
Because of the inadequate processes to correctly and swiftly address the issues of
illegal acts committed by PSF, the liability for acts committed by them is also
unclear. There is, at present, no international instrument that defines the liability for
illegal and violent acts committed by the PSF itself, its officers and employees, the
State where the PSF is incorporated and/or the country under whose laws the PSF
exists, even the country of origin of the employees of PSF. While there are municipal
instruments placing the liability for illegal acts of employees of PSF, they are none-
theless few and far between.
Given this murky legal milieu, the Philippines must immediately stop the
deployment of Filipinos as employees of PSF, as well as repatriate those employed
by PSF, for the repercussions against the Philippines outweigh the economics.
135 The Corfu Channel Case (merits), (UK v. Albania), ICJ Rep. 1949, at 4.
136 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran case, ICJ Rep. 1979, at 56; see Yeager,
n. 46.
Export of War 101

“AS IF” ACTING UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE UN CHARTER?




The United Nations Charter lays down mandatory measures under Chapter VII,
which are extremely important to its collective security system.1 The enforcement
mechanisms set out by Chapter VII give wide powers to the Security Council (here-
inafter SC), crucial in contending with international threats to peace. But it should
be noted that when the SC convenes in response to armed conflicts and works
to adopt any resolutions for criticizing those awful situations, the possibility of
reference to Chapter VII in such resolutions is carefully considered during the
deliberation within the SC. In other words, the Members of the SC always bear in
mind the importance of contemplating the appropriateness of reference to Chapter
VII in each particular case. They realize that Chapter VII authorizes the SC to
exercise a variety of actions with a great margin of discretion. These measures can
range from economic sanctions to the use of military force, and can restrict to some
extent the sovereignty of Member States as a means of restoring and maintaining
international peace and security. Consequently, the SC is particularly careful to
specify the limits and applicability of Chapter VII.
A dichotomy exists between Chapter VII and non-Chapter-VII-referenced
resolutions, based on a clear boundary between them in applying SC resolutions.
Recognition of this boundary is a prerequisite in choosing which Chapter to apply.
Due to the remarkably enlarged range of application of Chapter VII since the end of
* Professor of International Law, Kyoto University, Japan (email: sakai@law.kyoto-u.ac.jp).
This is a revised version of the discussion paper presented at the session of International Law in
Asia: Past, Present and Future of the inaugural conference of the Asian Society of International
Law at the Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore from 7–9 April 2007.
1 Higgins, R., Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It, Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1994, at 173–174, who says that it is in relation to its power under Chapter VII of the
Charter, in the direct handling of peace and security issues, that the United Nations has assumed
such an important role in the containment of disputes. Still the UN purports to adapt itself in the
recent changing circumstances.
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the Cold War, the SC has been repeatedly activated, resulting in, perhaps, a blurring
of the boundary on the two dimensions. One is reflected by the fact that the power of
the SC has increased due to cooperation, in particular, among its five permanent
members. The SC has also had its authority spread over a variety of operations that
the drafters of the Charter would not have assumed it could ever exercise. This
mainly concerns the interpretation of the UN Charter as well as the limits set on the
power of the SC. Another is related to the exact opposite, that is to say, deprivation
of the SC’s power to act. In the latter case, sovereign States may act in place of the
SC in the maintenance of international peace and security. However, it might be
safer to say that such action could ignore or even break the boundary rather than
make it vague. Thus, the boundary would seem to be obscured by an offensive
creeping in from both sides.
This article will focus on the implication of action taken under Chapter VII, to
illustrate the crossing point of these two directions: the UN-centred and multi-
national action making use of Chapter VII and strengthening the UN collective
security system on the one hand, and the State-centred, unilateral action extending
self-discretion and undermining the UN collective system, on the other.
BIPOLARIZATION OF THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE
AND SECURITY
Activation of the United Nations Security Council
Expanded role of the Security Council
In the field of maintaining international peace and security, the SC has vast formal
power to enforce measures under Chapter VII. Its functions may be divided into
roughly two categories: making decisions as to the “existence of any threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” under Article 39, and adopting
the enforcement measures under Articles 41 and 42. Particularly since the end of the
Cold War, the scope of both the functions has been tremendously expanded by the
SC.
As for the decision by the SC under Article 39 on what constitutes a “threat to
the peace”, this has been considerably expanded and so situations characterized as
such by the SC have been very varied in its practice. Some international lawyers have
asserted that the original meaning of that concept was restricted to armed conflict
between States,2 but whether this argument is correct or not, since the end of the
2 Armz, J., Der Begriff der Friedensbedrohung in Satzung und Praxis der Vereinten Nationen,
Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1975, at 110 and Schilling, T., “Die neue Weltordnung und die
Souveränität der Mitgrlieder der Vereinten Nationen”, Archiv des Völkerrechts, Bd.33 (1995), at
91–92. Contra, Tomuschat, C., “Obligations arising for States without or against their will”, 241
RdC (1993-IV), at 335–337.
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twentieth century the actual determination of the threat to peace has included not
only inter-States armed conflict but also humanitarian crisis within a State, the
material breach of human rights, international terrorism, etc.3 This tendency is
closely related to a significant change in the perception of the “peace” concept –
from a “negative” to a “positive” concept of peace.4 The broadened notion of peace
or of threat to peace is considered to have contributed to a gradual process whereby
the dividing lines between decisions and measures guided by Chapter VII and non-
Chapter-VII resolutions became less clear than the drafters of the Charter had
intended them to be.5
The increased power of the SC has caused a great variety of measures to be
taken after decisions under Article 39.6 Precisely speaking, assertive activation of its
power has led to expansion of the concept of a “threat to the peace” and increased
diversity of the enforcement measures under Chapter VII. This is a situation that is
more logically appropriate for the UN collective security system.
Logic of the UN collective security system and rhetoric of its implementation
According to the relevant provisions under Chapter VII, it is the SC that is in charge
of undertaking and implementing collective security in the UN system. As men-
tioned above, Article 39 is a gateway for Chapter VII measures, provided that the SC
shall determine the existence of any threat to peace, and that it shall also decide what
measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42. The original plan for
UN collective security by the drafters of the UN Charter expected that all significant
power during the decision-making phases as well as in their implementation process
should totally focus on the SC, whenever any forcible measures would be required.7
The reality since the establishment of the UN, however, is remarkably different
from the expectation by the drafters of the UN Charter because of the essentially
3 On the elaborate consideration of this concept, see Sorel, J.-M., “L’élargissement de la notion
de menace contre la paix” in SFDI (ed.), Le Chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations Unies, Paris:
Éditions A. Pedone, 1995, at 3–57; Österdahl, I., Threat to the Peace: The Interpretation by the
Security Council of Article 39 of the UN Charter, Uppsala: Iustus Förlag, 1998; and Schäfer, A.,
Der Begriff der “Bedrohung des Friedens” in Artikel 39 der Charta der Vereinten Nationen: Die
Praxis des Sicherheitsrates, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2006.
4 Schrijver, N.J., “The future of the Charter of the United Nations”, 10 Max Planck UNYB 9–10
(2006).
5 Wellens, K., “The UN Security Council and new threats to the peace: back to the future”,
8 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 53 (2003).
6 For the expanded powers of the SC after the Cold War, see de Wet, E., The Chapter VII Powers
of the United Nations Security Council, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004; and Manusama, K., The
United Nations Security Council in the Post-Cold War Era: Applying the Principle of Legality,
Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006.
7 Blokker, N., “The Security Council and the use of force – on recent practice” in Blokker, N.
and Schrijver, N. (eds.), The Security Council and the Use of Force: Theory and Reality – A Need
for Change?, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005, at 7–8.
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decentralized structure of the international community. During the Cold War, con-
flicts between East and West fairly reflected debates within the SC and there were few
agreements that involved Chapter VII situations in the decision-making process.
After the end of the Cold War, it became more likely for Member States to gradually
grow in accord with the existence of some values in international law. International
law can involve much more in human dimensions, for example, the protection of
human rights, the promotion of democracy and the rule of law, etc. Unfortunately,
difficulties have still remained in the application of relevant rules to concrete cases
such as in military and non-military enforcement actions that are likely to restrict
some of the fundamental rights of States.8
With respect to the use of force under Chapter VII, due to the impossibility of
genuine application of the related provisions, such as Article 43 under which no
agreement has been concluded so far, it is a contrivance that the SC can act under
Article 42 through the process of “organic growth”.9 In actual practice, there is also
the case of a leading country of the Member States that is authorized to use force
under Chapter VII and permitted to maintain the command and control of their
forces in the course of their operations. This is sometimes called a “Multinational
Force” but not identifiable as such, and yet, is empowered to carry out the collective
will of the SC on behalf of the UN. This is the reality of how the UN collective
security concept is implemented in the military sphere.10 Decentralized actions may
be legalized and legitimized by the SC through “authorization” which has been
installed through its practice of ultra legem.11
8 In the recent debates in the Security Council, the Myanmar case shows such difficulty. A draft
resolution by the United States and the United Kingdom (UN Doc. S/2007/14) was rejected by
the two vetoes. UN Doc. S/PV5619, 12 January 2007.
9 Franck, T.M. and Patel, F., “UN police action in lieu of war: ‘The old order changeth’ ”, 85
AJIL 66 (1991). See also Schachter, O., “United Nations law in the Gulf conflict”, 85 AJIL 464
(1991).
10 Franck, T.M., Recourse to Force: State Action Against Threats and Armed Attacks, Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, at 24–31. For comprehensive research on Security
Council authorizations to the Member States, see Sarooshi, D., The United Nations and the
Development of Collective Security: The Delegation by the UN Security Council of its Chapter VII
Powers, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999.
11 Weckel, P., “L’usage déraisonnable de la force”, 107 RGDIP 379 (2003). In order for the
military action by a Multinational Force to be seen as a UN operation, three requirements should
be met: the existence of a resolution authorizing the use of force, clear specification of the extent,
nature and objectives of the military action through the current and subsequent resolutions, and
regular submission of a report to the SC by the force commander on the military action being
taken. There remain several weak controls over military activities on the ground, that are in the
hands of the SC, and that it uses to place military enforcement actions through a Multinational
Force within the framework of the UN collective security. See White, N.D. and Ülgen, Ö., “The
Security Council and the decentralized military option: constitutionality and function”, 44 NILR
386–387 (1997). For the features of the post Gulf War authorizations, see also Lobel, J. and
Ratner, M., “Bypassing the Security Council: ambiguous authorizations to use force, cease-fires
and the Iraqi inspection regime”, 93 AJIL 141–144 (1999).
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The actual UN collective security system has thus included two directions as
reflected by the structural characteristics of the international community: a central-
ized one and a decentralized one. As the need to achieve a common value and to
keep a feeling of solidarity among members in the international community is
increasingly being recognized, this more centralized mechanism may work well
within the UN system. Provided, however, that States confronted with situations in
which they feel obliged to give priority to their own interests over the interests of the
international community, even if ideally each could be mutually complementary, do
not succumb to the temptation of adopting decentralized unilateral measures inside
and outside the UN system.12
Augmentation of the unilateral acts by States
On the international level, States normally try to maintain a free hand, particularly
when it concerns their own security. As long as unilateral acts by States are in
accordance with the UN Charter and meet the requirements to be observed in it,
relatively few serious problems will occur. However, some recent cases demonstrate
instances in which States tried to ease some of the legal requirements for the uni-
lateral use of force deliberately. There seemed to be even efforts to remove them,
substantially by ignoring such requirements, or by attempting to produce some new
exceptions to the non-use-of-force principle instead.
The reaction by some States to international terrorism may fall under the former
category. After the 11 September attacks by Al-Qaeda, in an attempt to crush its
main camps and capture the persons responsible for these horrifying events, the
United States and the United Kingdom started their military activities in Afghani-
stan, whose government was alleged to have provided support to the terrorist group,
as a function of their right to self-defence.13 The idea of pre-emptive action claimed
by President George W. Bush in the National Security Strategy in September 2002 is
an extension of this conduct.14
Arguably, these practices are questionable as regards their legality, because there
continues to be controversy regarding the definition of terrorist attacks as armed
attacks capable of activating the right of self-defence in accordance with inter-
12 Quigley, pointing out some problematic aspects of the authorization technique, concludes that
“[I]f the Security Council is to maintain its integrity as an institution, its members must work to
reassert Council prerogatives. Unless this is done, there will be little viability in the concept of
collective enforcement of the peace”. Quigley, J., “The ‘privatization’ of Security Council
enforcement action: a threat to multilateralism”, 17 Michigan JIL 283 (1996).
13 UN Doc. S/2001/946 (United States); and UN Doc. S/2001/947 (United Kingdom).
14 For the National Security Strategy of the United States of America, see 41 ILM, 1478–1479
(2002). See also, Gray, C., International Law and the Use of Force, 2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2004, at 176–179.
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national jurisprudence.15 Although the question of its legality does not have to be
dealt with here, it must be pointed out that once such unilateral actions recur, these
would likely be placed almost outside the control of the SC. This means that the
non-use of force principle might be eroded, and that the UN centralized mechanism
of regulation for the use of force could be undermined.
The latter category is still less centralized. There are many doctrines that have
strongly argued that some exceptions should be regarded as immune to the non-use-
of-force principle, besides military enforcement measures under Chapter VII and the
right to self-defence. Typical examples are the protection of nationals abroad, armed
reprisals to enforce human rights etc., and especially humanitarian intervention,16 as
in the case of Kosovo. The bombing of Yugoslavia by NATO and its subsequent
justification as a humanitarian intervention would obviously signify as a deviation
from the UN collective security system.17 It is certain that these kinds of unilateral
acts by States are fundamentally based on and gradually aggravate the decentralized
structure of international community. Ultimately, they might severely impair the
intrinsically centralized-oriented nature of UN collective security.18
The UN collective security system, thus, currently hangs on a precarious balance
between the need for strengthening the centralized functions performed mainly by
the SC, on the one hand, and the enduring demand for deviation from the UN
centralized system through the decentralized performance in the use of force by
States, on the other. It should be stressed, however, that the collective security system
itself includes elements of solidarity among States in the international community
and that this regime accordingly obliges States to act in the interest and defence of a
common value: the preservation of peace.19 What implication can then be derived
from actions undertaken “as if ” Chapter VII were in force? We will see it in taking
15 With regard to the recent jurisprudence of the ICJ on the use of force, see Gray, C., “The use
and abuse of the International Court of Justice: cases concerning the use of force after Nicara-
gua”, 14 EJIL 867–905 (2003). Wandscher, C., Internationaler Terrorismus und Selbstverteidi-
gungsrecht, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2006 gives comprehensive prospects on the relationship
between terrorism and the right to self-defence. On the historical work for defining terrorism in
international law, see Saul, B., “Attempts to define ‘terrorism’ in international law”, 52 NILR
57–83 (2005).
16 For these rules as the exceptions of the non-use of force principle other than self-defence, see
Gazzini, T., The Changing Rules on the Use of Force in International Law, Manchester: Manches-
ter University Press, 2005, at 163–179.
17 For a comprehensive review on the Kosovo crisis, e.g. Tomuschat, C. (ed.), Kosovo and the
International Community, Leiden: Kluwer Law International, 2002; and Corten, O. and Delcourt,
B. (eds.), Droit, légitimation et politique extérieure: L’Europe et la guerre du Kosovo, Brussels:
Edition Bruylant, 2000.
18 Kolb, R., Le droit relative au maintien de la paix internationale: Evolution historique, valeurs
fondatrices et tendances actuelles, Paris: Éditions A Pedone, 2005, at 53.
19 Wolfrum, R., “Solidarity amongst States: an emerging structural principle of international
law” in Dupuy, P.-M., Fassbender, B., Shaw, M.N. and Sommermann, K.-P. (eds.), Völkerrecht als
Weltordnung: Common Values in International Law: Festschrift für Christian Tomuschat, Kehl:
N.P. Engel Verlag, 2006, at 1092–1093.
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two examples in the next chapter, which seemingly blur the distinction between
Chapter VII and non Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
POSSIBLE ACTIVITIES BETWEEN CHAPTER VII AND NON-CHAPTER-VII
RESOLUTIONS
Use of force under the past authorization by Chapter VII resolutions
The “Operation Iraqi Freedom” and Security Council resolution 1441
The United States and its allies invaded Iraq in the course of a military action called
Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003, after Iraq refused to fully comply with
several relevant resolutions, including SC Resolution 1441, dated 8 November 2002.
The legality of their military action against Iraq was argued in and around the SC at
that time, but as the following will clearly show, Resolution 1441 on its own cannot
legally justify the use of force by the Coalition.20
In terms of the language, Resolution 1441 does not include authorization for the
use of force, despite reference to “Acting under Chapter VII”, and specific mention
among others, of Resolutions 678 and 687 in its preamble. In most cases in which the
use of force is authorized by the SC, it normally makes use of the term, “all neces-
sary means/measures” to fill certain objects precisely defined in each resolution.21
Regrettably, Resolution 1441 has no such terms, nor any similar ones. The words
“final opportunity” found in operative paragraph 2 of that resolution cannot be
interpreted as endorsement of any unilateral action by the Member States because
the SC set up “an enhanced inspection regime” to consider the situation referred
to in this paragraph and is responsible for determining whether or not Iraq faces
“serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations”
(operative paragraph 13).22 Thus, Resolution 1441 in itself provides no legal basis for
any military action.
This interpretation is confirmed by the intentions of most Member States in the
SC. The majority of them objected to any resolution that would authorize certain
Member States for unilateral action, and so insisted that no automatic resort to force
20 UN Doc. S/RES/1441 (2002), 8 November 2002. On the background of its adoption, in par-
ticular after 11 September 2001, see Malone, D.M., The International Struggle over Iraq: Politics
in the UN Security Council 1980–2005, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, at 186–195.
21 Blokker, N.M., “Is the authorization authorized? Powers and practice of the UN Security
Council to authorize the use of force by ‘coalitions of the able and willing’ ”, 11 EJIL 541–568
(2000); and Sicilianos, L.-A., “L’autorisation par le Conseil de sécurité de recourir à la force: une
tentative d’évaluation”, 106 RGDIP 5–50 (2002).
22 Corten, O., “Opération Iraqi Freedom: peut-on admettre l’argument de ‘l’autorisation implic-
ite’ de Counseil de sécurité?”, 36 RBDI 211–212 (2003); and Nguyen-Rounault, F., “L’inter-
vention armée en Irak et son occupation au regard du droit international”, 107 RGDIP 843–849
(2003).
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clause should be included within it. While the United States and the United King-
dom demanded that the combination of “material breach” and “serious con-
sequence” in Resolution 1441 should be interpreted as authorizing the use of armed
force, the rest of the SC Members did not accept this argument. The representative
of Ireland, for example, maintained that the purpose of that resolution was to
achieve disarmament of Iraq through inspections and not to establish the legal basis
for the use of force. This was reflected by the ideas of “a two-stage approach”, which
was supported by most States in the SC.23 In fact, the United States was unable to
persuade them otherwise and conceded, as its representative accepted at the meeting
in which Resolution 1441 was adopted, that the resolution contained neither “hid-
den triggers” nor “automaticity” with respect to the use of force. The United King-
dom also admitted that the SC should bear its own responsibility in this case.24 Thus,
Resolution 1441 in itself was not considered to permit any exception to the ban on
the use of force by the SC at the time of its adoption.25 This was further signified by
the fact that after the adoption of Resolution 1441, the United States and the United
Kingdom sought out a fresh resolution authorizing them to use military force just
before the beginning of “Operation Iraqi Freedom”.26
“Revival” of the previous authorization by the SC
The United States and the United Kingdom, forced to respond to the ongoing
events, and unable to rely upon ex post facto authorization,27 had to consider
another possibility, that is to say, the existing relevant Security Council resolutions,
especially the combination of Resolutions 678, 687 and 1441. The two governments,
having acquired limited evidence of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in
Iraq, and feeling the need to use force for eliminating that threat to peace, unsuccess-
fully attempted to persuade the SC to adopt a new resolution authorizing the use of
23 UN Doc. S/PV.4644, 8 November 2002, at 7 (Ireland). See also ibid., at 5 (France); at 6
(Mexico); at 8 (Russia); at 9 (Bulgaria); at 10 (Syria); and at 12 (China).
24 For these statements of the representatives in the Security Council meeting, see ibid., at 3
(the United States); and at 4–5 (the United Kingdom). See also Corten, O., Le retour des guerres
préventives: le droit international menacé, Brussels: Éditions Labor, 2003, at 33–34.
25 Hofmann, R., “International law and the use of military force against Iraq”, 45 GYIL 21–28
(2002).
26 On this process, see, White, N.D., “Self-defence, Security Council authority and Iraq” in
Burchill, R., White, N. D. and Morris, J. (eds.), International Conflict and Security Law: Essays in
Memory of Hilaire MacCoubrey, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, at 246–248.
27 For the ex post facto authorization, see Österdahl, I., “Preach what you practice: the Security
Council and the legalisation ex post facto of the unilateral use of force”, 74 Nordic JIL 231–260
(2005). Contra. see Kohen, M.G., “The use of force by the United States after the end of the
Cold War, and its impact on international law” in Byers, M. and Nolte, G. (eds.), United States
Hegemony and the Foundations of International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2003, at 217, where the author argues that the theory of ex post facto authorization contradicts
the rationale of the collective security system.
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force before their invasion of Iraq in March 2003.28 When they realized that the
efforts to obtain a second resolution for legitimizing their coming military oper-
ations had failed in the SC, they instead argued that besides the right to self-
defence,29 the combined and existing Security Council resolutions legally permitted
them to use force against Iraq because it posed the threat to peace with its WMD.
According to this so-called “combination” doctrine, pursuant to Resolution 678
authorizing Member States to use all necessary means to uphold and implement
Resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions, the Member States could use
force to enforce the cease-fire and to restore international peace and security, and
Resolution 1441, which acknowledged Iraq’s material breaches of Resolution 687,
triggered Resolution 678’s authorization to use force against Iraq.30 In sum, the
material breach of Resolution 687, which was found through the adoption of Reso-
lution 1441, revived the authority to use force under Resolution 678. The United
States and the United Kingdom then seemingly changed their interpretation of the
relevant resolutions, and took the position that no new resolution would be required
because Resolution 1441 (and Resolution 678) had already authorized the use of
force.31
Their argument, however, faced severe criticisms from other Member States of
the UN at the meeting of the SC just before the outbreak of war, and the majority
then were opposed to resumption of the war against Iraq. The consensus was that
upon consideration, Resolution 1441 did not authorize use of force explicitly or
implicitly, and that the findings of the resolution could not revive the preceding
authorization.32 The condemning voices from the international community have not
diminished but rather deepened during and after the war. Although some States,
28 White, N.D. and Myjer, E.P.J. “The use of force against Iraq”, 8 Journal of Conflict and
Security Law 5–6 (2003).
29 The relevancy of the self-defence to the “Operation Iraqi Freedom” is beyond this article. It is
only added here that interestingly, the United States alone invoked the self-defence to justify its
activities but the United Kingdom and another ally, Australia, did not. UN Doc. S/2003/350;
UN Doc. S/2003/352. On this subject, see Taft IV, W.H. and Buchwald, T.F., “Preemption, Iraq,
and international law”, 97 AJIL 557–563 (2003); Greenwood, C., “International law and pre-
emptive use of force: Afghanistan, Al-Qaida, and Iraq”, 4 San Diego ILJ 7–37 (2003); and Bothe,
M., “Terrorism and the legality of pre-emptive force”, 14 EJIL 227–240 (2003).
30 Hoo, J., “International law and the war in Iraq”, 97 AJIL 567 (2003). See also Lietzau, W.K.,
“Old laws, new wars: jus ad bellum in an age of terrorism”, 8 Max Planck UNYB 427–428 (2004).
31 The United Kingdom representative pleaded in a SC meeting after attacking Iraq that “[T]he
use of force is authorized in the current circumstances under Security Council resolutions 678
(1990), 687 (1991) and 1441 (2002)”. UN Doc. S/PV.4726 (Resumption 1), 27 March 2003, at 23.
The United States also explained that “Resolution 1441 (2002) explicitly found Iraq in continuing
material breach. In view of Iraq’s additional material breaches, the basis for the existing ceasefire
has been removed and the use of force is authorized under resolution 678 (1990)”, ibid., at 25.
See also, Corten, loc. cit., n. 22, at 223–224.
32 See UN Doc. S/PV.4709, 18 February 2003; UN Doc. S/PV.4709 (Resumption 1), 19 February
2003; UN Doc. S/PV.4714, 7 March 2003; UN Doc. S/PV.4717, 11 March 2003; and UN Doc.
S/PV.4717 (Resumption 1), 12 March 2003.
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including Japan, have stood with the United States and the United Kingdom,33 it
must be emphasized that the terms of Resolution 1441, the attitudes of the Member
States at the meetings of the SC, and the subsequent practice by the States after its
adoption reveal that “Operation Iraqi Freedom” has not been authorized under
Chapter VII by the SC.34
Thus, the United States and the United Kingdom invaded Iraq in March 2003
without any explicit or implicit authorization from the SC, although they sought to
obtain it in advance. As a result, they had to undertake their military operations
without the support and sanction of Chapter VII. However, what needs to be high-
lighted here is that the invasion of Iraq was considered contrary to the spirit of UN
collective security by the majority of the SC, and the United States and the United
Kingdom also tried to disguise their activities with a Chapter VII authorization of
the use of force through the combination doctrine. Plainly speaking, these countries
conducted the war in 2003, while lacking accordance with any Chapter VII reso-
lution, and simultaneously tried to justify their activities under a Chapter VII
authorization.
Binding effect of a non-Chapter-VII resolution?
The adoption of Security Council Resolution 1695 on North Korea
Another example of the seeming blur in the differentiation between Chapter VII and
non Chapter VII resolutions is SC Resolution 1695 regarding the launch of missiles
by North Korea in July 2006.35
North Korea has given rise to and increased tension around the East Asian
region since the early 1990s, by initially not observing the various non-proliferation
obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
and then declaring its withdrawal from the NPT regime. The missile incident, which
was followed by the exercise of the nuclear test by North Korea in October 2006,
should be considered in this context.36
33 UN Doc. S/PV.4726, 26 March 2003, at 39 (Japan). See also ibid., at 14 (Kuwait), 25 (Poland),
27 (Australia), and 35 (Republic of Korea).
34 Especially, Russia and China criticized the military operation by the United States and the
United Kingdom as a violation of international law. UN Doc. S/PV.4726 (Resumption 1), at 26
(Russian Federation), and 28 (China). See also Åkermark, S.S., “Storms, foxes, and nebulous legal
arguments: twelve years of force against Iraq, 1991–2003”, 54 ICLQ 223–226 (2004).
35 UN Doc.S/RES/1695 (2006), 15 July, 2006. See Crook, J.R. (ed.), “United States supports UN
sanctions, vigorous enforcement following North Korean missile and nuclear tests”, 101 AJIL
216–217 (2007).
36 On the outline of the nuclear crisis in North Korea, see Andemicael, B., “Nuclear verification
in North Korea and Iran” in Lee, R.S. (ed.), Swords into Plowshares: Building Peace through the
United Nations, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006, at 129–131; and Rozman, G., “The
North Korean nuclear crisis and US strategy in Northern Asia”, 47 Asian Survey 601–621 (2007).
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Immediately after the supposed launches of missiles by North Korea on 5 July
2006, the Japanese government protested strongly against them and tried to impose
sanctions in consultation with other States objecting to them as well. On the very
same day, a draft resolution on North Korea was ready and submitted to the UN
Security Council by Japan and the United States. Reportedly, this draft, determining
that “these launches constitute a threat to international peace and security”, and
referring to “Acting under Chapter VII”, decided that “North Korea shall immedi-
ately cease the development, testing, deployment and proliferation of ballistic mis-
siles”, and that “Member States shall prevent the transfer of some materials that
could contribute to North Korea’s missiles”.37 It is quite clear from these words that
the Japanese and the United States governments intended to have the SC adopt the
Chapter VII resolution with a binding force towards all Members States, including
North Korea.
Although fully supported by the United States,38 the Japanese draft resolution
was fiercely criticized as much too tough against North Korea by China and Russia
during informal meetings of the SC. They contended that such a harsh resolution
could stiffen North Korean resolve and aggravate the situation in the Korean
Peninsula so that the Six-Party Talks might be unsuccessful. Especially China, the
President of the talks, took great pains to prevent problems with the talks by
objecting to any attempts to adopt a Chapter VII resolution, which would alienate
North Korea. Instead, China, with Russia, put forward its own milder draft as a
Presidential Statement that subsequently became a draft resolution without refer-
ence to Chapter VII.39 The negotiation almost came to a deadlock, but finally, the
United Kingdom and France jointly proposed a compromise, which was acceptable
to both sides. Adoption of the resolution was necessary, not only because Japan
quickly sought it in response to the missile launches by North Korea in order to
demonstrate political pressure by the SC, but also because China and Russia felt the
adoption of a resolution would be the inevitable response to such hostile acts. On 15
July, the SC unanimously adopted Resolution 1695, in which “Acting under Chapter
VII” is not referred.40 However, the interpretation of this Resolution, particularly in
its legal effect, was not in perfect accord among the Member States of the SC.
37 For the information on this draft from Fox News, http://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_
story/0,3566,202213,00.html (visited on 20 July 2006).
38 It is said, however, that the Bush Administration overall has been averse to stronger sanctions
on North Korea by virtue of being wary of provoking Chinese opposition and of jeopardizing
any prospects for the restart of the Six-Party Talks. See Hughes, C.W., “The political economy
of Japanese sanctions towards North Korea: domestic coalitions and international systemic
pressures”, 79 Pacific Affairs 481 (2006).
39 “US, allies seek punitive action against N. Korea”, The Washington Post, 7 July 2006, A01; and
“At UN, China and Russia offer a new measure on North Korea”, The New York Times, 13 July
2006, at 8.
40 It is only after making sure that Chapter VII of the UN Charter is not invoked when China
joined in this resolution. See Cho, I.D. and Woo, M.J.-E., “North Korea in 2006: the year of
living dangerously”, 47 Asian Survey 70 (2007).
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The content of SC Resolution 1695 and its legal effect
Resolution 1695 includes a condemnation against the ballistic missile launches by
North Korea, demands on it for the suspension of all activities related to its ballistic
missile programme, calls for the re-establishment of its pre-existing commitments to
a moratorium on missile launching and an immediate return to the Six-Party Talks
without precondition. This Resolution also requires all Member States of the United
Nations, in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and con-
sistent with international law, to exercise vigilance and prevent missile and missile-
related materials, technology, etc. from being transferred to North Korea’s missile or
WMD programme. Given these contents, Resolution 1695 seemingly could impose
sanctions on North Korea with the binding force of all Member States, although it
never actually refers to “Acting under Chapter VII”, and never makes the determin-
ation that a threat to international peace and security might exist. The only reference
found is in its preamble, in the quite similar phrases: “Affirming that such launches
jeopardize peace, stability and security in the region and beyond” and “Acting under
its special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”.41
In fact, Japan read a legally binding force into this resolution owing to Article
25 of the UN Charter, even if it does not mention Chapter VII, as the Japanese
representative stated in the SC meeting just after its adoption:
Through the resolution, the Council has . . . agreed on a set of binding measures
that both the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Member States are obliged
to comply with in order to deal appropriately with the situation created by the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.42
Thus, Japan exerted an effect through inclusion of the aforementioned terms, which
are very similar to the ones usually used in a Chapter VII resolution.43 The United
States also maintained that the Council’s action is clear, firm and unanimous in
adopting this resolution.44
By contrast, China and Russia did not expressly State that this resolution was
mandatory to all Member States. It can be supposed from their attitudes during the
negotiation process that these countries have consistently refused the legally binding
41 UN Doc. S/RES/1695 (2006), pre.paras. 12 and 13.
42 UN Doc. S/PV.5490, 15 July 2006, at 2.
43 “UN Council, in weakened resolution, demands end to North Korean missile program”, The
New York Times, 16 July 2006, at 8.
44 UN Doc. S/PV.5490, at 6. “Security Council rebukes N. Korea: nations agree to demand end of
missile program”, The Washington Post, 16 July 2006, A13, says that the United States and Japan
overcame Chinese opposition by agreeing to include language offered by France and Britain that
only implicitly referred to Chapter VII. The French representative also says that the resolution is
perfectly clear and contains provisions to which all parties must adhere, UN Doc. S/PV.5490, at 7.
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effect of any non-Chapter-VII resolution, and thus were unconcerned by this com-
promised non Chapter VII resolution.45
However, is it impossible for a non Chapter VII resolution to be legally binding
because of Article 25 of the UN Charter? In its Advisory Opinion in the Namibia
case in 1971, the International Court of Justice stated on this point that Article 25
was not limited in its application to Chapter VII because it was not situated in
Chapter VII and that without it Articles 48 and 49 would secure a binding effect for
resolutions adopted under its auspices.46 Admittedly, most international lawyers also
support this view.47 As for the scope and the legal basis of the binding effect of the
decisions under Article 25, they are still controversial. In practice, there is a great
deal of confusion because of the artifice in the approach taken by Western countries
that only Chapter VII resolutions are binding.48
In this case, some international lawyers argue that the relevant paragraphs in
Resolution 1695 may have binding force even if Chapter VII is not referred to.49
Reconsidering such issues with respect to the precise scope of this Article, however,
is beyond this work. Rather, what should be noted here is that in order to ascertain
whether a resolution includes a binding decision, the intention of the SC with regard
to it should be taken into account. Only if there has been agreement among the
45 The New York Times, loc. cit., n. 43, at 8.
46 Legal Consequences for the States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South
West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep.
1971, at 52–53, paras. 113–114. Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, on the contrary, criticizes this
position taken by the Court in his dissenting opinion, saying that “[S]ince, in consequence, the
question whether any given resolution of the Security Council is binding or merely recommenda-
tory in effect, must be a matter for objective determination in each individual case, it follows that
the Council cannot, merely by invoking Article 25 . . . impart obligatory character to a resolution
which would not otherwise possess it according to the terms of the chapter or article of the
Charter on the basis of which the Council is, or must be deemed to be, acting” [emphasis in
original]. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, ibid., at 293–294, para. 114. See
Suy, E. and Angelet, N., “Article 25” in Cot, J.-P., Pellet, A. and Forteau, M. (eds.), La Charte
des Nations Unies: Commentaire article par article, 3rd ed., Paris: Economica, 2005, at 478.
47 Delbrück, J., “Article 25” in Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary,
2nd ed., Vol. I., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, at 457–458. See also Higgins, R., “The
advisory opinion on Namibia: which UN resolutions are binding under Article 25 of the Char-
ter?”, 21 ICLQ 270–286 (1972).
48 White, N.D., Keeping the Peace: The United Nations and the Maintenance of International
Peace and Security, 2nd ed., Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997, at 63; and Frowein,
J.A., “Collective enforcement of international obligations”, 47 ZaöRV 69–70 (1987). Also, Klab-
bers, though presuming that “[the SC] can also take binding decisions out side the Chapter VII
context”, confesses that “we do not really know the basis for the Namibia opinion, and thus we
cannot tell with certainly that, in 1971, the Court held a non-chapter-VII decision to be binding”.
Klabbers, J., An Introduction to International Institutional Law, Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2002, at 222–223.
49 Kirgis, F.L., “North Korea’s missile firings”, ASIL Insight, vol. 10, issue 18, 24 July 2006; and
Nakatani, K., “Kita-Chosen misairu hassya [North Korea’s missile launches]”, Jurist, No. 1321
(2006), at 48–49.
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Member States of the SC, therefore, a Chapter VII resolution must have a binding
effect. An article by the Japanese foreign minister showed that, at least in this case,
the Japanese government identified Resolution 1695 with a Chapter VII resolution
through the use of some “robust” verbs: demand, require, etc., which are usually
employed in the latter, and accordingly found the resolution binding the Member
States even if it lacked explicit reference to Chapter VII.50
Resolution 1695 definitely makes no reference to Chapter VII but this is because
China and Russia strongly resisted its reference because of possible issues with the
binding force. For their part, on the other hand, Japan and the United States were
satisfied since they interpreted this resolution as “Acting under Chapter VII”. This
revealed that both sides consider it extremely important whether or not the term
“Chapter VII” is inserted into the resolution. It also indicated that they recognized
and agreed that a Chapter VII resolution had a binding force that included all Mem-
ber States. This means that there is still a solemn threshold between Chapter VII and
non Chapter VII with respect to a binding effect of a resolution, at least in the SC.51
STATES TAKING CHAPTER VII SERIOUSLY
Reasons for covering up non Chapter VII
Political and legal call for Chapter VII in the use of force
The non Chapter VII actions, which seek the effects of Chapter VII, are intrinsically
ambiguous. States, which have unsuccessfully sought adoption of a Chapter VII
resolution, pretend to act “as if ” under Chapter VII. Then, those States entertain
two contradictory expectations: to use any means at their disposal, on the one hand,
and to have their actions accepted as legal and legitimate by the international com-
munity, on the other. When needed, they could invoke a Chapter VII resolution, with
the expectation that it might serve as a kind of bridge between these contradictory
preferences.
As for actions involving the use of force, the reason for States seeking a Chapter
VII resolution is relatively simple and clear. When the situation does not permit
acting States to invoke the right to self-defence, they look for an authorization by the
50 Asou, T., “Nihon gaiko, shiren to tassei no 11 nichi-kan [The Japanese diplomacy: 11 days of
trials and achievements]”, Chuo Koron (monthly magazine), 143 (September 2006).
51 On the SC’s legislative powers, Dicke insists that it is based on Articles 24 and 25 and on
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, but also that it is limited to its primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security. Dicke, K., “National interest vs. the interest of
the international community – a critical review of recent Security Council practice” in Delbrück,
J. (ed.), New Trends in International Lawmaking – International ‘Legislation’ in the Public Interest,
Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1997, at 164. It should be noted that discussion here focuses on the
maintenance of international peace and security. For a comprehensive review of the SC’s legisla-
tive power, see, Denis, C., Le pouvoir normative du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies: Portée et
limites, Brussels: Editions Bruylant, 2004.
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SC under Chapter VII. Otherwise, they would deliberately be violating existing rules
on the use of force with the intention of changing them.52 Those States which intend
to use force may also want to engage the SC because even their seemingly contro-
versial conduct might be legalized under Chapter VII. The economy of this
behaviour is derived from the possibility that what they are doing may be sanctioned
by the SC and therefore legitimized by the UN, from a political point of view.53
The Iraq war of 2003 is not the only instance in which States endeavoured to
acquire a Chapter VII resolution directly authorizing them to use force as if they had
been permitted to by the SC in advance. In the 1998 Iraq crisis, for example, the
United States and the United Kingdom also wanted to have an authorizing reso-
lution adopted, but the SC only provided Resolution 1154, which, according to most
Member States, did not automatically authorize any State to use force against Iraq in
its non-compliance with the disarmament provisions of Resolution 687. As in the
attack on Iraq to enforce the no-fly zone in the same month, these two countries
claimed to justify their conduct through reference to a series of relevant resolutions,
among which Resolution 678 has been regarded as occupying the most prominent
position on the use of force in the Iraq crises.54 Their interpretations of those resolu-
tions, especially the “revival” of the authorization effect of Resolution 678, did not
necessarily demand them to acquire a new authorization resolution to use force, but
they realized it was desirable politically to confirm the legitimacy of their actions.
Against these arguments, most States have never accepted any authorization of the
use of force in non-Chapter-VII resolutions, even when there is an allegedly implicit
authorization.55 As a result, whether States are for the use of force or against it, they
52 Byers, M., “Preemptive self-defense: hegemony, equality and strategies of legal changes”, 11
Journal of Political Philosophy 189 (2003).
53 This need of legitimacy from the UN should be stressed definitely in the ex post facto author-
ization. See Österdahl, loc.cit., n. 27, at 254–255. As a practical point of view as well, Paulus, A.,
“The war against Iraq and the future of international law: hegemony or pluralism?”, 25 Michigan
JIL 732 (2004), who is right in saying that “the use of force without the clear and unequivocal
support of international law and institutions is costly in terms of so-called political capital,. . . .
[T]hus, the legitimacy bestowed on military action by international institutions is everything but
negligible”.
54 For the justifications, especially by the United States government, see Murphy, S.D. (ed.),
“Contemporary practice of the United States relating to international law”, 93 AJIL 471–479
(1999). See also Wedgwood, R., “The enforcement of Security Council resolution 687: the threat
of force against Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction”, 92 AJIL 724–728 (1998). Similar argu-
ments appeared when the Security Council adopted Resolution 1137 in November 1997. See
Kirgis, F.L., “The legal background on the use of force to induce Iraq to comply with Security
Council resolutions”, ASIL Insights, November 1997; and Williamson, E.D., “Comment on: The
legal background on the use of force to induce Iraq to comply with Security Council resolutions”,
ASIL Insights, March 1998.
55 On the comments against the “revival” of Resolution 678, see Denis, C., “La resolution 678
(1990) peut-elle légitimer les actions armies menées contre l’Iraq postérieurement à l’adoption de
la resolution 687 (1991)?”, 31 RBDI 485–525 (1998). See also White, N.D. and Cryer, R.,
“Unilateral enforcement of resolution 687: a threat too far?”, 29 California Western ILJ 269–280
(1999).
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are always conscious of the boundary between Chapter VII and non-Chapter-VII
contents in a resolution, from a political perspective on the one hand, and from a
legal perspective on the other.
For its part, the UN also has some advantages in authorizing Member States to
take enforcement measures under Chapter VII. The SC is the only plausible source
of legitimization for the collective use of force.56 Such an endorsement may induce
Member States to become fully aware that their actions should fit into the frame-
work of UN collective security, and may lead to the activation of the SC. This also
allows the UN to explore further opportunities to exercise effective measures and so
improve its legitimacy in the field of international peace and security. This presents
an ideal response towards criticism against UN inaction such as occurred during the
crisis in Rwanda.57 The more effective the measures adopted and implemented by the
UN through a multilateral force or a regional organization force are, the more
established its legitimacy becomes under Chapter VII. Apart from the inner elements
of the SC,58 however, it is to be noted that going too far in this direction would
undermine the spirit and intention of both the UN as an institution and the collect-
ive security system itself.
Grasp of the special meaning of Chapter VII in Security Council lawmaking
Concerning the subject of the binding force under Article 25, legitimacy through the
SC could work equally well for States seeking a Chapter VII resolution. As already
mentioned, Japan and the United States sought the strength of a Security Council
decision and obstinately persisted in reference to Chapter VII in a resolution on the
North Korea missile launches, despite one or more paragraphs in a non-Chapter-VII
resolution possibly holding binding force depending on the terms used. As a founda-
tion for the binding force of a Security Council resolution, these two countries did
not choose only the general effects of a decision under Article 25, which the ICJ has
recognized in the Namibia case. They instead relied on both Article 25 and Chapter
VII in accordance with the practice of the permanent Member States of the SC that
a Security Council decision with binding force must be adopted only under Chapter
56 Brunnée, J. and Troope, S.J., “The use of force: international law after Iraq”, 53 ICLQ 805
(2004).
57 Gray, C., “A crisis of legitimacy for the UN collective security system?”, 56 ICLQ 169–170
(2007). For a general view on the legitimacy of the Security Council in the context of Chapter
VII, see Sato, T., “The legitimacy of Security Council activities under Chapter VII of the
UN Charter since the end of the Cold War” in Coicaud, J.-M. and Heiskanen, V. (eds.), The
Legitimacy of International Organizations, Tokyo: UNU Press, 2001, at 309–352.
58 The question to be asked at this point is whether the Security Council has such proper legitim-
acy that Member States could place trust and confidence in the Security Council. They are likely
to avoid the Security Council and to implement what they want to do if they cannot find any
confidence in the quality and objectivity of its decision making. See A More Secure World: Our
Shared Responsibility, Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges
and Change, New York: United Nations, 2004, paras. 197 and 204–209.
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VII. The rest of the Member States also stood in agreement that only a Chapter VII
resolution has the power to bind all UN Member States signifying that these coun-
tries, at least the main Members in the SC, take Chapter VII seriously. In so doing,
they imbued Chapter VII with a specific and special meaning in its power to affect
Security Council resolutions. In short, the SC Members have agreed to the legitim-
acy of Chapter VII in the lawmaking process in general and beyond the scope of its
application in the North Korea missile resolution. They have agreed to be cautious
in determining the legitimacy of their own activities and to keep to those strictly
derived from Chapter VII.59
Slightly different from the use of force authorizations,60 the above-mentioned
process of the adoption of Resolution 1695 seems to reveal that the SC Members
have unanimously understood that it is the SC who should be making mandatory
decisions in its lawmaking. And it can be also pointed out that they shared the same
idea that the legal basis should be required for such a decision only under Chapter
VII. In this sense, admittedly, the fact that Japan and the United States sought a
Chapter VII resolution may reflect their keen desire for legalization through applica-
tion of the UN Charter rules as well as legitimacy via SC resolution. In the Iraqi
crisis, the United States and the United Kingdom finally asked for political legitim-
acy from the SC only because they had allegedly obtained the legal basis for the use
of force against Iraq through the “revival” effect of Resolution 687. By contrast, in
the North Korea missile crisis, Japan and the United States had to utilize Chapter
VII in proving the legality of their activities as well as in persuading other Members
to confirm their alleged legitimacy. There was also the acknowledgement by these
59 Admittedly, the discussions in the SC just before adopting Resolution 1540 on the non-
proliferation of the WMD, through which the SC is said to exercise its legislative power, could
give a different interpretation. Besides the concern about the exercise of legislative functions by
the SC or the authorization of unilateral use of force by some States by recourse to Chapter VII,
some States express the view that there is no need for the reference to Chapter VII in the draft
resolution since Article 25 provides that all decisions by the SC shall be accepted and carried out
by the Member States. UN Doc. S/PV.4950, 22 April 2004, at 4 (Brazil), and 5 (Algeria). On the
contrary, some other States support the binding force under Chapter VII as the political import-
ance of this resolution in the maintenance of international peace and security. Ibid., at 8–9
(France), 12 (the United Kingdom), and 21 (New Zealand). The United States maintains that the
draft resolution is placed under Chapter VII because “the Council is acting under that Chapter
and levying binding requirements” (ibid., at 17). Japan also says that “[I]n adopting a binding
Security Council resolution under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security
Council assumes a lawmaking function” (ibid., at 28). For the effect of Resolution 1540 and the
SC’s legislative power, see Lavalle, R., “A novel, if awkward, exercise in international lawmaking:
Security Council resolution 1540 (2004)”, 51 NILR 411–437 (2004); Sur, S., “La Résolution 1540
du Conseil de sécurité (28 avril 2004): entre la prolifération des armes de destruction massive, le
terrorisme et les acteurs non étatiques”, 108 RGDIP 855–882 (2004); and Joyner, D.H., “Non-
proliferation law and the United Nations system: resolution 1540 and the limits of the power of
the Security Council”, 20 Leiden JIL 489–518 (2007).
60 Franck, T.M., “What happens now? the United Nations after Iraq”, 97 AJIL 616 (2003),
where he argues that the Iraqi crisis was not primarily about what to do but, rather, who decides.
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two and other Members as well, that a mandatory decision without Chapter VII
might not stand up to the competence of the SC in the field of international peace
and security.
The effects of acting “as if ” under Chapter VII
From centralized to decentralized?
The SC may legitimize and put otherwise unilateral acts by Member States under the
framework of UN collective security, and may also work to strengthen its insti-
tutional functions. This is appropriate, especially in the use of force, only to the
extent that the SC can exercise proper control over those acts. In the meantime,
States, in particular dominant States, are likely to secure consent from the UN, in
order to prevent the UN from exercising effective control over their own activities.
They also make use of the UN and its existing rules, and even try to create new rules,
as a means of realizing their own interests, while rejecting legal constraints on them-
selves unless those restrictions suit their interests. Even if this scheme appears
simplistic, dominant States may undoubtedly always oscillate between the so-called
instrumentalization of and withdrawal from international law.61 A major problem
here is that unilateral acts constitute a deviation from the UN collective security
system and the power of the SC has eroded through them. The result is an almost
unlimited margin of action available to powerful States. Actually, some scholars have
tried to justify the unilateral action by the United States and its allies on the grounds
of the SC’s inaction.62
Compared with it, actions engaged in “as if ” under Chapter VII, prima facie, do
not seriously impair the collective security system. This is because the States acting
“as if ” under Chapter VII seem to carry out their activities within the realm of that
system and seem to maintain legality and legitimacy via decisions by the SC. In
effect, it is argued that “the case for intervening in Iraq to enforce Council resolu-
tions comes from within the existing normative and institutional framework”.63
61 Krisch, N., “International law in times of hegemony: unequal power and the shaping of the
international order”, 16 EJIL 369–408 (2005).
62 E.g. Glennon, M.J., “The UN Security Council in a unipolar world’ ”, 44 Va. JIL 91–112
(2003); and Wedgwood, R., “Unilateral action in the UN system”, 11 EJIL 349–359 (2000).
63 Johnstone, I., “US–UN relations after Iraq: the end of the world (order) as we know it?”, 15
EJIL 831 (2004). Dinstein, after saying that “[T]he text of Resolution 1441 does not prescribe
that, prior to recourse to force, the Coalition must return to the Security Council for a second
(confirmatory) resolution”, concludes that “I consequently do not regard the 2003 hostilities in
Iraq as a diminution of the powers of the Security Council . . . from start to finish the Security
Council played an important political part–in Resolutions 660, 678, 687 and finally in Resolution
1441– . . .”. Dinstein, Y., “Sovereignty, the Security Council and the use of force”, in Bothe, M.,
O’Connell, M. E. and Ronzitti, N. (eds.), Redefining Sovereignty: The Use of Force After the Cold
War, Ardsley: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 2005, at 118–119.
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According to this argument, for the SC as well, such a situation would be more
desirable since the SC could effectively keep those States within the framework of the
collective security system that otherwise would depart from it.64
However, responses by most Security Council Members towards these kinds of
actions, as mentioned above, would give a different impression. They have rejected
any act that would obscure the differentiation between Chapter VII and non-
Chapter-VII resolutions, and have also maintained that no legal effects of Chapter
VII, including the authorization of the use of force, should be conferred to such
actions. Putting things differently, they have neither found any Chapter VII effect in
these actions nor recognized them as UN collective measures on behalf of the inter-
national community to realize its values.
In fact, one of the essential aspects of unilateral actions would be their deviation
or avoidance of possible SC control over them, which might by nature represent
decentralization.65 Both cases discussed in this article undeniably would appear to
represent decentralization sufficiently to deserve the criticism. It is not wrong, there-
fore, to assert that these actions “as if ” under Chapter VII may, to a large extent,
undermine the spirit and institution of the UN collective security system. Only the
SC can rule out the unlawfulness of the breach of one of the most fundamental
principles in international law and can also authorize the use of force within the
framework of the collective enforceable actions. It is also only the SC and not the
individual States that can impose binding decisions on all the UN Member States,
which is critical in the implementation and enforcement of UN mandatory meas-
ures. From this perspective, actions “as if ” under Chapter VII would seem to harm
the core of the UN collective security system and to foment preference for a
decentralized system in place of the collective one.
Should proponents of these actions unsuccessfully seek a Chapter VII resolution
to give the appearance of acting within the framework of the UN collective security
system, while having full awareness of the importance and distinction of Chapter
VII, the end result may be the same. That is, despite intentions that may hypothetic-
ally lie in the effective implementation of the UN collective measures and an under-
standing of the international community and its values, their conduct may still
threaten to undermine the developing centralized system for the international com-
munity and contribute in creating an international system of hegemony instead.66
64 Similar rhetoric can be seen in the ex post facto authorization doctrine. See Österdahl, loc. cit.,
n. 27, at 234–237.
65 For the negative impacts of such unilateral actions on the UN collective security system,
see Krisch, N., “Unilateral enforcement of the collective will: Kosovo, Iraq, and the Security
Council”, 3 Max Planck UNYB 100–102 (1999). On harmful aspects of unilateralism, see
Dupuy, P.-M., “The place and role of unilateralism in contemporary international law”, 11 EJIL
20 (2000).
66 For a very brief consideration on the United States’ hegemonic position in the current
international system and its influences on international law, see Vagts, D.F., “Hegemonic
international law”, 95 AJIL 843–848 (2003).
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Future impacts of dissembling resolution as compromise
States which claim to have achieved legitimacy through a Chapter VII resolution and
encounter vigorous objection may have to consider interpretation through a non-
Chapter-VII resolution so they can proceed “as if ” under Chapter VII. By contrast,
others can keep their line of reasoning that Chapter VII should be excluded, and,
despite objections to interpretations by the opposite side, does not prevent the SC
from adopting a resolution without any reference to Chapter VII. In this sense, the
adoption of a non Chapter VII resolution as the outcome of a confounding process
is equal to the result of a compromise between competing interests among the SC.
However, when resolutions produced in this context prove themselves to fall short of
the legal requirements set by Charter rules regarding use of force or of a binding
resolution, their effectiveness may be questionable.
On the legal effects of the terminological similarity between a Chapter VII and a
non-Chapter-VII resolution, Resolution 1701 calling upon the strength of UNIFIL,
which was adopted unanimously on 11 August 2006 after the Israel armed forces
invaded the Lebanese territories against Hezbollah’s attacks initiated in July 2006,
proved interesting and full of implications.67
In this resolution, the SC determines that the situation in Lebanon constitutes a
threat to international peace and security, and “authorizes UNIFIL to take all
necessary action”, to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile
activities, to resist forcible obstruction of performance of its duties, and “to protect
United Nations personnel, facilities and equipment, ensure the security and freedom
of movement of United Nations personnel, humanitarian workers and, without
prejudice to the responsibility of the government of Lebanon, to protect civilians
under imminent threat of physical violence”.68 It, however, contains no SC reference
to Chapter VII in it. Very similar sentence structure can be found in other
resolutions authorizing some recent “robust” peacekeeping forces to use force under
Chapter VII,69 but Resolution 1701 avoids any explicit reference to Chapter VII,
67 On the attacks by Israel as the background of adopting this resolution, see Letter dated 7
August 2006 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN
Doc. S/2006/626. See also Cannizzaro, E. “Entités non-Etatiques et régime international de l’em-
ploi de la force. Une étude sur le cas de la réaction israelienne au Liban”, 111 RGDIP 333–354
(2007). For an excellent inquiry into the recent activities of UNIFIL, involving the use of force,
see Murphy, R., “United Nations peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia, and the use of force”,
8 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 71–99 (2003). See also Coleman, K.P., International
Organizations and Peace Enforcement: The Politics of International Legitimacy, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2007, at 314–325.
68 UN Doc. S/RES/1701 (2006), 11 August 2006, pre. para. 11 and op. para. 12.
69 “Robust” rules of engagement of peacekeeping force is referred to in the Brahimi Report (UN
Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 55), but what are mentioned here as “robust” peacekeeping
forces are the ones which are combined with Chapter VII, and seen mainly in Africa, especially
since the end of the twentieth century, like UNAMSIL, UNMIL, UNOCI, MONUC and UNMIS.
On this issue, see Zacklin, R., “The use of force in peacekeeping operations” in Blokker and
Schrijver (eds.), op.cit, n. 7, at 91–106.
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despite the fact that Israel and the United States insisted on the deployment of the
most robust international force under Chapter VII authority to stabilize the situ-
ation in southern Lebanon.70 The result is that UNIFIL was not authorized to use
force under Chapter VII, although it fulfilled the same mandate as carried out by the
“robust” peacekeeping forces.71 This case demonstrates that language similar to that
used in a Chapter VII resolution does not necessarily carry the same effect in a non-
Chapter-VII resolution in which it is used. It is the intention of the SC Members that
may be crucial in determining the effects.
As Judge Rosalyn Higgins rightly pointed out in 1963, “[i]t has come to be
accepted almost as a matter of principle that the authority to decide upon disputed
questions of the interpretation of the Charter belongs to the organ charged with
their application”.72 And on the premise that the will of the international community
is expressed by the SC in the field of international peace and security, it is for the SC
to decide, on behalf of the international community, what steps should be taken, not
for the individual States.73
So, if the SC Members should agree that a new action should be and continue to
be supported in place of an older one in performing its activities on international
peace and security, there would be increasing possibility for establishment of a new
rule, either by changing the interpretation of relevant norms or through a legal
act within the framework of the UN Charter. A binding decision may provide a
good example of this point. The current prevailing view among the SC Members,
especially by five permanent members, that a legally binding effect should only be
conferred by a Chapter VII resolution might be a driving force for confirming their
interpretation or even for creating a new normative rule. It cannot be denied that
a rule saying that binding effects should be restricted to Chapter VII resolutions
might be introduced in the near future, depending on the subsequent practice of
the SC that has had to face criticism due to its paucity of supporting doctrines as
well as from the inappropriateness of its past behaviour.74 In this respect, Resolution
1685 fell short of a mandatory effect due to lack of reference to Chapter VII, and
70 Nasu, H., “The responsibility to react? Lessons from the Security Council’s response to the
Southern Lebanon crisis of 2006”, 14 International Peacekeeping 347 (2007).
71 The French representative clearly declared just before the adoption of Resolution 1701 that
“the mandate that the Security Council is giving UNIFIL is not one that imposes peace”, and the
Qatar representative also plainly stated that the mandate of UNIFIL “will continue to be subject
to the provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter”. See UN Doc. S/PV.5511, 11 August 2006, at 8
(France); and at 8–9 (Qatar).
72 These words are in the context of a domestic matter problem, but are also true of the use of
force, or the lawmaking questions. Higgins, R., The Development of International Law through the
Political Organs of the United Nations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963, at 66.
73 Lowe, V., “The Iraqi crisis: what now?”, 52 ICLQ 868–869 (2003). But see also Corten, O., “La
participation du Conseil de sécurité à l’élaboration, à la cristallisation ou à la consolidation de
règles coutumières”, 37 RBDI 562 (2004).
74 Jaqué, J.-P., “L’avis de la Cour international de justice du 21 juin 1971”, 76 RGDIP 1089–1092
(1972).
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nevertheless, may open a way for the creation of a new rule against the advisory
opinion of the ICJ in 1971.
As for the rules on the use of force within the UN collective security system, to
the contrary, there is little or no probability of reshaping them through the recent SC
practice. Actions “as if ” under Chapter VII, implicit or revival authorization of the
use of force, would undermine and even abrogate the spirit of that system if they
were to be regarded as under “true” authorization. The result would be to transform
originally unilateral acts of individual States into the disguised collective measures
of the UN but without its control over them. A series of SC resolutions after the
Gulf War have confirmed that this conversion should be illegitimate and may be
illegal as it may bring the danger of a creeping erosion of the centralized collective
security system. The general will of the SC through its legal acts can be established
here in drawing a strict line between an act under Chapter VII and one with no
reference to it. This does not mean that the possibility of creating and changing rules
of customary international law by greater unilateral acts “as if ” under Chapter VII
in the near future should be excluded. To realize it, however, the appearance of a
consistent interpretation of the relevant resolutions and treaties among the SC must
be awaited,75 and at present, the SC has found a significantly rigid threshold between
Chapter VII and non Chapter VII, where there seems to be no room for a disguised
Chapter VII action.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Actions “as if ” under Chapter VII might be legalized and legitimized through
attempted “revival” of a core authorization resolution (the Iraqi War in 2003), or the
implicit or implied authorization (the North Korea missile launch events in 2006) by
its creators. These justifications, however, have been fiercely challenged and criticized
for eroding the UN collective security system by both other States and many
scholars. From the perspective of the fundamental principles in international law,
namely, the non-use-of-force principle, and the mandatory effect of the SC decisions
as the nub of the UN collective security system, these assessments must be con-
sidered as correct. It is to be noted that those actions may bring to the surface the
inclusive antagonism in that system: decentralized unilateralism by individual States
and centralized collective measures by the international community, and may also
lead the system to be undermined.76
75 Byers, M., “The shifting foundations of international law: a decade of forceful measures
against Iraq”, 13 EJIL 40–41 (2002). On the recent controversial issue of interpretation of the SC
resolutions, see Wood, M.C., “The Interpretation of Security Council resolutions”, 2 Max
Planck UNYB 73–95 (1998); and Papastavridis, E., “Interpretation of Security Council resolutions
under Chapter VII in the aftermath of the Iraqi crisis”, 56 ICLQ 83–118 (2007).
76 Franck, T.M., “Is collective security through the UN still feasible?”, 9 The Finnish YIL 38
(2000).
124 Asian Yearbook of International Law
The traditional arguments, which may promote unilateral action by individual
States, would carry a veil of an institutional dimension for UN collective security.77
This is also the case when actions “as if ” under Chapter VII should be claimed.
Thus, it should be careful and prudent that such actions be legalized and legitimized
within the UN collective security system, because the UN Member States have
strongly identified Chapter VII as different from other parts of the UN Charter and
as having a distinctive effect on concrete actions. In practice, the SC has also accord-
ingly attached great weight to the rigid distinction between Chapter VII and non-
Chapter-VII resolutions.
77 Sicilianos, L.-A., “Après l’Irak: Vers une redefinition des pouvouirs du Conseil de sécurité?” in
Banneilier, K., Corten, O., Christakis, T. and Klein, P. (eds.), L’intervention en Irak et le droit
international, Paris: Édition A. Pedone, 2004, at 65.
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THE ROLE OF IMO RESOLUTIONS IN OCEAN LAW AND
POLICY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC
Mary George*
ABSTRACT
Resolutions of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) have a unique role
to play in the national ocean law and policy framework of States in the Asia-Pacific
region, being quasi-legal non-binding norms with a technical content quite
incomparable to the soft law found in general recommendations, guidelines, codes of
conduct, principles, standards, norms, best practices or model laws. These resolu-
tions are purpose driven, being passed for improving the safety and security of
navigation and for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution. As an
international inter-governmental organization with a membership of 167 Member
States, in content the resolutions blur the thin line between convincing evidence and
legal argument grounded in treaty, custom or general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations. To some extent, this paper follows the trail blazed by Professor
Dinah Shelton and to that extent alone bases its findings upon the research conclu-
sions as stated in her book, The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International
Legal System. In ocean law, the relationship between the 1982 Law of the Sea Con-
vention (1982 LOSC) that constantly refers to the Generally Accepted International
Rules and Standards (GAIRAS) and the IMO has been determined. According to
the IMO, many of these GAIRAS rules and standards refer to IMO Conventions
and Resolutions. Professor Shelton is of the view that the requirement in the 1982
LOSC to give effect to “generally accepted standards” increases the likelihood of
compliance with non-binding standards set for marine pollution by the IMO.1
* Associate Professor Datin Dr, Faculty of Law, University of Malaya 50603 Kuala Lumpur;
Head, Maritime Law and Policy Unit, Institute of Ocean and Earth Sciences, University of
Malaya. The author would like to express her gratitude to Mrs Marienne Harvey, Chief Librar-
ian and to her staff at The International Maritime Organization for their invaluable assistance
with documentation.
1 Shelton, D. (ed.), Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-binding Norms in the Inter-
national Legal System, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, at 536 and 537. The original name
of “Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO)” was changed to IMO by
IMO Assembly resolutions A.358(IX) and A.371 (X) adopted in 1975 and 1977 respectively. For
the Convention on IMCO, see 53 AJIL at 516 (1959).
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Although this aspect is not elaborated upon here, it is perhaps through this route
that disputes regarding IMO resolutions may be filed in the Registry of the ICJ. The
implications of this discussion for other IGO resolutions are not considered here.
INTRODUCTION
The IMO resolutions2 have a critical role to play in the formulation of national
ocean law and policy instruments of States in the Asia-Pacific region whereby
recommendations on technical global maritime rules and standards, not included in
IMO treaties,3 may be implemented in national legislation followed by institutional
capacity-building. It is through the effective mechanism of government depart-
ments that there can be effective exercise of maritime safety administration. In
implementing its technical cooperation programme, the IMO’s key principle is that
the ownership of the development and implementation process rests with the
recipient countries themselves. This is followed by the integration of IMO’s regula-
tory priorities into government programme-building process and promotion of
partnerships with governments, the industry and international development aid
agencies and other development aid programmes in the maritime sector. The IMO
assesses the effectiveness of any given assistance in accordance with paragraph 6 of
Resolution A.873(20). Resolution A.901(21) adopted on 25 November 1999 focuses,
inter alia, on the achievement of sustainable development and effective implementa-
tion of the Integrated Technical Cooperation Programme and assistance to devel-
oping countries (ITCP). The resolution urges Member States to take that linkage
into account in the preparation and delivery of their national development plans.
Resolution A.909 (22) was adopted on 29 November 2001 and covers policy making
in IMO – setting the organization’s policies and objectives.4 In this Resolution, the
Assembly endorses the need for openness and transparency within the IMO and to
ensure that all States represented are provided with an opportunity to contribute
constructively to any policy preparation and evaluation and all member govern-
ments are encouraged to submit policy documents to the Council for consideration.
The Resolution also calls upon the Council to ensure its implementation and to
report to the Assembly as appropriate.
Resolution A.777 (18) on Work Methods and Organization of Work in Commit-
tees and their Subsidiary Bodies adopted on 4 November 1993 calls upon member
2 Some areas of concern for the IMO are Ship and Port Interface, the Prevention of Air Pollution
from Ships, the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watch-
keeping, the International Safety Management Code, Passenger Ship Safety, the International
Ship and Port Facility Security Code, Port State Control, problem of places of refuge for disabled
vessels, and new regulations for bulk carrier safety, and marine pollution.
3 See LEG/MIMSC.5 at 2 and 5 where it is stated at 5 that “. . . national legislation implementing
IMO recommendations can be applied with binding effect to foreign ships”.
4 http://www.imo.org/About/mainframe.asp?topic_id=1333 (visited in November 2007).
128 Asian Yearbook of International Law
governments to bring this resolution to the attention of their representatives who
attend meetings of the organization and to advise them to observe agreed guidelines
on work methods and organization of work. The objective is to promote a safety
culture and environmental conscience, to avoid excessive regulation and intensify
governmental efforts at controlling security of ships and ports, to combat crimes at
sea and to control maritime terrorism and illicit drug trafficking, to check illegal
migration by sea and stowaway cases, thereby ensuring the wide and effective imple-
mentation of the revised conventions on standards, training, certification and
watchkeeping, the international safety management code, and the conventions on
marine pollution.
Arguments as to whether United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolu-
tions are law or not also apply to IMO Resolutions. When analyzing IMO resolu-
tions, much of the argument that centres around UNGA resolutions5 applies here
because these resolutions seem law-creating in behaviour6 and policy when govern-
ments adopt them into their municipal law and policy framework. These States have
to succeed in justifying their behaviour internationally, in the type and theory of
punishment they adopt for an infringement of their laws, in the regard they pay to
5 See, for instance, Resolution 22 C (1) of the General Assembly of the United Nations, 13
February 1946. Privileges and Immunities of the International Court of Justice: 1. The General
Assembly, with a view to ensuring that the International Court of Justice shall enjoy the privil-
eges, immunities and facilities necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfilment of its
purposes, in the country of its seat and elsewhere, invites the members of the Court at their first
session to consider this question and to inform the Secretary-General of their recommendations.
2. The General Assembly decides that the question of the privileges and immunities of the Court
shall be considered as soon as possible after the receipt of the recommendations of the Court. 3.
The General Assembly recommends that, until further action has been taken, the rules which have
been applied to the Permanent Court of International Justice should be observed by Members in
relation to the International Court of Justice.
See also Resolution 90(I) of the General Assembly of the United Nations, 11 December
1946; Privileges and Immunities of Members of the International Court of Justice, The Registry,
Assessors, and Agents and Counsel of the Parties and of Witnesses And Experts – By a reso-
lution adopted on 13 February 1946, the General Assembly, with a view to ensuring that the
International Court of Justice should enjoy the privileges, immunities and facilities necessary for
the exercise of its functions and the fulfilment of its purposes, in the country of its seat and
elsewhere, invited the Court at its first session to consider this question and to inform the
Secretary-General of its recommendations. The Court has accordingly examined the problem in
its various aspects during its first session, held at The Hague from 3 April to 6 May 1946, and has
transmitted to the General Assembly its conclusions. The General Assembly considered the
recommendations of the Court during the second part of its first session, and the report of the
Sixth Committee.
6 See Letter from the President of the International Court of Justice to the Minister for Foreign
Affairs of The Netherlands, 26 June 1946; Letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of The
Netherlands to the President of the International Court of Justice, 26 June 1946; and Letter from
the Minister for Foreign Affairs of The Netherlands to the President of the International Court
of Justice, 26 February 1971, see http://www.icj-cij.org (visited on 21 October 2007).
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the domestic and international factors that they consider important, in enumerating
the international legal norms through which they seek to justify their behaviour and
in their relationship to the societal formations for which they have undertaken such
laws and policy.7 Questions raised by Professor Onuma shape the arguments: “Fur-
thermore, we could also contribute to the study of international law as a normative
science by seeking to answer the question of how we can promote compliance with
international law by exploring the following issues: (1) Which international legal
norms do we utilize? (2) Which government behaviour are we seeking to regulate?
(3) What kind of law-realizing mechanism are we trying to use? (4) What kind of
interpretative and legislative techniques are we going to employ?”8 The international
norms that are utilized to regulate the flag State and government behaviour under
consideration are the standards and normative content of the technical IMO resolu-
tions and their application by coastal States to all flag States in the maritime zones
under their enforcement jurisdiction such as in the territorial seas and in straits used
for international navigation. The law-realizing mechanism and the interpretative
and legislative techniques used here centre around: (1) the quasi-legal character of
the resolutions under discussion; (2) the precautionary principle at the IMO; (3)
the philosophy of criminal sanctions for violations of these resolutions; (4) the
theory of compliance; (5) their evidentiary character; and (6) Professor Shelton’s
arguments.
STANDARDS AND NORMATIVE CONTENT OF IMO RESOLUTIONS AND
THEIR APPLICATION TO ALL FLAG STATES
The IMO resolutions are adopted by the Assembly, the Council, the Maritime Safety
Committee (MSC), the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) and
the Committee on the London Convention (LC). The IMO Assembly has passed
over 945 resolutions to date. Generally, the IMO resolutions are of two types, those
which have formative influence on treaties or which mature into treaties and their
amendments and those, considered in this paper, which though not law-creating yet
contain the potential to develop into rules. For instance, Assembly Resolution A.5(1)
1959 adopted the Status of the Convention on International Maritime Consultative
Organization (IMCO), the precursor to the IMO, and A.945(23) 2003 adopted the
1991 Amendments to the Convention on the International Maritime Organization
(Institutionalization of the Facilitation Committee). The IMO Council adopted
Resolution A. 316 (ES.V) of 1974 on Wider Representation in the Council to include
the Asian States who are new actors in IMO’s work, for it was not easy even for non-
Asian States such as Panama (in the Americas) and Liberia (in Africa) to effectively
7 Onuma, Y., “International law in and with international politics: the functions of international
law in international society”, 14 EJIL 105–139 (2003), at 138.
8 Ibid., at 138 and 139.
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occupy a position within the forerunner of the IMO, referred to as the Inter-
Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO).9
The Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) through MSC.1 (XLV) 1981 adopted
the 1981 amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea,
1974 and by MSC 227(82) 2006 adopted the amendments to the Protocol of 1988
relating to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974. The LC
Committee has adopted Resolution LP.1(1) 2006 on the amendment to include CO2
sequestration in sub-seabed geological formations in Annex 1 to the London
Protocol.
IMO resolutions in straits used for international navigation
The Maritime Safety Committee at its 79th session discussed the matter of the
proposed pilotage system in the Torres Strait Particularly Sensitive Sea Area
whereby the existing associated protective measure of a system of pilotage within the
Great Barrier Reef would be extended to include the Torres Strait.10 It is significant
9 See the Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-Governmental Maritime
Consultative Organization Case, ICJ Rep. 1960, at 160, 195 where the Court interpreted the term
“largest ship-owning nations” in the IMCO Constitution, according to the natural and ordinary
meaning of the words. The question before the Court was as follows: “Is the Maritime Safety
Committee of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, which was elected
on 15 January 1959, constituted in accordance with the Convention for the Establishment of the
Organization?” The Court by nine votes to five gave a negative answer to the question.
10 The background to this issue is as follows: MEPC  Resolution 45(30) deals with the current
system of pilotage within the Great Barrier Reef. Australia’s new proposed resolution recom-
mended that governments “recognize the need for effective protection of the Great Barrier Reef
and Torres Strait region and inform ships flying their flag that they should act in accordance with
Australia’s system of pilotage for merchant ships 70m in length and over or oil tankers, chemical
tankers and gas carriers, irrespective of size when navigating:
(a) the inner route of the Great Barrier Reef between the northern extreme of Cape York
Peninsula . . . and . . . in Hydrographers Passage:
(b) the Torres Strait and Great North East Channel between Booby Island . . . and Bramble
Cay . . .”.
See IMO Document, Maritime Safety Committee, 79th session, Agenda Item 23, MSC 79/23, 15
December 2004. It is to be noted that IMO Assembly Resolution A.710(17) adopted in November
1991, introduced a regime of recommended pilotage in the Torres Strait, replacing IMO Reso-
lution A.619(15) adopted in November 1987. IMO Resolution A.710(17) “recommends that all
ships of 70 m in length and over and all loaded oil tankers, chemical tankers or liquefied gas
carriers, irrespective of size, use the pilotage services licensed under Australian Commonwealth,
State or Territory law, when navigating the Torres Strait and the Great North East Channel
between Booby Island . . . and Bramble Cay. . . . The proposed extension of the existing compul-
sory pilotage areas would have the same geographic application as this resolution. Compliance
with the existing recommended pilotage regime is declining and Resolution A.710(17) no longer
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to note that the Sub-Committee on Safety of Navigation in its Report to the Mari-
time Safety Committee “noted the opinion of a number of delegations that there
was no clear legal basis to adopt a compulsory pilotage regime in international
straits”.11 Of course the view submitted by Australia and Papua New Guinea was
that this was consistent with international law and implementable under the 1982
LOSC and IMO instruments and procedures.12 While the reasons advanced by both
States are valid, the text of Part III, 1982 LOSC as currently worded does not give
the desired legal imprimatur to impose any action that would hamper transit pas-
sage. The issue here is not the IMO resolution but the nature of transit passage in
straits used for international navigation which cannot be suspended or hampered.
Any IMO resolution that has the effect of hampering or suspending transit passage
per se is null and void. In the Legal Committee of the IMO, various arguments were
advanced for and against the motion. One important suggestion was that “a new
regulation in SOLAS Chapter V could be adopted concerning pilotage. Moreover,
the new regulation should also be supported by the development of new guidelines
and criteria for adoption of pilotage schemes”.13 Despite that, the Committee was
unable to resolve the issue.14
Australia issued Marine Orders Part 54, Issue 4 (Order No. 10 of 2006) on
Coastal Pilotage repealing Marine Order Part 54, Issue 3 to give effect to IMO
Resolution MEPC 133 (53) on Designation of the Torres Strait as an extension of
the Great Barrier Reef Particularly Sensitive Sea Area. In Notice to Mariners 1267
for Australia Aus376 [1152/2006] it states that the Torres Strait Compulsory Pilotage
Area consists of:
Area A bounded in the south by latitude 10 41’S, in the north by Australia’s EEZ, and
longitudes 141 50’E to 142 05’E.
Area B bounded in the south by latitude 10 41’S, in the north by Australia’s EEZ, and
longitudes 142 05’E to 143 24’E. All vessels of 70 metres or greater . . . all loaded oil
tankers, chemical tankers and liquefied gas carriers when transiting through Area A
with a draught of 8 metres or more must carry a pilot. The same vessels (irrespective
provides an acceptable level of protection for the Torres Strait. Data from shipping in the Torres
Strait in 1995 and 2001 shows compliance has dropped from 70% to 32% for vessels on eastbound
voyages and 55% to 38.5% for west bound voyages. This amounts to over 500 unpiloted transits
per year and is increasing rapidly. As a consequence, the risk of an accident is unacceptably high.
Australia and Papua New Guinea therefore consider that resolution A.710(17) has proven to be
inadequate to protect the Torres Strait.” See IMO Document, Legal Committee, 89th session,
LEG 89/15, 24 August 2004, at paras. 4, 5 and 6.
11 See IMO Document, Sub-Committee on Safety of Navigation, 50th session, Agenda item 19,
and NAV 50/19, 28 July 2004. An extract of the Report of the Ships’ Working Group at para. 15.
12 See IMO Document, Legal Committee, 89th session, Agenda item 15, LEG89/15, 24 August
2004.
13 See ibid., Agenda item 16, LEG89/16, 4 November 2004, at para. 2347.
14 Ibid., Agenda item 15, LEG89/15, at para. 241.
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of draught) when transiting through Area B must carry a pilot. Defence forces vessels
are exempt.
Provision 8 to the Explanatory Notes to Marine Orders Part 54, Issue 4 (Order
No. 10 of 2006) states as follows:
. . . the duties of a pilotage provider include(ing) the timely supply of information
prior to providing a pilot for a transit of Torres Strait. The provision also specifies the
conditions for the issuing of a Document of Compliance and the associated validity
periods. Provision 8.1.1 is a penal provision which prohibits a person from acting as a
pilotage provider unless the person is the holder of a valid Document of Compliance.
Provision 8.2 is a penal provision that requires a pilotage provider to operate in
accordance with the Queensland Coastal Pilotage Safety Management Code.15
This is an example of an IMO resolution operating within the national law
framework of a coastal State. As the Torres Strait is a strait used for international
navigation under the 1982 LOSC, transit passage of foreign flags can neither be
suspended nor hampered and this is the case even when the marine environment is at
stake. Further, the domestic laws of any strait State that adopt an IMO resolution
cannot impose criminal sanctions upon foreign flags that refuse to comply with the
impugned domestic law. This is because the transit passage regime of straits used for
international navigation in Part III of the 1982 LOSC does not permit such criminal
enforcement jurisdiction by the strait State unlike the regime of the territorial seas
where such action is permitted expressly. Flag States in the Torres Strait have a duty
to comply with the resolution found in municipal law suo moto, and where they have
failed to do so through deliberate voluntary non-compliance, the matter has to be
referred to the diplomatic mission of the flag State whereby restitution in integrum
may be offered by the flag States to the coastal State. If the dispute is submitted to
the Australian courts based on the locus, the courts in Australia may examine the
feasibility of applying, mutatis mutandis, the doctrine of the most significant rela-
tionship, a concept borrowed from the law of contracts in conflict of laws situations,
as was expounded by the High Court of Hong Kong in Bank of India v. Gobindram
Naraindas Sadhwani and Others,16 to the case of an impugned IMO resolution. The
better solution might be to read both propositions of law together to mutually
reinforce each other.
Other IMO Resolutions that encourage the use of pilots on board ships in
certain areas are as follows:
15 In a private discussion with Professor James Crawford, Lauterpacht Centre for International
Law, University of Cambridge, I was advised that penal provisions are no longer attached for
non-compliance with this provision, 1 November 2007.
16 See August, R., Public International Law, Text, Cases and Readings, New Jersey: Prentice Hall,
1995, at 488; Carter, B.E., Trimble, P.R. and Bradley, C.A., International Law, New York: Aspen
Publishers, 2003, at 448.
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• Resolution A.480(IX) (adopted in 1975) recommends the use of qualified deep-
sea pilots in the Baltic and Resolution A.620(15) (adopted 1987) recommends
that ships with a draught of 13 metres or more should use the pilotage services
established by Coastal States in the entrances to the Baltic Sea;
• A.486(XII) (adopted 1981) recommends the use of deep-sea pilots in the North
Sea, English Channel and Skagerrak;
• A.579(14) (adopted 1985) recommends that certain oil tankers, all chemical
carriers and gas carriers and ships carrying radioactive material using the Sound
(which separates Sweden and Denmark) should use pilotage services;
• A.668(16) (adopted 1989) recommends the use of pilotage services in the Euro-
Channel and IJ-Channel (in the Netherlands); and
• A.827(19) (adopted 1995) on Ships’ Routeing includes in Annex 2 Rules and
Recommendations on Navigation through the Strait of Istanbul, the Strait of
Canakkale and the Marmara Sea the recommendation that: “Masters of vessels
passing through the Straits are strongly recommended to avail themselves of
the services of a qualified pilot in order to comply with the requirements of safe
navigation.”17
Greater corroborative evidence of the technical content of IMO resolutions may
also be found in the MEPC Resolutions, which include:
• MEPC 46(30) on measures to control potential adverse impacts associated with
the use of tributyl tin compounds in antifouling paints;
• MEPC 50(31) international guidelines for preventing the introduction of
unwanted aquatic organisms and pathogens from ships’ ballast water and
sediment discharge;18 and
• MEPC 67(37) guidelines on incorporation of the precautionary approach in the
context of specific IMO activities.
There are many IMO marine pollution treaties now where there once were
IMO resolutions such as The International Convention on the Control of Harmful
Anti-Fouling Systems 2001 and The International Convention for the Control and
Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments 2004.
The MEPC Resolutions target prevention of pollution by liquid substances
in bulk,19 prevention of pollution by harmful substances in packaged
17 The present discussion does not cover the customary international law status of pilotage for
which there seems to be ample basis.
18 This has become a treaty now, International Convention for the Control and Management of
Ships’ Ballast water and Sediments 2004.
19 Prevention of pollution (noxious liquid substances in bulk)
MEPC 32(27) 1989. Amendments to the International Code for the Construction and Equip-
ment of Ships Carrying Dangerous Chemicals in Bulk (IBC Codes);
MEPC 33(27) 1989. Amendments to the International Code for the Construction and Equip-
ment of Ships Carrying Dangerous Chemicals in Bulk (BCH Code);
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form,20 prevention of pollution by sewage,21 prevention of pollution by garbage,22
MEPC. 34(27) 1989. Amendments to the annex of the Protocol of 1978 relating to the Inter-
national Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 (Appendices II and III of
Annex II of MARPOL 73/78;
MEPC 40(29) 1990. Amendments to the International Code for the Construction and Equipment
of Ships Carrying Dangerous Chemicals in Bulk (IBC Code) (Harmonised system of survey and
certification);
MEPC 41 (29) 1990. Amendments to the Code for the Construction and Equipment of Ships
Carrying Dangerous Chemicals in Bulk (BCH Code) (Harmonised system of survey and
certification);
MEPC 57(33) 1992. Amendments to the annex of the Protocol of 1978 relating to the Inter-
national Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 (Designation of the Ant-
arctic area as a special area and lists of liquid substances in Annex II);
MEPC 62(35) 1994. Amendments to the standards for procedures and arrangements for the
discharge of noxious liquid substances – Amends MEPC 18(22);
MEPC 109 (49) 2003. Tripartite agreements;
MEPC 119 (52) 2004. 2004 Amendments to the International Code for the Construction and
Equipment of Ships carrying Dangerous Chemicals in Bulk (IBC Code);
MEPC 137(53) 2005. Amendments to the guidelines for the development of shipboard marine
pollution emergency plans for oil and/or noxious liquid substances (Resolution MEPC 85(44) –
Amends Resolution MEPC 85(44);
MEPC 158 (55) 2006. Amendments to the guidelines for the transport and handling of limited
amounts of hazardous and noxious liquid substances in bulk on off-shore support vessels (Reso-
lutionA.673(16) – Amends A.673(16);
MEPC 160(55) 2006. Implications of the revised Annex II to MARPOL 73/78 for the reference in
article 1.5(a)(ii) of the HNS Convention to “Noxious Liquid Substances carried in Bulk”.
20 Prevention of pollution (harmful substances in packaged form)
MEPC 35(27) 1989. Implementation of Annex III of MARPOL 73/78;
MEPC 58(33) 1992. Amendments to the annex of the Protocol of 1978 relating to the
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 (Revised Annex III);
MEPC 156(55) 2006. Amendments to the Annex of the Protocol of 1978 relating to the
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 (Revised Annex III of
MARPOL 73/78);
MEPC 157(55) 2006. Recommendation on standards for the rate of discharge of untreated
sewage from ships;
MEPC 159(55) 2006. Revised guidelines on implementation of effluent standards and perform-
ance tests for sewage treatment plants – Supersedes MEPC 2(VI).
21 Prevention of pollution (sewage)
MEPC 38(29) 1990. Application of the provisions of Annex IV of the International Convention
for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating
thereto, on the discharge of sewage in the Baltic Sea area, MEPC 143(54) 2006. Amendments to
the Annex of the Protocol of 1978 relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships, 1973 (Addition of Regulation 13 to Annex IV of MARPOL 73/78).
22 Prevention of pollution (garbage)
MEPC 9(17) 1982. Application of the provisions of Annex V of MARPOL 73/78 on the
discharge of garbage in the Baltic Sea area;
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reception of waste facilities from ships’,23 prevention of pollution of the sea by oil,24
control of ships and discharges,25 contravention of conventions and penalties,26
MEPC 31(26) 1988. Establishment of the date of application of the provisions of regulation 5 of
Annex V of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as
modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto, on the discharge of garbage in the Baltic Sea
area;
MEPC 36(28) 1989. Amendments to the annex of the Protocol of 1978 relating to the Inter-
national Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 (Amendments to Annex V
of MARPOL 73/78);
MEPC 37(28) 1989. Establishment of the date of the provisions of regulation 5 of Annex V of
the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by the
Protocol of 1978 relating thereto, on the discharge of garbage in the North Sea area;
MEPC 42(30) 1990. Amendments to the annex of the Protocol of 1978 relating to the Inter-
national Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 (Designation of Antarctic
area as a special area under Annex V of MARPOL 73/78);
MEPC 43(30) 1990. Prevention of pollution by garbage in the Mediterranean;
MEPC 48(31) 1991. Amendments to the annex of the Protocol of 1978 relating to the Inter-
national Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 (Designation of the Wider
Caribbean area as a special area under Annex V of MARPOL 73/78);
MEPC 71(38) 1996. Guidelines for the development of garbage management plans;
MEPC 92(45) 2000. Amendments to the Revised guidelines for the implementation of Annex V
of MARPOL 73/78 (Resolution MEPC 59(33)) – Amends MEPC 59(33).
23 Reception facilities for wastes from ships
MEPC 83(44) 2000. Guidelines for ensuring the adequacy of port waste reception facilities.
Implementation of conventions
MEPC 87(44) 2000. Use of Spanish under IMO conventions relating to pollution prevention.
24 Prevention of pollution (oil)
MEPC 1(II) 1974. Establishment of the list of substances to be annexed to the Protocol relating
to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Marine Pollution by Substances Other than Oil,
MEPC 17(22) 1985. Implementation of Annex II of MARPOL 73/78, MEPC  53(32) 1992.
Development of the capacity of ship scrapping for the smooth implementation of the
amendments to Annex I of MARPOL 73/78;
MEPC 64(36) 1994. Guidelines for approval of alternative structural or operational
arrangements as called for in regulation 13G (7) of Annex I of MARPOL 73/78;
MEPC 88(44) 2000. Implementation of Annex IV of MARPOL 73/78;
MEPC 92(45) 2000. Amendments to the Revised guidelines for the implementation of Annex C
of MARPOL 73/78 (Resolution MEPC 59(33) – Amends MEPC 59(33).
25 Control of ships and discharges
MEPC 51(32)1992. Amendments to the Annex of the Protocol of 1978 relating to the Inter-
national Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 (Discharge criteria of
Annex 1 of MARPOL 73/78).
MEPC 107(49) 2003. Revised guidelines and specification for pollution prevention equipment for
machinery space bilges of ships (Amends MEPC 60(33) on Guidelines and specifications for
pollution equipment for machinery space bilges of ships).
26 Contravention of conventions and penalties; MEPC 61(34) 1993. Visibility limits of oil
discharges of Annex I of MARPOL 73/78.
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reporting of incidents involving harmful substances,27 combating of spillages28 and
prevention of air pollution from ships.29
It is self-evident that the content of these resolutions needs to be implemented
for the safe and secure navigation of ships and for sound environmental protection
and preservation of the marine environment. It might be argued that the preponder-
ance of IMO resolutions will diminish when their content makes its way into treaties.
Until then, their value will not diminish to negligible proportions. Coastal States
do have an option to adopt the IMO Resolution or ratify the treaty. Both are valid
and the IMO Resolution has a legal validity even though its contents are now
found in a treaty. These Resolutions will always be binding upon coastal States
that decide to adopt them into their municipal laws without ratifying the corres-
ponding treaty. It remains to be seen whether flag States have a culture of con-
forming to IMO Resolutions in domestic law.
Where there are new areas untouched by treaties, or by judicial decisions or the
writings of jurists, the role of IMO resolutions as a dynamic source of fresh rules of
international law of the sea cannot be ignored. These resolutions may over time
amount to either custom or its less legal form, usage. While breach of a custom may
be punished, breach of a usage does not attract the punishment of law. The con-
summation of a usage as custom involves two processes that must be satisfied,
namely, the material or State practice and the psychological aspects of the custom-
ary rule often referred to as the opinio juris sive necessitatis.
PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS
The kind of punishment that should be meted out to foreign flags that violate
domestic laws encapsulating IMO resolutions without encouraging recidivism is not
expressly covered by the 1982 LOSC. However, this may be implied as the 1982
LOSC comes quite close to the idea of penal sanctions in the protection of the
marine environment, where Article 211 endeavours to harmonize policy among
27 Reporting of incidents involving harmful substances: MEPC 138(53) 2005. Amendments to
the general principles for ship reporting systems and ship reporting requirements, including
guidelines for reporting incidents involving dangerous goods, harmful substances and/or marine
pollutants (Resolution A.851(20)).
28 Combating of spillages: MEPC 12(18) 1983. Regional arrangements for combating major
incidents of marine pollution. MEPC 54(32) 1992. Guidelines for the development of shipboard
oil pollution emergency plans.
29 Prevention of air pollution from ships:
MEPC 96(47) 2002. Guidelines for the sampling of fuel oil for determination of compliance with
Annex VI of MARPOL 73/78.
MEPC 130(53) 2005. Guidelines for on-board exhaust GAS-SOx cleaning systems.
MEPC 132(53) 2005. Amendments to the Annex of the Protocol of 1997 to amend the Inter-
national Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by the Protocol
of 1978 relating thereto (Amendments to MARPOL Annex VI and the NOx Technical Code).
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States on pollution from vessels and Article 217 has a generic provision that “penal-
ties provided for by the laws and regulations of States for vessels flying their flag shall
be adequate in severity to discourage violations wherever they occur”; and again in
Articles 228 and 230 which deal with the issue of marine pollution beyond the
territorial sea of the coastal State, and in its territorial sea “except in the case of a
wilful and serious act of pollution in the territorial sea” and the issue of double
jeopardy and the imposition of monetary penalties and the observance of the rights
of the accused.
There needs to be a balance between ocean law and policy and philosophy such
that a suitable form of punishment can be meted out for non-compliance by the
impugned foreign flag. It would be possible to consider the IMO resolutions that are
incorporated into domestic ocean law and policy framework of States as quasi-legal
in structure. In a quasi-legal framework, punitive elements of law have no place. For
example, in domestic criminal law, rapists express “their rage” and predatory paedo-
philes “replay their old scripts”. What message then is the foreign flag sending to the
coastal State when they express non-compliance with coastal State rules? As the act
of flag States is volitional, how should the coastal State react? In a legal regime,
punitive maritime criminal law might remove the source of non-compliance once the
reasons for non-compliance are made known and general defences are woven into
the statute. Unlike domestic criminal law where medical models may be advanced to
explain why rape takes place, in maritime and ocean-related law this may not
be a solution. In an actual dispute between the States parties with regard to the
implementation of an IMO resolution, the courts should be guided by the “most
significant relationship” doctrine. This doctrine States that courts should apply the
law of the State that has the closest and most real connection with the dispute.
There is no punitive element here but restitution in integrum may prove to be more
realistic given the purpose-driven test of implementing the IMO resolution in the
first place.
The IMO Resolutions lay down international standards for international ship-
ping and for control of marine pollution. The question of whether IMO resolutions
are binding or not depends upon two factors: consent of the coastal State and legal
nature of the resolution. Where a State adopts or consents to a resolution and its
treaty, it is said to be binding upon that State. Examining the legal nature of an IMO
Resolution, being in name a resolution, ipso facto, compels it to be regarded as non-
binding. However, examining the contents of the resolutions associated with treaties,
it seems that a very strong case may be made out for them to be considered as
binding norms. Those resolutions not engaged with a treaty may be considered as
non-binding norms.
As non-binding norms do not attract penal sanctions, they are said to be of a
quasi-legal character. The Oxford Dictionary offers the following meaning of the
term “quasi”: “seemingly: apparently but not really; being partly or almost
independent.” In other words, if these rules are adopted into municipal law, they
cannot be of a punitive character. By comparison, “quasi in rem jurisdiction applies
when a court is determining the ownership rights of specific persons in specific
property. The defendant must be present in the forum State, but the property does
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not have to be. In such cases, the plaintiff ’s remedy is limited to acquiring the
defendant’s interests in the specific property – no money damages are allowed.”
Here, too, it is noteworthy that monetary damages are not awarded.30
The IMO standards are and may be adopted to suit local needs and conditions.
However, the IMO standards are technical and unlike the other so-called soft law
standards which are adopted by many international bodies such as the ILO. These
standards are of value as they represent an interim, preparatory step towards
the final or eventual development of international law. They have a very strong
persuasive effect and many standards move from voluntary to mandatory hard law
when States pass them into legislation. So, a regime of rules is adopted for
behaviour. This also means that new actors have entered the area of international
law. The balance between hard law and soft law can achieve many objectives in an
ocean law and policy framework.
The practice of technical committees in adopting the standards encapsulated in
IMO resolutions for enhancing safety of navigation is particularly interesting. An
example of a practical application of the IMO resolutions is seen in the IEC Tech-
nical Committee 80 established in 1980, which has issued several thematic brochures
on Maritime Navigation and Radiocommunication Equipment where reference is
made to the IMO Performance Standards where applicable. In this way, they have
given effect to IMO Resolution A.823(19) in Automatic Radar Plotting Aids,
MSC.64(67) Annex 4 in Automatic Tracking Aids, MSC.64(67) Annex 4 in Elec-
tronic Plotting Aids and A.817 (19) amended by MSC.86(70) Annex 4 in Electronic
Chart Display and Systems, MSC.64(67) Annex 1 in Integrated Bridge Systems, and
MSC.86(70) Annex 3 in Integrated Navigation Systems to name a few. As the con-
tribution of technical committees towards lawmaking and opinio juris has not been
explored so far, it is quite clear that this is fast becoming an area of practical
importance and cannot remain in the shadows for long. This is also because, in 1999,
the IMO’s Assembly adopted Resolution A.900(21) on Objectives of the Organiza-
tion in the 2000s,31 the first of which is to continue the proactive policy of the 1990s
to enhance safety of navigation and to control marine pollution of the seas and
oceans. To do so, Formal Safety Assessment should be used whereby the emphasis
was shifted on to people and there had to be effective uniform implementation of
existing IMO standards and regulations. Among others, the Resolution highlights
the worldwide implementation of the standards and regulations adopted by the
organization.32 This is an example of the worldwide application of IMO standards
and norms.
30 August, R., n. 16, at 473.
31 http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D14472/900.pdf (visited on 1
December 2006).
32 http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D14472/900.pdf (visited on 1
December 2006).
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QUASI-LEGAL CHARACTER
It could be argued that IMO resolutions are technical norms that create expectations
of behaviour in States for they are drafted by developed and developing maritime
nations. Given the international context in which they are adopted, and the fact that
the subject matter of the norm has received universal recognition, it may be argued
that they have the pull of an international treaty even though they are not of such
kind. They are more than political or moral commitments. Legally binding obliga-
tions are chosen very carefully by States and where IMO resolutions are related to
IMO treaties, they help in shaping consensus on the obligations. To begin with, these
resolutions have an international character and acquire a national or regional trait
eventually. Treaties have a place in municipal laws and resolutions ought to have a
place in the policy setting of the municipal law. They are quasi-legal because they are
technical, specific and vital for domestic implementation and compliance as they
deal with safe and secure shipping and prevention of marine pollution. They are
special norms that set standards of behaviour in scientific and legal domains. This is
particularly so as the IMO has factored the highly regarded precautionary principle
into its work. These resolutions are the Recommendations, Standards and Measures
such as the Resolutions of the Marine Environment Protection Committee
(MEPC).33
Where coastal States have adopted IMO resolutions into their municipal law to
promote safe and secure navigation and for protection and preservation of their
marine environment, all flag States should after examination of the facts as a whole,
suo moto, abide by these rules in foreign maritime zones even if they have voted
against the impugned resolution. These resolutions could play an important role in
national ocean law and policy framework in the Asia-Pacific region, when adopted
by the region or a portion thereof. They may be interpreted as an evidentiary source
of law under Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ and not as a formal source as
resolutions are not mentioned therein unless their normative content amounts to a
custom having acquired sufficient State practice and opinio juris sive necessitatis or
represents jus cogens or is tantamount to an erga omnes right or obligation or is a
general principle of law recognized by civilized nations. For purposes of due dili-
gence performance requirements of coastal States, municipal legislation should
incorporate or transform these rules for application in their territorial seas or in
straits used for international navigation subject to the caveat that in straits, the right
of transit passage of ships and aircraft may not be compromised. Just as treaties
33 There are other IMO resolutions on a wide array of subjects such as the Resolutions that refer
to the MEPC, namely A.297 (VIII) on the Establishment of a Marine Environment Protection
Committee and A.346 (IX) on Approval of the Reports of the Marine Environment Protection
Committee. See also http://www.imo.org/InfoResource/mainframe.asp?topic_id=435 (visited on
1 December 2007). For a recent paper that discussed issues relating to IMO Assembly Resolution
A.981(24) on recycling of ships, see Dr Mikelis, Nikos, “Developments and issues on recycling
of ships” presented at the East Asian Seas Congress, Haikou City, Hainan Province, PR China,
12–16 December 2006.
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become binding upon States that ratify them, IMO resolutions become binding
upon States that adopt them.
Schachter’s arguments, that deny the General Assembly the authority to adopt
resolutions that purport to assert legal norms without recourse to treaty provisions
but nevertheless are declaratory of the law either in general terms or in a particular
case, may be drawn upon in the context of IMO resolutions that are not related or
connected to a treaty/amendment. Resolutions of the IMO and those of the UNGA
are rather different. The IMO is the central global forum set up under the ECOSOC
of the UN for the international community, with the competence to discuss and
adopt the necessary legal and scientific infrastructure for safe, secure and efficient
navigation and control of marine pollution. The IMO has become a major instru-
ment of States for articulating their national interests and seeking general support
for them. The conception of [Assembly] resolutions as expressions of international
law and as expressions of common interests and the “general will” of the inter-
national community has been a natural consequence. It also has naturally followed
that in many cases the effort is made to transform the “general will” thus expressed
into law. One obvious way of accomplishing that transformation is to use a reso-
lution as a basis of a treaty by the [Assembly] itself or by a diplomatic conference
convened by it. The treaties are then open for adherence by Member States and other
States. A considerable number of such treaties have been concluded following a
formative stage in which a resolution was adopted. This two-stage process presents
no problems under the UN Charter or classical international law. States are, of
course, free to adhere to such treaties or not as they choose in keeping with their
constitutional procedures. There is no legal uncertainty in that process. “. . . Legal
uncertainty has, however, been created when the General Assembly adopted resolu-
tions which purported to assert legal norms without recourse to the treaty process.
Such resolutions ‘declared the law’ either in general terms or as applied to a particu-
lar case. Neither in form nor intent were they recommendatory.”34 Schachter ques-
tions the legally binding nature of these resolutions when the GA had no consti-
tutional authority to adopt the mandatory decisions. Here again it is submitted that
the GA resolutions are different from the IMO resolutions. The IMO possesses the
constitutional mandate to adopt the IMO resolutions. They are authoritative and so
should be binding upon the States that accept them whether unanimously or almost
unanimously. So long as the resolution is not ultra vires the constitutional mandate
of the IMO, it may be considered binding upon States parties that accept it accord-
ing to their constitutional provisions. Though worded as a Guideline or Recom-
mendation, it is nevertheless a declaration which expresses the opinio juris communis
of States participating in that resolution. As States are required to vote responsibly
at all times but perhaps do not, instead of categorizing these IMO resolutions as
binding, they are instead referred to here as quasi-legal non-binding norms. In this
34 See Schachter, O., “International law in theory and practice” in Carter, Trimble and Bradley,
op. cit., n. 16, at 129.
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way they are in between two polar categories: “binding” and “hortatory”. To qualify
as a binding customary rule, the elements of State practice and opinio juris sive
necessitatis must be fulfilled, even though some commentators are satisfied with only
the opinio juris. The credibility of States in the adoption of an IMO resolution may
be differentiated from their performance at the UNGA. The language of IMO reso-
lutions also assists us in this matter for unlike UNGA resolutions, they do not couch
“principles” as law or use equivocal language to this end. If voting on a UNGA
resolution commits the State to it or expresses the stance of the State on that issue,
the adoption of an IMO resolution by that State empowers the State to use the rule
in a national ocean law and policy instrument which may be changed periodically or
from time to time.
The use of IMO resolutions may enable a State to assess the legal, scientific and
financial requirements for the implementation of that resolution in future. Just as
Schachter catogorized these UNGA norms as evidentiary in character, so too in the
present case they are regarded as “evidentiary” in nature. Schachter adds: “We
would assess the degree and character of support received in the United Nations and
the relation if any of the asserted rule to an underlying Charter or customary law
principle . . . [It] would be pertinent to determine whether State practice both before
and after the adoption of the resolution varies so significantly from the norm
asserted as to deprive it of validity as custom or agreed interpretation. This
determination – namely, whether inconsistent practice should vitiate an asserted
principle – may involve drawing distinctions among norms based on value judg-
ments of their significance . . . They require justification grounded in values accepted
by the community of States as reflected in their authoritative statements and collec-
tive declarations.”35
When accepted as evidence, they are also subject to rebuttals. For non-
concurring States, they are not binding at law unless they are dealing with safe and
secure navigation in a Particularly Sensitive Sea such as a strait used for inter-
national navigation where the coastal strait State cannot suspend or hamper transit
passage. Flag States in such seas have to agree either on a bilateral or multilateral
basis with the strait State that they in turn will not jeopardize the marine environ-
ment and voluntarily agree to the implementation of the IMO resolution. In the
context of UNGA resolutions declaring apartheid illegal, Schachter said: “On the
other hand, if a resolution is persuasive evidence of an existing obligation, then a
dissenting State may be considered bound by that obligation.”36 This may be true for
the IMO resolutions too.
When drafting any policy for the lawful government of a nation, one should have
explicit prioritization of the list of projects to be accomplished so that there is a start
and a finish to that policy for the period under review. One should be able to spot the
problem areas, the technical criteria and economic cost factors, and costs benefit
35 Schachter, loc. cit., n. 34, at 131 and 132.
36 Ibid, at 132.
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analysis based on the best information available. Issues relating to economics and
law are inseparable. Questions on hard to compare alternatives such as what do we
tackle and how, what laws are appropriate and “in place”, what has been the invest-
ment of the federal and State government and the non-governmental organizations
in the projects identified so far are equally pressing on the mind of the policy drafter.
Likewise, questions relating to institutional rigidities such as the number of institu-
tions involved, clash of their institutional priorities and the role of international
agencies also come to mind. Following from this, it is also incumbent on the gov-
ernment to examine political issues, election manifesto promises to the people and
address issues such as “who benefits” and “has the project increased the welfare in
the country”. Furthermore, the government has to undertake several steps to end
“conflicts”, resource depletion, check malnutrition, prevent communicable diseases
among species, improve upon the income of the coastal populations and islanders
and alleviate their suffering from hunger. The government of a State would have to
take cognizance of its international treaty obligations but before it adopts a piece-
meal approach to treaty ratification, quasi-legal non-binding norms can play an
effective role by giving the government a feel for the nature of the rights and
obligations. Focusing on the international plane, the government has to examine the
international norms and inventorize its international obligations, for example on
sustainable development.
To improve sustainable development, the IMO focuses on the improvement of
the safety of merchant and fishing fleets, efficiency of maritime activities, increased
global trade, improved balance of payments and enhanced marine tourism, cleaner
waters and coasts, environment protection through integrated, greater access to pro-
tein through improved fisheries catches and coastal zone management. It also
endorsed the promotion of sustainable livelihoods and poverty eradication,
employment for seafarers in the global shipping and fisheries industries, consequent
beneficial impact and increased foreign exchange earnings, and at the local level,
especially in coastal/fishing communities.
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
Resolution MEPC.67(37) adopted on 15 September 1995 notes that General
Assembly resolution 47/191 requests the United Nations Specialized Agencies to
report on steps taken to strengthen and adjust their activities in line with Agenda 21.
The Resolution acknowledges that the Marine Environment Protection Committee
is IMO’s focal point for UNCED follow-up actions, and in November 1994
approved a report to the Commission on Sustainable Development in fulfilment of
UNGA Resolution 47/191. The above MEPC resolution also endorses that Principle
15 of the Rio Declaration calls for the application of the Precautionary Approach
and in pursuance to that adopts the guidelines on incorporation of the Precaution-
ary Approach in the context of specific IMO activities, on an interim basis until
further experience with their application has been gained. It requests all relevant
IMO bodies to review the guidelines and provide comments to the Committee with a
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view to their eventual submission to the Assembly for adoption as a guidance for all
relevant IMO activities.
“The Precautionary approach as set out in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration states:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely
applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”
“In Chapter 17 of Agenda 21, it states further:
17.21 A precautionary and anticipatory rather than a reactive approach is necessary
to prevent the degradation of the marine environment.”
Resolution MEPC67.(37) and 37/22/Add.1 in section 2 provide that the precaution-
ary approach has been incorporated into the work of IMO. In section 4 the decision-
making and management processes are listed. To incorporate the precautionary
approach, the organization should ensure that anticipation and prevention of
environmental problems arising from any regulatory activities of IMO and striving
for continual improvement in all facets of those activities are incorporated into its
work. It is also vital that solutions to problems and consideration of new and exist-
ing policies, programmes, guidelines and regulations are developed in accordance
with the precautionary approach. Likewise, it states that where action is necessary
and options may involve uncertainty, all options are evaluated consistent with the
precautionary approach. This is driven home in Resolution MEPC.50(31), MEPC
31/21 at Annex 16 on ballast water and sediment guidelines in section 9 on Future
Considerations where it is provided that “It must be made clear, however, that there
is a lack of research knowledge and practical experience on the cost, safety,
effectiveness, and environmental acceptability of these possible approaches. Any
proposed chemical or biocidal treatments should be environmentally safe and in
compliance with international conventions. Authorities carrying out or commission-
ing research studies into these or other relevant areas are encouraged to work co-
operatively and provide information on the results to the Organization.”37
THEORY OF COMPLIANCE
In the Torres Strait, the IMO Resolution tried to solve a safety of navigation issue to
protect and preserve the marine eco-system of the Strait. To implement an inter-
national obligation domestically, what is the most effective technique to maximize
flag State compliance with the resolution? The term “compliance” has often been
used in a fluid manner to include terms such as implementation, effectiveness or even
37 The IMO has not adopted any resolution on tsunamis. For IMO’s response to this disaster, see
http://www.imo.org/Newsroom/mainframe.asp?topic_id=1018&doc_id=4603 (visited on 2 July
2005).
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enforcement. These processes require international political and legal cooperation.
Domestic laws make the link between an international obligation and the national
legal system. Compliance in relation to a resolution would mean how far that State
has complied with the resolution. Implementation and compliance with an IMO
resolution would increase its effectiveness.
Enforcement just as in other international environmental treaties would mean in
the present context the methods available to force States to implement and comply
with the obligations of the resolution. Effectiveness is the effect of the resolution as a
whole when wholly complied with by States. In other words, was the resolution able
to achieve the envisaged goal? What was the enthusiasm of States during the negoti-
ations of the resolution and what was the international public opinion on this reso-
lution? Extrapolating from the primary rule system of international environmental
law, it is argued that the IMO Resolution only requires a clear and specific, albeit, a
minimal behavioural change in flag ship individuals such as the captain and crew
when asked to take on compulsory pilotage. As Australia neither lacks the resources
nor the technological abilities to undertake this pilotage for foreign flags, foreign
flags have very little reason for non-compliance. All weaknesses relating to compli-
ance by third States should be taken into account during the drafting of the IMO
Resolution. The primary rule system has been explained as follows:
The primary rule system is the actual contents of the treaty that is agreed upon by the
parties. This primary rule system defines the behaviour that is required by the specific
treaty, or in other words, the duties imposed upon the participatory States under the
specific treaty. The primary rules are directly related to the activity that the environ-
mental accord is supposed to regulate. A first important aspect of the design of the
primary rule system relates to whether it requires any behavioural change, what the
costs of this change will be, and by whom this behavioural change is required. It is
easier to achieve compliance if the degree of behavioural change and the costs of this
change are low.38
Where the international rules do not show a differentiation of the obligations,
local laws may adopt a “managerial type of approach” and where instead of penal
provisions, the local laws may perhaps take into account the differing capacities and
prevent non-compliance in the local laws by adopting bilateral or multilateral
agreements on such compulsory pilotage. Other essential aspects of compliance are
accuracy of information on the environmental risks, transparency of implementa-
tion and third-party compliance monitoring. States transform their local laws “from
an enforcement to a managerial approach to compliance”.39 Incapacity on the part
of the foreign flags to comply with compulsory pilotage may be documented and
publicized.
38 Faure, M. and Lefevere, J., “Compliance with international environmental agreements, the
global environment: institutions, law and policy” in Carter, Trimble and Bradley, op. cit., n. 16, at
932.
39 Ibid.
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EVIDENTIARY CHARACTER
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) does not refer
to the Resolutions of the UN or of its specialized agencies such as the IMO. It is trite
law that UNSC Resolutions when validly adopted and passed are binding upon the
States mentioned therein, as part of the mandate of the UN. The General Assembly
of the United Nations has the mandate under Article 10 of the UN Charter to
discuss any appropriate matter and make non-binding recommendations to its
members unless the Security Council has dealt with the matter under Article 12. The
issue then arises as to the status of the UNGA Resolutions. The arguments have
been varied: Sloan has argued that each resolution must be weighed according to its
own merits; that budgetary decisions under Article 17 of the Charter are binding
upon the members and that non-binding legal resolutions carry an obligation of
cooperation and good faith.40 Professor Ian Brownlie wrote that Resolutions of the
UNGA are not binding in general on Member States, but when they are concerned
with general norms of international law, then acceptance by a majority vote consti-
tutes evidence of the opinions of governments in the widest forum for the expression
of such opinions: “Even when they are framed as general principles, resolutions of
this kind provide a basis for the progressive development of the law and the speedy
consolidation of customary rules. In general, each individual resolution must be
assessed in the light of all the circumstances and also by reference to other evidence
of the opinions of States on the point in issue.”41
Commentators are divided in their opinion about the effect of GA resolutions.
Some are of the view that the position taken at and resolutions adopted by the
UNGA particularly in the field of human rights are binding and may be evidence of
customary international law. This legitimacy has been questioned by some authors
such as Oscar Schachter, discussed above. A UNGA resolution is only binding where
it contains a rule of customary international law. According to the orthodox view,
the elements of customary international law are the corpus of the law and the animus
of States that accompany it (State practice and opinio juris). By corpus is meant the
material or objective element which consists of a usage – consuetudo embodying a
rule of conduct. The animus is the conviction on the part of States that the rule is
legally binding. Such a conviction has to be an acceptance, a recognition of or an
acquiescence in the binding character of the rule in question. In other words, it has
40 Sloan, “General Assembly resolutions revisited”, 58 BYIL 93 (1987).
41 Brownlie, I., Principles of Public International Law, 5th ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2002, at 14 and 15. Examples of important “lawmaking” resolutions are the Resolution which
affirmed “the principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremburg
Tribunal and the Judgment of the Tribunal; the Resolution on Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear
Weapons for War Purposes; the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Coun-
tries and Peoples; the Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources and the
Declaration of Legal Principles Governing Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space”. See Brownlie, ibid., at 14 and 15.
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to amount to a rule of the general law binding on all, which the Statute of the ICJ
speaks of as “international custom, as being evidence of a general practice accepted
as law”.42 This view finds expression in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ which
states that the Court applies international custom as being evidence of a general
practice accepted as law. For example, the decisions in the S.S. Lotus case,43 the
Asylum case44 and Right of Passage case45 stress the importance of the subjective
element of opinio juris. If the international community of nations wishes to give a
binding legal effect to its resolutions, then there has to exist the requisite Opinio
Generalis Juris Generalis among members of the United Nations. Until then it
remains merely recommendatory with a potential binding force (in posse).46 While
there is no minimum time limit imposed for the formation of a customary rule
(North Sea Continental Shelf Cases 1969), the universal acceptance of the rule in
question by States is important (Fisheries Jurisdiction Case 1973). A State’s voting
pattern at the UNGA is significant for it shows one aspect of State practice, but
unless it is accompanied by the necessary opinio juris it has no legally binding value
(Nicaragua Case 1986 and North Sea Continental Shelf Cases 1969) and it falls
within the body of “soft law”. The ICJ has accepted the possibility of a resolution
being part of customary international law (North Sea Continental Shelf Cases
and Nicaragua Case). The question is whether all UNGA Resolutions should be
considered binding or only some of them depending upon their content, given the
political nature of the GA.
The Memorandum of the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs on the Use of
the Terms “Declaration and Recommendation” states that a declaration in inter-
national law is a formal and solemn instrument, such as a Declaration of Human
Rights. A Recommendation is less formal. Other than this strict legal distinction
there is no difference between the two. Both are adopted by a UN organ, and as
such, though not binding upon Member States like a treaty is, there is an expectation
that the Member States will abide by it. An expectation may eventually be justified
by State practice and a declaration could become custom.47 However, based on the
intention of the parties, a Declaration could be equivalent to a treaty if intended by
the parties to be legally binding.
Article 18 of the United Nations Charter states that a resolution of the General
Assembly requires a two-thirds majority on important matters. Where a resolution
has two-thirds majority it is of political significance.
Cheng is of the view that customary international law applicable erga omnes
needs only one single constitutive element which is the opinio juris of States, and if a
new opinio juris should grow overnight, he questions whether it should then give rise
42 Cheng, B., Studies in International Space Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997, at 138.
43 (France v. Turkey), PCIJ Series A. No. 10 (1927).
44 (Columbia v. Peru), ICJ Rep. 1950, at 226.
45 Preliminary Objections, ICJ Rep. 1957, at 125.
46 Cheng, op. cit., n. 42, at 142–143.
47 E/CN.4/L.610 (2.4.62), at 1–2.
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to instant customary international law. He further argues that usage or practice is
still a normal element of the rule of customary international law, where instead of
being a constitutive and indispensable element, it is only an evidence of that legal
rule and of the opinio juris.48
Ago’s view is that UNGA resolutions that have had a follow-up action carried
through may minimalize the difference between a resolution and an established
source of international law.49
Professor Onuma wrote, in the context of the adoption of comprehensive stand-
ards of human rights, that “in order to carry out global human rights policies with
the limited resources of our international society, we must first establish human rights
standards which are legitimate from international, transnational and intercivilizational
perspectives, and tackle human rights problems not on the basis of political con-
siderations or sporadic concerns, but on priorities in terms of seriousness and
urgency of the problem”.50 Though at an earlier point in the article, Professor
Onuma did point out that: “From the viewpoint of international law, the multilateral
human rights conventions are more important than the declarations or resolutions,
because while the former formally binds contracting parties, the latter generally has
only recommendatory force”.51 However, Professor Onuma did not altogether set
aside the argument that declarations and resolutions may embody norms of general
international law on human rights by his examination of such documentation
further in the article.52 Extrapolating from Professor Onuma’s arguments, it is my
submission that perhaps the IMO Resolutions may just pass the intercivilizational
test in setting policy standards as developing and developed maritime States repre-
sentative of Asia, Africa, Europe and many other regions bring to bear their experi-
ences in the maritime sector and this fact should give it the necessary legitimacy
towards an intercivilizational approach to maritime shipping and cleaner oceans.
Legal dispute and evidence before the international court
As the question is whether an IMO resolution can create a rule of international
law which in turn creates a binding obligation, a dispute between States Parties,
assuming that there is no Article 53 situation, has to be brought under one of the
categories of Article 36 of the Statute of the ICJ, set out below.
48 Cheng, op. cit., n. 42, at 142–143.
49 Ago, Shin-ichi, “Follow-up of United Nations resoltuions”, Extract from Ho to Seiji – 21 Seiki
Eno Taido (Law and politics – Quickening toward the 21st Century), Vol. 1, November 1995, at 80
and 81.
50 Onuma, Y., “Towards an intercivilisational approach to human rights: for universalisation of
human rights through overcoming of a westcentric notion of human rights”, 7 Asian Yearbook of
International Law, at 73.
51 Onuma, loc. cit., n. 50, at 71.
52 Ibid., at 72 and 73.
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Article 36
1. The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and
all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties
and conventions in force.
2. The States parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they
recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any
other State accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal
disputes concerning:
a. the interpretation of a treaty;
b. any question of international law;
c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an
international obligation;
d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an
international obligation.
3. The declarations referred to above may be made unconditionally or on condition
of reciprocity on the part of several or certain States, or for a certain time.
4. Such declarations shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, who shall transmit copies thereof to the parties to the Statute and to the
Registrar of the Court.
5. Declarations made under Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of
International Justice and which are still in force shall be deemed, as between the
parties to the present Statute, to be acceptances of the compulsory jurisdiction of
the International Court of Justice for the period which they still have to run and in
accordance with their terms.
6. In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall
be settled by the decision of the Court.
If IMO Resolutions are the subject matter of a dispute before the ICJ, they may
be brought under Article 36(2)(a) above under the provisions of the 1982 LOSC that
refer to GAIRAS rules which have been ascertained by the IMO as a reference to its
treaties and resolutions.53 As they represent the subject matter of the dispute, then
surely the Resolutions are not convincing evidence but legal argument. There can be
a submission of additional evidence outside of the Rules of the Court, Articles 6, 29,
57, 58, 62, 63, 66, 70, 71, 72 and 79, based on the equality of the States Parties to the
53 It might be possible for IMO resolutions to fall under limbs (b) or (d) of Article 36 (2),
provided the Resolutions directly referred to a question of international law or expressly con-
tained a recognised international obligation under custom or jus cogens or is an erga omnes
obligation or right. Situations such as the Torres Strait incident discussed  above may come under
limb (c). This might prove to be a source of contention.
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dispute. In the Nicaragua Case (Merits)54 in paragraph 29, the ICJ held that for the
purposes of deciding whether the claim was well-founded in law, the principle of jura
novit curia signified that the Court was not solely dependent upon the argument of
the parties before it with respect to the applicable law. Sufficient evidence must be
brought to the Court to show that the dispute is not politically inspired but legally
based and sufficient evidence has to be adduced for the legal case. This would also be
the case where the coastal State has enacted budgetary legislation for specific provi-
sions for funds to be used in this regard. From the above, it may be inferred that a
dispute under an IMO Resolution will fall within Article 36(2)(a) of the Statute of
the ICJ for it to be considered a justiciable dispute with the relevant evidence and
legal argument. It is also trite law that Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ does not
refer to IMO Resolutions as a source of law unless the Resolution has crystallized as
a rule of custom or has become a rule of treaty, whether regional or global. Under
this Article, IMO Resolutions can play the role of convincing evidence before the
Court. Following through, the next question is whether there has to be some meas-
ure of consistency between Articles 36 and 38 to stem the dichotomy that arises
where an IMO Resolution is the subject matter of a dispute under Article 36 as
shown above but not a source of law but remains evidentiary in character under
Article 38.
Article 297(1) of the 1982 LOSC provides for compulsory dispute settlement
procedures concerning the interpretation or application of the provisions of the
LOSC by a coastal State in the exercise of its sovereign rights or jurisdiction. Para-
graph (c) of this Article provides that this provision is applicable where a “coastal
State has acted in contravention of specified international rules and standards for
the protection and preservation of the marine environment which are applicable to
the coastal State and which have been established by this Convention or through a
competent international organization . . .”. Where States Parties choose the ICJ
under Article 287(1)(b) of the 1982 LOSC for compulsory dispute settlement, Art-
icle 288(1) confers jurisdiction on the court “over any dispute concerning the inter-
pretation or application of this Convention . . .” or under paragraph 2 “over any
dispute concerning the interpretation or application of an international agreement
related to the purposes of this Convention . . .”. While the IMO Resolutions could
fall under Article 288(1) as they are part of the GAIRAS, it is less certain whether
they amount to an “international agreement” under paragraph 2. For this
determination, as discussed above, recourse must be had to the legitimacy of the
resolution, intention of States Parties to the resolution, and whether the text was
adopted by consensus. Article 223 requires States which institute proceedings for a
violation of “Section 5: International Rules and National Legislation to Prevent,
Reduce and Control Pollution of the Marine Environment” to take measures to
facilitate the proceedings such as the hearing of witnesses and the admission of
evidence.
54 Nicaragua v. United States (Merits), ICJ Rep. 1986 on-line, http://www.icj-cij.org (visited on 20
October 2007).
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PROFESSOR SHELTON’S ARGUMENTS ON NON-BINDING NORMS
Professor Shelton distinguished between four categories of instruments based on
whether the form was binding or non-binding and whether the content was binding
or non-binding. This served as a basis for categorizing instruments and for clarifying
hypotheses related to compliance.
The distinction drawn based on the form of the instrument and the instrument’s
purpose is an essential parameter in framing our understanding of compliance . . .
The results from the case studies on compliance with soft law indicate that the answer
is mixed: in some cases the binding instrument evokes much greater compliance, in
others there may be little difference, and in still others a non-binding legal instrument
may evoke better compliance than would a binding one. In general, the same factors
are at play and the pathways through which compliance takes place are the same.
Where domestic institutions for enforcing law, such as the judiciary, are not available,
or in the absence of domestic legislation or a customary international law rule, the
various international and national incentives and pressures to comply may often be
less. Moreover, it is less likely that the institutions often associated with agreements
will be created for soft law instruments.55
The first hypothesis of the study was that the context in which soft law developed
would affect compliance with the norm . . . the circumstances that led to the negoti-
ation of a non-binding obligation affected its compliance. The requirement in the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea to give effect to “generally accepted standards”
increases the likelihood of compliance with the non-binding standards set for marine
pollution by the IMO56 (emphasis added).
Generally, the research confirmed that the consensus about the norm positively
affected compliance. For example, the case on drift net fishing and land mines, and
the shared common norm of protecting the Antarctic, confirm this.
The second hypothesis was that where it was costly to comply with soft law,
either because of economic costs or the lack of technical, administrative, or other
capacity, compliance was less likely . . . Capacity of the actor and the lack of proper
infrastructure to comply also affected compliance. So, third States’ assistance may
be required to spur compliance. Institutional mechanisms for monitoring and
supervizing compliance with soft law obligations are crucial.
Professor Shelton also identified six factors that influence non-binding norms as
set out below, of which three are important for the present discussion:
(1) The force of the Continuing Relationship among Participants factor.
(2) The Reputation factor.
55 Shelton, loc. cit., n. 1, at 535 and 536.
56 Ibid., at 536 and 537.
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(3) Consensus on the Underlying Norm factor.
(4) Maximizing Welfare and Increasing Efficiency.
(5) The threat of legal enforcement.
(6) The Institutional Setting:57
The force of the Continuing Relationship among Participants factor is important for
non-binding instruments are generally designed to influence the behaviour of States
and other actors for numerous years or indefinitely. States must engage with each
other constantly in the international system. In this sense, they are engaged in an
ongoing business relationship. However, the theory suggests that for non-binding
instruments, States may need to be engaged in a somewhat tighter relationship, either
one focused on the issues that are the subject of the agreement or otherwise linked
together closely in their disparate dealings. . . . Pressures from civil society may be
brought to bear to elicit compliance with the instruments. . . . Compliance with non-
binding instruments would enhance a State’s reputation, since a State would be
known to comply even if it had not assumed a binding obligation. The source for
developing the norms must be viewed as legitimate by the international community. A
consensus on the norm tends to give legitimacy to the norm. Perceived legitimacy in
turn fosters compliance.58
It is submitted that when we extrapolate from Professor Shelton’s arguments, we
find that the IMO resolutions, in terms of form and content, as far as purpose and
compliance are concerned, may well be binding resolutions. The resolutions should
evoke better compliance as they are capable of responding to the demands of tech-
nology. They are pointers to States to the way forward and have no sanctions
attached to them. They reflect the available best practices of the international com-
munity and could prove to be a clear statement of the goals that States must aspire to
achieve in an ocean policy. In particular, where domestic legal systems lack the full
spectrum of ocean-related and maritime legislation and institutions for enforcing
such laws, IMO Resolutions serve as good policy indicators. Likewise, where rules of
customary international law are of unclear applicability in a domestic legal system,
then again IMO Resolutions on such matters may prove to be invaluable when they
are included in a national ocean policy.
However, if IMO resolutions were considered quasi legislative in character and
were a part of a national oceans policy, then States could still apply the benefit of the
57 Ibid., at 535–545. For informal social norms, research indicates that the institutional setting
affects compliance. E.g. Antarctica Treaty Consultative Parties within the context of the Antarc-
tic Treaty (Shelton, loc. cit., at 545). According to Kellman, the recommendations come in
where the treaties leave off. There is substantial compliance with them, because of the insti-
tutional setting and the link to the treaties. NGOs and global civil society play important roles in
fostering compliance with international soft law. They can provide important input into relevant
institutions and put pressure on governments and other actors to comply. They are part of the
institutional context (Shelton, ibid., at 546).
58 Ibid., at 540–543.
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treaties as IMO resolutions will encapsulate the essence of a treaty. States that find it
difficult to adopt the basket of conventions approach in their legislation may find it
useful to adopt the “basket of Resolutions” approach.
It is submitted that when we apply Professor Shelton’s second hypothesis to the
IMO Resolutions we find that they have been adopted with the active and continu-
ous participation of all States, developing and developed, with an interest in the
subject matter. The meetings are continuous and the subject matter of the agenda
requires States to engage in a continuous dialogue. The norm-creating culture of the
IMO thus becomes legitimate in the eyes of the international community.59
CONCLUSIONS
The Oceans Commission is of the view that numerous global instruments lead to
uncertainties at the national level. However, they point out that more rules are
needed in the following inadequately developed areas of ocean law as follows:
• current international agreements are required to reflect the “precautionary
principle”;
• specified standards and recommended applications are required to be drawn up
to reinforce global and regional framework agreements.60
From the above discussion, it is quite apparent that IMO Resolutions contain
international standards and recommendations that may be adopted by States. Many
of these resolutions are a precursor to the IMO Conventions that deal with issues
relating to the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution and protection
of the marine environment, effective implementation of Port State Control, the
implementation of the London Convention, the Protocol to the London Conven-
tion, all issues relating to Maritime Safety of Navigation and the actual adoption of
conventions. These resolutions have played a tremendous role in shaping the past,
present and future conventions concluded by the IMO. Even though they are tanta-
mount to a rule of law, unfortunately the principles of public international law as
found in Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ do not explicitly recognize a category
entitled “Resolutions of UN/IMO” as a source of law. As the 1982 LOSC is virtually
dependent upon the IMO as an international inter-governmental organization and
the IMO Conventions for effective implementation of its provisions, including
GAIRAS referred to above, it does make a case out for these resolutions to have
some legal standing. The IMO resolutions may be considered the power in a national
oceans law and policy framework.
59 Ibid., at 543.
60 See The International World Commission on the Oceans, The Ocean Our Future: The Report of
the Independent World Commission on the Oceans, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1998, at 149.
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Pre-treaty resolutions which contain the nucleus of a valid rule for safe and
secure shipping and protection of the marine environment ought to have a quasi-
legal effect. It is also possible that over time some of the provisions of the non-
binding norms may, besides slipping into customary international law, have ripened
into erga omnes obligations and rights or even represent jus cogens, peremptory
norms of general international law.61 However, there may be a possibility that IMO
resolutions may represent the opinio juris generalis juris or opinio juris communis as
they are adopted at the IMO and subsequently find their way into national oceans
policies and domestic laws of States.
As coastal States, strait States, port States, archipelagic States and flag States are
all dependent upon the IMO conventions, protocols, regulations and codes for their
safety and security, this ought to confer greater legal validity upon the IMO resolu-
tions: as legal rules. Where the 1982 LOSC is insufficient for the new millennium, the
IMO resolutions may fill in the gaps. As a specialized agency of the UN that has
been entrusted with the core duty of protecting the seas and oceans, shipping and
the fight against maritime terrorism, the IMO has proved itself beyond doubt,
especially in the recent adoption of the 2005 SUA Protocols.
Up to a point, the paper relied on the findings of Professor Shelton whose
conclusions are that non-binding norms only become international law when they
emerge in customary international law or are incorporated into a treaty. However,
this paper argued that the IMO resolutions which are heavy in technical content
may be considered as quasi-legal in character and have a role to play in a national
oceans law and policy framework of States in the Asia-Pacific region. Reluctantly,
it is conceded that these are not treaties and only to that extent are said to be
non-binding norms. However, all treaties and resolutions are binding upon those
who accept them. On the domestic level, however, non-binding international
instruments often become a source of law even before they are obligatory on the
international level. States employ non-binding instruments for the following
reasons:
(1) When they do not desire legally binding commitments.
(2) When they are related to a treaty in some manner.
(3) Where they precede the treaty, they help in shaping consensus.
(4) Where a prior treaty refers to them, they may acquire legal validity.
61 A good example of the binding nature of legally non-binding norms is found in driftnet fishing.
The chapter on Driftnet Fishing authored by Donald Rothwell in Professor Shelton’s book
demonstrates that there is great compliance with the non-binding UNGA 1991 resolution that
calls upon all States to implement fully a global moratorium on all large scale pelagic driftnet
fishing by the end of 1992. To ensure that this happened, the UN set up a mechanism whereby the
UN Sec-Gen reported to the UNGA on the resolution’s implementation. The UN FAO and the
UNEP monitored the status of high sea driftnet fishing while States, NGOs and international
organizations with fishing interests and the scientific community provided information on such
fishing. Shelton, op. cit., n. 1, at 538.
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(5) Subject matter is very important to determine if the resolution is binding or
non-binding.62
(6) The content of the norm, the process by which it was adopted, the international
context, and especially the institutional follow-up, institutional monitoring, and
supervisory mechanism are all important. The compliance pull attributable to
law is missing. There is no longer any need to couch obligations in legal terms, as
there is a large measure of compliance with the non-binding obligations. They
have a place in the modern legal system.63
Professor Shelton has stated that non-binding norms are heavy in normative
content and are relevant for compliance, enforcement, implementation, monitoring,
supervision and effectiveness. There is a freedom of action in upholding these
non-binding norms, which generally are a prelude to the treaties themselves.
It is submitted that by adopting the normative content of IMO resolutions into
a national oceans law and policy framework, we adopt the minimum/maximum
standards and best practices based on a precautionary approach. It is also submitted
that the IMO resolutions, like some of the UNGA resolutions, provide the necessary
policy infrastructure upon which to build a national oceans law and policy frame-
work which a State can revise and carry through each year without calling for
legislative amendments. This is because a policy statement needs to set standards
and address the “best practices” on the subject matter with the least red tape. To
draft an oceans law and policy paper means to draft a paper that is capable of
amendment without involving legal bureaucracy and which is up to date and in
consonance with the latest thinking on the subject, which mirrors the developments
at the IMO, one of the many relevant organizations. Even if States are unable to
implement the conventions due to their technical difficulties, States may aspire to a
higher level of conduct by adopting the relevant IMO resolutions as part and parcel
of their policy.
It is also submitted that IMO resolutions may be prophylactic in nature, for like
the treaties, they could assist in preventing disputes by ensuring that shipping is safe,
secure and efficient on clean and secure oceans. When States meet and greet in the
name of IMO meetings64 and resolutions are adopted, there is a great deal of con-
sensus building and indirect settlement of ocean law disputes. If these quasi-legal
obligations create rights and duties for States, then at least they are self-adopted. It is
62 See human rights where soft law usually preceded hard law in the past, helping to build con-
sensus on the norms. See human rights courts in regional systems only. In arms control, there are
more international instruments than regional ones. There are also soft and hard laws existing
together; sometimes soft law acts as a precursor or subsequent gap-filler in the environmental
field. Soft law follows these agreements and acts to fill in the gaps, bringing in the non-State
actors, or allowing solutions when there are scientific uncertainties.
63 Shelton, op. cit., n. 1 at 554.
64 See List of IMO Meetings by acronym and dates at http://www.imo.org/includes/blastData
Only.asp/date_id%3DI7589/ListofIMOMeetingsbyacronymmandates.doc (visited on 5 March
2007).
The Role of IMO Resolutions 155
the intention of States Parties and the text of the instruments that they consent to
that ought to matter. It is probable that there will be implications for third States if
the resolutions were to amount to custom under a regional practice unless the per-
sistent objector rule applies. Finally, if IMO resolutions are regarded as legally
binding or quasi-legal, then it is a breakthrough not only in Public International
Law but also for the Law of the Sea. It is also suggested that perhaps the IMO
resolutions will also pass the intercivilizational test laid down by Professor Onuma.
This will then mean that the dawn of a new thought process has emerged: an inter-
civilizational approach to ocean law and governance in the context of the IMO
resolutions.
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LEGAL MATERIALS

STATE PRACTICE OF ASIAN COUNTRIES IN THE FIELD OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW*
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA1
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Dispute over International Air Passenger Transport Contract
ABDUL WAHEED V. CHINA EASTERN AIRLINES CORP. LTD
1st Instance Court: People’s Court of Pudong New Area, Shanghai Municipality, 21
December 2005
2nd Instance Court: No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court of Shanghai Municipality, 24
February 2006
Facts
On 29 December 2004, the plaintiff bought a discounted air ticket (non-refundable
and non-endorsable) issued by Cathay Pacific (CP). The air ticket set forth the
arrangement of the journey as follows: China Eastern (CE) Airlines MU 703 from
Shanghai to Hong Kong at 11.00 am on 31 December 2004; then CP Airlines
from Hong Kong to Karachi at 16.00 pm on the same day. The clauses on the back
of the air ticket provided that the contract shall comply with the liability rules and
restrictions specified in the Warsaw Convention.
* Edited by B.S. Chimni. The responsibility for the content of the contributions is that of the
national contributor to the State Practice section. The original footnote form has been retained in
each contribution. The year for which the State Practice has been collated is 2006 (and in some
cases for part of 2007). However, in many instances State practice for previous years has been
included. This editorial decision, as in the past, was taken for two reasons – first, in many
instances the record of State practice is available in later years only; second, in the belief that
readers may find this State practice useful.
1 Contributed by Yun ZHAO, Associate Professor, University of Hong Kong.
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Because of snow on 30 December 2004, Pudong Airport had to close its service
for one hour from 22.00 to 23.00. As a result, 104 flights were delayed that day. On
the next day, 43 flights were cancelled and 142 flights were delayed. The MU 703
flight was also delayed for 3 hours and 22 minutes due to bad weather, and the
plaintiff was not able to catch the connecting flight to Karachi after arriving at Hong
Kong Airport.
When the plaintiff and his family realized that they would miss the connecting
flight to Karachi due to the later arrival of flight MU 703 in Hong Kong, they asked
CE Airlines’ service counter about how to deal with the matter. The CE employee
asked the plaintiff to fill in a “Registration Form on Endurance” and said they
would help resolve the problem later. After the plaintiff ’s arrival in Hong Kong, CE’s
employee offered two solutions to the plaintiff: either to wait for another three days
at Hong Kong Airport for the next CP flight to Karachi at the plaintiff ’s own
expense, or to buy air tickets from another air company and fly to Karachi at the
price of around HK$25,000. The plaintiff and his family refused to accept either of
the two solutions. With the intervention of Hong Kong Airport employees, the
plaintiff bought the air tickets and luggage tickets of Emirates Airline and took its
flight to Karachi via Dubai. The plaintiff paid HK$4,721 in air fares and HK$759 in
luggage fares, totalling HK$5,480.
State practice and implementation
The plaintiff was a Pakistani citizen. The place of departure and destination of the
original air ticket was Shanghai, China and Karachi, Pakistan, respectively. Article
142(1) of the General Principles of Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) provides that “the application of law in civil relations with foreigners shall be
governed by the provisions in this Chapter”. Article 142(2) further states that “if any
international treaty concluded or acceded to by the People’s Republic of China
contains any provision different from those in the civil laws of the People’s Republic
of China, the provisions of the international treaty shall prevail, unless the provisions
are the ones on which the People’s Republic of China has announced reservations”.
Both China and Pakistan are contracting parties of the 1955 Protocol to Amend the
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage
by Air, signed at Warsaw in 1929 (hereinafter referred to as the 1955 Hague Protocol)
and the 1961 Convention Supplementary to the Warsaw Convention, for the Unifica-
tion of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air Performed by a
Person Other than the Contracting Carrier (hereinafter referred to as the Guadala-
jara Convention). The two international conventions are applicable in the present
case. Article 28(1) of the 1955 Hague Protocol provides that “an action for damages
must be brought, at the option of the plaintiff, in the territory of one of the High
Contracting Parties, either before the Court having jurisdiction where the carrier is
ordinarily resident, or has his principal place of business, or has an establishment by
which the contract has been made or before the Court having jurisdiction at the place
of destination”. Accordingly, Pudong Court had the jurisdiction to hear the dispute.
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Article 7 of the Guadalajara Convention provides that “in relation to the car-
riage performed by the actual carrier, an action for damages may be brought, at the
option of the plaintiff, against that carrier or the contracting carrier, or against both
together or separately. If the action is brought against only one of those carriers, that
carrier shall have the right to require the other carrier to join in the proceedings, the
procedures and effects being governed by the law of the court that accepted the
case”. As the air ticket held by the plaintiff was issued by CP, the international air
passenger transport contractual relationship was established between the plaintiff
and CP, with the latter being the contractual carrier. There was no direct inter-
national air passenger transport contractual relationship between CE and the plain-
tiff. CE was only an actual carrier to perform the transport task for the part of the
travel from Shanghai to Hong Kong. According to the Guadalajara Convention, the
plaintiff is entitled to bring the lawsuit against CP or CE or both as defendants. In
the present case, the plaintiff chose to bring the lawsuit against CE only, although CE
had the right to require CP to take part in the proceedings. Since the plaintiff
claimed only for damages for the flight delay that occurred in the journey from
Shanghai to Hong Kong with CE as the actual carrier, CP did not have to be added
as a party in the present proceedings.
Article 19 of the 1955 Hague Protocol provides that “the carrier is liable for
damage occasioned by delay in the carriage by air of passengers, luggage or goods”.
Article 20(1) further provides that “the carrier is not liable if he proves that he and
his agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was
impossible for him or them to take such measures”. The MU 703 flight on 31
December 2004 was delayed due to force majeure (bad weather). CE did not need to
bear liability for the delay, provided it proved that it had taken all necessary meas-
ures to avoid damages occurring because of the delay to the passengers. In this
instance the plaintiff had foreseen the result of the delay and had asked CE
employees many times for their assistance. CE should have known that the CP
connecting flight from Hong Kong to Karachi was every three days and that it was
inconvenient for the plaintiff and his family (including one infant) to wait long at a
transfer airport. Accordingly, CE was under an obligation to inform the plaintiff of
possible disadvantageous circumstances during the transfer and persuade the plain-
tiff to take a flight on another day. However, CE failed to do so; instead, CE asked
the plaintiff to fill in a form on Endurance and told him that it would help to resolve
the matter. As such, the plaintiff ’s reliance on CE to make appropriate arrange-
ments was reasonable. In normal circumstances, CE should have endorsed the plain-
tiff ’s air tickets to another airline so as to help them fly to Karachi as soon as
possible. However, CE proposed two other solutions, which put the plaintiff in a
dilemma. Accordingly, CE did not take all necessary measures to avoid the losses
that passengers incurred and thus was not exempt from liabilities. CE was therefore
liable for compensating the plaintiff ’s loss for buying the air tickets at Hong Kong
airport.
In the appeal stage, Shanghai No. 1 Intermediate Court confirmed the decision
made by the Court of the First Instance. Further comments were made in the
judgment. First, once a flight is delayed, the passengers are entitled to get the most
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detailed information at the earliest time so as to make the most rational decision.
The air company is obliged to make an announcement timely of information on flight
delay and provide the passengers with other available journey information when so
requested. Second, an air ticket is the prima facie voucher proving the existence of
the international air passenger transport contract. Once a passenger has paid the full
amount of the ticket fare, the air company shall provide the complete transport
services. The air company may only cancel some services for a discounted air ticket.
A discounted air ticket with the condition of “non-refundable, non-endorsable”
merely restricted the passenger from returning or endorsing the ticket due to his/her
own reason; such a condition did not deprive the passenger of the right to fly to the
place of destination on time. In the present case, with CE failing to fulfil its obliga-
tion, the plaintiff had no choice but to buy other tickets. Had CE clearly informed
the plaintiff of the unfavourable consequences of flying to Hong Kong, the plaintiff
would have avoided the losses. Accordingly, Shanghai No. 1 Intermediate Court
decided on 24 February 2006 that the appeal by CE be rejected and that the
judgment of the first instance be sustained.
INDIA2
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Definition of “good” extendable to intangible property for the purpose of levying of
sales tax – Nature of software program – Incorporation of the concept of “transaction
value” into Indian law pursuant to GATT/WTO obligations
TATA CONSULTANCY SERVICES V. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
Supreme Court of India, 5 November 2004
(2005) 1 Supreme Court Cases 308
The appellants, inter alia, were the providers of computer consultancy services. As
part of their business they prepared and loaded on customers’ computers custom-
made software which was termed “uncanned software”. They also sold computer
software packages off the shelf which were termed “canned software”. While the
appellants were the licensees with permission to sub-license these canned software
packages to others, the ownership of the canned software packages remained with
those companies or persons who had developed these software packages. The
canned software programs were programs like Oracle, Lotus and others. Sales tax
2 Contributed by V.G. Hegde, Associate Professor, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal
Nehru University, New Delhi.
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was imposed on the sales of these canned software packages under the Andhra
Pradesh General Sales Act, 1957 holding that these packages were “goods”.
The appellants challenged imposition of sales tax on these canned software
packages, arguing that the term “goods” under the Act referred to and meant only
tangible movable property. Computer software, according to them, could not be
regarded as tangible movable property. A software program, appellants pointed out,
was essentially a series of commands issued to the hardware of the computer that
enabled the computer to perform in a particular manner. For this purpose, a soft-
ware program was reduced to a physical form by recording it on a magnetic media
such as floppy drives, CDs or hard drives. Appellants further argued that in cases
of software the consumer would not get any final product but simply a set of
commands which would enable his computer to function. Considering the inherent
characteristic and nature of the software, appellants contended that it could not fall
within the definition of the term “goods”.
Noting the contentions of the appellants, the Court, inter alia, observed that:
the term “goods”, for the purposes of sales tax, cannot be given a narrow meaning. It
has been held that properties which are capable of being abstracted, consumed and
used and/or transmitted, transferred, delivered, stored or possessed, etc. are “goods”
for the purposes of sales tax . . . The test is whether the item concerned is capable of
abstraction, consumption and use and whether it can be transmitted, transferred,
delivered, stored, possessed, etc. Admittedly in the case of software, both canned and
uncanned, all of these are possible.
The Court referred to an earlier case decided by it in 2001 (Associated Cement
Companies Ltd v. Commissioner of Customs (2001) 4 SCC 593) which dealt with the
issue of applicability of customs duty on technical material supplied in the form of
drawings, manuals and computer disk, etc. The other important question in this
2001 case related to the actual mode of valuation of customs duty on intangible
property. The Court, in the present case agreed with the view expressed in the 2001
case “. . . the moment the information or advice is put on a media, whether paper or
diskettes or any other thing, that what is supplied becomes a chattel”. The Court
further noted that “it is clear that intellectual property when put on a media would
be regarded as an article on the total value of which customs duty is payable”. In
other words, “duty was payable on the transaction value determined therein and in
determining the transaction value there has to be added to the price actually paid or
payable”. The Court further noted the relevant paras of the 2001 case which, inter
alia, stated: “It will be appropriate to note that the Customs Valuation Rules, 1988
are framed keeping in view the GATT protocol and the WTO agreement.3 In fact
our rules appear to be an exact copy of GATT and WTO. For the purpose of
3 The Court was referring to (a) Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1947
and (b) WTO Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994.
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valuation under the 1988 Rules the concept of ‘transaction value’ which was intro-
duced was based on the aforesaid GATT protocol and WTO agreement. The shift
from the concept of price of goods, as was classically understood, is clearly discern-
ible in the new principles. Transaction value may be entirely different from the classic
concept of price of goods. Full meaning has to be given to the rules and the transac-
tion value may include many items which may not classically have been understood
to be part of the sale price.”
Taking into account the existing jurisprudence on the issue,4 the Court stated:
In our view, the term “goods” as used in Article 366(12) of the Constitution and as
defined in the said Act is very wide and includes all types of movable properties,
whether those properties be tangible or intangible. We are in complete agreement
with the observations made by this Court in Associated Cement Companies Lid. A
software program may consist of various commands which enable the computer to
perform a designated task. The copyright in that program may remain with the
originator of the program. But the moment copies are made and marketed, it
becomes goods, which are susceptible to sales tax. Even intellectual property, once it
is put on to a media, whether it be in the form of books or canvas (in case of painting)
or computer discs or cassettes, and marketed would become “goods”. We see no
difference between a sale of a software program on a CD/floppy disc from a sale of
music on a cassette/CD or a sale of a film on video cassette/CD. In all such cases, the
intellectual property has been incorporated on a media for purposes of transfer. Sale
is not just of the media which by itself has very little value. The software and the
media cannot be split up. What the buyer purchases and pays for is not the disc or the
CD. As in the case of paintings or books or music or films the buyer is purchasing
the intellectual property and not the media i.e., the paper or cassette or disc or CD.
Thus a transaction/sale of computer software is clearly a sale of “goods” within the
meaning of the term as defined in the said Act. The term “all materials, articles and
commodities” includes both tangible and intangible /incorporeal property which is
capable of abstraction, consumption and use and which can be transmitted, trans-
ferred, delivered, stored, possessed, etc. The software programs have all these
attributes.5
The Court therefore held that the software program was a “good” and
accordingly the appellant was liable to pay sales tax on the software marketed by it.
4 CCE v. Acer India Ltd (2004) 8 SCC 173. In this case the Supreme Court had considered in
detail what a software program was. It had held that a computer and operative software are
different marketable commodities.
5 Article 366(12) of the Constitution defines “goods” as to include “all materials, commodities
and articles”. Article 366 defines various terms and expressions incorporated in the Constitution.
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International law as a guide to interpret domestic law – Appointment of a Police
Officer as a member of the National Human Rights Commission – Scope of
application of “Paris Principles” – Application and Interpretation of Human Rights
PEOPLE’S UNION FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES V. UNION OF INDIA AND
ANOTHER
Supreme Court of India, 18 January 2005
(2005) 2 Supreme Court Cases 436
The question before the Supreme Court was whether a former member of the police
force is eligible to become a member of the National Human Rights Commission
(NHRC) as per section 3(2)(d) of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 (1993
Act hereinafter). Section 3(2)(d) of the 1993 Act provides that persons having
“knowledge of, or practical experience in, matters relating to human rights” should
be appointed as members of the NHRC. The fundamental question was whether the
appointment of a police officer would be consistent with the language of the section
and the true intendment of the Act.6
The Court, while noting that the challenge was based on the fundamental issue
and not on any allegations of a personal nature, referred to the Statement of Objects
and Reasons in enacting the 1993 Act which, inter alia, stated that “the human rights
embodied in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Inter-
national Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted by the
General Assembly of the United Nations on 16-12-1966 stand substantially protected
by the Constitution of India”.7 After considering the salient features of the Act, the
Court went on to recount the developments at the international level that resulted in
the creation of national human rights institutions, specifically the 1993 Act.8 The
6 This was a Division Bench opinion delivered by Justice Y.K. Sabharwal and Justice D.M.
Dharmadhikari. Both gave two separate opinions without concurring on the conclusions.
Accordingly, in view of difference of opinion, the matter was referred to a larger bench (see the
next case People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India and Another (2005) 5 Supreme Court
Cases 363)).
7 Quoting from the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, the Court noted two definitions –
“Human Rights” mean the rights relating to life, liberty, equality and dignity of the individual
guaranteed by the Constitution or embodied in the International Covenants and enforceable by
courts in India (s. 2(1)(d)). “International Covenants” mean the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 16-12-1966 (s. 2(1)(f )).
8 The Court, inter alia, noted that “Articles 1, 55,56,62,68 and 76 of the UN Charter provide
the basis for recognition, elaboration of the contents of the standards and the machinery for
implementing the protection of human rights. The General Assembly of the United Nations on
10-9-1948 adopted a Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 16-12-1966 form bedrock of
international recognition of human rights.”
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Court, referring to “Paris Principles”,9 observed that “the composition of a
national institution and the appointment of its members, whether by means of an
election or otherwise, shall be established in accordance with procedures which
affords all necessary guarantees to ensure the pluralist representation of the social
forces (of civilian society) involved in the protection and promotion of human
rights . . .”10
The Court noted some of its earlier decisions in which “drawing aid from
International Covenants, law enacted by the Indian parliament was construed and
relief of protection of human rights was given”.11 The Court, noting that many
international treaties had influenced interpretation of Indian law in several ways,
stated:
This Court has relied upon them for statutory interpretation, where the terms of any
legislation are not clear or are reasonably capable of more than one meaning. In such
cases, the courts have relied upon the meaning which is in consonance with the
treaties, for there is a prima facie presumption that parliament did not intend to act in
breach of international law, including State treaty obligations. It is also well accepted
that in construing any provision in domestic legislation which is ambiguous, in the
sense that it is capable of more than one meaning, the meaning which conforms most
closely to the provisions of any international instrument is to be preferred, in the
absence of any domestic law to the contrary.12
The Court, accordingly, held that the Paris Principles be taken into account
while interpreting section 3(2)(d) of the 1993 enactment while proposing to appoint
a police officer as a member of the NHRC and held the appointment null and
void.13
Justice D.M. Dharmadhikari rendering a separate opinion referred to the
9 The “Paris Principles” were adopted in 1991 by the United Nations sponsored meetings of
representatives of national institutions in Paris wherein a detailed set of principles on the status
of national human rights institutions was developed, The Court also referred to six criteria to be
met by national human rights institutions under the Paris Principles, namely (a) Independence
guaranteed by the statute or Constitution; (b) Autonomy from the government; (c) Pluralism in
membership; (d) Broad mandate based on human rights standards; (e) Adequate power of the
State; and (f ) Sufficient resources.
10 The Court also outlined the categories of representative to be included such as (a)
non-governmental organizations responsible for human rights . . . (b) trends in philosophical
and religious thought; (c) universities and qualified experts; (d) parliament; (e) government
departments (in advisory capacity).
11 Mackinnon Mackenzie and Co. Ltd v. Audrey D’ Costa (1987) 2 SCC 469; Sheela Barse v. Secy.,
Children’s Aid Society (1987) 3 SCC 50; and Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1997 SC 3011.
12 This part of the judgment was delivered by Justice Y.K. Sabharwal.
13 However, without affecting the validity of the decisions taken while the Respondent was a
member of the Commission.
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limitations placed on the applicability of “Paris Principles” as an interpretative tool
to fill the gaps within domestic law.14 He noted:
“Paris Principles” are at best merely in the nature of guidelines to be followed by
covenanting countries who are parties to the resolutions taken in the international
conferences on human rights. There is no obligation on acceptance of “Paris
Principles”, to incorporate them word by word in statutory law. In the “Paris Prin-
ciples”, a pluralistic composition of the Commission, under the Act, in respect of
membership, Judges have a majority. A real pluralistic composition ought to include
in its membership judges, human rights activists, scientists, academicians and even
experienced police officers and social researchers . . . Merely because there are
instances of human rights violations by some members of the police is no ground
to exclude all police officers as a class from the membership of the Commission.
The “Paris Principles” can at best be taken aid of to understand and interpret the
provisions of the Act but not to substitute or supplement it.
Legal Status of UN Resolutions and Human Rights Instruments – Binding Nature
of Paris Principles – Domestic Implementation of treaties and covenants – Reference
to Indian Case Law
PEOPLE’S UNION FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES V. UNION OF INDIA AND
ANOTHER
Supreme Court of India, 29 April 2005
(2005) 5 Supreme Court Cases 363
The division bench case, as referred above, on account of disagreement between
judges on the applicability and binding nature of Paris Principles vis-à-vis section
3(2)(d) of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 was taken to a five-judge
bench. The issue was whether a former police officer could be appointed as one of
the members of the NHRC.
The Court, at the outset, noted that the provisions of the 1993 Act were in
conformity with the Paris Principles and that neither the Paris Principles nor the UN
Resolution prohibit a former civil servant or a police officer from becoming a mem-
ber of the NHRC. The Court also observed that “once the Indian legislature enacts a
law pursuant to an international convention then the legislative area in that field
being covered it is the municipal law alone that prevails hence, the validity of the
appointment of the second respondent can only be examined with reference to the
provisions of the Act”. The Court, however, concluded that “. . . neither the Paris
14 Justice D.M. Dharmadhikari dissented on the issue of validity of appointment of Respondent
and did not endorse the conclusions recorded by Justice Y.K. Sabharwal.
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Principles nor the UN Resolution and much less does the Act either expressly or
impliedly exclude the inclusion of a police officer in the Commission”. The Court
referring to the “well established canon of construction”15 stated: “If we apply the
said principle of law to the facts of the case, there being no exclusion in Section
3(2)(d) of the Act and the language being clear, we cannot by looking back into the
Paris Principles or the UN Resolution interpret an exclusionary clause to keep
police officers from being members of the Commission in spite of the Act not
providing for the same.” Referring to the judgment of Justice Sabharwal the
Court noted:
17. In arriving at his decision Hon’ble Sabharwal. J has treated the Paris Principles
and the UN General Assembly Resolution as covenants. Thereafter, he has applied
the law applicable to international covenants and imported the obligations under the
Paris Principles and the UN General Assembly Resolution as if they are binding as
legal obligations on India even in the municipal context. While doing so he has relied
upon the judgments of this Hon’ble Court in Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co. Ltd. v.
Audrey D’ Costa; Sheela Barse v. Secy. Children’s Aid Society; People’s Union for Civil
Liberties v. Union of India; and Vishaka v. State of Rajastahn.
18. Having noted the above we would with respect like to point out that neither the
Paris Principles nor the subsequent UN General Assembly Resolution can be exalted
to the status of a covenant in international law. Therefore merely because India is a
party to these documents does not cast any binding legal obligation on it. Further, all
the above cases which Hon’ble Sabharwal. J has relied upon deal with the obligations
of the Indian State pursuant to its being a party to a covenant/treaty or a convention
and not merely a declaration in the international fora or a UN General Assembly
Resolution.
The Court, accordingly, concluded that since the field in relation to the
constitution of NHRC was covered by an Act of the Indian parliament, neither
the Paris Principles nor the UN General Assembly Resolution could override the
express provisions of the Act.
15 . . . that the court should read the section as it is and cannot rewrite it to suit its convenience;
nor does any canon of construction permit the court to read the section in such a manner as to
render it to some extent otiose . . .” in A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak (1984) 2 SCC
500.
168 Asian Yearbook of International Law
Implementation and incorporation of Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Protection of Juveniles – Scope and
application of Indian Juvenile Justice enactments taking into account existing
international legal norms
PRATAP SINGH V. STATE OF JHARKHAND AND ANOTHER
Supreme Court of India, 2 February 2005
(2005) 3 Supreme Court Cases 551
The issue before the Court was with regard to the mode of determining the age of
the appellant who was charged under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code. The
two specific issues were: (1) whether the date of occurrence would be the reckoning
date for determining the age of the alleged offender as a juvenile offender or the date
when he was produced in the court/competent authority; (2) whether the Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (hereinafter 2000 Act) would be
applicable in the case of proceedings initiated and pending under the earlier Juvenile
Justice Act of 1986 (hereinafter 1986 Act) when the Act of 2000 was enforced with
effect from 1 April 2001. The Court also had to deal with its own two conflicting
decisions given at two different times. In Arnit Das v. State of Bihar (2000) 5 SCC
488, a case decided in 2000, the Court had held the date of production before the
Juvenile Court as the date relevant for deciding whether or not the appellant was
juvenile for the purpose of trial. This decision, according to appellants, did not
notice a decision of the Court in Umesh Chandra v. State of Rajasthan (1982) 2 SCC
202 which, inter alia, had held the date of occurrence of the offence as the deciding
date for determination of the age of the juvenile.
After surveying the provisions of both the 1986 and 2000 enactments, the Court
noted: “The Juvenile Justice Act in its present form has been enacted in discharge of
the obligation of our country to follow the United Nations Standard Minimum
Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice, 1985 also known as the Beijing
Rules (the Rules).” After surveying the provisions of Beijing Rules, the Court
observed:
The problem of juvenile justice is, no doubt, one of tragic human interest so much
so in fact that it is not confined to this country alone but cuts across national bound-
aries. In 1966 at the Second United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and
Treatment of Offenders at London this issue was discussed and several therapeutic
recommendations were adopted. To bring the operations of the juvenile justice
system in the country in conformity with the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the
Administration of Juvenile Justice, the Juvenile Justice Act came into existence in
1986. A review of the working of the then existing Acts both State and parliamentary
would indicate that much greater attention was found necessary to be given to chil-
dren who may be found in situations of social maladjustment, delinquency or neglect.
The justice system as available for adults could not be considered suitable for being
applied to juveniles. There is also need for larger involvement of informal system and
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community-based welfare agencies in the care, protection, treatment, development
and rehabilitation of such juveniles.
The Court pointed out that the provisions of the 1986 Act and the 2000 Act were
required to be construed having regard to the Beijing Rules. Surveying and compar-
ing the provisions of the 1986 and 2000 Act, the Court further pointed out that “the
said Act has not only to be read in terms of the Rules but also the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules
for the Protection of Juveniles”. The Court further noted:
The Juvenile Justice Act specifically refers to international law. The relevant provi-
sions of the Rules are incorporated therein. The international treaties, covenants and
conventions although may not be a part of our municipal law, the same can be
referred to and followed by the courts having regard to the fact that India is a party to
the said treaties. A right to a speedy trial is not a new right. It is embedded in our
Constitution in terms of Articles 14 and 21 thereof. The international treaties recog-
nize the same. It is now trite that any violation of human rights would be looked
down upon. Some provisions of the international law although may not be a part of
our municipal law but the courts are not hesitant to in referring thereto so as to find
new rights in the context of Constitution. Constitution of India and other ongoing
statutes have been read consistently with the rules of international law. Constitution
is a source of, and not an exercise of, legislative power. The principles of international
law whenever applicable operate as a statutory implication but the legislature in the
instant case held itself bound thereby and, thus, did not legislate in disregard of the
constitutional provisions or the international law as also in the context of Article 20
and 21 of the Constitution. The law has to be understood, therefore, in accordance
with the international law. Part III of our Constitution protects substantive as well as
procedural rights. Implications which arise therefrom must effectively be protected by
the judiciary. A contextual meaning to the statute is required to be assigned having
regard to the constitutional as well as international law operating in the field.
The Court further noted that the “Constitution of India and the juvenile justice
legislations must necessarily be understood in the context of present-day scenarios
and having regard to the international treaties and conventions. Our Constitution
takes note of the institutions of the world community which had been created . . .”
Now, the Constitution speaks not only “to the people of India who made it and
accepted it for their governance but also to the international community as the basic
law of the Indian nation which is a member of that community”. Inevitably, “its
meaning is influenced by the legal context in which it must operate”.
After considering the scope and application of 1986 and 2000 enactments, the
Court held that the date of occurrence of the event should be taken as the relevant
date for determining the age of a juvenile and not the date on which he was produced
before the Juvenile Court. As regards the retrospective application of the 2000 Act
for the events which occurred before its commencement the Court held that it would
have limited application in the cases pending.
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Appointment of Arbitrators – Nature of Courts’ function in appointing Arbitrators –
Difference between “administrative” and “judicial” function – Incorporation of the
language of UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration
SBP & CO V. PATEL ENGINEERING LTD AND ANOTHER
Supreme Court of India, 26 October 2005
(2005) 8 Supreme Court Cases 618
The Court in this case examined the role of the Chief Justice or his designate
while appointing arbitrators as per section 11(6) of the Indian Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter 1996 Act).16 Hitherto the nature and function of
the Chief Justice and his designate were held to be administrative in character.17
Accordingly, the existing view was that the Chief Justice or his nominee performing
the function under section 11(6) of the 1996 Act could not decide any contentious
issue between the parties. The correctness of this view was questioned before the
Court.
While surveying the provisions of the 1996 Act, the Court noted that the scheme
and language of the enactment were based on the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration. It also noted that the General Assembly of the United Nations had
recommended that all countries give due consideration to the Model Law so as to
establish “a unified legal framework for a fair and efficient settlement of disputes
arising in international commercial relations”. The Court further noted that while
adapting the Model Law the 1996 Act had made some departures from it. The Court
pointed out that Article 11 of the Model Law provided for the making of a request
to “the court or other authority specified in Article 6 to take the necessary measure”.
The words in Section 11 of the 1996 Act, the Court further pointed out, referred to
“the Chief Justice or the person or institution designated by him”. According to the
Court: “The fact that instead of the court, the powers are conferred on the Chief
16 Section 11 of the 1996 Act provided for the “Appointment of Arbitrators”. Section 11(6)
provided that: “Where, under an appointment procedure agreed upon by the parties – (a) a party
fails to act as required under that procedure; or (b) the parties, or the two appointed arbitrators,
fail to reach an agreement expected of them under the procedure; or a person, including an
institution, fails to perform any function entrusted to him or it under that procedure, a party may
request the Chief Justice or any person or institution designated by him to take the necessary
measure, unless the agreement on the appointment procedure provides other means of securing
appointment. This question of ‘administrative’ v. ‘judicial’ function of the Chief Justice was
referred to seven judge bench of the Supreme Court in the SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd.
(2005) 6 SCC 288.”
17 Konkan Railway Corp. Ltd. v. Mehul Construction Co. (2000) 7 SCC 201; Konkan Railway
Corp. Ltd. v. Rani Construction (P) Ltd (2002) 2 SCC 388; Ador Samia (P) Ltd v. Peekay Holding
Ltd. (1999) 8 SCC 572; and Sundarm Finance Ltd v. NEPC India Ltd (1999) 2 SCC 479.
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Justice, has to be appreciated in the context of statute.” The Court, referring to its
averment in an earlier case decided in 1993 – Supreme Court Advocates on Record
Association v. Union of India18 that the “expression ‘Chief Justice’ was used in the
sense of collectivity of judges of the Supreme Court and the High Court respect-
ively” – noted that “the departure from the UNCITRAL Model regarding the
conferment of the power cannot be said to be conclusive or significant in the circum-
stances”. Referring to an earlier question that was dealt with in Konkan Railway
Corp. Ltd v. Mehul Construction Co.19 about the nature of order passed by the Chief
Justice or his nominee in exercise of his power under section 11(6) of the 1996 Act,
the Court stated:
After noticing the Statement of Objects and Reasons for the Act and after comparing
the language of Section 11 of the Act and the corresponding article of the Model
Law, it was stated that the Act has designated the Chief Justice of the High Court in
case of domestic arbitration and the Chief Justice of India in cases of international
commercial arbitration, to be authority to perform the function of appointment of
an arbitrator, whereas under the Model Law, the said power was vested with the
court. When the matter is placed before the Chief Justice or his nominee to bear in
mind the legislative intent that the arbitral process should be set in motion without
any delay whatsoever and all contentious issues left to be raised before the Arbitral
Tribunal itself. It was further held that at that stage, it would not be appropriate for
the Chief Justice or his nominee, to entertain any contention or decide the same
between the parties. It was also held that in view of the conferment of power on the
Arbitral Tribunal under Section 16 of the Act, the intention of the legislature and its
anxiety to see that the arbitral process is set in motion at the earliest, it will be
appropriate for the Chief Justice to appoint an arbitrator without wasting any time or
without entertaining any contentious issue by a party objecting to the appointment
of an arbitrator.20
The Court further observed:
It was noticed that in other countries where UNCITRAL Model was being
followed, the court could decide such issues judicially and need not mechanically
appoint an arbitrator. There were situations where preliminary issues would have to
18 (1993) 4 SCC 441.
19 (2000) 7 SCC 201.
20 Ibid; The Court quoted para. 4 from its 2000 decision on Konkan Railway which, inter alia,
stated: “If it is held that an order under Section 11 (6) is a judicial or quasi-judicial order then the
said order would be amenable to judicial intervention and any reluctant party may frustrate the
entire purpose of the Act by adopting dilatory tactics in approaching a court of law even against
an order of appointment of an arbitrator. Such an interpretation has to be avoided in order
to achieve the basic objective for which the country has enacted the Act of 1996 adopting
UNCITRAL Model.”
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be decided by the court rather than by the arbitrator. If the order of the Chief
Justice or his nominees were to be treated as an administrative one, it could be
challenged before the Single Judge of the High Court, then before a Division Bench
and then the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution, a result that
would cause further delay in arbitral proceedings, something sought to be prevented
by the Act.
The Court concluded that the proceedings before the Chief Justice, while
entertaining an application under section 11(6) of the Act, were adjudicatory.21
Accordingly, it held that the power exercised by the Chief Justice of the High
Court or the Chief Justice of India under section 11(6) of the Act was not an
administrative power but a judicial power.
Meaning of Dumping – GATT/WTO interpretations on Agreement on Implementation
of Article VI of GATT, 1994 – Customs Tariff (Identification, Assessment and
Collection of Anti-Dumping Duty on Dumped Articles and for Determination of
Injury) Rules, 1995
S & S ENTERPRISE V. DESIGNATED AUTHORITY AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India, 22 February 2005
(2005) 3 Supreme Court Cases 337
The appellant imported lead acid batteries from Bangladesh during the period 1
February 2000 to 13 September 2001. The total number of batteries so imported was
found to be less than 3% of the total imports of such batteries into India during that
period. Designated Authority confirmed this after investigation pursuant to a com-
plaint received to this effect under the Customs Tariff (Identification, Assessment
and Collection of Anti-Dumping Duty on Dumped Articles and for Determination
of Injury) Rules, 1995 (hereinafter the Rules). According to Rule 14(d), if the
Designated Authority determines that the volume of the dumped imports actual or
potential from a particular country accounts for less than 3% of the imports of
21 Justice C.K. Thakker while dissenting refers, inter alia, in para. 52 to the UNCITRAL Model
Law stating “The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
adopted a Model Law in 1985 on International Commercial Arbitration. The General Assembly
of the United Nations recommended member-States to give due consideration to the Model Law
to have uniformity in arbitration procedure which resulted in passing of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996. The Act is a complete code in itself and consolidates and amends the law
relating to domestic arbitration, international commercial arbitration and enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards”. According to Justice Thakker, Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act
after considering the UNCITRAL Model “intended to minimize the supervisory role of the court
in arbitral process”.
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the like product, it shall terminate the investigation immediately. Nevertheless, the
Designated Authority continued the investigation in respect of imports from
Bangladesh on the finding that the value of imports made from Bangladesh was
more than 6% which was more than the de minimis limit of 3% as provided under
Rule 14(d). The Designated Authority published its final findings on 7 December
2001 and held that the anti-dumping duty was payable in respect of such import of
batteries during the period under investigation. The Ministry of Finance accepted
the recommendation and notified the anti-dumping duty payable by the appellant.
The appellant preferred an appeal before the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control)
Appellate Tribunal (CEGAT) which, inter alia, rejected the submission of the
appellant that the volume of exports should have been computed on the basis of
quantity rather than on the basis of price. It held that the world “volume” in the
context of Rule 14 meant value. The appellant preferred an appeal before the
Supreme Court.
The Court, holding the interpretation of Rule 14(d) by the Designated Authority
and the Tribunal as incorrect and contrary to its language, stated:
The imposition of anti-dumping duty is under Section 9-A of the Customs Tariff
Act, 1975 and the Rules and is the outcome of the General Agreement on Tariff and
Trade (GATT) to which India is a party. The purpose behind the imposition of the
duty is to curb unfair trade practices resorted to by exporters of a particular country
of flooding the domestic markets with goods at rates which are lower than the rate at
which the exporters normally sell the same or like goods in their own countries so as
to cause or be likely to cause injury to the domestic market. The levy of anti-dumping
duty is a method recognized by GATT which seeks to remedy the injury and at the
same time balances the right of exporters from other countries to sell their products
within the country with the interest of the domestic markets. Thus the factors to
constitute “dumping” are (i) an import at prices which are lower than the normal
value of the goods in the exporting country; (ii) the exports must be sufficient to cause
injury to the domestic industry.
Referring to Article 5.8 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the
GATT, 1994 the Court noted that “a negligible quantity of imports would not be
sufficient to cause such injury”. The Court further observed:
The de minimis rule as far as the price is concerned is when the dumping margin or the
difference between the export price of the article and its normal value is less than 2%.
In other words the exporter is selling the goods in India at almost the same price that
it does in its country. As far as quantity is concerned, if the export accounts for less
than 3% of the total imports of the like article into India, it is treated as too trivial for
the law and is ignored.
The Court, while noting the distinction between volume as meaning quantity on
the one hand and price on the other, stated: “For example under Rule 11(2), the
Designated Authority is required to determine the injury to the domestic industry
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taking into account, inter alia, the volume of dumped imports and their effect on the
price in the domestic market for like articles.”22 The Court concluded:
Therefore, when Rule 14(d) says that the investigation must be terminated if the
“volume” of the dumped imports is less than 3% of the imports of the like product, it
must mean that the quantity of dumped imports must account for less than 3% of the
total imports. To hold otherwise would mean that if the price is lower than 3%,
irrespective of the quantity imported, the investigation would be dropped and it
would, as submitted by the appellant, lead to the absurd situation that a small number
of expensive imports would invite anti-dumping investigation but cheap imports
flooding the domestic markets would not. In fact such a situation is exactly what the
dumping rules have been framed to prevent.
The Court, while setting aside the anti-dumping duty imposed on the appellant,
held that it was incumbent on the Designated Authority to have closed the investiga-
tion under Rule 14(d) once it came to the conclusion that the volume of dumped
imports was less than 3% of the total imports.
Environment and Development – Stockholm Declaration – Rio Declaration –
Intergenerational Equity – Doctrine of Public Trust – State Responsibility
and Environment
INTELLECTUALS FORUM, TIRUPATHI V. STATE OF ANDHRA
PRADESH AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India, 23 February 2006
AIR 2006 Supreme Court 1350
The present case related to preservation and restoration of two historically
important tanks, namely, “Avilala and Peruru”, located on the precincts of Tirupati,
a famous holy town in South India. Appellants challenged the decision of the
government of Andhra Pradesh to alienate the tank bed lands in favour of some
governmental agencies for valuable consideration. The High Court of Andhra
Pradesh in September 2000 had dismissed the petition of appellants that challenged
the alienation of these tank beds, finding no illegality or irregularity in the action of
the respondents. Aggrieved by this decision, the appellants filed an appeal in the
Supreme Court raising the issue as to whether urban development could be given
22 Rule 2(d) defines the term “like article” as “an article which is identical or alike in all respects
to the article under investigation for being dumped in India or in the absence of such an article,
another article which although not alike in all respects, has characteristics closely resembling
those of the articles under investigation”.
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primacy over and above the need to protect the environment and valuable fresh
water resources. The Supreme Court, in order to examine this question from
the technical and empirical standpoint, appointed a Committee of Experts. This
Committee, inter alia, suggested various measures to revive the tanks by recharging
the ground water level.
Referring to the doctrine of public trust as enunciated by it in an earlier
decision,23 the Court stated:
The responsibility of the State to protect the environment is now a well-accepted
notion in all countries. It is this notion that, in international law, gave rise to the
principle of “State responsibility” for pollution emanating within one’s own territor-
ies [Corfu Channel Case, ICJ Reports (1949) 4]. This responsibility is clearly enunci-
ated in the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm 1972
(Stockholm Convention), to which India was a party . . . The respondents, however,
have taken the plea that the actions taken by the government were in pursuance of
urgent needs of development. The debate between the developmental and economic
needs and that of the environment is an enduring one, since if environment is
destroyed for any purpose without compelling developmental cause, it will most
probably run foul of the executive and judicial safeguards . . . In response to this
difficulty, policy makers and judicial bodies across the world have produced the con-
cept of “sustainable development”. This concept, as defined in the 1987 Report of the
World Commission on Environment and Development (Brundtland Report) defines
it as “Development without compromising the ability of the future generations to
meet their own needs” . . . Subsequently the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, passed during the Earth Summit of 1992, to which also India is a
party, adopted the notion of sustainable development.24
The Court held that the tank was a communal property and the State authorities
are trustees to hold and manage such properties for the benefits of the community
23 In M.C.Mehata v. Kamal Nath 1997 (1) SCC 388, the Supreme Court of India referring to the
doctrine of public trust, inter alia, stated: “The issues presented in this case illustrate the classic
struggle between those members of the public who would preserve our rivers, forests, parks and
open lands in their pristine purity and those charged with administrative responsibility, who
under the pressures of the changing needs of an increasingly complex society find it necessary to
encroach to some extent upon open lands, heretofore considered inviolate to change. The reso-
lution of this conflict in any given case is for the legislature and not for the Courts . . . But, in the
absence of any legislation, the executive acting under the doctrine of public trust cannot abdicate
the natural resource and convert them into private ownership or commercial use” (emphasis added).
24 The Supreme Court refers to its averments on this issue in earlier cases, such as Essar Oil v.
Halar Utkarsh Samiti, 2004 (2) SCC 392; Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India,
1996 (5) SCC 281; M.C.Mehata v. Union of India (Taj Trapezium Case), 1997 (2) SCC 653; State
of Himachal Pradesh v. Ganesh Wood Products, 1995 (3) SCC 363; and Narmada Bachao Andolan
v. Union of India, 2002 (10) SCC 664.
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and they cannot be allowed to commit any act or omission which will infringe the
right of the Community and alienate the property to any person or body.
Environmental aspects of Open Spaces and Open Lands – Need for Environmental
Impact Assessment in Building Regulations – Sustainable Development and Concepts
of International Environmental Law
BOMBAY DYEING & MFG. CO. LTD V. BOMBAY ENVIRONMENTAL
ACTION GROUP AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India, 7 March 2006
AIR 2006 Supreme Court 1489
The Bombay Environmental Action Group, a public charitable trust, questioned the
validity of Development Control Regulation No. 58 (DCR 58) framed by the State
of Maharashtra in terms of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act,
1966. DCR 58 was framed by the State of Maharashtra to deal with the situation
arising out of closure and/or unavailability of various cotton textile mills occa-
sioned, inter alia, by reason of a strike resorted by the workers thereof. The validity
of DCR 58 was challenged before the Bombay High Court to “protect the interests
of the residents of Mumbai and to improve the quality of life in the town of Mum-
bai . . . also for preventing further serious damage to the town planning and ecology
so as to avoid an irretrievable breakdown of the city”. The main thrust of the writ
petitioners was to ensure “open spaces” for the city and to provide the “crying need
of space for public housing”. The Bombay High Court, inter alia, concluded that “the
intent is to control the development and re-development by making comprehensive
regulatory measures, the portions becoming vacant after demolition of existing
built-up areas have to be included in the concept of ‘open lands’ ”. The February
2005 judgment of the Bombay High Court was challenged before the Supreme
Court.
The Court examined in great detail the statutory scheme of DCR 58 and its
constitutional validity and framed the following question: Would any synthesis
between environmental aspects and building regulation vis-à-vis the scheme floated
by the Board of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction in terms of the provisions
of Sick Industries Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 be possible? As regards
the environmental issues the Court stated:
It is often felt that in the process of encouraging development the environment gets
sidelined. However, with major threats to the environment, such as climate change,
depletion of natural resources, the entrophication of water systems and biodiversity
and global warming, the need to protect the environment has become a priority. At
the same time, it is also necessary to promote development. The harmonization of the
two needs has led to the concept of sustainable development, so much so that it has
become most significant and focal point of environmental legislation and judicial
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decisions relating to the same. Sustainable development, simply put, is a process in
which development can be sustained over generations . . . Making the concept of
sustainable development operational for public policies raises important challenges
that involve complex synergies and trade offs.
The Court further noted that the Indian judiciary has time and again recognized
“sustainable development” as being a fundamental concept of Indian law. It referred
to its earlier decisions which elaborated core environmental legal principles based on
emerging concepts from international environmental law such as “precautionary
principle” and “polluter pays principle”.25 It pointed out that “this Court, referring
to Article 48-A and 51-A (g) of the Constitution of India, observed that the afore-
mentioned principles are part of the constitutional law”. The Court also noted that
“this Court negatived the attempt on the part of the State for in situ regularization
by way of change of policy”. The Court, while noting that in terms of Article 243-W
of the Constitution of India the Municipalities have constitutional responsibilities
of town planning,26 stated that “. . . the government must have due regard in letter
and spirit to aspects that have been mentioned in the earlier place including rights
of individuals who are residents of the localities under consideration for in situ
regularization by amendment of the Master Plan”.27 The Court also noted: “While
considering the environmental aspect, we must not forget that before constructions
are allowed to be commenced and completed, the exercise for environmental impact
assessment is mandatorily required to be done by the competent authority.” It
accordingly suggested the creation of an expert body to examine this aspect.28
However, the Court upheld the legal validity of DCR 58, noting that it is not
25 Vellore Citizens’ Welfare Form v. Union of India and Others (1996) 5 SCC 647; Indian Council
for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India (1996) 5 SCC 281; A.P. Pollution Control Board v. Prof.
M.V.Nayudu and others (1999) 2 SCC 718; and Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India and
Others (2000) 10 SCC 664.
26 M.C. Mehta v. Union of India and Others (2004) 6 SCC 588.
27 The Court while interpreting this aspect referred to some earlier cases – Sushanta Tagore and
Others v. Union of India (2005) 3 SCC 16; Indian Handicrafts Emporium and Others v. Union of
India and Others (2003) 7 SCC 589; Virender Gaur and Others v. State of Haryana and Others
(1995) 2 SCC 577; and Friends Colony Development Committee v. State of Orissa and Others
(2004) 8 SCC 733.
28 The Court also framed the issue to be examined by this Expert Body when it stated: “The
question has to be considered having regard to the fact that in stead and place of industries which
would have otherwise a far larger environmental impact vis-à-vis the buildings which would be
constructed would be used for residential or commercial purposes. The problem will have to be
addressed from the point of view that as a part of the scheme framed by the State in making DCR
58, the money would be invested not only for the purpose of revival and/or rehabilitation of the
sick or closed mills, the same would also give a boost to modernization/and/or shifting of mills
and /or parts thereof from residential area to outside the town of Bombay . . . while doing the
exercise of scrutiny as regard environmental impact assessment would be required to be gone
into”.
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“contrary to the principles governing environmental aspects including the principles
of sustainable and planned development vis-à-vis Article 21 of the Constitution of
India”.
Preservation and Protection of Ecology – Calculation of Net Present Value (NPV) –
Compensatory Afforestaion Programme – Cost Analysis of Environment – Sustainable
use of Biodiversity-
T.N. GODAVARMAN THIRUMULPAD V. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India, 26 September 2005
2005 Supreme Court Cases (SCC) 1
This case dealt with the issue of conservation, preservation and protection of forests
and its ecology.29 The questions before the Court were: When forest land was used
for non-forest purposes, what measures are required to be taken to compensate for
loss of forest land and to compensate for the effect on the ecology? Whether before
diversion of forest land for non-forest purposes and consequential loss of benefits
accruing from the forest should the user agency of such land be required to compen-
sate for the diversion? If so, should not the user agency be required to make payment
of net present value (NPV) of such diverted land so as to utilize the amounts
so received for getting back in the long run the benefits which are lost by such
diversion? What guidelines should be issued for determining NPV?
The Court sought to examine these questions in the light of Forest
(Conservation) Act, 1980, the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 and other related
enactments.
The Court noted that NPV is the present value (PV) of net cash flow from a
project, discounted by the cost of capital. Further, that “. . . NPV is a method by
29 It should be noted that the Court issued directions with regard to preservation of forests in the
first T.N.Godavarman case in 1997 (see (1997) 2 SCC 267). The genesis of this case dates back to
20 March 2000 when the Supreme Court of India decided to take suo motu action upon a
statement by the government of India which was placed before it showing dismal degradation of
forest land violating all existing legislations and norms relating to protection of environment,
specifically violating compensatory afforestaion programmes and utilizing an diverting funds
generated for this purpose for other areas. See T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India
(2002) 10 SCC 646. The Court, accordingly, issued a direction in November 2001 to the Ministry
of Environment and Forests to formulate a scheme providing that whenever any permission was
granted for change of use of forest land for non-forest purposes and one of the condition for
granting permission was to ensure that there would be compensatory afforestation. The Ministry
submitted the scheme in March 2002. A Central Empowered Committee considered this scheme
and suggested few improvements and these were accepted by the government. The government
created, pursuant to this, the Compensatory Afforestation Fund Management Authority
(CAMPA).
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which future expenditures (costs) and benefit are levelised in order to account for the
time value of money”. Applying this principle to forests and other environmental
resources, the Court stressed that “forestry is a public project. It is important to bear
in mind that a benefit received today is worth more than that received later. The
benefit received today is in fact ‘cost incurred’ today. Time value of the cash inflow/
outflow is important in investment appraisal . . . The object behind NPV is to levelise
costs . . . A project like forestry has a long gestation period of 40–50 years. It goes
through cost cycles each year depending upon inflation, rate of interest, internal rate
of return etc . . . Under NPV, all costs are discounted to some reference date which
we have taken as 2005 for illustration. The total cost reckoned at this reference date is
the sum of present value or future value of costs discounted to the year 2005.
Similarly, one can calculate the present value of the revenue from the expected
benefits of forest regeneration.”
After examining varied facets of NPV, the Court applied it to environmental
assets. It, inter alia, stated:
The current method of valuing pubic sector projects, like forestry, has become
contentious as public sector undertakings agree for lower discount rate on account of
long gestation period. However, the flaw with this argument is that the low rate of
return is computed without including the intangible or environmental impact/benefits
emanating from forests.
The Court further raised the question as to how one values the intangibles. It
pointed out that “there are several methods, viz., opportunity cost, replacement cost,
travel cost, contingent value method (CVM) and social benefit cost analysis
(SBCA)”. It further noted that SBCA could be applied to the evaluation of
environmental impacts of forestry projects. Here, the Court pointed out, one must
appreciate that “the environmental outputs from forests appear as public goods for
which there is no market”.30 According to the Court, the value of these intangible
environmental outputs would be difficult to quantify. The Court, however, noted
that under SBCA, benefits from each of the above environmental outputs were
identifiable. Further elaborating this aspect the Court noted:
Forest sustainability is an integral part of forest management and policy that also has
a unique dominating feature and calls for forest owners and society to make a long-
term (50 years or longer) commitment to manage forests for future generations. One
of the viewpoints for sustaining forest is a naturally functioning forest ecosystem.
This viewpoint takes the man and nature relationship to the point of endorsing, to
the extent possible, the notion of letting the forest develop and process without
30 The Court classified these environmental outputs as – flood control benefits; water produc-
tion; soil conservation; outdoor recreation; biodiversity and conservation; and habitat and air
purification.
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significant human intervention. A strong adoption of the naturalistic value system
that whatever nature does is better than what humans do, this is almost the “nature
dominates man” perspective. Parks and natural reserve creations; non-intervention in
insect, disease and fire process; and reduction of human activities are typical policy
situations. This viewpoint has been endorsed by the 1988 Forest Policy of the
government of India.
The Court, while referring to several studies, outlined some of the criteria
reflecting key elements of ecological, economic and social sustainability, such as
conservation of biological diversity; maintenance of productive capacity of forest
ecosystems; maintenance of forest ecosystem health and vitality; conservation
and maintenance of soil and water resources; maintenance and enhancement of
long-term multiple socio-economic benefits to meet the needs of societies; legal,
institutional and economic framework for forest conservation and sustainable
management. The Court also noted that “different components of the biodiversity
system possess different kinds of value . . . that it is difficult to value an ecosystem,
since it possesses a large number of characteristics, more than just market-oriented
ones”. The Court thereafter dealt with the issue of valuation of NPV, fee to be
charged on the basis of this valuation and as to who – centre or State – should get
the amount so collected. For this purpose, the Court examined the evolution and
framework of Indian forest laws, forest policy and other related issues, noting that:
“. . . in 1977, forest and wildlife were taken out from the State List and incorporated
in the Concurrent List. Considering the compulsions of the States and large
depletion of forest, these legislative measures have shifted the responsibility from
States to the Centre. Moreover any threat to the ecology can lead to violation of the
right of enjoyment of healthy life guaranteed under Article 21, which is required to
be protected. The Constitution enjoins upon this Court a duty to protect the
environment.” The Court further noted:
. . . sustainable use of biodiversity is fundamental to ecological sustainability. The
loss of biodiversity stems from destruction of the habitat, extension of agriculture,
filling up of wetlands, conversion of rich biodiversity sites for human settlement and
industrial development, destruction of coastal areas and uncontrolled commercial
exploitation.
The Court, emphasizing that “. . . ecology is not the property of any State but
belongs to all, being a gift of nature for the entire nation”, upheld the validity of
CAMPA and valuation of NPV. For the purpose of evaluating NPV and other
related issues outlined in the judgment, the Court constituted an expert committee.
The Court also granted exemption from payment of NPV to certain government
projects such as hospitals, dispensaries and schools.
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National and International Norms relating to Rights of the Child – UN General
Assembly Special Session on the Rights of the Child – India’s Obligations under the
1992 Convention on the Rights of the Child
R.D. UPADHYAY V. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India, 13 April 2006
AIR 2006 Supreme Court 1946
The case concerned those children who were in jail with their mothers who were
either under-trials or prisoners or convicts. The plight of children and their mothers
was brought to the notice of the Court by some non-governmental organizations.31
The Court referred to various constitutional and legal provisions which were put
in place specifically to take care of welfare and development of children belonging to
different sections of society.32 As regards India’s obligation under International Law,
the Court noted:
India acceded to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in December 1992 to
reiterate its commitment to the cause of the children. The objective of the Conven-
tion is to give every child the right to survival and development in a healthy and
congenial environment.
The Court also noted that “the UN General Assembly Special Session on
Children held in New York in May 2002 was attended by an Indian delegation led by
Minister of Human Resources Development and consisted of Parliamentarians,
NGOs and officials. It was a follow up to the world summit held in 1990. The summit
adopted the declaration on the survival, protection and development of children and
endorsed a plan of action for its implementation”.33 The Court examined the reports
31 Women’s Action Research and Legal Action for Women (WARLAW); the Court also referred
to the work done by Mahila Pratiraksha Mandal, Navjyothi and Nari Niketan.
32 Article 15(3) of the Indian Constitution for making special provision for women and chidren;
Article 21A (inserted by 86th Constitutional amendment) for free and compulsory education for
children; Article 24 prohibiting employment of children below the age of fourteen years in any
factory or mine or engagement in other hazardous employment; Article 39(e) . . . not to abuse
tender age of children; Article 39(f ) . . . State to ensure that children are given opportunities and
facilities to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity and that
childhood and youth are protected against exploitation and against moral and material aban-
donment; Article 42 for humane conditions of work and maternity relief; Article 45 for early
childhood care and education for all children until they complete the age of six years; and Article
47 for raising nutritional health and improvement of pubic health. The Court also listed several
national legislations such as Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 and other related enactments specific
infants, children and persons with disabilities. It also referred to the National Policy for Children,
1974.
33 The Court referred to National Charter for Children, 2003 to reiterate the commitment of the
government to the cause of the children.
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filed pursuant to its directions by various State governments and union territories
and noted that there were 6,496 under-trial women with 1,053 children and 1,873
convicted women with 20 children. Referring to recommendations of various expert
committees constituted to resolve this issue, the Court noted:
Various provisions of the Constitution and statutes have been noticed earlier which
cast an obligation on the State to look after the welfare of children and provide for
social, educational and cultural development of the child with its dignity intact and
protected from any kind of exploitation. Children are to be given opportunities and
facilities to develop in a healthy manner and in a condition of freedom and dignity.
We have also noted UN conventions to which India is a signatory on the Rights of the
Child . . . This Court has, in several cases, accepted International Conventions as
enforceable when these Conventions elucidate and effectuate the fundamental rights
under the Constitution. They have also been read as part of domestic law, as long as
there is no inconsistency between the Convention and domestic law.34
The Court issued extensive guidelines with regard to treatment of children
and mothers in jail. It also ordered that the Jail Manual and other relevant rules,
regulations and instructions should be suitably amended incorporating these
guidelines.
Environment and Development – Stockholm Declaration – Rio Declaration – Report of
the Brundtland Commission – Sustainable Development – Climate Change Issues
KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL AREAS DEVELOPMENT BOARD V.
C. KENCHAPPA AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India, 12 May 2006
(2006) Supreme Court Cases 371
The respondent agriculturists, who were affected by the acquisition of lands of
different villages, filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution with a
prayer that the appellant Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board (KIADB)
be directed to refrain from converting the lands of the respondents for any industrial
or other purposes and to retain the lands for use by the respondents for grazing their
cattle. The High Court of Karnataka, after considering the case, ordered that the
extent of lands reserved for grazing cattle, agricultural and residential purposes
should not be disturbed. The High Court further held that whenever there was an
acquisition of land for industrial, commercial or non-agricultural purposes, except
34 The Court referred to two of its earlier cases on the subject – Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan
(1997) 6 SCC 241; and Sheela Barse v. Secretary, Children’s Aid Society (1987) 3 SCC 50.
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for residential purposes, the authorities must leave a 1 km area from the village limits
as a free zone or green area to maintain ecological equilibrium. The appellant
KIADB preferred a special leave petition before the Supreme Court challenging this
order of the High Court. When the case came up for hearing before the Supreme
Court no one from the side of the agriculturists appeared before the Court to defend
their point of view. Accordingly, the Court appointed a counsel for this purpose as
an amicus curiae.
The considered view of the Court was that before acquisition of the land
necessary exercise regarding the impact of development on ecology and environment
should be carried out. After referring to constitutional requirements to protect and
preserve environment, the Court noted:
The rise in global temperature has also been confirmed by the Inter-Governmental
Panel on Climate Change set up by the United Nations in its final report published in
August 1990. The global warming has led to unprecedented rise in the sea level. Apart
from melting of the polar ice it has led to inundation of low-lying coastal regions.
Global warming is expected to profoundly affect species and ecosystem. Melting of
polar ice and glaciers, thermal expansion of seas would cause worldwide flooding and
unprecedented rise in the sea level if gas emissions continue at the present rate.
Enormous amount of gases and chemicals emitted by the industrial plants and
automobiles have led to depletion of ozone layers which serve as a shield to protect
life on the earth from the ultraviolet rays of the sun.
Examining Principle 3 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, which, inter alia, provided that “the right to development must be
fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of present
and future generations”, the Court noted that it nowhere identified what these
included. “Interestingly” the Court pointed out:
It eschews the term “entirely” in Principle 1, declaring instead that human beings “are
entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature”. One of the few
bodies to proffer a definition is the European Commission. In developing an “Action
Programme on the Environment”, it defined “environment as the combination of
elements whose complex interrelationships make up the settings, the surroundings
and the conditions of life of the individual and of society as they are and as they are
felt . . . Some understanding of what ‘the environment’ may encompass can be dis-
cerned from other treaty provisions. Those agreements which define ‘environmental
effects’, environmental impacts” or “environmental damage” typically include harm
to flora, fauna, soil, water, air, landscape, cultural heritage, and any interaction
between these factors.
The Court also referred to the World Summit on Sustainable Development held
in Johannesburg in 2002, the purpose of which was “to evaluate the obstacles to
progress and the results achieved since the 1992 World Summit at Rio de Janeiro”.
Referring to the concept of “sustainable development” the Court stated:
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A nation’s progress largely depends on development, therefore, the development
cannot be stopped, but we need to control it rationally. No government can cope with
the problem of environmental repair by itself alone; people’s voluntary participation
in environmental management is a must for sustainable development. There is a need
to create environmental awareness which may be propagated through formal and
informal education. We must scientifically assess the ecological impact of various
developmental schemes. To meet the challenges of current environmental issues, the
entire globe should be considered the proper arena for environmental adjustment.
Unity of mankind is not just a dream of the enlightenment but a biophysical fact.
The Court, referring to the need to “maintain a delicate balance between
industrialisation and ecology”, pointed out: “The courts in various judgments have
developed the basic and essential features of sustainable development. In order to
protect sustainable development, it is necessary to implement and enforce some of
its main components and ingredients such as precautionary principle, polluter-pay
pays and public trust doctrine. We can trace the foundation of these ingredients in a
number of judgments delivered by this Court and the High Courts after the Rio
Conference, 1992.”
The Court, accordingly, directed that in future before acquisition of lands for
development, the consequence and adverse impact of development on environment
must be properly comprehended and the lands be acquired for development that
they did not gravely impair the ecology and environment. The Court also made it
mandatory to obtain clearance from Pollution Control Board before taking decision
on the land use and its conversion in all such cases in future.
Balance of power between the Union and States – Secret Ballot as a Democratic
Principle and the value of Human Rights – Legal Validity of International Human
Rights Instruments in Municipal Laws
KULDIP NAYAR AND OTHERS V. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India, 22 August 2006
(2006) 7 Supreme Court Cases 371
Petitioners challenged the amendments made to the Representation of the People
Act, 1951 through the Representation of the People (Amendment) Act 40 of 2003
which, inter alia, sought to delete the requirement of “domicile” in the State con-
cerned for getting elected to the Council of States, i.e. Rajyasabha. The petitioner
argued that this amendment violated the principle of federalism, a basic structure of
the Constitution. The petitioner also challenged some other amendments which,
inter alia, included the introduction of an open ballot system. The petitioner argued
that this deletion of “secrecy” in voting, an essence of free and fair elections (as well
as the voter’s freedom of expression), violated the basic structure of the Constitution
enshrined in Article 19(1), a subject matter of fundamental right.
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The Court, in its elaborate judgment, considered primarily the history of the
Representation of Peoples enactments of 1950 and 1951 and examined it within the
framework of the Constitution. This examination included the arguments relating to
domicile requirements of citizens in the context of balance of power structure
between the Union and the States. The Court noted the argument that “the Council
of States is a House of parliament constituted to provide representation of various
States and Union Territories; that its members have to represent the people of differ-
ent States to enable them to legislate after understanding their problems; that the
nomenclature ‘Council of States’ indicates the federal character of the House and a
representative who is not ordinarily resident and who does not belong to the State
concerned cannot effectively represent the State”.
The Court thereafter examined and noted the submissions made on the question
of “open ballot and secrecy” that laid “the foundation for ensuring free and fair
election which in turn ensures a democratic government showing the true will of the
people”. It was further argued by the petitioners, referring to Article 21 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 25 of the International Coven-
ant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), that “it is democratic government that
is ultimately responsible for protecting the human rights of the people viz. civil,
political, social and economic rights”. The petitioners argued that “international
instructions can be used for interpreting the municipal laws” and referred to
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on this aspect.35 The Court concurred with the
argument that “this Court may lay down guidelines in consonance with the prin-
ciples laid down in the international instruments so as to effectuate the fundamental
rights guaranteed under the Constitution”. The Court further noted:
There can be no quarrel with the proposition that the International Covenants and
Declarations as adopted by the United Nations have to be respected by all signatory
States and the meaning given to them has to be such as would help in effective
implementation of the rights declared therein. The applicability of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the principles thereof may have to be read, if need
be, into the domestic jurisprudence.
The Court, accordingly, concluded that “the law on the subject as settled in
India is clear enough as to render it not necessary for the Court to look elsewhere, to
deal with the issues that have been raised here. Further, in case of conflict, the
municipal laws have to prevail”. The Court, dismissing the petition, noted: “The
higher principle, however, is free and fair elections. If secrecy becomes a source for
corruption then sunlight and transparency have the capacity to remove it. We can
35 Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225; Jolly George Varghese v. Bank of
Cohin (1980) 2 SCC 360; People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India (1997) 1
SCC 301; Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa (1993) 2 SCC 746; Kapila Hingorani v. State of Bihar
(2003) 6 SCC1 and State of West Bengal v. Kesoram Industries Ltd. (2004) 10 SCC 201.
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only say that legislation pursuant to a legislative policy that transparency will
eliminate the evil that has crept in would hopefully serve the larger object of free and
fair elections.”
Commencement of Arbitration Proceedings – Appointment of Arbitrators –
UNCITRAL Model Rules on Arbitration – Relationship between Indian Arbitration
Law and UNCITRAL Model Rules
RASHTRIYA ISPAT NIGAM LTD. AND ANOTHER V. VERMA
TRANSPORT CO.
Supreme Court of India, 8 August 2006
(2006) 7 Supreme Court Cases 275
The main issue in this case related to the applicability of section 8 of the Indian
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter 1996 Act) which, inter alia,
provided for the referring of parties to arbitration where there was a subsisting
arbitration agreement between them. The appellant, a public-sector undertaking,
sought to take recourse to section 8 when the respondent challenged the legal issues
relating to the violation of contract that existed between them before the Civil Judge
(Junior Division) Jalandhar in the State of Punjab. The lower Court directed the
parties to maintain status quo pending adjudication of this question. Upon an
appeal by the appellants seeking to take recourse to arbitration proceedings, the
High Court of Punjab and Haryana refused to review this order of the lower Court.
Accordingly, the Appellant filed this special leave petition before the Supreme Court.
The Court, noting various arguments of the parties, pointed out that the 1996
Act embodied the relevant rules of Model Law. The 1996 Act, the Court further
noted, “was enacted by parliament in the light of the UNCITRAL Model Rules. In
certain respects, parliament of India while enacting the said Act has gone beyond the
scope of the said Rules”. Specifically referring to section 8 of the 1996 Act, the
Court noted:
Section 8 of the 1996 Act, however, although lifted the first part of the said Article 8
did not contain the expression contained in the second part of therein. The Indian
parliament has gone beyond the recommendations made by the UNCITRAL Model
Rules in enacting Sections 8 and 16 of the 1996 Act.
The Court further noted:
The provisions of Sections 8 and 16 of the 1996 Act may be compared with Sections
45 and 54 thereof. Section 45 deals with the New York Convention, whereas Section
54 deals with the Geneva Convention Awards. The difference can be immediately
noticed. Whereas under Sections 45 and 54, the court exercises its supervisory juris-
diction in relation to arbitration proceedings, in terms of Section 16 of the 1996 Act,
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the arbitrator is entitled to determine his own jurisdiction. We, however, do not mean
to suggest that Part II of the 1996 Act does not contemplate determination of his own
jurisdiction by the Arbitral Tribunal as we are not called upon to determine the said
question. We have referred to the aforementioned provisions only for the purpose of
comparing the difference in the language used by the Indian parliament while dealing
with the domestic arbitration vis-à-vis the international arbitration.
The Court, after considering several pleas raised by the respondents,36 accord-
ingly upheld the petitioners’ plea that “what was necessary was to consider the
substance of the dispute. Once it is found that the dispute between the parties arose
out of the contract, Section 8 of the 1996 Act would be attracted”.
OTHER RELEVANT STATE PRACTICE
Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism37
Indian Statement in the Sixth Committee of the 61st Session of the United Nations
General Assembly Resolution on Agenda Item 100: Measures to Eliminate
International Terrorism on 11 October, 2006
India noted that terrorism undermined the very foundation of freedom and
democracy, enjoyment of human rights and continued existence of open and demo-
cratic societies. It also noted that the annual report of the UN Secretary-General on
this item presented measures taken at the national and international levels for the
prevention and suppression of international terrorism as well as information on
incidents caused by international terrorism.
India also noted adoption of the United Nations Global Counter Terrorism
Strategy which was launched at a high-level segment at the beginning of the 61st
Session. India hoped that “the strategy would provide the impetus that unites the
international community in its global fight against terrorism through practical
measures that facilitate cooperation by way of extradition, prosecution, information
flows and capacity building”.
Referring to Comprehensive Convention against International Terrorism
(CCIT), India further noted:
. . . notwithstanding the setback of not meeting the timeline set by the World Summit
Outcome Document for concluding the convention, we continue to believe that
agreement on the draft convention is attainable. The call for early conclusion of
36 One of them being – illegal termination of contract and blacklisting of the respondent firm did
not attract s. 8 of the 1996 Act.
37 See http://meaindia.nic.in and http://www.un.int/India/
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CCIT was reiterated by practically all the dignitaries in the general debate this
session. A meeting is necessary to work for early conclusion of the CCIT. We must
now work together for its finalization and adoption. We sincerely hope that, in a spirit
of mutual accommodation and flexibility, Member States would respond construct-
ively and help in the early conclusion of the Comprehensive Convention so that our
mandate of completing the legal framework of conventions aimed at combating
international terrorism can be brought to a successful close. We may determine
whether appropriate reference to international humanitarian law could meet the
pending concerns.
On the issue of implementation of the comprehensive legal framework relating
to counter-terrorism, India stated:
The 13 UN Conventions and Protocols remain fundamental tools in the fight against
terrorism. In this regard we also note the “Report of the Secretary-General on
strengthening international cooperation and technical assistance in promoting the
implementation of the universal conventions and protocols related to terrorism
within the framework of the activities of the United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime”. We appreciate the growing activities of UNODC in counter terrorism efforts,
especially its technical assistance activities at the national, sub-regional and regional
levels, within the framework of its global project on strengthening the legal regime
against terrorism. We are pleased to note that its work has contributed significantly to
increasing the number of countries that have ratified all twelve universal legal instru-
ments relating to terrorism. We understand that the focus of the technical assistance
activities of UNODC is shifting from the phase of ratification support to the phase
of legislative implementation and support for national counter terrorism capacity
building for criminal justice systems. We therefore, support increased resource
allocations for UNODC counter terrorism activities from the United Nations regular
budget and voluntary contributions.
Conventional Weapons, Small Arms and Light Weapons and CCW 38
Indian Statement on the Thematic Debate on Conventional Weapons, Small Arms and
Light Weapons and Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) at the 61st
Session of the First Committee of the UN General Assembly on 17 October 2006
Referring to devastating consequences of unregulated and illicit trade in con-
ventional weapons and small arms and light weapons, India placed its strong
commitment to the full and effective implementation of the UN Programmes of
Action on Preventing, Combating and Eradicating Illicit Trade in Small Arms and
Light Weapons. India stated:
38 See for the Indian Statement http://meaindia.nic.in or http://www.un.int/india/
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India’s approach to disarmament and international security is guided by a strong
commitment to international humanitarian law, of which the Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons is one of the principal instruments. India is among those 20
States Parties that adhere to the entire CCW package – the Convention, Amended
Article I, and all five Protocols, including AP II. We support the draft Plan of Action,
to be adopted at the forthcoming Review Conference, stipulating seven action points
for promoting the universality of the Convention. India also favours strengthening
the Convention through a compliance mechanism. Besides, we support the creation
of a sponsorship programme to facilitate enhanced participation from mine and
ERW-affected States Parties in CCW-related meetings. This may also broaden
awareness about the Convention and help in promoting its universalization.39
On Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, India noted that it:
. . . is conscious of the humanitarian risks resulting from the indiscriminate use and
transfer of anti-personnel mines. We, therefore, support the humanitarian objectives
of the Anti-Personnel Mine Convention. At the same time, we recognize the limita-
tions of this Convention in not addressing national security concerns of States with
long land borders, where minefields at frontiers will continue to form an important
component of defence in times of conflict. While our security requirements necessi-
tate the use of anti-personnel mines, these are used in accordance with internationally
acknowledged security norms and safety parameters. We are in favour of strength-
ened cooperation in mine clearance technology, equipment and training; risk
education; rehabilitation; victim assistance and socio-economic betterment of
mine-affected communities.
India, while assuring to work towards steady progress in the areas of
conventional disarmament, supported the UN Register of Conventional Arms as an
important confidence-building measure and pointed out that it had submitted
annual reports on the export and import of conventional arms.
Report of the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the
Strengthening of the Role of the Organization40
Indian Statement on Agenda Item 79 at the Sixth Committee of the United Nations
General Assembly on Report of Special Committee on the Charter of the United
Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization on 16 October  2006
Noting proposals to improve the working methods of the Special Committee on
the Charter (Charter Committee hereinafter) India provided its views on some of the
39 “ERW” refers to “Explosive Remnants of War”
40 See for the Indian Statement http://meaindia.nic.in or http://www.un.int/india/
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substantive proposals.41 On the Russian proposal concerning effective implementa-
tion of Article 50 relating to Assistance to Third States affected by the application of
sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, India suggested:
. . . immediate steps need to be taken to implement the relevant portion of the 2005
World Summit Outcome Document on sanctions, especially Paragraph 108, which
calls upon the Security Council to improve the monitoring of the implementation of
and effects of sanctions, ensure that sanctions are implemented in accountable
manner, review regularly such monitoring and develop a mechanism to address
special economic problems arising from the application of sanctions in accordance
with the UN Charter.
Regarding the other Russian proposal on Peacekeeping Operations under
Chapter VI of the UN Charter, India, while noting that the political and operational
aspects of peacekeeping were being dealt with by other specialized committees,
pointed out that this Charter Committee could contribute to the subject from the
legal angle. India further noted that the allocation of the agenda item on “Com-
prehensive Review of the Peacekeeping Operations in all their respects” to the sixth
committee this year would fill this need for focused legal scrutiny.
As regards the joint proposal of the Russian Federation and Belarus seeking
an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the legal
consequences of use of force without a decision of the Security Council taken
pursuant to Chapter VII, India held the view that “consideration of such a refer-
ence would provide an opportunity to clarify the position on certain important
legal aspects”. On the Cuban proposal aimed at redefining the powers and func-
tions of the General Assembly and its relationship with the Security Council,
India noted that it attached great importance “to the reform of the United Nations,
including the revitalization of the General Assembly and democratization of
the Security Council and significantly enhanced transparency in its working
methods”.
Referring to the ICJ, India noted:
The ICJ, except for a very few contentious proceedings and rare advisory opinions,
has no automatic power of judicial review of Security Council decisions. It is there-
fore important to introduce checks and balances into the Security Council through
expansion of its permanent and non permanent members. This would also make
sanctions policy, of which we spoke earlier, more rational and optimal.
41 These proposals were: to avoid duplication of work of other UN bodies; to have the Commit-
tee focus on fewer topics; to have proposals submitted early enough for a thorough study by the
Committee; to establish a cut-off mechanism to prevent prolonged and ineffective discussion of
some proposals; to consider certain issues once every two or three years instead of annually; and
to allow for the reconsideration of the duration of sessions.
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Concluding, India supported the establishment of a Repertory of Practice of the
UN organs as it would be a “valuable source of information on the application
of the Charter and an indispensable tool for the preservation of the institutional
memory of the United Nations”.
Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
on the Work of its 39th Session42
Indian Statement on Agenda Item 77 at the Sixth Committee of the UN General
Assembly on Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on
the Work of its 39th Session on 10 October 2006
Referring to the approval in principle of the key provisions of a draft legislative
guide on secured transactions, India noted that “the legislative guide will assist
countries in adopting modern secured transactions legislation – a necessary condi-
tion for increasing access to low-cost credit, thus facilitating the cross-border
movement of goods and services and contributing to economic development”.
India, taking note of the cooperation between UNIDROIT (International Institute
for the Unification of Private Law) and UNCITRAL, sought to emphasize the
need to “ensure consistency between the draft Unidroit securities convention and
UNCITRAL legislative guide on secured transactions”.
Noting the adoption of revised legislative provisions on interim measures of
protection and the form of the arbitration agreement,43 India hoped that this would
significantly update the provisions of Model Law. With regard to UNCITRAL’s
future work programme in this area, specifically to revise the 1985 Arbitration Rules
so as to make them compatible with emerging new areas such as intellectual property
rights, investment disputes, insolvency or unfair competition, India stated:
Once again we would advise caution in undertaking a revision of UNCITAL Arbitra-
tion Rules of 1976 which enjoy widespread recognition and have served as a model for
national legislation of several countries and for dispute settlement mechanism in
bilateral investment protection agreements. The desired flexibility, as was indicated by
several States during the Session, should not be lost in any future revision.
While noting UNCITRAL’s progress in the areas of insolvency and transport
law, India appreciated its Secretariat’s cooperation with the UN Office on Drugs and
Crime in the area of commercial fraud.
42 See for the Indian Statement http://meaindia.nic.in or http://www.un.int/india/
43 The new provisions on arbitration, as further noted by India, address the requirement for
aligning the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration with cur-
rent practices in international trade, particularly with respect to the form in which arbitration
agreements are concluded and the granting of interim measures of protection.
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International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance44
Explanation of Vote after the Vote by India on A/C.3/61/L.17 titled “International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance” on 13
November 2006.
India noted its consistent support to efforts to deal with the problem of enforced
disappearance and believed that the “most effective instrument for prevention of
enforced disappearance is the guarantee of a State that it respects civil and political
rights and will fulfill its obligations to its people”. While pointing out that the
existing body of international human rights law and international humanitarian law
would provide a comprehensive framework to tackle this unacceptable phenom-
enon, India further noted that what was needed would be the enforcement and
implementation of the law by the State. So, it laid emphasis on the strengthening of
national capacities. Against this backdrop, India pointed out that it had approached
the negotiations for a legally binding instrument on enforced disappearance. India
further stated:
However, we were not convinced about the need for a separate Convention or the
creation of a new monitoring body to deal with this issue. In our view, an Optional
Protocol to the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights would have
provided a preferred solution.
On the draft text of the Convention India noted:
It also remains of concern to us that the text still retains certain drawbacks. Thus, the
“constructive ambiguity” in the definition of enforced disappearance creates two
different standards of proof for the same crime, one here and another in Rome
Statute. The missing element of “intent” and “knowledge” in the definition will not
help in easing the burden of proof as mens rea is an essential element for criminalisa-
tion of any act. Accordingly, we would have preferred if “intent” had been more
clearly incorporated in the definition of “enforced disappearance”. Furthermore, the
exclusion of non-State actors from the definition ignores contemporary threats,
which require our collective and determined response.
While noting that States have different legal systems and national contexts, India
agreed to joined others in adopting this Convention with the following
understanding:
44 For the Indian Statement see http://meaindia.nic.in and http://www.un.int/India/
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. . . that the instrument allows national jurisdictions to criminalize the offence
of enforced disappearance in accordance with their respective legal systems and
constitutional procedures.
. . . as regards remedy and compensation, there is no statutory right to compensation
in a Common Law system such as India’s. However, the Indian judiciary, at all levels,
as well as the National Human Rights Commission of India, regularly grant remedy
and compensation to victims of human rights abuse.
Report of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)45
Indian Statement on Agenda Item 70: Report of the International Court of Justice at
the 61st Session of the UN General Assembly on 26 October 2006.
India noted “the respect and the central role assigned to the ICJ within the UN
Charter system”. Referring to the creation of a number of specialized regional and
international courts, India stated:
The political process connected with the establishment of special international
judicial bodies has been, on occasion, perceived as diminishing the role of the ICJ in
the field of peaceful settlement of international disputes. Moreover, legitimate ques-
tions have been raised about the legal basis underlying the establishment by the
Security Council of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals established for former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The Security Council does not have this power under the
Charter and while, it can set up subsidiary bodies, it cannot given them powers that it
does not have itself; the established legal principle of nemo dat quod non habet. The
lack of challenge from the general UN membership does not mean acceptance of
such exercise in the future, still less any general endorsement of a power that the
Charter does not give.
Noting the variety of cases dealt by the ICJ in the last 50 years, India further
emphasized that the Court “should not regard itself as precluded from questioning
the validity of a Security Council resolution, insofar as it affects the legal rights
of States”. India also noted that this issue was raised very pointedly by Judge
Shahabudin and others in the Lockerbie case. India further noted:
Many legal scholars rightly emphasize that the Court should not concede to the
Security Council a place above the Charter; it should rather adopt a textual approach
to Article 39, the wording of which contains all the necessary elements for a delimita-
tion of the competences of the Security Council under chapter VII. The Court should
45 For the Indian Statement see http://meaindia.nic.in and http://www.un.int/India/
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not hesitate to affirm the rule of law in the international legal order. In the Lockerbie
and Namibia case the Court showed that it has the power of judicial review but,
unfortunately, this is limited to a very few contentious proceedings and a very few
advisory opinions that are sought. The power of judicial review is a crucial element in
a democratic system of checks and balances. the most practical, and perhaps the only,
way of introducing these into the functioning of the Security Council is through an
expansion of the permanent and non-permanent membership of the Council and a
transformation of its working methods.
India, while concluding, noted that the increasing relevance of the Court is
reflected in the number of cases before the Court. Some of these cases, as pointed
out by India, increasingly include fact-intensive cases which raise new procedural
issues for it.
Report of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for
Genocide and other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring
States between 1 January and 31 December 1994 and Report of the International
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia since 199146
Indian Statement on Agenda Item 72 and 73: Report of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda
and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and other Such Violations Committed
in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994 and
Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
the Former Yugoslavia since 1991
Noting increasing prominence of international criminal law with the establishment
of international criminal tribunals and referring to the manner of the creation of
these tribunals, India stated:
In questioning the competence of the Security Council to establish these tribunals,
many legal scholars, after an extensive analysis of the traveaux preparatoires, came to
the conclusion that it was not the intention of the drafters of the Charter to endow
the Council with such competence. However, some scholars rely on other concepts to
46 For the Indian Statement see http://meaindia.nic.in and http://www.un.int/India/
State Practice 195
justify the attribution of legislative functions to the Council, namely, the concepts of
“implied powers” and “subsequent practice”.
Referring to the Reparation for Injuries case in which ICJ, inter alia, had laid
down the doctrine of “implied powers”, India further stated:
This doctrine and Article 29 of the Charter under which Security Council can
establish subsidiary organs necessary for its functions, is often used in the context of
justifying setting up of ICTY. This doctrine has been also confirmed by the ICTY in
the Tadic case. However, this ignores the basic legal principle nemo dat quad non
habet, which means you cannot give what you don’t have. The Security Council has
not been assigned any judicial functions under the Charter, therefore under Article
29, or under the concept of implied powers, it cannot set up a subsidiary body
entrusting to it the functions which the Council itself does not possess. In so doing
the Council did not take a legitimate peace-enforcement measure under any article or
articles of Chapter VII, notably under Article 41. It took, simply, a lawmaking (not to
mention law-determining and law-enforcing) measure which fell outside its functions
under Chapter VII or any other provision of the Charter or general international law.
India noted that international humanitarian law required that trials for viola-
tions must be scrupulously fair and consistent with contemporary international
standards. Referring to two goals of such trials, i.e. to punish the guilty and to
promote socially desirable results, including deterrence of future offences, India
pointed out that “there is a view that when such ‘international’ prosecutions are
undertaken by foreign judicial systems or Tribunals, with little or no connection
to the perpetrators, victims, or offenses, they are invariably decoupled from the
political, social and economic context of the affected country”. Accordingly, India
argued for “strengthening the national justice system by building local capacity of
judicial personnel”.
Report of the International Law Commission47
Indian Statement on Agenda Item 78: Report of the International Law Commission
Chapter VI: Shared Natural Resources and Chapter VII: Responsibility of
International Orgnisations at the Sixth Committee of the 61st Session of the UN
General Assembly on 31 October 2006
India welcomed the completion of the first reading of the set of 19 draft articles
and commentaries on the law of transboundary aquifers. India also noted that
international practice in this area was still evolving, despite abundant treaties and
47 For the Indian Statement see http://meaindia.nic.in and http://www.un.int/India/
196 Asian Yearbook of International Law
other legal documents. It supported the inclusion of draft Article 3 which provided
for the principle of State sovereignty over the portion of a transboundary aquifer
or aquifer system located within its territory. On the principle of “equitable and
reasonable utilization” as set out in draft articles and a specific reference to “accrual
of benefits”, India stated, without elaborating, that it required some clarifications.
It supported the inclusion of “precautionary” approach, “general obligation to
cooperate” and other related issues.
India, with regard to Responsibility of International Organizations, sounding a
“note of caution”, pointed out:
First, the attributes of a State and an international organization are not the same.
Second, given the diversity of international organizations and differences in their
objectives and functions, it would be difficult to assess which of the circumstances
precluding wrongfulness listed in Chapter V of Part One of the articles on the
responsibility of States could be applicable to international organizations, especially
given the absence of definitive practice in this area.
On inclusion of a reference to “self-defence” in draft Article 18 and critiquing
such an inclusion, India stated:
Since international organizations are not members of the United Nations, the
reference to the Charter of the UN is replaced by “principles of international law
embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. However, this comparison overlooks
the essential difference between a State and an international organization, namely a
circumstance such as self-defence is by its very nature only applicable to the actions of
a State, it could be questioned whether the international obligations usually attribut-
able to international organizations may be such that could reasonably lead to breach
of a peremptory norm of general international law under article 26 of the articles on
State Responsibility.
India was not sure about the extension of “concept of necessity” to international
organizations. It further pointed out:
States are entitled to invoke necessity to safeguard their essential interests, but under
what circumstances the same right should extend to international organizations is
difficult to envisage due to lack of specific practice in the area. The application of this
concept to Peace Mission also raises some difficulties as those Missions have to follow
very clear rues of engagement. Therefore, we would prefer deletion of this article
so that this concept may not be invoked as a pretext for non-compliance with
international obligations or for infringement of the rights of any third State.
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Report of the International Law Commission48
Indian Statement on Agenda Item 78: Report of the International Law Commission,
Chapter X: Effected of Armed Conflicts on Treaties, Chapter XI: The Obligation to
Extradite or Prosecute, Chapter XII: Fragmentation of International Law at the Sixth
Committee of UN General Assembly on 3 November 2006
On the topic “Effects of armed conflicts on treaties”, India observed that “while the
topic is generally part of the law of treaties and not that on the use of force, the topic
is also closely related to other domains of international law, therefore, it is not
possible to maintain a strict separation between the law of treaties and other
branches of international law which may also be relevant to the topic”. It also
pointed out that the scope of the topic should be limited to treaties concluded
between States and should not include treaties concluded by international organiza-
tions. India suggested that the scope of an “armed conflict” should be limited to
conflicts between States and not deal with internal conflicts.
While referring to the work on the topic “the obligation to extradite or
prosecute”, India referred, inter alia, to its own practice. It stated:
India is a State party to the international conventions against drug trafficking, as
well as the United Nations Conventions against terrorism, and is signatory to the
Conventions on transnational organized crime and on corruption, all of which pro-
vide for the obligation to extradite or prosecute. While none of these conventions
specifically permit reservations to this obligation, the absence of a bilateral extradi-
tion treaty may have such an effect in case the law of a State party does not allow
extradition without an extradition treaty.
India also pointed out that all its extradition treaties provided for the obligation
to extradite or prosecute.
Referring to the topic “Fragmentation of international law: difficulties arising
from the diversification and expansion of international law” and the “42 conclu-
sions” identified by the ILC, India noted that these conclusions “should prove
very useful to practitioners and legal advisers as guidelines in dealing with the
practical consequences of the widening scope and expansion of international
law”.
48 For the Indian Statement see http://meaindia.nic.in and http://www.un.int/India/
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The Rule of Law at National and International Level49
Indian Statement on Agenda Item 80: The Rule of Law at National and International
Level at the Sixth Committee of the 61st Session of the United Nations General
Assembly on 17 October 2006.
India on the scope of application of “rule of law” noted:
It is often advanced as a solution to abusive governmental power, economic
stagnation and corruption. It is considered fundamental in promoting democracy
and human rights, free and fair markets and fighting international crimes and terror-
ism. It is also seen as an essential component of promoting peace in post-conflict
societies. The rule of law may have different meaning and a different content
depending on the objective it is seeking to achieve.
India further noted:
There is sufficient reason to seriously examine the concept of the rule of law as it
functions at the national level and to explore ways of understanding the rather new
internationlised context within which it operates today. In this regard it is essential to
point out that supranational institutions which are set up to promote rule of law
should themselves also be in accord with systems of democratic accountability
presupposed by the rule of law. This applies inter-alia to the United Nations and
international financial and trading institutions. This also means that, in accordance
with the UN Charter, development of international law is a function of the General
Assembly and not the Security Council.
Referring to strengthening of linkages between municipal law and international
law, India termed the setting up of a rule of law assistance unit with a broad
mandate as “useful”. It also noted:
The dissemination of regular information about actions taken by the General
Assembly and other international organizations would be helpful in identifying and
evaluating new trends in international law, such as the appearance of guidelines,
recommendations and other “non-enforceable” texts. This so-called “soft law” often
plays a significant role in the development of contemporary international law and in
strategic efforts to amend it.




Sovereign Immunity – Night-time Landing Practice of the United States Air Force in
Japan – Japan–US Agreement Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of US
Armed Forces in Japan
X ET AL. V. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Supreme Court, Second Petty Bench, 12 April 2002
56 Minshu [Supreme Court Civil Reports] 729 [2002], 1786 Hanrei Jihou
[Judicial Reports] 43 [2002]
Japanese citizens who reside near the United States Armed Forces’ air base in
Yokota (hereinafter cited as Yokota Air Base), located at the west end of the
metropolis of Tokyo, filed for an injunction against the Nighttime Landing Practice
(hereinafter cited as NLP) in Yokota Air Base and instituted a claim against the
United States of America for damages for their suffering from the terrible noise
caused by the landing practice.
The Tokyo District Court (first trial) and the Tokyo High Court (appeal trial)
had both acknowledged the sovereign immunity of the United States, but the
reasons adopted by the two courts were different. The District Court found that the
principle of absolute immunity still stands in customary international law regarding
sovereign immunity and concluded that in this case Japanese courts may not exercise
jurisdiction over the United States of America.
Meanwhile, the High Court found that Japan abandoned jurisdiction over
claims for damages against the United States under Article 18(5) of the “Agreement
Under VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the
United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United
States Armed Forces in Japan” (hereinafter cited as the Status of Forces Agree-
ment), which is interpreted by the High Court to provide for the abandonment of the
right of claim and civil jurisdiction. Therefore, the High Court also acknowledged
the sovereign immunity of the United States in this case.
The appellants (X et al.) made an assertion that the High Court misinterpreted
Article 18(5) of the Status of Forces Agreement on the ground that it does not lay
down an abandonment of jurisdiction. They further argued that there has been an
established principle regarding sovereign immunity under customary international
law that a State or government cannot be immune from a foreign State’s jurisdiction
in respect of its own tortious acts committed inside the territory of that foreign
State.
50 Contributed by TANAKA Norio, Professor of International Law, Ryukoku University and
Associate Professor ITAKURA Minako, Shizuoka University.
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However, the Second Petty Bench of the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal,
rejecting the reasoning of the High Court concerning Article 18(5) of the Status of
Forces Agreement. According to the Supreme Court, Article 18(5) is not a clause
providing the United States with sovereign immunity from the civil jurisdiction of
Japanese courts but simply a clause establishing an institution to deal with claims
that arise from tortious acts committed by the US Armed Forces in Japan.
The Supreme Court stated as follows. With regard to civil jurisdictional immun-
ity of foreign States, the so-called “absolute theory of immunity” traditionally has
been recognized as a customary rule in international law. However, as the range of
governmental activities has extended over larger areas, there has arisen the idea that
civil jurisdictional immunity should not be applied so widely to a State’s acts in the
private law sector, followed by accumulated practice of other States which attempt to
restrict the scope of immunity. Despite such recent trends, however, it should be said
that even today we can still recognize the survival of the foreign State’s immunity
from civil jurisdiction as a principle of customary international law, in cases in which
a foreign State’s act at issue could be considered a sovereign act.
In this case, the Supreme Court concluded as follows. The NLP carried out by
the aircraft at Yokota Air Base is nothing but an official activity of the US Armed
Forces in Japan, because the nature and purpose of this activity clearly show its
character as a sovereign act. There can be no doubt, under customary international
law, of its immunity from civil jurisdiction. Therefore, unless otherwise agreed
between Japan and the United States, Japanese courts’ civil jurisdiction does not
extend to the appellee in this case.51
Racial Discrimination – Refusal of the Use of Public Bath by Foreigners –
Effectiveness of International Human Rights Law between Individuals – Equal Right
before Law
X1, X2 AND X3 V. Y1 (A JOINT STOCK CORPORATION) AND Y2 (OTARU
CITY)
Sapporo District Court, Decision, 11 December 2002
1806 Hanrei Jihou 84 [2003]
All of the plaintiffs reside in Japan. X1 and X2 are foreigners, but X3 is a natural-
ized Japanese from America. When they tried to use Y1’s public bath in Otaru city,
they were denied use of the bath on the grounds that they looked foreigners. Y1
51 12 (1) Hachioji Branch of the Tokyo District Court, Decision, 14 March 1997, 1612 Hanrei
Jihou [Judicial Reports] 101 [1997]. See also, 41 The Japanese Annual of International Law 91
[1998].
(2) Tokyo High Court, Decision, 25 December 1998, 1665 Hanrei Jihou 64 [1999]. See also 42
The Japanese Annual of International Law 38 [1999].
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adopted a policy to limit customers of the bath to Japanese people only, because Y1
had had trouble many times before with foreigners who were crews of the fishing
vessels visiting the harbour of Otaru city.
The plaintiffs argued that Yl’s refusal of their right to use the facility was an
instance of racial discrimination illegal under Article 14(1) of the Japanese Constitu-
tion, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(ICERD). They demanded reparations and publication of an apology from Y1
under the tort law as a part of the civil code. They also argued that the racial
discrimination demonstrated by Yl’s refusal of their right to use the bathing facility
was followed by Y2’s failure to take effective measures to eliminate racial discrimin-
ation, which was illegal under ICERD, thus demanding reparations from Y2 for the
violation of their right under the National Redress Act.
On the first issue of applicability of international human rights law as well as the
Japanese Constitution between individuals, the District Court stated as follows:
Article 14(1) of the Japanese Constitution, which provides equal right for all people
under the law, does not regulate directly the relationship between individuals, but the
relationship between a public authority and individuals. Should Article 14(1) of the
Constitution be applied directly to a relationship between individuals, the sphere of
private life, where free decisions are permitted on the principle of individual auton-
omy, might be unjustly limited. Even if ICCPR and ICERD are applicable as
domestic law in Japan, they do not directly regulate the relationships between
individuals but the relationships between a public authority and individuals.
Second, on the issue of whether the plaintiffs’ right was infringed by the refusal
of use of the public bath, the District Court stated as follows: If an individual’s right
or freedom is violated by an act of another individual, and if such violation exceeds
the limits of a socially permissible range, the first individual’s interest should be
given legal protection based on Articles 1 and 90 of the Civil Code concerning
general restrictions on the principle of private autonomy, or rules of tort law. In the
interpretation of the regulations of such laws concerning individual rights, Article
14(1) of the Japanese Constitution, the ICCPR and ICERD can be one of the
standards of interpretation. The refusal of the use of the public bath in this case is
not considered as an incident of discrimination on the basis of nationality, because
even an American who got Japanese nationality faced the same refusal. However, it
should be said that such refusal by Y1 amounts to a kind of racial discrimination for
reasons of race, skin colour and ethnicity, which also should be eliminated even in
the relationship between individuals, in the light of the object and purpose of Article
14(1) of the Japanese Constitution, Article 26 of ICCPR and ICERD.
Third, however, the District Court did not acknowledge the responsibility of Y2
by stating as follows: Article 2(1)(d) of ICERD stipulates that “States Parties con-
demn racial discrimination and undertake to pursue by all appropriate means and
without delay a policy of eliminating racial discrimination in all its forms and pro-
moting understanding among all races, and, to this end, each State Party shall
prohibit and bring to an end, by all appropriate means, including legislation as
required by circumstances, racial discrimination by any persons, group or organiza-
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tion”. Even if defendant Y2, as a local government, is under an obligation to pro-
hibit racial discrimination, its obligation is only a political one and cannot be inter-
preted to place Y2 under the obligation to prohibit and bring to an end racial
discrimination by enacting a municipal byelaw. On the other hand, it is acknow-
ledged that Y2 tried to prevent racial discrimination in this case through some
measures and policies regarding prohibition of discrimination, such as making a
request to the owner of the public bath for equal treatment among users. Therefore,
there is no illegal act on the part of Otaru city.
Thus, the District Court held that Y1 pay the plaintiffs a total of 1,000,000
yen and additionally 5% of this amount yearly from 16 February 2001 until Y1
completes the payment. The Court accepted a part of the claims presented by the
plaintiffs, but all others were dismissed by the Court on the aforementioned
grounds.52
Recognition of Refugee Status – The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees –
Article 61–2(2) (Sixty-day Rule) of the Immigration Control and Refugee
Recognition Act
X V. THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE
Tokyo High Court, 18 February 2003
1883 Hanrei Jihou [Judicial Report] 41 [2003]
X (the plaintiff in the first trial and the appellee in the appeal trial) is a foreigner who
has Ethiopian nationality and was a member of the All-Amhara People’s Organiza-
tion (AAPO), which is a kind of ethnic organization in Ethiopia. As the Ethiopian
government adopted a repressive policy towards the AAPO, X came up against
circumstances threatening his safety. He made his escape from the country on 14
December 1997, based upon a recommendation of the AAPO. In fact, after he left
the country, his mother and brother were arrested by the government. X entered
Japan on 15 December 1997 and submitted to the Minister of Justice an application
for recognition of his refugee status on 24 March 1998.
The Minister of Justice made a disposition of non-recognition of refugee status
(hereinafter referred to as the Disposition) because his application was submitted
after the due date as fixed by Article 61–2(2) (hereinafter referred to as the Sixty-day
Rule) of the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act (hereinafter referred
to as the Act) and stated that there was no reason for its saving clause to take effect.53
52 (1) 46 The Japanese Annual of International Law 163 [2003].
53 (1) Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act, Art. 61–2 (Recognition of Refugee
Status), paragraph 2 provides as follows: The application mentioned in the preceding paragraph
[application for recognition of refugee status] must be submitted within 60 days after the day the
person landed in Japan, provided that this shall not apply if there are unavoidable circumstances.
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X, who sought dismissal of the Disposition, argued that the Sixty-day Rule is in
violation of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (hereinafter
referred to as the Convention) and that there were “unavoidable circumstances” in
the sense of the saving clause of Article 61–2(2) of the Act. On 17 January 2002, the
Tokyo District Court acknowledged that there were “unavoidable circumstances” in
the sense of the saving clause and dismissed the Disposition. The Minister of Justice
appealed to the Tokyo High Court.
The Tokyo High Court rejected his appeal. However, the Court did not recog-
nize X’s argument on the Sixty-day Rule on the following grounds. Whereas the
Convention provides the definition of refugee and prescribes the measures to be
taken by the States Parties for the protection of refugees, it does not specify the
procedures for recognition of refugee status. As a result, it should be interpreted
that every State Party to the Convention has the discretion to lay down its own
procedures. As passage of time might make it extremely difficult to ascertain the
facts entitling the applicant to refugee status, Article 61–2(2) of the Act sets a due
date for the submission of an application. The purpose of this article is also to
ensure a fair administration of the refugee recognition system and to prevent
fraudulent applications as far as possible. The due period is fixed to be 60 days,
empirically long enough, taking into account the geographic and social circum-
stances of Japan. Thus, there is no reason to argue that Article 61–2(2) of the Act is
in violation of the Convention.
On the other hand, the Tokyo High Court recognized the claimed “unavoidable
circumstances” in the sense of the saving clause of Article 61–2(2) of the Act and
rejected the appeal of the Minister of Justice. The Court found as follows. Consider-
ing whether the “unavoidable circumstances” did or did not exist, the subject matter
to be considered should not be confined to the physical and objective circumstances
such as disease or traffic disruption making it difficult for the plaintiff to come to the
Immigration Control office. It is necessary to consider various circumstances caus-
ing the delay of the application for refugee status, including those of the departure
from the country of origin, the content and degree of psychological barriers to have
access to the system of refugee recognition in Japan, the content or presence of the
certificate of the applicant, the language ability, or the length of the period elapsed.
The delayed application for refugee status does not necessarily mean that the
applicant is presumed not to be a refugee. After specifically considering the circum-
stances of X, the Court recognized the presence of “unavoidable circumstances” and
maintained the original judgment which had dismissed the Disposition.54
54 1798 Hanrei Jihou 60 [2002]. See also 46 The Japanese Annual of International Law 166 [2003].
The Sixty-day Rule was abolished upon the amendment of the Act in May 2004, Japanese Diet.
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Change in Recognition and Succession of governments
X V. THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Supreme Court, Third Petty Bench, 27 March 2007
Saiko-Saibansho Minji-hanreishu (Supreme Court Civil Reports), Vol. 61, No. 2
(2007), p. 711
This case was originally one of claim for evacuation of a building, but the fact that
its original plaintiff was the government of the Republic of China (RC) and that
during the proceedings the government of Japan recognized the government of the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) in place of that of the RC made this case
significantly political and complex.
The disputed building was constructed in 1931 and Kyoto Imperial University
(as it then was) rented it as a dormitory for Chinese students in April 1945. After the
Second World War, the Embassy of the RC in Japan bought this building. In the
mid-1960s, the relationship between the Embassy and some students living in it
deteriorated, so the RC requested them to evacuate the building and filed the case in
the Kyoto District Court in 1967. In 1972, by a Joint Communiqué of the govern-
ment of Japan and the government of the PRC, Japan recognized the latter and the
plaintiff lost the status of legitimate government of China in Japan.
Thus the issues on this dispute were the following:
(a) Whether the RC retains a locus standi before a Japanese court after Japan’s
change in recognition of the government of China in 1972.
(b) Whether the ownership of the real estate in Japan, maintained by the govern-
ment of the RC until 1972, is transferred to that of the PRC as a result of
Japan’s switch of recognition from the former to the latter.
In this case, four judgments had been given before this latest one by the Supreme
Court: the first one by the Kyoto District Court (the court of first instance) in 1977;55
the second by the Osaka High Court (the intermediate appellate instance) in 1982;56
the third by the Kyoto District Court (the remanded first instance) in 1986;57 and the
fourth by the Osaka High Court (the remanded intermediate appellate instance) in
1987.58
55 Kyoto District Court Judgment of 16 September 1977, in Hanrei Jihou (Judicial Reports) No.
890 (1978), p. 131.
56 Osaka High Court Judgment of 14 April 1982, in Hanrei Jihou (Judicial Reports) No. 1053
(1982), p. 115.
57 Kyoto District Court Judgment of 4 February 1986, in Hanrei Jihou (Judicial Reports) No.
1199 (1986), p. 131.
58 Osaka High Court Judgment of 26 February 1987, in Hanrei Jihou (Judicial Reports) No. 1232
(1987), p. 119.
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With respect to issue (a), all the four previous judgments reached an affirmative
conclusion. As regards issue (b), although the first judgment affirmed the transfer of
the ownership of the dormitory from the government of the RC to that of the PRC,
the three subsequent judgments found that the switch of recognition had no impact
on the ownership. Thereafter there had been 20 years of silence on the part of the
judiciary.
The Supreme Court noted that the name “RC” had meant China as a State (“the
State of China”) and found that as a result of the Japanese government’s change of
recognition in 1972, the name of the State of China had changed from RC to PRC.
Then the Court held that the plaintiff in this case was the State of China, renamed
PRC since 1972. Pointing out that because the RC’s ambassador had lost his
capacity to represent the State of China in Japan in 1972, the proceedings of this
case should have been terminated at that time.
Thus the Court ordered the reversal of the original judgment (the fourth
judgment) and the cancellation of the judgment in the remanded first instance (the
third judgment). Then this case was remanded to the Kyoto District Court again.
Sovereign Immunity
X V. THE STATE OF ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN
Supreme Court, Second Petty Bench, 21 July 2006
Saiko-Saibansho Minji-hanreishu (Supreme Court Civil Reports), Vol. 60, No. 6
(2006), p. 2542
The appellants X were two Japanese companies. They sold computers and related
parts to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in 1986 and concluded quasi-loan
contracts in 1988. But Pakistan allegedly breached these contracts and X filed this
case.
The Tokyo District Court accepted all of the plaintiffs’ claims, pointing out that
Pakistan did not contest the alleged facts because Pakistan had neither attended
any public hearing of the proceedings nor submitted any written statements or
documents.59
However, the Tokyo High Court reversed the original judgment, supporting the
contention of Pakistan that the principle of sovereign immunity should apply in this
case. The Japanese courts had maintained the principle of absolute immunity since
the principle was adopted in 1928.60 The Tokyo High Court, finding that Pakistan
59 Tokyo District Court Judgment of 27 August 2001, in Saiko-Saibansho Minji-hanreishu
(Supreme Court Civil Reports), Vol. 60, No. 6 (2006), p. 2551.
60 Grand Court of Cassation Judgment of 28 December 1928, in Daishinin Minji-hanreishu
(Grand Court of Cassation Civil Reports), Vol. 7, No. 12 (1928), p. 1128.
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had not waived such immunity, held that the State of Pakistan was not subject to
Japanese jurisdiction in this case.61
The Supreme Court adopted the doctrine of restrictive immunity formally and
declared a change in the applicable law. The Court noted that the United Nations
Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property,62 as well as
many countries, has adopted this restrictive approach and stated that there was no
reason for recognizing the immunity against acts of a private character by a foreign
State because such acts did not, normally, infringe on the sovereignty of that foreign
State (emphasis added).
In the instant case, the Court found that the alleged acts by Pakistan were
ordinary commercial transactions, which could be conducted by a private person
regardless of their purpose (emphasis added). Therefore, the Court concluded that
Pakistan could not have immunity from Japanese jurisdiction.
The Court, noting that both the contracts between X and Pakistan clearly
provided that conflicts arising from this contract should be subject to Japanese
judicial jurisdiction, held that such clauses meant in any case a waiver of immunity
in principle. Thus the Court ordered the reversal of the original judgment and this
case was remanded to the Tokyo High Court.
Nationality of Children Born out of Wedlock
X V. THE STATE OF JAPAN
Tokyo District Court, 29 March 2006
Hanrei Jiho (Judicial Reports), No. 1932 (2006), p. 51.
The plaintiffs were nine children who were born from Philippine mothers and were
recognized by their Japanese fathers after their birth. Although their mothers as
their legal representatives applied to the Minister of Justice after recognition by their
fathers to request that they be granted Japanese nationality, their application was
not accepted and their acquisition of Japanese nationality denied.
Article 3(1) of the Nationality Law of Japan provides:
A child (excluding a child who was once a Japanese national) under twenty years of
age who has acquired the status of a legitimate child by reason of the marriage of its
father and mother and their recognition, may acquire Japanese nationality by making
notification to the Minister of Justice, if the father or mother who has effected the
recognition was, at the time of the child’s birth, a Japanese national and such father
61 Tokyo High Court Judgment of 5 February 2003, in Saiko-Saibansho Minji-hanreishu
(Supreme Court Civil Reports), Vol. 60, No. 6 (2006), p. 2554.
62 UNGA Res.59/38 (2 December 2004). Not yet in force.
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or mother is presently a Japanese national or was, at the time of his or her death, a
Japanese national (emphasis added).
According to this clause, it is necessary to meet two requirements for acquiring
Japanese nationality by legitimation: one is that the father and mother of the child
have married and the other is that the child has acquired the status of a legitimate
child.
The main issue in this case was whether these two requirements were consistent
with Article 14(1)63 of the Constitution of Japan. The Court affirmed the acquisition
of Japanese nationality on the ground that the disputed requirements in Article 3(1)
of the Nationality Law were in themselves inconsistent with Article 14(1) of the
Constitution and consequently void.
The plaintiffs claimed that the disputed requirements also violated some inter-
national human rights conventions that Japan had already ratified, such as Article 9
of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women, 1979 (CEDAW), Article 24(1) and (3) of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, 1966 (ICCPR), Articles 2 and 7 of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, 1989 (CRC).
First, the Court held that Article 9 of CEDAW could not be interpreted as
requiring equality between legitimate and illegitimate children or equal treatment for
a Japanese father and a Japanese mother with respect to the nationality of their
children.
Second, the Court held that Article 24(1) of the ICCPR could not be inter-
preted as requiring the same status and equal rights for illegitimate children as
legitimate children. And with respect to Article 24(3) of the ICCPR, the Court held
that this clause did not oblige the States parties to give their nationality to all
children born in their territory.
Third, the Court, noting that paragraph 1 of Article 2 of the CRC does not
refer to illegitimate children clearly, stated that it did not intend to embrace a dif-
ferentiated treatment between legitimate and illegitimate children with respect to the
acquisition of nationality. And the Court found that “the status” in paragraph 2
should be interpreted as political or social status, not as personal or relational status.
On the other hand, the Court held that Article 7 of CRC did not oblige the States
parties to give their nationality to illegitimate children.
The Court further found that there was no need to examine the applicability of
these articles in the domestic jurisdiction.
The plaintiffs had also invoked General Comment No. 17 (1998) of the Human
Rights Committee (CCPR), the Concluding Observation of the Committee on the
Rights of the Child (CRC) concerning the Nationality Law of UK (CRC/C/15/
Add.188, 2002), the Concluding Observation of the CCPR concerning the fourth
63 Art. 14(1) of the Japanese Constitution provides: “All of the people are equal under the law
and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic or social relations because of race,
creed, sex, social status or family origin.”
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periodic report (CCPR/C/79/Add.102, 1998) and the Concluding Observation of the
CRC concerning the second periodic report (CRC/C/15/Add.231, 2004), both sub-
mitted by Japan. However, the Court found that these instruments had no binding
force on the interpretation of these treaties by State organs including the judiciary.
Thus all contentions by the plaintiffs concerning international law were
dismissed.
The respondent appealed to the Tokyo High Court.
Refugee Status of an Indigenous Person Persecuted by Non-State Organs and Internal
Protection Alternative
X V. MINISTER OF JUSTICE, SUPERVISING IMMIGRATION INSPECTOR
Tokyo District Court, 2 February 2007
Not yet reported
The plaintiff was born in Bangladesh and has nationality of that country. He
belongs to the Jumma people, who are indigenous inhabitants living in Chittagong
Hill Tract (CHT) in that country. The political organization of Jumma indigenous
people, the “Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (CHT People’s United
Party, PCJSS)” and its armed wing the “Shanti Bahini”, formed in 1973, had strug-
gled against the national government for more than 20 years. In 1997, a Peace
Accord was signed between the national government and the PCJSS. But some
members of the PCJSS who opposed this Accord formed a new political organiza-
tion named the United Peoples Democratic Front (UPDF) in 1998, leading to
conflicts between the PCJSS and the UPDF.
The plaintiff was a central member of the UPDF, but withdrew from the organ-
ization immediately before coming to Japan. On 19 July 2002, he was admitted to
enter Japan with a status of residence of “temporary visitor”. But since 10 January
2004, he had been staying without legal status of residence. On 2 December 2004 he
was detained on suspicion of overstay and finally ordered to be deported from Japan
on 24 January 2005. However, he had applied for recognition of his refugee status on
12 September 2002, but the Minister of Justice had turned down his application on 4
December 2003. He now advanced a request for the revocation of the deportation
order and an invalidation of the denial of recognition of his refugee status.
The Court, pointing out that the word “fear of being persecuted” in the
definition of “refugee” in Article 1 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees64 meant that an important requirement to recognize that refugee status is a
64 The Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act (Act No. 319 of 1951) adopts the same
definition as the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951), providing that the term
“refugee” means a refugee who falls under the provisions of Art. 1 of the Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees (Art. 2, item 3–2).
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lack of protection by the country of his nationality, found that the requirement was
fulfilled if there was a well-founded fear of being persecuted even by non-State organs
with the government’s connivance or neglect, and that the government of his
country was not expected to afford an effective protection (emphasis added). While
denying the alleged persecution by his national government, the Court recognized
his refugee status on the ground that there was a well-founded fear of being
persecuted by non-State organs such as the PCJSS or the UPDF.
The other issue in this case was whether the plaintiff could live without a fear of
being persecuted in areas other than CHT within Bangladesh. It is known as the
concept of “internal protection alternative”.65 The Court, noting that security was
not good in Bangladesh as a whole and that the PCJSS could exercise considerable
influence on the whole country because it had a close connection with the national
government, held that there was a well-founded fear of being persecuted, even if the
plaintiff lived in areas other than CHT.
Thus the Court fully accepted the plaintiff ’s claims.
Abolition of National Clause in National Pension Law and Failure of Remedial
Measures
X V. THE STATE OF JAPAN
Kyoto District Court, 23 February 2007
Not yet reported
The plaintiffs were five Korean residents in Japan, who were born in Korea during
the 1910s and 1920s and had lived in Japan since the 1920s or the 1930s. The
National Pension Law of Japan, enacted in 1959, had a so-called national clause
which limited the scope of insured persons to Japanese nationals. That national
clause was abolished in 1981 when Japan became a party to the 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees and now insured persons are defined as “per-
sons living in Japan aged 20 and over but under 60” (Article 7(1)). But because
effective transitional or remedial measures were not taken at that time, some of the
plaintiffs could not draw an old-age pension at all and the others could draw only
a little.
The plaintiffs claimed that the national clause was contrary to the International
Covenants on Human Rights (1966), Article 14(1) of the Constitution of Japan and
customary international law, and that the failure to take effective transitional or
65 See European Legal Network on Asylum (ELENA), Research Paper on the Application of the
Concept of Internal Protection Alternative, November 1998, updated as of autumn 2000, avail-
able at the official site of the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) (http://
www.ecre.org/files/ipa.pdf).
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remedial measures constituted a violation of the State Redress Law. The Court held
as follows.
First, with respect to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, 1966 (ICESCR), the Court held that Articles 2 and 9 invoked by
the plaintiffs only declared the contracting parties’ political responsibilities to
implement active policies for the right to social security of every person and held
that these articles were not self-executing and could not apply in the domestic
jurisdiction.
Second, with respect to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR), the Court recognized that Articles 2 and 26 invoked by the plain-
tiffs were self-executing and could apply in the domestic courts. But the Court held
that Article 26 permitted a reasonable differentiated treatment between nationals
and foreigners and that as for social security there was some discretion on the part of
the States parties. The Court therefore found that the disputed national clause was
not contrary to Articles 2 and 26. The Court also held that the failure to take
effective transitional or remedial measures was not contrary to these articles either,
on the ground that whether the parties took some transitional or remedial measures
was within their discretion and it was not contrary to the International Covenants
on Human Rights for the parties to give priority to nationals in the sphere of social
policy.
Third, with respect to Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(1948), the Court found that some acts or omissions of the parties could not be
estimated to constitute a strictly legal violation of the Declaration on ground that
this Declaration did not have a legal binding force, without examining whether the
Declaration became customary international law.
The Court also reached a negative conclusion with respect to the violation of
Article 14(1) of the Constitution and rejected all claims.
Forced Labour of Chinese Citizens during the Second World War – Waiver of War
Reparation Claims of Nationals by Their Country
NISHIMATSU CONSTRUCTION CO. V. Y
Supreme Court, Second Petty Bench, 27 April 2007
Saiko-Saibansho Minji-hanreishu (Supreme Court Civil Reports), Vol. 61, No. 3
(2007), p. 1188
The appellant, Nishimatsu Construction, made many Chinese people work forcibly
on the site of construction in Hiroshima Prefecture under the national policy during
the Second World War. The appellees Y (originally plaintiffs) were former workers
and their survivors, all citizens of the People’s Republic of China. They claimed
compensation for the forced labour and resultant damages.
The Hiroshima High Court, recognizing the default of obligation for care and
safety of Chinese workers, found that it was not admissible for the company to
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invoke negative prescription which amounted to an abuse of rights and ordered the
company to pay compensation.66
The legal issue in this case was whether the war reparation claims of Chinese
citizens had been renounced by their country. The Hiroshima High Court had held
that the Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the government of the
People’s Republic of China67 in 1972 had not extinguished the Japanese govern-
ment’s obligation to respond to the compensation claims of Chinese nationals. The
ruling in the other case concerning the former Chinese comfort women, pointing out
that the Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan in 1952 was the
only peace treaty between Japan and China and that Article 1168 of this treaty was
also applied to the nationals of the PRC, held that the compensation claims of
Chinese citizens were renounced by this clause.69
The Supreme Court held that section 5 of the Joint Communiqué meant
comprehensive renouncement of the war reparations by China, including the
compensation claims of its nationals. The Court did not find that the Treaty of
Peace between the RC and Japan could apply to the nationals of the PRC because
this treaty itself has a limited scope of application.70 Then the Court, examining
the wording of section 5 of the Joint Communiqué, held that this clause must
be interpreted in the same way as a corresponding clause of the Treaty of San
Francisco in 1951,71 although it was not clear about the subject of claims renounced
in section 5.
This was the first ever judgment of the Supreme Court on the issue of whether
the war reparation claims of nationals are renounced by the waiver clause of the
peace treaty their country concluded. On the same day, the Supreme Court declared
66 Hiroshima High Court Judgment of 9 July 2004, in Hanrei Jiho (Judicial Reports), No. 1865
(2004), p. 62.
67 Section 5 of this Communiqué provides: “The government of the People’s Republic of China
declares that in the interest of the friendship between the Chinese and the Japanese peoples, it
renounces its demand for war reparation from Japan.”
68 Art. 11 of the Treaty of Peace between the RC and Japan provides: “Unless otherwise provided
for in the present Treaty and the documents supplementary thereto, any problem arising between
the Republic of China and Japan as a result of the existence of a State of war shall be settled in
accordance with the relevant provisions of the San Francisco Treaty.”
69 Tokyo High Court Judgment of 18 March 2005, in Shomu Geppo (Monthly Reports of Judicial
Matters), Vol. 51, No. 11 (2005), p. 2858.
70 Both plenipotentiaries confirmed in the Exchange of Notes in 1952 that “the terms of the
present Treaty shall, in respect of the Republic of China, be applicable to all the territories which
are now, or which may hereafter be under the control of its government.”
71 Art. 14(b) of the Treaty of San Francisco provides: “Except as otherwise provided in the
present Treaty, the Allied Powers waive all reparations claims of the Allied Powers, other claims
of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of any actions taken by Japan and its
nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war, and claims of the Allied Powers for direct
military costs of occupation.”
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the final dismissal of the compensation claims by the Chinese nationals for the same
reason in the four other cases.72
OTHER RELEVANT STATE PRACTICE 2006–200773
Economic partnership agreements (EPA)
Japan concluded the first EPA with Singapore in 2002. Since then the Japanese
government has undertaken to conclude similar agreements with other States, and
the EPA with Mexico came into effect in April 2005. In 2006, the Cabinet of the
Japanese government decided to accelerate negotiations on EPAs. In accordance
with the decision, several EPAs came into force or were signed during the years
2006–2007. The EPAs with Malaysia came into force in July 2006, with Chile in
September 2007 and with Thailand in November 2007. The EPA with the Philip-
pines was signed in September 2006, with Brunei in June 2007 and with Indonesia
in August 2007, although none of them had come into force at the time of
writing.
The main significance of the EPA between Japan and Malaysia is as follows.
First, the establishment of a framework for expansion of the trade and invest-
ments between the two countries; second, a symbol of partnership in the new era;
and third, the basis for acceleration of negotiations for EPAs in the East Asian
region.
The EPA between Japan and Chile is the second EPA with the Latin American
States. This EPA is important for Japan because it improves the conditions for trade
and investments of Japanese nationals in Chile, contributes to the stable supply of
mineral resources and secures the basis for expansion of economic transactions with
the Latin American States.
Japan expects that the EPAs with Thailand and the Philippines will contribute to
further expansion of the respective bilateral economic relationship and provide the
basis for closer partnership with the East Asian region. The other specific feature of
these agreements is that they contain provisions for freer movement of natural per-
sons. In the case of the EPA with Thailand, it provides the movement of natural
persons of a limited category and further negotiations are scheduled to be pursued.
However, Article 110, paragraph 2 of the EPA with the Philippines guarantees nat-
ural persons with “the entry and temporary stay in accordance with the terms and
conditions of the specific commitment set out in Annex 8, provided that the natural
persons comply with immigration laws and regulations applicable to entry and tem-
porary stay which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Chapter” referred
72 Supreme Court, First Petty Bench, Judgment of 27 April 2007, in Hanrei Jiho (Judicial
Reports), No. 1969 (2007), p. 38, and the three other judgments are not yet reported.
73 Contributed by KAWANO Mariko, Faculty of Law, Waseda University; member of the
Editorial Board.
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to in paragraph 1. The specific commitment provided in paragraph 1 is as follows:
“(a) short-term business visitors of the other Party, (b) intra-corporate transferees of
the other Party, (c) investors of the other Party, (d) natural persons of the other
Party who engage in professional services, (e) natural persons of the other Party who
engage in supplying services, which require technology or knowledge at an advanced
level or which require specialized skills belonging to particular fields of industry, on
the basis of a contract with public or private organizations in the former Party, and
(f ) natural persons of the other Party who engage in supplying services as nurses or
certified careworkers or related activities, on the basis of a contract with public
or private organizations in the former Party or on the basis of admission to public or
private training facilities in the former Party.”
The EPAs with Indonesia and Brunei are important not only as a basis for the
expansion of bilateral economic relations but also for securing stable supply of
mineral resources including oil and natural gas.
As far as the EPA with Singapore is concerned, the Protocol Amending the
Agreement between Japan and the Republic of Singapore for a New-Age Economic
Partnership was signed in March 2007. By this Protocol it is expected that the
liberalization and facilitation of trade in goods and services between them will be
promoted and the economies of both countries further invigorated.
Japan intends to expand its EPAs and is pursuing bilateral negotiations with Viet
Nam, Korea, India, Australia and Switzerland respectively. Japan is also undertak-
ing negotiations to conclude an ASEAN–Japan Comprehensive Economic Partner-
ship Agreement and Free Trade Agreements with the members of the GCC (UAE,
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain).
Accession to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
Japan deposited the instrument of accession to the Rome Statute of the Inter-
national Criminal Court with the UN Secretary-General on 17 July 2007 and
became a State Party to the Statute on 1 October 2007.
To accede to the Statute, Japan enacted the Act for the Cooperation with the
International Criminal Court on 11 May 2007. The new Act provides for procedural
measures and new crimes to fulfil the obligations under the Rome Statute.
Ms Saiga Fumiko, Ambassador in Charge of Human Rights and a member of
the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
was elected as a Judge on 30 November 2007.
Signature of the Convention on Jurisdictional Immunity of States and its Property
Japan signed the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States
and Their Property on 11 January 2007. In the United Nations International Law
Commission, Ambassador Ogiso, former Japanese member of the Commission,
served as a Special Rapporteur. Ambassador Yamada, the present Japanese member
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of the ILC, served as a Rapporteur for the Working Group in the reconsideration of
the text of the final reading in the ILC in 1999 and played a very important role
in the negotiations in the Sixth Committee from 1999 to 2000. The Japanese
government intends to ratify the Convention in due time.
Japan’s new reservation to the declaration accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice
Japan made a declaration to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice in 1958, in which it declared that it:
recognizes as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to
any other State accepting the same obligation and on condition of reciprocity, the
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, over all disputes which arise on
and after the date of the present declaration with regard to situations or facts
subsequent to the same date and which are not settled by means of peaceful
settlement.
It can be said that this declaration did not contain any substantive reservation to the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.
Japan maintained its declaration for about 50 years and made a new declaration
on 9 July 2007. In the new declaration, Japan attaches a new paragraph for
reservation as follows:
This declaration does not apply to any dispute in respect of which any other party to
the dispute has accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice only in relation to or for the purpose of the dispute; or where the acceptance
of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction on behalf of any other party to the dispute
was deposited or notified less than twelve months prior to the filing of the application
bringing the dispute before the Court.
NATIONAL LAWS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW MATTERS74
Promulgation of the Basic Act of Ocean Policy
Japan promulgated the Basic Act of Ocean Policy on 20 July 2007. The Act was
drafted by some members of the Diet from several political parties.
74 Contributed by KAWANO Mariko, Faculty of Law, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan;
member of the Editorial Board.
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Chapter one provides for the general principles. Article 1 stipulates the pur-
pose of this Act. In accordance with Article 1, the Headquarters for Ocean Policy
was established in order to promote measures with regard to the oceans com-
prehensively and systematically and to emphasize the importance of contribution
to the coexistence of the oceans and mankind. Six basic principles provided in the
Act are as follows: harmonization of the development and use of the oceans with
the conservation of marine environment (Article 2); securing the safety and secur-
ity on the oceans (Article 3); improvement of scientific knowledge of the oceans
(Article 4); sound development of ocean industries (Article 5); comprehensive
governance of the oceans (Article 6); and international partnership with regard to
the oceans (Article 7). The Act differentiates between the responsibilities of the
four relevant parties – the State, local governments, business operators and cit-
izens – regarding the ocean issues in Articles 8 through 11, while Article 12
recognizes the importance of the coordination and cooperation among these four
parties.
In Chapter two, Article 16 provides that the government shall formulate a basic
plan to promote measures with regard to the oceans comprehensively and
systematically.
In Chapter three, 12 basic measures on ocean policy are provided: promotion of
development and use of ocean resources (Article 17); conservation of marine
environment and others (Article 18); promotion of development of exclusive eco-
nomic zone and others (Article 19); securing maritime transport (Article 20); secur-
ing the Safety and Security of the oceans (Article 21); promotion of ocean survey
(Article 22); promotion of research and development in ocean science and technol-
ogy and other related matters (Article 23); promotion of ocean industries and
strengthening the international competitiveness (Article 24); integrated management
of the coastal zone (Article 25); conservation of the remote islands and the like
(Article 26); securing international coordination and promotion of international
cooperation (Article 27); and enhancement of citizens’ understanding of the oceans
and their issues (Article 28).
Chapter four establishes the organs to fulfil the task and undertake the measures
as provided in the Act. The Headquarters for Ocean Policy is established in the
Cabinet (Article 29) and Article 30 stipulates its competence. The Headquarters
consists of the Director-General, the Vice-Director and the Members (Article 31).
Article 33 provides for the Minister for Ocean Policy.
In accordance with the Act, the Headquarters have taken efforts to formulate
the basic plan on ocean policy and it was expected to be made public in March
2008.
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KOREA75
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
The Restrictions on the Freedom of a Dual National to Renounce Citizenship
THE CORROBORATION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY IN KOREAN
NATIONALITY ACT ARTICLE 12, PARAGRAPH 1
Petitioner: Yoon
Pronounced on 30 November 2006, by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of
Korea (Decision based on 2005 HunMa739)
Facts
The petitioner (Yoon) was brought up in the United States by a Korean father and
holds a dual nationality: Korean and American. Yoon was residing in Korea until
the Military Administration enlisted him on 1 January 2004, in accordance with the
Military Service Law. In May 2005, a revision of the Military Service Law was
carried out in order to prohibit the evasion of military service by dual nationals. This
amended version states that a dual national, who is a direct descendant (of a Korean
national) and was born in a foreign country without purpose of permanent resi-
dence, should serve the Korean military prior to renunciation of his Korean nation-
ality. The petitioner claimed that such an article is unconstitutional and filed a
constitutional appeal.
Legal issues
Article 12 of the amended Military Service Law regulates the basics of the selection
of nationality. It states that a person who acquires dual nationality status before the
age of 20 must make a choice between the two before the age of 22, and he or she
who acquires dual nationality after the age of 22 must make the choice within two
years from acquisition. Should such responsibility be neglected until the expiration
of the proposed period, the subject shall be denationalized.
The freedom to renounce and change one’s nationality is guaranteed by Article
14 of the Constitution. Does Article 12, Paragraph 1 of Military Service Law, which
limits the freedom of deciding one’s nationality, then, violate the constitution?
75 Contributed by Eric Yong-Joong Lee, Dr iur. He is professor of Dongguk, University College




Article 12, Paragraph 1 of the Military Service Law does not infringe Article 14 of
the Constitution. The petition was rejected. The decision is based on the following
reasoning.
The proviso of Article 12, Paragraph 1 of the Military Service Law purports to
prohibit a Korean citizen from avoiding his obligatory military service through
renunciation of nationality. A dual national may be exempted from military service
by renouncing his Korean nationality within three months after his service is
assigned; however, after the expiration of such period the subject must fulfil the
military service before renouncing Korean citizenship.
The military service is essential to national existence; hence an indispensable
Constitutional element. Article 5, Paragraph 2 and Article 39 of the Constitution
elucidate such significance of the service. The absence of Article 12, Paragraph 1 of
the Military Service Law will facilitate the evasion of service by a dual national,
thereby infringing on both the universal military service system stated in Article 39
and the equality of military service stated in Article 11 of the Constitution.
Moreover, the right to choose one’s nationality is only partially restricted by the
proviso of Article 12, Paragraph 1 of the Military Service Law. Three months of
time is granted to make a free selection, and the period of restriction lasts only until
the subject reaches the age of 36 when the obligation to military service is lifted.
Furthermore, clearance of duty, by either discharge or exemption, brings back the
right to renounce Korean nationality at any time.
The issue related to the Reliance Principle
The First Article of the supplementary provision of the revised Korean Nationality
Act States that the law must be enforced with promulgation and the Second Article
extends the scope of effect to those who were born prior to its enforcement. Thus,
according to the latter article and purport of amendment, it is clear that Article 12,
Paragraph 1 of the Military Service Law applies to the petitioner. Therefore, the
assertion that the above stated law is unclear is unfounded and so conforms to the
reliance principle.
The Legal Criteria for the Status of Refugee
THE COURT OF ADMINSTRATIVE LITIGATION
(2006GooHap 28345 Judgment)
Facts
The petitioner, a former Egyptian Muslim, converted to Copt (Egyptian Christianity)
after marrying a Christian woman in April 2005. The Egyptian Islamic groups
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repeatedly threatened and kidnapped him for re-conversion. Consequently, on 27
September 2005, he entered Korea under the pretence of a business trip and
requested refugee status. Nevertheless, the Minister of Justice concluded that the
petitioner’s assertion lacked credibility and refused.
Judgment
Refugee convention and requisites
In defining the term “refugee”, the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refu-
gees (hereinafter 1951 Convention) requires a well-founded fear of being persecuted
for reasons of race, religion, nationality or membership of a particular social group
or political opinion. Here, “persecution” is generally seen as unreasonable dis-
crimination, pain, disadvantage or further life or freedom-threatening conduct by
any body, its scope unlimited to the government agency.
In order to acquire the status of refugee, simply informing the government of the
applicant’s fear is insufficient; the applicant must provide substantial evidence of
such threats. In other words, the subjective State of the applicant should be
grounded on objective circumstances. A circumstance in which any rational
individual will suffer similar hardships should conform to the required objectivity.
Furthermore, not only the basic human rights environment of the applicant’s
homeland but whether the contemporary situation of the country may lead to such
persecution of the applicant should also be considered. The applicant is responsible
for the substantiation of such a situation.
The Court’s judgment on the petitioner’s circumstance
The Egyptian government currently bans conversion from Muslim to Christianity
and persecutes the corresponding population with imprisonment by means of secret
service. The petitioner has undergone conversion and there is a good possibility that
oppression will follow deportation, accordingly.
Moreover, previous records of the petitioner’s suffering of threats by Muslim
groups and escape from his homeland show the likelihood of the repetition of such.
Incoherence within the petitioner’s testimony notwithstanding, it seemed that the
investigation was conducted on an unstable petitioner, who probably had neither
the composure nor explanatory material to support his assertion. In addition, the
petitioner might have not known the difference between Catholic and Christianity
since his conversion was only recent, by which the Court cannot affirm that the
petitioner’s testimony lacks due credibility.
Conclusion
As the petitioner has a well-founded fear of persecution as stated in the 1951 Con-
vention, he thereby holds the status of a refugee according to Article 2, Subpara-
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graph 2 of 2, Immigrant Control Law. Therefore, the decision of the defendant that
the petitioner is not a refugee is illegal.
The Claim of Damages by Requisition during Japanese Colonial Period
Decision made on 2 February 2007 Busan District Court (2000 GaHap7960
Judgment)
Facts
The petitioners, born in South Korea during the Japanese colonial period, were
drafted and assigned to Mitsubishi Corporation in Hiroshima, Japan in 1944. After
being injured by the US bombing on Hiroshima, they returned to Korea, suffering
from the after-effects of the incident. In December 1995, they filed a case against the
Mitsubishi Corporation claiming damages and back payment. After losing in the
first trial, they filed the same suit in Korea. According to the petitioners, Mitsubishi
Corporation took advantage of the war not only by forcing work within a coarse
environment but also by leaving them without any necessary aid after the bombing.
Moreover, they claimed the corporation neglected its responsibility to safely trans-
port the petitioners back to South Korea after the requisition had ended. The
Corporation also failed to keep the promise of remitting half of the wage to their
families back in Korea, returning the partially reduced wages that they were told
were being saved for private savings. According to them the corporation even refused
to pay anything at all, towards the end of the draft.
Legal issues
The petitioners asserted that the Mitsubishi Corporation should take responsibility
for causing such damages, as it violated international laws such as the international
common law that bans slavery, the International Labor Organization Agreement No.
29 that rejects all kinds of compulsory labour, and the Nuremberg Codes.
Judgment
Neither the ILO Agreement No. 29 nor the Nuremberg Codes State possibilities in
which the victim of compulsory labor can directly claim for damages. Should the
prohibition of slavery be recognized as enforcing according to international law as
asserted by the petitioners, even so the argument that an international common law
exists to allow direct claim for damages is unfounded. Therefore, petitioners do not
have the right to ask Mitsubishi Corporation to take direct responsibility for dam-
ages caused by the compulsory labour.
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The issues related to the extinctive prescription
The petitioners claimed that the damages done by the Mitsubishi Corporation were
followed by crime against humanity, to which general extinctive prescription must
not be applied. However, the Court found such a claim to be unfounded. The extinct-
ive prescription initiates when the corresponding right is objectively generated and
can be exercised. Likewise, it is interrupted when the right cannot be exercised due to
obstacles – de jure, not de facto; and the ignorance of an individual of such law, even
as a result of misinformation, would clearly fall for the latter. In relation to Article 2,
1965 Korea–Japan Claims Settlement Agreement, and its minutes, whether the
Korean government had only disclaimed its diplomatic protectorate of its citizens or
also surrendered the individual claims for damages against Japan and/or its people
has been unclear. Nevertheless, even if the petitioners believed that their rights could
not be properly exercised by insufficient understanding of the agreement, the pres-
ence of such agreement, or the enactment of a Japanese law that disallows individual
claims of Korean people against Japan and/or its people, are not legal obstacles by
which the prescription is interrupted. Therefore, the initial date in reckoning was not
26 August 2005, as asserted by the petitioners, and their claim had lapsed due to
extinction, prior to litigation.
NEPAL76
Right to Equality – Equality test is unlikely to be invoked against procedural and
customary matters
FORUM FOR WOMEN, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT, KATHMANDU AND
OTHERS V. PRIME MINISTER AND OFFICE OF THE COUNCIL OF
MINISTERS AND OTHERS
Special Bench of the Supreme Court of Nepal, decided on 1 September 200677
The fact in issue in the case was about naming a newly born child. The law had given
priority to a father in naming a child; a mother could name a child only when the
father was missing or dead. The writ petitioner had therefore asked the Supreme
Court of Nepal to declare section 3(1)78 of the Children Act, 1992 of Nepal ultra
76 Contributed by Surendra Bhandari, Law Associates Nepal, Kathmandu.
77 The Special Bench of the Supreme Court of Nepal consisted of Justice Ram Nagina Singh,
Justice Ram Prasad Shrestha, and Justice Khil Raj Regmi.
78 Section 3.1(a) of the Children Act, 1991 of Nepal provides: “On the birth of a child, name
should be given in accordance with their religion, culture and custom by father, and by mother if
the father is not available, and by other members of the family if the mother is also not available.
In case of missing or death of father, mother, and other members of the family, person or
organization rearing the child should give a name.”
State Practice 221
vires the equality provision of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, 1990. The
writ petitioner had challenged section 3(1) of the Children Act, 1992 as it contra-
vened Article 11(1)79 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1990, Article 7 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948,80 Article 26 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 196681 and equality provisions of the Con-
vention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 1979
(CEDAW).
The Supreme Court rejected the writ petition on two grounds. First, naming a
child is an activity traditionally shared by all the family members. To invoke an
equality test on customary matters like this is improbable. The Court refrained from
testing whether the customary practice of naming a child and section 3(1) of the
Children Act, 1992 were reinforcing or contradicting each other. The Court was also
silent as to the legal consequences if the law was not compatible with customary
practice. Second, the Court acknowledged that the government had found section
3(1) of the Children Act discriminatory and was ready to amend it. Despite the fact,
the Court did not declare section 3(1) discriminatory.
The Court concluded that there was no urgency to issue a writ petition declaring
the impugned provision ultra vires the provisions of law, in particular when the
government has already carried out a study to identify laws discriminatory between
men and women and was taking steps in the direction of amending discriminating
laws.
79 Article 11(1) of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, 1990 provides: “All citizens shall
be equal before the law. No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws.” In January
2007, the 1990 Constitution has been withdrawn by an Interim Constitution 2007. However, the
provisions on non-discrimination and equality in the Interim Constitution are similar to the 1990
Constitution.
80 Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides: “All are equal before the law
and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to
equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any
incitement to such discrimination.”
81 Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 provides: “All
persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protec-
tion of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all
persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status.”
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Gender Discrimination based on Infertility – Rules of International Law prevail over
Domestic Laws to the extent that the Domestic Laws are inconsistent
ADV. MIRA DHUNGANA AND OTHERS V. PRIME MINISTER AND
OFFICE OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND OTHERS
Special Bench of the Supreme Court of Nepal, decided on 30 March 200682
Delivering a landmark decision, the Supreme Court of Nepal enunciated a principle
that domestic laws inconsistent with the treaty provisions are ultra vires to the extent
of inconsistency. Further the Supreme Court explained that international laws rati-
fied by government prevail over domestic laws under section 9(1)83 of the Treaty Act,
1990 of Nepal if the domestic laws did not comply with the treaty provisions.
The writ petitioners had raised a question that section 1(1)84 of Chapter 12 on
Husband and Wife of the National Code, 1963 of Nepal was inconsistent to Article
1185 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, Articles 2, 3, 5 and 23(4) of
ICCPR, and Articles 1, 2, 3 and 16.1(c) of CEDAW. The impugned section 1(1)
provided a right to a husband to get divorced from his wife after ten years of
marriage on the ground of his wife’s infertility certified by a medical board recog-
nized by government. But section 1(2) of the same law provides a right to a wife
to get divorced from her husband on the ground of impotency. The main line of
82 The Special Bench of the Supreme Court of Nepal consisted of Justice Ram Nagina Singh,
Justice Anup Raj Sharma, and Justice Gauri Dhakal.
83 Section 9(1) of the Treaty Act, 1990 of Nepal provides that in case of inconsistency between
domestic laws and international treaties to which Nepal is a Party, the provisions of treaty law
shall prevail over the domestic laws.
84 Section 1(1) of Chapter 12 on Husband and Wife of the National Code, 1963 provides that a
husband can get divorced with his wife after the completion of ten years of marriage if the
medical board recognized by government certifies infertility of a wife.
85 Article 11 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal follows:
(1) All citizens shall be equal before the law. No person shall be denied the equal protection of
the laws.
(2) No discrimination shall be made against any citizen in the application of general laws on the
grounds of religion, race, sex, caste, tribe or ideological conviction or any of them.
(3) The State shall not discriminate among citizens on grounds of religion, race, sex, caste, tribe,
or ideological conviction or any of these.
Provided that special provisions may be made by law for the protection and advancement of
the interests of women, children, the aged or those who are physically or mentally incapaci-
tated or those who belong to a class which is economically, socially or educationally
backward.
(4) No person shall, on the basis of caste, be discriminated against as untouchable, be denied
access to any public place, or be deprived of the use of public utilities. Any contravention of
this provision shall be punishable by law.
(5) No discrimination in regard to remuneration shall be made between men and women for the
same work.
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argument of the writ petitioners was that “infertility” and “impotency” were two
different conditions, which the Supreme Court agreed. According to the impugned
law a husband could get divorced on the ground of “infertility” but a wife could not
get divorced on the ground of “infertility”, therefore the impugned law believed that
only women can be prone to infertility and men are not prone to infertility. Therefore,
the law was discriminatory and the petitioners asked the Supreme Court to declare it
ultra vires. The Supreme Court discussed Articles 2, 3, 5 and 23(4) of ICCPR, and
Articles 1, 2, 3 and 16.1(c) of CEDAW and found the impugned section inconsistent
to these provisions of international law and declared the impugned section 1(1) null
and void effective from the date of the delivery of the decision. Further, the Supreme
Court directed the government to enact law if needed to provide a right to divorce on
the ground of infertility but without making any discrimination between men and
women and paying respect to the ratified treaties.
Gender Discrimination in Reproductive Health Rights – The Rules of the Multilateral
Convention to which Nepal is a Party are self-enforceable
ADV. PRAKASH MANI SHARMA AND OTHERS V. MINISTRY OF CIVIL
AVIATION AND TRANSPORTATION AND OTHERS
Special Bench of the Supreme Court of Nepal, decided on 30 December 200586
The facts in issue in this case were that Royal Nepal Airlines Corporation, a State-
owned and operated company, had provided maternity leave under section 115 of its
byelaws only to married women and had denied the same rights to single or un-
married mothers. The writ petitioners had challenged the impugned section 115
claiming that it was inconsistent with Articles 11 and 12(1)87 of the Constitution of
the Kingdom of Nepal 1990, Article 11(2)88 of CEDAW, Article 24(2) of the Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child 1989 and different provisions of the Convention
86 The Special Bench of the Supreme Court of Nepal consisted of Justice Min Bahadur
Rayamajhi, Justice Sarada Shrestha, and Justice Balaram K.C.
87 Article 12(1) of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, 1990 provides: “No person shall
be deprived of his personal liberty save in accordance with law, and no law shall be made which
provides for capital punishment.”
88 Article 11(2) of the CEDAW provides: “In order to prevent discrimination against women on
the grounds of marriage or maternity and to ensure their effective right to work, States Parties
shall take appropriate measures:
(a) To prohibit, subject to the imposition of sanctions, dismissal on the grounds of pregnancy or
of maternity leave and discrimination in dismissals on the basis of marital status;
(b) To introduce maternity leave with pay or with comparable social benefits without loss of
former employment, seniority or social allowances;
(c) To encourage the provision of the necessary supporting social services to enable parents to
combine family obligations with work responsibilities and participation in public life, in
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Concerning Maternity Protection, 2000. The Supreme Court examined in detail the
provisions of the cited international laws and concluded that different legal systems
have different normative mechanisms with regard to international law. For example,
some countries apply the rules of international law only when the rules are incorpor-
ated into domestic laws. The Nepalese legal system has accorded higher normative
hierarchy to the international laws to which Nepal is a party. Therefore, the govern-
ment and all State agencies bear a responsibility to give effect to the rules of inter-
national laws irrespective of whether they are incorporated into domestic laws or not.
Being convinced that the impugned section 115 was discriminatory, the Supreme
Court ordered the Royal Nepal Airlines Corporation to amend the impugned dis-
criminatory provision and make it compatible with the provisions of cited inter-
national laws within three months from the date of the issuance of the order.
This case is one of the landmark decisions of the Supreme Court of Nepal
establishing jurisprudence on the relationship between domestic laws and inter-
national laws. Most importantly it established the following three principles:
• First, international laws are self-enforcing when Nepal is a party to them.
• Second, the State and all its agencies are responsible to give effect to such inter-
national laws as to the domestic laws.
• Third, international laws prevail over domestic laws, if the domestic laws are
inconsistent with such international laws.
PHILIPPINES89
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Right of citizens to information upheld
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in
his capacity as Senate President v. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as
Executive Secretary, et al.
G.R. No. 169777, 20 April 2006.
In Drilon et al. v. Executive Secretary, the Supreme Court of the Philippines struck
down an Executive Order (EO No. 464) issued by President Arroyo preventing heads
of departments of the executive branch from appearing and answering questions in
particular through promoting the establishment and development of a network of child-care
facilities;
(d) To provide special protection to women during pregnancy in types of work proved to be
harmful to them.”
89 Contributed by Harry Roque Jr, Faculty Member, College of Law, University of Philippines,
Diliman, Quezon City.
State Practice 225
hearings in aid of legislation before Congress. EO No. 464 was perceived as a meas-
ure undertaken by the Arroyo administration to stymie the Senate’s efforts to
investigate alleged incidents of election-rigging in the 2004 national elections as well
as irregularities in the North Rail project contract entered into by the Philippine
government with a Chinese contractor. It required all heads of departments of the
Executive Branch of the government – including senior military, police and national
security officials – to secure the consent of the President before appearing before
either chamber of the Philippine Congress. By virtue of this EO, several senior
military and executive officials who had been issued subpoenas by the Senate refused
to attend the scheduled legislative inquiries and military officials who attended in
defiance of the EO were relieved from their military posts and made to face court-
martial proceedings.
The EO invoked the doctrine of “executive privilege” to justify the prohibition
on the attendance by executive officials to legislative hearings, resulting in a stale-
mate and a near “constitutional crisis”. Pitted against each other were the Execu-
tive’s right to such privilege and confidentiality on one hand and the Legislative’s
constitutionally vested power and right to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation as
well as the citizens’ right to be informed on matters of public concern on the other.
Several petitions were filed by legislators, members of the Bar, political parties and
citizens; groups assailing the constitutionality of the EO on the grounds that it
infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to fulfil its duties and denies the
people their right to information on matters of public concern.
Drawing on established legal principles and jurisprudence on the scope of
“executive privilege” and the constitutional power of inquiry held by the Philippine
Congress, the Court invalidated the portion of the EO (section 3 thereof ) which
required executive officials to secure the consent of the President prior to attending
hearings conducted by Congress in aid of legislation. Also worth noting is the
Court’s reiteration of its protection of the right of the people to be informed of
public matters – a right guaranteed under its Constitution90 and international law91 –
saying thus:
90 1987 Const., art. III, § 7.
91 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/
menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm. Article 19 of the Covenant states:
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek,
receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in
writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special
duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall
only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:
(a) for respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) for the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public
health or morals (emphasis supplied).
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To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in
public, however, any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of infor-
mation in such investigations necessarily deprives the people of information which,
being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public
concern. The citizens are thereby denied access to information which they can use in
formulating their own opinions on the matter before Congress – opinions which they
can then communicate to their representatives and other government officials
through the various legal means allowed by their freedom of expression.
Right of citizens to peaceful assembly upheld
BAYAN, et al., V. EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary,
et al.
G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006.
In BAYAN et al. v. Ermita et al., the Supreme Court was asked to declare unconsti-
tutional Batas Pambansa Blg. 180,92 the statute governing public assemblies and
demonstrations in the Philippines, and the policy of Calibrated Pre-emptive
Response (CPR) adopted by the Arroyo administration as enunciated in a press
statement by Executive Secretary Ermita which purported to set a new standard for
responses by law enforcement officers to unauthorized demonstrations. While BP
880 required police officers to observe “maximum tolerance” in dealing with pro-
testors and rallyists, CPR declared a policy of “calibrated pre-emptive response” to
be in effect in lieu of the maximum tolerance standard set forth in BP 880.93 Several
petitions were filed by citizens’ groups assailing BP 880 as unconstitutional for cur-
tailing the people’s right to assembly and freedom of expression as it requires a
permit for rallies to be conducted, thereby limiting the people’s choice of venue. A
declaration that CPR is void was likewise sought from the court for being an ultra
vires act of the Executive, as it purported to alter a statutory standard set by the
Legislature.
The Court revisited long-established jurisprudence on the right to freedom of
assembly in the Philippines and ultimately upheld the validity of BP 880, holding
that it was not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a reasonable restriction
regulating the time, place and manner of the exercise of the right. The ground for the
denial of a permit to rally under the law – clear and present danger to public order,
public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health – was found to be a
92 An Act Ensuring the Free Exercise by the People of their Right Peaceably to Assemble and
Petition the government [and] for Other Purposes, 22 May 1985.
93 See Palace orders strict enforcement of “no permit, no rally” policy, available at: http://
www.op.gov.ph/news.asp?newsid=13532
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valid exception to the exercise of the right by the Court, which cited the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights94 and the International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights.95 With the validity of BP 880 and its standard of “maximum tolerance”,
CPR was struck down by the Court as being devoid of legal purpose and giving rise
to abuses by police forces.
Status of terrorism under international law
PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, et al, V. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS
PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, et al.
G.R. No. 171396, 3 May 2006.
Amidst this growing political dissent against the Arroyo administration, the
Supreme Court of the Philippines took cognizance of the status of terrorism under
international law to strike down an issuance of President Arroyo declaring a state
of national emergency during the commemoration of the 1986 People Power
Revolution. In David v. Arroyo seven consolidated petitions challenged the consti-
tutionality of Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and General Order No.
5 (GO No. 5) in the wake of the arrests of numerous civilians and political
oppositionists during the course of their participation in political demonstrations.
Raids and confiscations were also carried out on the offices of several newspapers by
the armed forces. The assailed PP 1017 declared a state of national emergency on
the 20th anniversary of the EDSA People Power Revolution, citing as cause the
existence of a conspiracy between elements of the Philippine opposition and extrem-
ist communist insurgents and their repeated attempts to bring down the Arroyo
administration. GO No. 5 was enacted on the same day as implementing PP 1017
and calling on the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National
94 Articles 20 and 29 of the UDHR state:
Article 20
Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.
Article 29
1. Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development
of his personality is possible.
2. In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such
limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recogni-
tion and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just
requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic
society.
3. These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and
principles of the United Nations.
95 Art. 19, supra n. 3.
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Police to “immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and
measures prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the
country”.
PP 1017 declared the following:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of
the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine
Constitution which States that: “The President . . . whenever it becomes necessary,
. . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress . . . rebellion . . .” and in
my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent
or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or
rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and
regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided
in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National
Emergency.
G.O. No. 5 implemented PP 1017 by stating thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the
powers vested in me under the Constitution as President of the Republic of the
Philippines, and Commander-in-Chief of the Republic of the Philippines, and pursu-
ant to Proclamation No. 1017 dated February 24, 2006, do hereby call upon the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to
prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country;
I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Chief of the PNP, as well as the
officers and men of the AFP and PNP, to immediately carry out the necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless
violence (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court resolved to rule on the merits notwithstanding the prior
lifting of PP 1017 and the declaration that the state of national emergency has
ceased. Petitioners’ facial challenge to the constitutionality of both issuances called
for their invalidity on the basis of the overbreadth and void for vagueness doctrines,
but were held by the Court to be untenable in the case of PP 1017. GO No. 5 was
likewise held valid as an executive issuance, but the Court held the use of the phrase
“acts of terrorism” in the GO to be invalid and struck down the inclusion of such
phrase in the issuance as unconstitutional. While the phrase “lawless violence” finds
meaning in its use in the constitutional grant to the President of emergency powers,
no such legal definition of “terrorism” was found by the court that would prevent
GO No. 5 from being enforced and implemented arbitrarily. The Court proceeded
with an examination of the prevailing state of international law and developments
in the international community as well as of the laws of the Philippines and found
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no legal definition of “terrorism” that could serve as basis for the implementation of
GO No. 5. The Court considered “terrorism” at this point in time to be an
“amorphous and vague” concept of which no definition has been agreed upon and
accepted by the international community:
What, then, is the defining criterion for terrorist acts – the differentia specifica
distinguishing those acts from eventually legitimate acts of national resistance or
self-defense?
Since the times of the Cold War the United Nations Organization has been trying in
vain to reach a consensus on the basic issue of definition. The organization has
intensified its efforts recently, but has been unable to bridge the gap between those
who associate “terrorism” with any violent act by non-State groups against civilians,
State functionaries or infrastructure or military installations, and those who believe
in the concept of the legitimate use of force when resistance against foreign occupa-
tion or against systematic oppression of ethnic and/or religious groups within a State
is concerned.
The dilemma facing the international community can best be illustrated by reference
to the contradicting categorization of organizations and movements such as Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) – which is a terrorist group for Israel and a liberation
movement for Arabs and Muslims – the Kashmiri resistance groups – who are terror-
ists in the perception of India, liberation fighters in that of Pakistan – the earlier
Contras in Nicaragua – freedom fighters for the United States, terrorists for the
Socialist camp – or, most drastically, the Afghani Mujahedeen (later to become the
Taliban movement): during the Cold War period they were a group of freedom
fighters for the West, nurtured by the United States, and a terrorist gang for the Soviet
Union. One could go on and on in enumerating examples of conflicting categoriza-
tions that cannot be reconciled in any way – because of opposing political interests
that are at the roots of those perceptions.
How, then, can those contradicting definitions and conflicting perceptions and evalu-
ations of one and the same group and its actions be explained? In our analysis, the
basic reason for these striking inconsistencies lies in the divergent interest of States.
Depending on whether a State is in the position of an occupying power or in that of a
rival, or adversary, of an occupying power in a given territory, the definition of
terrorism will “fluctuate” accordingly. A State may eventually see itself as protector
of the rights of a certain ethnic group outside its territory and will therefore speak of
a “liberation struggle,” not of “terrorism” when acts of violence by this group are
concerned, and vice-versa.
The United Nations Organization has been unable to reach a decision on the defin-
ition of terrorism exactly because of these conflicting interests of sovereign States
that determine in each and every instance how a particular armed movement (i.e. a
non-State actor) is labeled in regard to the terrorists-freedom fighter dichotomy. A
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“policy of double standards” on this vital issue of international affairs has been the
unavoidable consequence.
This “definitional predicament” of an organization consisting of sovereign States –
and not of peoples, in spite of the emphasis in the Preamble to the United Nations
Charter! – has become even more serious in the present global power constellation:
one superpower exercises the decisive role in the Security Council, former great
powers of the Cold War era as well as medium powers are increasingly being margin-
alized; and the problem has become even more acute since the terrorist attacks of 11
September 2001 in the United States.
The absence of a law defining “acts of terrorism” may result in abuse and oppression
on the part of the police or military. An illustration is when a group of persons are
merely engaged in a drinking spree. Yet the military or the police may consider the act
as an act of terrorism and immediately arrest them pursuant to G.O. No. 5. Obvi-
ously, this is abuse and oppression on their part. It must be remembered that an act
can only be considered a crime if there is a law defining the same as such and
imposing the corresponding penalty thereon.
The absence of any law defining terrorism may, the Court ultimately declared, result
in abuse and oppression on the part of the police, the military, and even the
President herself. Said the Court:
Since there is no law defining “acts of terrorism,” it is President Arroyo alone,
under G.O. No. 5, who has the discretion to determine what acts constitute terror-
ism. Her judgment on this aspect is absolute, without restrictions. Consequently,
there can be indiscriminate arrest without warrants, breaking into offices and resi-
dences, taking over the media enterprises, prohibition and dispersal of all
assemblies and gatherings unfriendly to the administration. All these can be effected
in the name of G.O. No. 5. These acts go far beyond the calling-out power of the
President. Certainly, they violate the due process clause of the Constitution. Thus,
this Court declares that the “acts of terrorism” portion of G.O. No. 5 is
unconstitutional.
Significantly, there is nothing in G.O. No. 5 authorizing the military or police to
commit acts beyond what are necessary and appropriate to suppress and prevent
lawless violence, the limitation of their authority in pursuing the Order. Otherwise,
such acts are considered illegal . . .
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Treaties on Industrial Property; Protection of Trademarks and Tradenames
PHILIP MORRIS, INC., BENSON & HEDGES (CANADA), INC., and
FABRIQUES DE TABAC REUNIES, S.A., (now known as PHILIP MORRIS
PRODUCTS SA) V. FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION.
G.R. No. 158589. 27 June 2006.
In Philip Morris, Inc. v. Fortune Tobacco Corp. petitioners (corporations registered
under the laws of the State of Virginia in the United States) sought the reversal of an
appellate court decision affirming the dismissal of their complaint for trademark
infringement and damages against the respondent for the latter’s alleged use of
trademarks for their cigarettes which were deceptively similar to those of the
petitioners. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the respond-
ents did not commit trademark infringement against the petitioners and that the
petitioners were barred from maintaining any action in Philippine courts. Invoking
the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial and Intellectual Property
(Paris Convention), the petitioners assert that they can sue before Philippine courts
for infringement of trademarks or for unfair competition without need of obtaining
registration or a licence to do business, or of actually doing business in the Philip-
pines, by virtue of their being corporate nationals of member countries of the Paris
Union. They argue that upon the request of an interested party, a country of the
Union may prohibit the use of a trademark which constitutes a reproduction, imita-
tion or translation of a mark already belonging to a person entitled to the benefits of
the said Convention.
Reiterating a previous ruling,96 the Supreme Court held that while Petitioners
had standing to sue to enforce trademark rights, such right to sue does not necessar-
ily include a right to protection of their registered marks in the absence of actual use
in the Philippines. While it may be true that the Philippines’ adherence to the Paris
Convention effectively obligates the country to honour and enforce its provisions
regarding the protection of industrial property of foreign nationals in its territory,
any protection accorded has to be made subject to the limitations of Philippine laws.
Hence, foreign nationals must still observe and comply with the conditions imposed
by Philippine law on its nationals, as Article 2 of the Paris Convention substantially
provides that nationals of member countries shall have rights specially provided by
the Convention as are consistent with the laws of the country where protection is
sought, and enjoy the privileges that the laws of that country now grant or may
hereafter grant to its nationals.
Considering that the applicable Philippine laws on intellectual property at the
time mandate actual use of the marks and/or emblems in local commerce and trade
before they may be registered and ownership thereof acquired, the petitioners could
96 Philip Morris, Inc., et al. v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 91332, 16 July 1993, 224 SCRA 576, at 595.
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not, according to the Court, dispense with the element of actual use. Their being
nationals of member countries of the Paris Union did not automatically entitle them
to the relief they demanded.
NATIONAL LAWS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW MATTERS
Law on the Rights of Children in Conflict with the Law
The Juvenile Justice Act (Republic Act No. 9344 of 28 April 2006)97
Republic Act No. 9344 was a response to the increasing number of children and
minors in conflict with the law in the country and the miserable plight of children
and minors in prison – especially those for whom no formal charges have even been
filed. The Act declares as policy the commitment by Philippine law enforcement
authorities to international standards of protection for children98 and the primacy of
respecting their dignity and worth in all proceedings involving minors alleged or
accused of infringing penal laws. It also sets forth several rights of children in
conflict with the law,99 adopting as well the provisions of the United Nations Stand-
ard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (Beijing Rules), the
United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (Riyadh
Guidelines) and the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived
of Liberty. The Act likewise imposes a penalty on any person who commits violation
against these rights.
Rep. Act No. 9344 also puts in place a number of administrative mechanisms
for the effective implementation of its guarantees, including the establishment of a
Juvenile Justice Welfare Council and the setting up of comprehensive juvenile
intervention and community-based programmes on juvenile justice and welfare
by the local government units. It also sets forth guidelines for the treatment of
children in conflict with the law at the various stages of criminal investigation and
prosecution,100 giving additional importance to prevention and rehabilitation.
97 An Act Establishing a Comprehensive Juvenile Justice and Welfare System, Creating the
Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council Under the Department of Justice, Appropriating Funds
Therefor and for Other Purposes, 102 OG 3913 No. 25 (June 19, 2006).
98 The Act in § 2(d) makes express reference to Art. 40 of the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child.
99 See §5(a)–(o)
100 See Titles IV (Treatment of Children Below the Age of Criminal Responsibility), V (Juvenile
Justice and Welfare System) and VI (Rehabilitation and Reintegration)
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Law Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty in the Philippines
Anti-Death Penalty Law (Republic Act 9346 of 24 June 2006)
On 24 June 2006, Republic Act No. 9346101 was passed into law by President Arroyo
amidst political pressure calling for a ban on the imposition of the death penalty
in the country. With the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the imposition of capital
punishment was suspended and all death sentences were reduced to reclusion per-
petua. There was, however, no outright prohibition on its imposition, except that
such imposition would require the enactment of an enabling law by Congress “for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes”.102 An enabling law was then passed
on 20 March 1996 in Republic Act No. 7659,103 otherwise known as the Death
Penalty Law. Seven convicts were subsequently made to suffer death by lethal injec-
tion until the passage of Rep. Act No. 9346. The Act substitutes reclusion perpetua
and life imprisonment for the death penalty.
Enactment of a Biofuels Act
Republic Act No. 9367
Concern for the environment and the adverse effects of automobile emissions led to
the enactment of legislation mandating the use of biofuels – fuel additives derived
from renewable substances (primarily indigenous organic matter or biomass) that
promote more efficient fuel burn and reduce toxic and pollutant emissions. Republic
Act no. 9367,104 otherwise known as the Biofuels Act, is considered a significant
piece of legislation aimed at reducing the Philippines’ reliance on imported fossil fuel
and at the same time contributing to the international campaign to reduce green-
house gas emissions. The Act was a consolidation of House Bill No. 4629105 and
Senate Bill No. 2226.106 An essential feature of both draft bills that made it to the
final enacted Act was the introduction of fiscal and non-fiscal incentives – such
101 An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, 102 OG 5307 No. 33
(14 Aug. 2006)
102 1987 Const., art. III, § 19.
103 “An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that
Purpose the Revised Penal Code, as Amended, Other Special Penal Laws, and for other
Purposes.”
104 “An Act To Direct The Use Of Biofuels, Establishing For This Purpose The Biofuel Program,
Appropriating Funds Therefor, And For Other Purposes.”
105 “An Act Mandating the Use of Bioethanol or Ethyl Alcohol as Transport Fuel and Support-
ing the Development and Use of other Biofuels, Establishing for the Purpose the National
Biofuels Program, Appropriating Funds therefor, and for other Purposes.”
106 An Act to Mandate the Use of Biofuels in the Transport Sector, Establishing for this Purpose
the Philippine Biofuel Program. Appropriating Funds therefor, and for Other Purposes, 103 OG
1221 No. 11 (12 March 2007).
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as tax exemptions, investment incentives and provision of financial assistance by
government financial institutions – which would encourage private investment in the
production and distribution of biofuels.107 The Act mandates a phasing-out of
harmful gas additives within six months from its effectivity. In place of such addi-
tives, the Philippine government, through a proposed National Bioethanol Pro-
gramme, will require the blending (5% by volume) of bioethanol in all gasoline
distributed and sold in the country within two years. The mandated amount of
bioethanol will subsequently be increased to 10% within four years from effectivity.
To implement these provisions, the Bills call for the involvement and cooperation of
the concerned executive departments through the creation of a National Biofuel
Board, namely, the Department of Energy, Department of Agriculture, Department
of Environment and Natural Resources, Department of Trade and Industry,
Department of Science and Technology, Department of Finance, the Philippine
Coconut Authority and the Sugar Regulatory Administration. The enactment into
law of the Biofuels Act was relatively expeditious, with both draft bills gaining
substantial support and being approved by their respective houses on 29 November
2006. The Act itself was signed into law on 27 January 2007.
OTHER RELEVANT STATE PRACTICE
Action addressing wave of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances;
recognition and application of the doctrine of command responsibility
Creation of an independent commission to address media and activist killings
The year 2006 saw an alarming increase in incidents of alleged human rights viola-
tions committed by the Philippine government against political dissenters, journal-
ists and activists. The concern and outrage of Filipino citizens for these incidents
found expression in the media and the demonstrations by militant groups critical of
the Arroyo administration, and ultimately caught the attention and concern of the
international community. Expressing concern over the wave of attacks against activ-
ists and media, President Arroyo issued Administrative Order No. 157 (“Creating an
Independent Commission to Address Media and Activist Killings”) on 21 August
2006, forming an independent commission to formulate a report and suggest effect-
ive policy measures to address and eliminate the causes of the growing problem of
media and activist killings. The Melo Commission (so named after its chairperson,
retired Supreme Court Justice Jose Melo) soon thereafter released its report, in
107 § 6 of the Act provides for incentives in the form of exemptions from specific tax, value-added
tax, waste-water charges under the Philippine Clean Water Act and the provision of financial
assistance to qualified investors.
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January 2007. The Melo Report108 applied the principle of “command responsibil-
ity” and implied that the Philippine government was partly responsible for killings
attributable to its military forces. In its report the Commission said:
Certain facts, taken together with admissions and statements by the witnesses, lead
the Commission to conclude that there is some circumstantial evidence that a certain
group in the military, certainly not the whole military organization, is responsible for
the killings. To maintain otherwise would be closing one’s eyes to reality.109
. . . .
General Palparan’s numerous public statements caught on film or relayed through
print media give the overall impression that he is not a bit disturbed by the extra-
judicial killings of civilian activists, whom he considers enemies of the State. He
admits having uttered statements that may have encouraged the said killings. He also
obviously condones these killings, by failing to properly investigate the possibility
that his men may have been behind them.
General Palparan’s statements and cavalier attitude towards the killings inevitably
reveals that he has no qualms about the killing of those whom he considers his
enemies, whether by his order or done by his men independently. He mentions that if
his men kill civilians suspected of NPA connections, “it is their call,” obviously
meaning that it is up to them to do so. This gives the impression that he may not order
the killings, but neither will he order his men to desist from doing so. Under the
doctrine of command responsibility, General Palparan admitted his guilt of the said
crimes when he made this statement. Worse, he admittedly offers encouragement and
“inspiration” to those who may have been responsible for the killings.110
The report makes an implied indictment of the Philippine government’s responses to
the wave of killings:
. . . it becomes equally plain that some ranking officers in the Army (for the Navy, Air
Force and Coast Guard are not herein involved), have not performed their function of
investigating or preventing the said killings, as well as punishing their perpetrators.111
108 Report of the Independent Commission to Address Media and Activist Killings, 22 January,
2007. Available at: http://www.inquirer.net/verbatim/Meloreport.pdf (hereinafter Melo report).
The Commission stated as part of its findings that General Palparan – a high-ranking military
official said to be the one ordering the killings as part of a systematic anti-insurgency campaign –
and some of his superior officers may be held responsible for failing to prevent, punish or
condemn the killings under the principle of command responsibility, squarely implying
culpability on the part of the Philippine government.
109 Ibid., at 53.
110 Ibid., at 59.
111 Ibid., at 61.
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The report also discusses the history, development and status of the doctrine of
command responsibility as already forming part of customary international law:
Hence, it is clear that the doctrine of command responsibility in general has been
adopted by the Philippines, as a generally accepted principle of international law, and
hence, as part of the law of the land. The doctrine’s refinements and restatements –
AP I and the Rome Statute, while signed by but as of yet lacking ratification by the
Philippines, may be considered similarly applicable and binding. This was probably
put best by Justice Perfecto in his separate opinion in Yamashita v. Styer, where he
stated:
“While communist insurgency must be addressed, the fight against it must not be at the
expense of the Constitution and the laws of the nation, and it hardly needs emphasiz-
ing, not at the expense of innocent civilians. The armed forces is not a State within a
State, nor are its members outside the ambit of the Constitution or of the rule of law.
Ours is a government of laws, not of men.”
SRI LANKA112
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Fundamental Rights – death of petitioner’s husband while in police custody –
international documents on the rights of and treatment of prisoners
LAMA HEWAGE LAL (DECEASED): RANI FERNANDO (WIFE OF
DECEASED LAL) V. OFFICER-IN-CHARGE, MINOR OFFENCES,
SEEDUWA POLICE AND OTHERS
SUPREME COURT, 17 September 2003 and 14 June 2004
[2005] 1 Sri Lanka Law Report 40
BANDARANAYAKE J, DE SILVA J AND JAYASINGHE J
This case was filed by the wife and three minor children of one Lama Hewage Lal
(the deceased) who was arrested by an officer of the Seeduwa Police Station. He
subsequently died while in the custody of the Negombo prison officials. The
petitioners alleged that death was due to torture which the deceased suffered while
he was in detention. Considering all the facts and the medical evidence the Court
determined that death was due to assault which took place in the Negombo prison
on 7 November 2002.
112 Contributed by Camena Guneratne, Senior Lecturer, Department of Legal Studies, Open
University of Sri Lanka.
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The Court referred to several Sri Lankan cases on torture and cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment and punishment and also noted the decision of the UN
Human Rights Committee in the case of Thomas v. Jamaica.113 Bandaranayake J
observed that there had been several International Covenants and Declarations on
the issue of the rights of prisoners and cited the following:
• General Assembly Resolution 43/174 of 9 December 1988 which adopted
the UN Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form
of Detention or Imprisonment.
• The United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of
Offenders which adopted the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of
Prisoners adopted at the Congress held in Geneva in 1955 and approved by the
Economic and Social Council by its Resolutions 663 C (XXIV) of 31 July 1957
and 2076 (LXII) of 13 May 1977.
The Court observed that “[c]onsidering the Rules contained in the Prisons Ordin-
ance and the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners adopted by
the first United Nations Congress, it is quite obvious that the Prison Officers are
bound not only to perform such duties for the purpose of preserving discipline and
enforcing diligence, cleanliness, order and conformity to the rules of the prison, but
also to treat the prisoners with kindness and humanity”.
113 Communication No. 366/1989, Views of UN Human Rights Committee, 2 November 1993.
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights – Optional Protocol to the
Covenant – Communication to the UN Committee on Human Rights – State
obligations under the Covenant – monism and dualism – State sovereignty
NALLARATNAM SINGARARSA (PRESENTLY SERVING A TERM OF
IMPRISONMENT IN THE KALUTARA PRISON) V. THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL114
SUPREME COURT, 15 September 2006
S.N. SILVA C.J., N. JAYASINGHE J., N.K. UDALAGAMA J,
N. E. DISSANAYAKE J AND G. AMARATUNGA J
SUPREME COURT SPECIAL LEAVE APPLICATION NO. 182/99
(UNREPORTED)115
The petitioner is a Sri Lankan citizen resident in Batticoloa in the Eastern Province
of Sri Lanka. He had no schooling and was illiterate in all languages at the time of
his arrest. On 16 July 1993, while he was sleeping at home, he was arrested by Sri
Lankan security forces and brought to the Komanthurai Army Camp, where he was
assaulted by soldiers. Later he was handed over to the Counter Subversive Unit of
the Batticoloa Police where he was subject to further assaults, threats and abuse.
In or around August 1993 the petitioner was produced before a magistrate and
remanded back to the custody of the Batticoloa police. On 30 September 1993 Police
Constable (PC) Hashim of the Batticoloa police got the petitioner to put his thumb
impression on several typed pages in the Sinhala language after getting particulars
of the petitioner and his family.116 On 11 December 1993 the petitioner was taken to
the Assistant Superintendent of Police (ASP) Herath’s office where he allegedly
made a confessionary statement to the ASP which was recorded by PC Hashim. On
2 September 1994 the Attorney General filed indictment against the petitioner on
five counts117 and the indictment was served on 30 September 1994.
114 In the matter of an application for revision and/or review of the Judgment and order to
Supreme Court (Special) Leave Application No. 182/99 dated 28 January 2000 and pursuant to
the findings of the Human Rights Committee set up under the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights in Communication No. 1033 of 2001 made under the Optional Protocol
thereto.
115 The information for this analysis is taken from the petition, the written submissions of the
petitioner, the written submissions of the respondent and the judgment of the Supreme Court. In
some instances the wording of these documents has been re-produced verbatim.
116 The petitioner, being Tamil by ethnic origin, would have spoken in the Tamil language. His
evidence was translated into Sinhala by PC Hashim.
117 The first count was under Regulation 23(a) of the Emergency (Miscellaneous Provisions and
Powers) Regulations No. 1 of 1989 of having conspired by unlawful means to overthrow the
government with several other persons and persons unknown. The other four counts were under
certain provisions of the Prevention of Terrorism Act No. 30 of 1981 (PTA) of having attacked
four army camps with a view to achieving the objective set out in count 1.
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Trial commenced in the High Court of Colombo on 30 September 1994. The
petitioner pleaded not guilty to all counts and objected to the admissibility of the
confession on the grounds that it was not voluntary. Having heard the evidence of
the petitioner and the two police officers involved, the High Court judge found an
inconsistency in the petitioner’s evidence on one issue – namely the time he spent in
the ASP’s office when the statement was being typed. On this issue alone, and
ignoring the entirety of his testimony or the nature of the burden resting on him,118
the evidence of the police officers was accepted and the confession admitted in
evidence as being voluntary.
The trial resumed with the two police officers being the prosecution witnesses.
The judge referred to their evidence including the confession and concluded that it
was true. Accordingly the petitioner was found guilty and sentenced to 10 years’
rigorous imprisonment on all counts. On appeal, the Court of Appeal accepted that
the prosecution’s case rested solely on the confession. However, it rejected the con-
tention that the facts in the confession should be corroborated by independent evi-
dence. It held that the petitioner’s confession was voluntary and had been properly
recorded. The medical evidence that the petitioner had been assaulted after his arrest
and his evidence that the confession had not been made by him voluntarily was
dismissed without examining the circumstances. The conviction was upheld but the
sentence was reduced to seven years on all counts. The petitioner’s application for
special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed without reasons given,
on 28 January 2000.
On 21 November 2001 the petitioner submitted a communication to the UN
Committee on Human Rights (HRC) as provided for under the Optional Protocol to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).119 The HRC,
after considering the material placed before it by the Petitioner and the State, found
the following violations:
(a) That both the evidentiary provisions of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA)
which had been relied upon to convict the Petitioner, and the factual circum-
stances surrounding his alleged confession, negate the provisions of the ICCPR
relating to a fair trial.
(b) That the Petitioner’s right to a review of the High Court decision without delay
(Articles 14.3(c) and 14.5 of the ICCPR) had been violated.
(c) That the burden of proving whether a confession was not voluntary was on the
accused by section 16 of the PTA, and even if the threshold of proof is placed
very low and “a mere possibility of involuntariness would suffice to sway a court
in favour of the accused” (as claimed by the State), there had been a willingness
118 Under s.16 of the PTA the burden of proving that a confession is not voluntary is on the
accused person.
119 Sri Lanka acceded to the ICCPR on 11 June 1980 and to the Optional Protocol on 3 October
1997.
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of the Courts at all stages to dismiss complaints of torture and ill treatment.
This was a violation of Articles 14.2 and 14.3(g) of the ICCPR (which relate to
the presumption of innocence and the guarantee not to be compelled to testify
against oneself or to confess guilt).
(d) That Section 16 of the PTA violated Articles 14.2 and 14.3(g) of the ICCPR.
The HRC also stated that “[i]n accordance with Article 2, para 3(a) of the Covenant,
the State party is under an obligation to provide the author (i.e. the Petitioner) with
an effective and appropriate remedy, including retrial and compensation. The State
party is under an obligation to avoid similar violations in the future and should
ensure that the impugned sections of the PTA are made compatible with the provi-
sions of the Covenants”. The HRC requested the State to provide it with informa-
tion within 90 days as to what measures it had taken with regard to give effect to its
views.
The Sri Lanka government in its response to the HRC dated 2 February 2005
stated that it had declined to do anything for the following reasons.
The Constitution of Sri Lanka and the prevailing legal regime do not provide for
release or re-trial of a convicted person after his conviction is affirmed by the highest
Appellate Court, the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka. Therefore the State does not have
the legal authority to execute the decision of the Human Rights Committee to release
the convict or grant a re-trial. The government of Sri Lanka cannot be expected to act
in any manner which is contrary to the Constitution of Sri Lanka.
The petitioner thereafter made an application to the Supreme Court for the exercise
of the Court’s inherent power of revision and/or review of a conviction and sen-
tence. He argued that the position of the Sri Lanka government did not accurately
represent the State’s obligations under the ICCPR which requires the State to pro-
vide an effective remedy for violations of rights guaranteed by it.120 Referring to
General Comment 31 of the HRC and Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties (1969), he argued that the executive branch of the government
cannot avoid compliance with the ICCPR by arguing that an act which violated its
provisions was carried out by another branch of government. Therefore, when the
HRC forwarded its views to the State, Article 2(3) of the ICCPR required it to give
an “effective remedy” for the violation. The petitioner therefore argued that the
State’s response frustrated his legitimate expectation that the government, by acced-
ing to the Optional Protocol, would consider itself bound to give effect to the views
of the HRC.
The petitioner also pleaded that all three courts erred in law and fact in their
findings, which resulted in his conviction and a grave miscarriage of justice. These
errors related to the alleged confession which he made, the lack of independent
120 Article 2(3)(a) of the ICCPR.
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corroboration of the confession, the provisions of the PTA which shifted the burden
of proof and required him to establish the involuntariness of the confession, and
the decision of the High Court which shifted the burden on him to prove his inno-
cence. His right to a fair trial was violated by the Court’s failure to consider exculpa-
tory evidence, i.e. the medical evidence which showed that he had been assaulted
while in police custody, lack of an independent translation of his confession which
he was made to sign and the making of the confession at a time when he had had no
access to a lawyer for several months. He further argued that the Emergency Regula-
tions under which he had been convicted were ultra vires the Constitution of Sri
Lanka.
The petitioner therefore prayed the Court, inter alia, to permit him to support
the application, set aside the conviction of the High Court and the judgments and
orders of the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, and to make order for his
release and the granting of compensation.
The decision of the Supreme Court
The unanimous judgment of the five Member Divisional Bench of the Supreme
Court was delivered by the Chief Justice with the other judges concurring. Rather
than considering the substantive issues raised by the petitioner in his appeal, the
Court chose instead to focus on the issue of the ICCPR and its Optional Protocol
and their relevance to the Sri Lankan constitutional processes.
The Court firstly considered whether Sri Lanka followed a monist or a dualist
system. Citing Articles 3 and 4 of the Constitution which refers to sovereignty, Silva
CJ stated: “Sovereignty within and in respect of the territory constituting one coun-
try is reposed in the People. Sovereignty includes legislative, executive and judicial
power, exercised by the respective organs of government for and in trust for the
People. There is a functional separation in the exercise of power derived from the
Sovereignty of the People by the three organs of government . . . The organs of
government do not have a plenary power that transcends the Constitution and the
exercise of power is circumscribed by the Constitution and the written law that
derive its authority therefrom.”
In the light of his conclusion that Sri Lanka followed a dualist legal system, the
Chief Justice went on to say that the President as head of State is empowered to
enter into treaties or accede to a Covenant, the contents of which are not inconsis-
tent with the Constitution or written law. The President is not the repository of
plenary executive power which, in all spheres, constitutes the inalienable sovereignty
of the people. While he/she may enter into international treaties, such treaties must
be implemented by the exercise of the legislative power of parliament in order to
have internal effect and attribute rights and duties to individuals. “Without taking
such measures, in 1997 the Optional Protocol was acceded to purporting to give a
remedy through the Human Rights Committee in respect of the violation of rights
that have not been enacted to the law of Sri Lanka.”
Citing the declaration made by the President as head of State and government
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upon accession to the Optional Protocol,121 Silva CJ stated that one of its com-
ponents was a recognition of the power of the HRC to receive and consider such
a communication of alleged violations of rights under the Covenant. He argued
that such a purported conferment is inconsistent with the Constitution, making
accession to the Optional Protocol in 1997 by the then President ultra vires the
Constitution and Presidential powers. He held that “[t]he accession and declaration
does not bind the Republic qua State and has no legal effect within the Republic”.
Considering the submissions of the petitioner in regard to the findings of the
HRC, he took the view that the alternative remedies specified by the HRC cannot be
comprehended in the context of Sri Lanka’s court procedure and the “Committee at
Geneva, not linked with the Sovereignty of the People, has purported to set aside the
order made at all three levels of Courts that exercise the judicial power of the People
of Sri Lanka”. Therefore, “the Petitioner cannot seek to vindicate and enforce his
rights through the Human Rights Committee at Geneva which is not reposed with
judicial power under our Constitution”. The Supreme Court which is the highest
and final superior court of record in Sri Lanka, cannot vary or set aside its order on
the findings of the HRC. Therefore, the Court held that the petitioner’s application
was misconceived and without legal basis and dismissed it accordingly.
NATIONAL LAWS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW MATTERS
Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Financing Act No. 25 of 2005
This is an Act to give effect to the Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist
Financing which was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in
December 1991 and which Sri Lanka ratified in September 2000.
The offences under the Act have been set out in section 3. Any person who
provides or collects funds directly or indirectly, unlawfully or wilfully with the inten-
tion or knowledge that such funds will be used to commit the specified acts is guilty
of an offence under this law. The acts include any act which constitutes an offence
within the scope of or definition of any other Treaties specified in Schedule I122 or
121 Available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty6_asp.htm accessed on 3 June 2008.
122 The Treaties are – Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (1970),
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (1971),
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Per-
sons, including Diplomatic Agents (1973), International Convention against the Taking of Hos-
tages (1979), Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1980), Protocol for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports serving International Civil Aviation
Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety
of Civil Aviation (1988), Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation (1988), Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf (1988) and International Convention for the
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997).
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“any other act, intended to cause death or serious bodily injury, to civilians or to any
other person not taking an active part in the hostilities, in a situation of armed
conflict, and the purpose of such act, by its nature or context is to intimidate a
population or to compel a government or an international organization, to do or to
abstain from doing any act”. Further, it is not necessary to show that the funds were
actually used in the commission of the offence.
Attempting, aiding or abetting or acting with a common purpose with another
person to commit the offence is also a violation of these provisions. If an offence is
committed by a body of persons, every member, director, manager, secretary, officer
or servant of such body of persons shall be guilty of the offence unless it can be
proved that it was done without his/her knowledge or that he/she exercised due
diligence to prevent it.
The punishment for committing such offences shall be imprisonment for
between 15 and 20 years. Further, on indictment of any person in the High Court, all
funds collected in contravention of this law shall be seized or frozen until the conclu-
sion of the trial, whether lying in an account with any bank or in the possession of
such person. On conviction of such person, the funds shall be forfeited to the State
subject to the provisions of the Act.
Offences under this Act shall be tried by the High Court of Colombo or of the
Western Province situated in Colombo. If the offence is committed outside Sri
Lanka, the Court will have jurisdiction to try it as if it were committed within Sri
Lanka under the following circumstances – the accused is present in Sri Lanka; the
act is committed by a Sri Lankan citizen, or a citizen of a country which is a Party to
the Convention, or by a stateless person who has his/her habitual residence is Sri
Lanka; such act is committed against or on board a ship or aircraft registered in Sri
Lanka or under the laws of another State which is a Party to the Convention at the
time it was committed; or the person in relation to whom the offence was committed
is a citizen of Sri Lanka; or such act is committed to compel the government of
Sri Lanka to do or abstain from doing any act; such act is committed against a State
or a government facility of that State situated in another country, including any
diplomatic or consular premises of such State; or such act is committed against any
property owned, leased or used by the government of Sri Lanka including an
embassy or other diplomatic or consular premises of Sri Lanka.
Several provisions deal with non-Sri Lankan citizens who may be arrested for
the commission of such offences. Such accused persons have been accorded rights of
communication with their State of nationality or in the case of stateless persons the
State where they were habitually resident. The Extradition Law, No. 8 of 1977, and
the provisions of the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, No. 25 of 2002,
will also be applicable in specified and relevant circumstances. The Minister of For-
eign Affairs is also empowered to make necessary regulations to give effect to the
Act.
244 Asian Yearbook of International Law
Convention on Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Women and Children for
Prostitution Act No. 30 of 2005
This is an Act to give effect to the Convention on Preventing and Combating
Trafficking in Women and Children for Prostitution adopted by the South Asian
Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) in January 2002 and to which Sri
Lanka became a signatory.
The provisions of the Act are fairly straightforward. “Trafficking” has been
defined for the purposes of the Act as “the moving, selling or buying of women and
children for prostitution within and outside a country for monetary or other con-
siderations with or without the consent of the person being subjected to trafficking”.
Section 2 states that any person who keeps, maintains or manages, knowingly
finances or takes part in the financing of, or knowingly lets or rents a building or
other place or any part thereof for the purpose of trafficking of women and children
for prostitution or any matter connected thereto, shall be guilty of an offence under
this Act. Any person who attempts to commit, aids or abets in the commission of or
conspires to commit any of these offences shall also be guilty of an offence. Punish-
ments for the offences have been set out as imprisonment of either description for a
minimum period of three years and a maximum of 15 and a fine. The Court may
recover compensation to be paid to the victim by way of such fine and a further term
of five years may be imposed for failure to pay such fine.
The remaining provisions of the Act relate to the procedural aspects of dealing
with the offences. The High Court of Colombo and the High Court of the Western
Province sitting in Colombo have exclusive jurisdiction to handle such offences.
Where an offence under the Act is committed outside Sri Lanka the Court shall
nevertheless have jurisdiction to try it if the offender is present in Sri Lanka, or is a
Sri Lankan citizen, or a stateless person who is habitually resident in Sri Lanka, or
the victim is a Sri Lankan citizen.
Certain aggravating circumstances listed in section 4 may also be taken into
account by the Court trying the case. These circumstances include situations where
the offender is involved in organized crime, has inflicted violence or used arms in the
commission of the offence, is holding public office and has misused the powers of
such office, has a record of such offences or is involved in the victimization or
trafficking of children. Further, if the offender is in a custodial or educational insti-
tution or social facility to which children have access for various purposes, this is
also deemed to be an aggravating circumstance.
The extradition laws have been appropriately amended to facilitate the extradi-
tion to and from Sri Lanka of those accused of such offences. Non-Sri Lankan
citizens arrested under this Act have been accorded rights of communication and
visitation by representatives of their countries of citizenship. The provisions of the
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act No. 25 of 2002 will also be applicable in
dealing with offences under the present Act.
The Minister is empowered to issue any general or specific directions which
may be necessary for the implementation of this Act. These include direction in
regard to measures which may be necessary to provide victims of trafficking with
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accommodation and shelter, to create awareness among the law enforcement
agencies and the judiciary of the offences under the Convention, to appoint officers
to any regional task force that may be established in order to implement the provi-
sions of this Act; to share relevant information, to promote public awareness of
the issues and their causes, to repatriate victims of cross border trafficking includ-
ing the provision of legal advice and health care. Importantly, necessary measures
will also be taken to monitor institutions involved in foreign employment to
prevent women and children being trafficked in the guise of being provided
employment.
Geneva Conventions Act No. 4 of 2006
This is an Act to give effect to the first, second, third and fourth Geneva Conventions
on armed conflict and humanitarian law.123 The Preamble notes that these Conven-
tions came into force in relation to Sri Lanka on 28 February 1959 and it has become
necessary to make legislative provisions to give effect to Sri Lanka’s obligations
under them.
Part I of the Act is entitled “Preliminary” and relates to offences committed
under the four Conventions. Section 2 states that any person, whether a Sri Lankan
citizen or not, who commits or attempts to commit or aids, abets, conspires or
procures the commission of a grave breach of any of the enumerated Articles of the
Convention shall be guilty of an offence. Such offence may be committed within or
outside Sri Lanka.
For the purposes of the Act, a grave breach of each Convention is defined in
section 2(2) as one which is a breach of the Convention in question involving an act
referred to in the following Articles and committed against persons or property
protected by that Convention:
First Convention – Article 50;
Second Convention – Article 51;
Third Convention – Article 130;
Fourth Convention – Article 147.
Where in the course of proceedings under the Act, a question arises under section 2
relating to the circumstances in which that Convention applies in relation to the
breach, a certificate under the hand of the Secretary to the Ministry of Foreign
123 The four Conventions are respectively – Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Conditions of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forced in the Field (1949), Geneva Convention
for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea (1949), Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
(1949) and Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of war
(1949).
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Affairs stating that the Convention applies in a particular situation shall be
admissible as evidence and shall be prima facie evidence of such fact.124
The terms “aids”, “abets”, “conspires” and “procures” shall have the same
meaning as that in the Penal Code of Sri Lanka. Any person convicted of an offence
shall be punished with death where the offence involves the wilful killing of a person
protected by any of the Conventions, and imprisonment of either description not
exceeding 20 years for any other offence.125
The offences shall be triable by the High Court of the Western Province, holden
in Colombo.126 All offences under the Act are cognizable and non-bailable within the
meaning and for the purposes of the Criminal Procedure Code Act No. 15 of
1979.127 The Court may, where it is considered appropriate in the public interest or
the interests of justice, exclude the public or any person from its proceedings.128
Every prosecution shall be by way of direct indictment filed by the Attorney Gen-
eral. However, this provision will not affect the provisions of the Army Act, Navy
Act or Air Force Act129 relating to the jurisdiction of courts martial trying persons
who commit civil offences under their provisions.
Part II of the Act is entitled “Legal proceedings in respect of protected persons”.
Such protected persons are protected prisoners of war130 and protected internees.131
A trial shall not proceed in respect of such persons unless it is proved to the satisfac-
tion of the Court that the following matters (insofar as they are known to the
prosecutor) had been served three weeks previously on the protecting power if any,
and if the accused is a protected prisoner of war, on the accused and the prisoners’
representatives. The matters to be so served are the name, date of birth and descrip-
tion of the accused; where the accused is a protected prisoner of war (POW), his
rank and his army, regimental, personal and serial numbers; the accused’s place of
detention, internment or residence; the offence with which he/she is charged; and the
Court before which the trial is to take place and the date and time of such trial.
Section 8 relates to legal representation of prisoners of war. Under this section,
where any person is brought to trial for an offence under Section 2 or where a
protected POW is brought to trial for any offence, the trial shall not continue unless
the accused is represented by counsel or the Court is satisfied that a period of 21 days






129 Chapters 357, 358 and 359 respectively of the Legislative Enactments.
130 Section 7. Section 4(3) of Part I States that any person referred to in Art. 5 of the Third
Convention may apply to the High Court for a declaration that he has the status of a protected
prisoner of war.
131 The interpretation clause defines a “protected internee” as “a person protected by the Fourth
Convention and interned in Sri Lanka”.
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Where there is no counsel accepted by the accused as representing him/her, counsel
instructed for that purpose by the protecting power shall be regarding as so repre-
senting him/her. In cases where the Court has adjourned proceedings due to lack of
counsel, the Court shall direct that a counsel be assigned to watch over the interests
of the accused at future proceedings in connection with offence. Where there is no
other counsel at such future proceedings, such counsel so assigned by the Court shall
be regarded as representing the accused.
Section 9 relates to appeals against conviction and sentence. Section 10 relates to
the reduction of sentence of custody of protected POWs and internees. Where a
protected POW has been convicted and sentenced to death, the Court shall, taking
all the facts into consideration, consider whether such sentence can be commuted to
life imprisonment. In fixing a term of imprisonment or other penalty, the period of
custody of the convicted person shall be taken into account.
Part III relates to “Abuse of the Red Cross and other Emblems”. Under this
Part it is an offence to display specified emblems for any purpose whatsoever in Sri
Lanka or outside or on board any ship or aircraft registered in Sri Lanka, without
the written authorization of the Minister or anyone authorized by him/her. These
emblems are the Red Cross, the Red Crescent, the Red Lion and Sun and the her-
aldic emblem of the Swiss Confederation as described in the respective sections. Any
other additional distinctive emblem subsequently adopted by the High Contracting
Parties to the Geneva Conventions may also be brought within this section by Order
of the Minister published in the Gazette. Defences to the offence and punishments
for contravention of this section have also been set out.
TAJIKISTAN132
NATIONAL LAWS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW MATTERS
The Law on “Protection of the Objects of Historical and Cultural Heritage”
Adopted 3 March 2006
The Law on Protection of the Objects of Historical and Cultural Heritage is the first
normative framework adopted after independence of the Tajik State in 1991 and is
dedicated to the protection and use of objects belonging to historical and cultural
heritage under the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of Tajikistan. The pre-
amble of the Law imparts the status of common property of the people of Tajikistan
to the objects of historical and cultural significance.
The Law sets the general framework regarding the objects of historical and
cultural heritage and in addition provides the definition of the term “objects of
historical and cultural heritage” employed throughout the text of the law. The scope
132 Contribued by Dr Tahmina Karimova.
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of responsibilities of the State agencies, legal entities and individuals with regard to
the protection and use of the aforementioned objects133 are also the subject of the
law’s regulation.
The term “objects of historical and cultural heritage”, according to Article 3 of
the Law, stands for all monuments related to historical events of the people, monu-
ments concerning the development of society and the State, products of material
and non-material art that hold historical, scientific, and artistic value, and other
valuables of national significance.
The objects of historical and cultural heritage are classified into two categories,
namely movable and immovable objects, and each is subdivided into different cat-
egories. The movable monuments include unitary pieces and complex objects and
immovable monuments consist of historical monuments, archeological monuments,
monuments of town planning and landscapes.
The unitary pieces include archeological findings, pieces of antiquity, disjointed
elements of immovable monuments, anthropological and ethnological materials,
historical relics, objects of art (paintings, graphics, applied art, cinema, and photo-
graphs) located in different State and non-State museums; funds, libraries,
depositories, collections; documentary materials, manuscript, graphic, typescript,
cinematographic documents, video-audio materials, and rare publications kept in
national archive funds. The complex objects consist of historical complexes, funds
and collections of unitary pieces that constitute one ensemble, as well as complexes,
funds and collections that hold a scientific value, or a holistic significance.
As for historical monuments, these objects include buildings, constructions,
memorials, historical necropolis, monuments and memorials related to the most
significant events of the life of the people of Tajikistan, development of the society,
the State and the culture as well as monuments concerning the lives of prominent
persons in the sphere of politics, science and culture.134
Archeological monuments are considered to be the objects such as caves, sites,
mounds, relics of ancient settlements, fortifying constructions, ancient mines,
irrigation systems, roads and bridges, grave mounds and necropolis, petroglyphic
illustrations and inscriptions. The objects of historical and cultural heritage are
furthermore classified into objects possessing national significance and those objects
that are of local significance, e.g. are especially valuable for the history and the
culture of a specific region, a city or a district.135
The objects of historical and cultural heritage are recognized as such only upon
registration in the State Registrar of Objects of Historical and Cultural Heritage.
This registrar according to the law is made available to the public. The lists of objects
belonging to individuals are made public only upon permission of the owners of
these objects. The registrar includes information about name, place, location, date,
133 The Law on Protection of the Objects of Historical and Cultural Heritage, Art. 1.
134 Ibid., Art. 4.
135 Ibid., Art. 5.
State Practice 249
researches conducted on the object, State, parameters, type of ownership over the
object, etc. The information on the movable objects should also include information
about the type and material of the object, techniques used to create the object,
particularities of the style of the creator, etc.136
Having set the regulatory framework at the level of definitions and classification
of the objects protected by the law in question, the legal instrument further on
provides a general framework for the government’s commitment with regards to the
protection and the use of the objects of historical and cultural significance. Thus,
among other obligations, the government exercises the function of forming the State
policy, financing of researches, identification, maintenance and restoration of the
objects of historical and cultural heritage. The government in addition is vested with
an authority to develop and approve programmes on protection, maintenance,
researches, and use of the objects.
More specific tasks are delegated to a central ministerial authority and to the
local governments. The functions of oversight on implementation of the Law on
Protection of the Objects of Historical and Cultural Heritage, management of the
State Registrar, inspection of the objects, development of State programmes and
international cooperation are vested to the central authority. The local authorities
on protection of the objects of historical and cultural heritage are organized by the
central-level authorities and are primarily engaged in identification of objects, their
registration, protection, restoration and their use.137 According to Article 11, the
State protection of the objects of historical and cultural heritage is ensured through
the following actions: (1) State registration of the objects that are of historical and
cultural value; (2) provision of historical and cultural inspection of the objects; (3)
development of projects on establishment of the zones of protection for the afore-
mentioned objects; (4) licensing activities related to restoration of the objects of
historical and cultural heritage; (5) granting permissions to researches related to the
objects; (6) securing protection signs; and (7) monitoring of the State of the objects
of cultural heritage. The historical and cultural inspection taken care of by the State
agencies solely is conducted for several reasons, such as identification of the object
of cultural and historical significance; collection of evidence for registration of the
object in the State Registrar of Objects of Historical and Cultural Heritage;
determination of the category to which the object belongs; and collection of the
evidence for exclusion of the object from the State Registrar.
Article 17 of the Law stipulates that some objects of historical and cultural
heritage can be included in the list of World Cultural Heritage in accordance with
the rules established by the Convention concerning the Protection of World Cultural
and Natural Heritage.
Section 4 of the Law thoroughly reflects the issues of financing of the objects of
historical and cultural heritage and their maintenance and restoration. The legal
136 Ibid., Art. 12.
137 Ibid., Arts. 9 and 10.
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provisions under the section harmonize in detail rules regarding the sources of
financing the protection and use of the objects falling within the jurisdiction of the
Law and their maintenance and restoration. According to the Law both budgetary
and non-budgetary allocations may be expended for the purposes of protection and
use of the objects. Among the measures of restoration, the legal provisions pre-
scribed by Article 21 determine the following steps: preliminary research of the
object; conservation of the object with an aim to preserve the current State of the
object and prevent from further destruction; repair of the object; restoration of the
object consisting of a combination of measures including research, projects imple-
mented to identify and protect the esthetical and historical value of the object;
regeneration of the object that includes measures aimed at restitution of the whole-
ness of the graphics, sketches of constructions and buildings; reconstruction of the
historical and cultural heritage entailing a number of research, project and produc-
tion works with an aim to improve the technical State and functional qualities of the
objects through introduction of partial changes into the construction that do not
alter significantly the uniqueness of the object; and adjusting the object of historical
and cultural heritage to the general use.
The Law on Protection of the Objects of Historical and Cultural Heritage
recognizes State and private ownership of the objects of historical and cultural
significance. Use of the objects for military purposes and privatization of the
objects are prohibited.138 The Law additionally sets the rules determining the scope
of obligations of the owner of the object and prescribes that in some cases based on
the exigencies related to protection, maintenance, use of the object as well as with
an aim to ensure rights of individuals, legal entities and the State, the property
rights of the owner of the object of historical and cultural heritage may be
restricted. The law does not provide guidance on/does not give specific references on
the procedures followed to impose restrictions on the owner. The legal provision
however, determines that the rights of the owner are fully restituted upon elimin-
ation of circumstances and conditions that have caused imposition of the
restrictions.
The Law foresees creation of protected national historical territories for objects
that present a special historical, scientific, artistic value and that are included in the
State Registrar. The legal provision on the issue differentiates two types of such
territories: (1) historical and cultural conservation areas and (2) historical places.
The concluding part of the Law sets general principles of liability for persons
acting in violation of the provisions of the Law on protecting objects of historical
and cultural heritage and prescribes that all disputes related to the protection and
use of these objects shall be dealt with in accordance with the domestic legislation,
e.g. the laws of Tajikistan.
138 Ibid., Art. 24.
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Unified Concept of the Republic of Tajikistan on Suppression of Terrorism
and Extremism
Adopted 28 March 2006
Tajikistan legislative framework provides a wide range of laws covering issues of
terrorism and extremism. Moreover, the Supreme Court of Tajikistan has developed
best practices of implementation of the anti-terrorism laws that give interpretation
to the provisions in the area. Yet the work has been ongoing and the Unified Con-
cept of the Republic of Tajikistan on Suppression of Terrorism (hereinafter the
Concept) was adopted in March 2006. The document stipulates that the Concept
represents a system of opinions on the content, main directions and forms of sup-
pression of terrorism and extremism and includes the key aspects of the State policy
in this regard.
The Concept document notes that terrorism is a crime of a global nature that
requires cooperation between States and law enforcement agencies. Further, the
threat of terrorism is of special concern to Tajikistan and the entire region
(e.g. Central Asia) since this phenomenon has been persistent for the entire period of
the establishment of the new and independent State of Tajikistan. Furthermore,
terrorism has a tendency to connect to different forms of transnational crimes
including illegal drug trafficking, illegal weapon proliferation (thus becoming
one of the sources of financial support), illegal migration and trafficking in
humans. The concept indicates that Tajikistan is a potential object of terrorist
and extremist attacks due to its geopolitical and economic situation. Lack of
coherence in interstate cooperation, regional and local armed conflicts, emerging
structures of transnational organized crimes are deemed to be at the root of
the global threat of the terrorism. In this regard, Tajikistan has taken a par-
ticularly active position in pursuing cooperation to strengthen peace and security
in the region. Furthermore, the Concept stipulates that the areas of joint action
should be geared towards identification, prevention and suppression of illegal
activities.
The Concept recalls international obligations of Tajikistan with regards to the
suppression of terrorism and extremism and stipulates that Tajikistan is bound to
ban terrorist and extremist activities against other States in its territory and should
create an effective system of fight against funding and propaganda of terrorism and
extremism. The Concept identifies the following areas as the basis for establishing
anti-terrorism structures: (1) international cooperation (among the States, organiza-
tions, law enforcement bodies, etc.) based on the provisions of international instru-
ments; (2) use of best practices of other States in combating terrorism; and (3)
establishment of a coordinated mechanism to combat terrorism and to suppress
potential channels of illegal weapons sale. The document reiterates that the core of
international cooperation remains with the system of the United Nations which has
been a driving force in the development of the normative basis for suppression of
terrorism.
The concept sets the following principles and objectives of the State policy on
suppression of terrorism:
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(1) Security and protection from terrorism and its threat for the State, its citizens
and other persons under the jurisdiction of its territory.
(2) Elimination of terrorist and extremist threats in the territory of Tajikistan.
(3) Establishment of the atmosphere of intolerance towards terrorism and
extremism in all its forms of manifestation in the territory of Tajikistan.
(4) Identification, elimination and prevention of causes and conditions conducive to
emergence and propagation of terrorism and extremism in the territory of
Tajikistan as well as elimination of the consequences of crimes of extremist and
terrorist character.
(5) Improvement of cooperation among the authorities in charge of prevention,
identification, suppression and investigation of crimes of terrorist and extremist
character, identification and suppression of activities of organizations and per-
sons involved in terrorist and extremist activity as well as resistance to financing
of terrorism and extremism.
(6) Development of common approaches for partners directly involved in suppres-
sion of terrorism and extremism.
(7) Strengthening of the role of the State as the guarantor of security of individuals
and society at large in situations of the threat of terrorism and extremism.
(8) Implementation of international norms on suppression of the financing of
terrorism and extremism.
(9) Development of the necessary international normative framework for
cooperation among international organizations, States, development and
harmonization of international norms, domestic legislation in the area of
suppression of terrorism and extremism.
(10)Development of cooperation of law enforcement structures and agencies of
State control to identify and prevent financing of international terrorism and
extremism.
The concept develops the following set of guiding principles for the achievement of
objectives and activities to suppress terrorism and extremism:
• commitment to suppress terrorism and extremism;
• inevitability of liability of both individuals and legal entities for participation in
terrorist and extremist activities;
• integrated approach in suppression of terrorism and extremism with the use of
combination of preventive, legislative, political, socio-economical and other
measures;
• averting exercise of the policy of double standards in international relations
involving suppression of terrorism and extremism;
• strict observance of principles and norms of international law.
In accordance with the Concept the principal directions of the activities of agencies
and authorities involved in suppression of terrorism and extremism include, inter
alia: (1) analysis of factors and conditions conducive to the emergence of terrorism
and extremism, forecasting of tendencies of the development and manifestation of
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these phenomenon in the territory of Tajikistan; (2) prevention, identification, sup-
pression and investigation of crimes of terrorist and extremist character; (3) pro-
vision of assistance to victims of crimes of terrorist and extremist character; (4)
suppression of terrorism in all types of transportation, objects of survival and crit-
ical infrastructure; (5) prevention of the use or threat of use of weapons of mass
destruction and means of its transportation, radioactive, toxic and other dangerous
agents, materials and technologies of its production for terrorist aims; (6) suppres-
sion of financing of terrorist and extremist activities; (7) prevention of the use or
threat of use of local and global computer networks for terrorist purposes (suppres-
sion of cyberterrorism); (8) improvement of normative framework of cooperation in
the area of suppression of terrorism and extremism; (9) cooperation with civil society
and mass media with an aim to increase effectiveness of activities against terrorism
and extremism; (10) suppression of propaganda of terrorism and extremism; (11)
participation in anti-terrorist activities of the international community, including
cooperation in the framework of international organizations and collective anti-
terrorist operations, joining efforts and assistance to development of a global strategy
of suppression of new challenges and threats under the umbrella of the United
Nations organization; and (12) improvement of the material and technical basis of
units performing activities on suppression of terrorism and extremism, development
of means and special techniques and equipment for the support of these units.
The implementation of the Concept document is supported by an integrated
approach involving measures and determined actions of the State agencies and pub-
lic institutions as well as individuals participating in the anti-terrorist activities. The
system to implement measures on suppression of terrorism is established in addition
to the concept through implementation of provisions of the Constitution of
Tajikistan, the Criminal Code, the Law on Suppression of Terrorism, the Law on
Suppression of Extremism, the Concept on National Security as well as a number of
international treaties adhered to by the Republic of Tajikistan. The concept provides
involvement of a wide range of stakeholders in the activities on suppression of
terrorism including but not limited to executive, legislative and judicial branch of
power, and local authorities.
Integrated Programme on Combating Trafficking in Humans
Adopted 6 May 2006
Following a consistent normative work on issues of trafficking in humans, Tajikistan
has adopted an integrated programme on Suppression of Trafficking in Humans in
the Republic of Tajikistan for the years 2006 to 2010. The normative process has
commenced by ratification of the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime and its supplementing Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking
in Persons, Especially Women and Children, and Protocol against the Smuggling of
Migrants by Land, Air and Sea.
The programme reiterates that according to the Constitution of the Republic of
Tajikistan, the international treaties adhered to by Tajikistan become part of the
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domestic legal system and in cases of inconsistency with the domestic legislation the
provisions of the international treaties prevail. As part of the national response, the
Tajik government has established a Working Group on Trafficking in Humans and
its Prevention and has passed the Law on Combating Trafficking in Humans. In
addition to this, there is a Multisectoral Commission on Combating Trafficking in
Humans, including representatives of a number of ministries and agencies such as
the General Prosecution Office, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Security,
Ministry of Labour and Social Protection, Ministry of Education, Ministry of
Health, etc. It is stipulated that the Commission is authorized to advance the State
policy of combating trafficking in humans and to develop recommendations to
improve the effectiveness of the actions taken by other relevant agencies.
In addition to interagency bodies, specialized departments within the structures
of individual agencies on trafficking in humans were set up. Thus, such a department
was established in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. With regards to the activities of
this department, the programme provides statistics on the results achieved for the
period of time the department has been functioning.
In view of the international obligations and commitment at the national level,
amendments have been introduced into the Criminal Code. These amendments
include among others introduction of the new elements of crime “trafficking in
humans”, amendments to the criminalization of the falsification of documents for
the purpose of trafficking, and “trafficking in minors”. The latter provision has been
particularly reinforced in view of the country’s commitment and obligation under
the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the ILO Convention on Worst
Forms of Child Labour.
The programme elaborates on the fundamental principles of the Law on Com-
bating Trafficking in Humans, defines the scope of application of the law and areas
of direct interventions. Along other areas of intervention, the programme particu-
larly outlines awareness raising on accessible judicial remedies to protect rights of
victims of trafficking, health services available, reintegration of victims of trafficking
into the society and provision of temporary shelter for victims of the trafficking.
The programme identifies future areas of work such as introduction of amend-
ments and additions to the current legislation of Tajikistan, development of the
information database, launching researches on the nature and the scale, including
mechanisms of the trafficking, training of the law enforcement bodies, health system
personnel, migration services and other key partners involved and improvement of
international cooperation in combating trafficking in humans.
The programme is designed for the years 2006 and 2010 and sets a list of object-
ives with a matrix of activities, timeframe, executive bodies and indicators. The
programme determines the following objectives to be achieved for the period men-
tioned: (1) monitoring of the trafficking in humans; (2) establishment of the training
components on trafficking in humans for the State agencies and agencies involved in
the anti-trafficking activities; (3) elimination of the social problems fostering the
ground for the expansion of the traffickers in humans; (4) setting up conditions for
return, reintegration of victims of trafficking in humans; and (5) improvement of
legislation and international cooperation.
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OTHER STATE PRACTICE
Subregional Framework Convention on Protection of the Environment for the
Sustainable Development in Central Asia139
Signed 22 November 2006
The five Central Asian republics signed the Framework Convention on Protection of
the Environment for the Sustainable Development in Central Asia in view of the
existent challenges in the areas of environment and sustainable development in Cen-
tral Asia. The preamble of the document recalls firsthand the commitment of Cen-
tral Asian States to cooperate in protection of the unique environment of Central
Asia and its sustainable use of natural resources and stipulates that this commitment
is geared towards: (1) promotion of the economic and social development with a
view to the protection of the environment; (2) acknowledging the signification of
ecological policy and legislation in the field of protection of environment and
development aimed at meeting fundamental needs of the people and improving the
quality of life and a secure future; and (3) development of regulatory framework for
regional cooperation in the area of protection of the environment; further develop-
ment of the existent agreements among the States of Central Asia (in the area of
protection of environment and rational use of natural resources for the sustainable
development).
The main objective of the Framework Convention is to ensure effective protec-
tion of the environment for the sustainable development of Central Asia, including
improvement of the ecological situation, rational use of the natural resources, as
well as the decrease and prevention of transboundary damage to the environment
through harmonization and coordination of ecological policy and actions of the
contracting parties via establishment of mutual rights and obligations.140
The Convention defines a number of concepts, including terms such as “bio-
logical diversity”, “degradation of soil”, “pollution” and “sustainable
development”.141
According to Article 2 of the Framework Convention, the provision of the
instrument applies to all territories under the jurisdiction of the contracting parties,
with special attention to the territory of the Aral Sea basin and to all types of
activities implemented by either of the contracting parties within their territory.
The Framework Convention determines that for the purposes of implementa-
tion of the provisions of the convention, the parties to the agreement shall be guided
by the UN Charter, principles of the international law and the following
principles:142
139 The Framework Convention determines that the term Central Asia refers to Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, Art. 1.
140 Ibid., Art. 3.
141 Ibid., Art. 1.
142 Ibid., Art. 4.
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(1) States have a sovereign right to develop their own resources in accordance with
their policy on environment and are responsible to ensure that actions under-
taken within their jurisdiction does not inflict damage to the environment of the
other party.
(2) Protection of the environment is an unalienable constituent of the process of the
achievement of sustainable development and cannot be viewed as a separate
process.
(3) Emphasis is on preventive measures in ensuring the protection to the
environment.
(4) In times of serious and irreversible threats to the environment, the lack of the
scientifically proved methods shall not be utilized as a justification for delays in
effective decision making and measures to suppress deterioration of the eco-
logical situation.
(5) Natural resources and other components of the environment shall be consumed
in a rational way to meet the needs of the present and future generations.
(6) Transboundary damages and other detrimental consequences shall be dimin-
ished by means of cooperation of the parties to the Convention on a bilateral
and multilateral basis and in the framework regional organizations. This process
shall include: (1) impact assessment of the specific action towards the environ-
ment; (2) preliminary, timely and sufficient information to the State parties at
risk of detrimental consequences and consultation in bona fide with such State
parties; (3) integration of a “polluter pays” system of environmental fines in
accordance with which the polluter compensates measures of prevention, con-
trol and elimination of the detrimental effects to the environment.
The Framework Convention sets a list of general obligations of the State parties,
including an obligation to cooperate in the spirit of partnership, a commitment to
undertake national measures and actions, to integrate interests of the environment
into the strategies, plans and programmes of economic and social development, to
consume transboundary natural resources in fair and reasonable mode, to cooperate
in the development of protocols to the Framework Convention establishing add-
itional measures, procedures and standards of implementation of the obligations
under the agreement and to undertake measures to improve the ecological situation
in the Aral Sea basin.
The protection of the environment and sustainable development are emphasized
throughout the treaty and the treaty requires State parties to the Convention to
include management of the natural resources in their national and regional pro-
grammes and plans of development. According to the Convention this should be
based on the environment protection policy and all policy frameworks should
undergo a regular ecological impact assessment.143 To this end, the Convention
143 Ibid., Art. 6.
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obliges the State parties to adopt a set of rules and procedures of impact assessment
in the framework of additional protocol.144
The Framework Convention sets a framework of regulations for the protection
of atmospheric air, water resources, land resources, wastes, mountain ecosystems
and biological diversity.
The contracting parties shall take all necessary measures for gradual decrease
and prevention of the pollution of the air, including the transboundary pollution,
protection of the water resources and the use of the land. The instrument sets in
general terms a standardized framework of obligations for the areas mentioned.
According to the provisions of the Convention, the States are bound to cooperate
and make use of the relevant mechanisms, regional projects and multilateral
schemes. Obligations under the Framework Convention with regards to the protec-
tion of atmospheric air, water resources and the use of land shall be further
developed in the framework of separate protocols. The protocols will be based on
rules and procedures covering monitoring of situation and sources of pollution of
atmospheric air, establishment of the structure for regional information exchange,
identification and prioritization of the polluters, and development of the regional
system of indicators of the air pollution, protection of the water resources and the
use of land.145
As for the management of the wastes, the Convention stipulates analogous
framework of obligations, e.g. taking all necessary measures through relevant
regional projects, bilateral or multilateral schemes and mechanisms of cooperation.
The Convention stipulates that provisions governing the management of wastes
require further elaboration in the form of a separate protocol and should be based
on rules and procedures established by the States. In particular the following areas
may serve as areas to be covered by these rules and procedures: (1) improvement of
the national registers of places of collection and disposal of wastes; (2) establish-
ment and introduction of a regional register of places of collection and disposal of
wastes that potentially may have a transboundary impact; (3) establishment of a
regional network of centres of safe productions and technologies; and (4) measures
and actions to prevent transboundary radioactive pollution from mining and testing
areas.
Similar lines of legal provisions are proposed in relation to the mountain
ecosystems and biological diversity. In terms of rules and procedures, the following
actions, among others, are included in the list to be taken into consideration:
improvement of the national systems of identification and monitoring of the
components of the biological diversity that are significant for its preservation and
sustainable usage; and joint measures to protect biological diversity in-situ and
ex-situ.146
144 Ibid., Art. 7.
145 Ibid., Arts. 8, 9 and 10.
146 Ibid., Art. 13.
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According to the Convention, the State parties should ensure constant cooper-
ation in exchange of scientific and technological researches, exchange of the results
for the purposes of development and implementation of the policies and pro-
grammes on protection of the environment. In addition the Convention recom-
mends establishment of regional scientific and technological centres for further
cooperation, development of ecological education and best practice sharing.
Aiming at effective implementation of the instrument, a regular exchange of
information on implementation of the provisions of the Framework Convention is
prescribed by Article 17. Furthermore the provision requires that the State parties
ensure access to information on the situation of the environment to the public on the
condition that this is done in accordance with domestic legislation and with
consideration of the provisions of international law. Participation of the public at
large is subject to adoption of rules and procedures by the State parties in this
regard.147
In accordance with the Framework Convention the State parties are bound to
take measures to set up and improve their national infrastructure to effectively
implement the provisions of the Convention. These measures may include adoption
or amendment of the domestic legislation.148 The conference of the State party may
develop rules and procedures to encourage implementation of the provisions of the
Convention and may even consider provision of assistance in situations of justified
failure to comply with the requirements of the instrument. The State parties are free
to adopt stricter measures of protection of the environment on the condition that
these measures are in compliance with the Convention and norms of the inter-
national law. The Framework Convention prescribes each State party to appoint a
national body and delegate authority to take actions in relation to the implementa-
tion of the Convention.149 Each national body submits a report on the status of the
provisions of the Framework Convention and protocols to it. The periodicity of the
submission of the reports as well as the format are to be decided by the coordinating
body established under the Convention.150
The Convention sets a body of rules for the treaty bodies, namely the Confer-
ence of Parties and the Secretariat, for the purpose of ensuring implementation of
the provisions of the Convention.
The Conference of Parties being the representative body is composed of one
representative from each State party. The first meeting is to be held not later than 12
months upon entry into force of the Framework Convention. The first meeting of the
Conference of Parties shall look, inter alia, into the following issues: establishment
of other bodies to the Convention if necessary; setting up the secretariat of the
Convention; and development of procedural and financial rules for the treaty bodies.
The following functions are vested in the Conference’s mandate: review and taking
147 Ibid., Art. 18.
148 Ibid., Art. 19.
149 Ibid., Art. 15.
150 Ibid., Art. 20.
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decisions on implementation of the provisions of the Framework Convention and
protocols to it; review and approval of protocols, amendments to the Convention;
review of the State reports on implementation of the provisions of the Convention,
as well as the review of the progress achieved by each of the parties and obstacles to
the implementation of the provisions of the Convention; review of the reports pre-
pared by the Secretariat; establishment and maintenance of liaisons and cooperation
with relevant bodies of the regional cooperation as well as international organiza-
tions, agencies, financial and scientific institutions, on issues related to the implemen-
tation of the Convention; establishment of support bodies that might be necessary
for the implementation of the provisions of the Convention and protocols to it;
appointment of the Executive Secretary and other relevant staff; performance of any
other functions that may be necessary for the achievement of the objectives of the
Convention.
The Framework Convention furthermore creates a Secretariat. In accordance
with Article 24 the Secretariat is composed of the Executive Secretary and other
personnel as required. The functions include administrative organization of the
Conference of Parties and its supplementary bodies; preparation and transfer of
notifications, reports and other information; review of the queries and information
from the State parties and consultations on issues related to the implementation of
the Convention and protocols to it; preparation and dissemination of the reports on
issues related to the Framework Convention; setting up and regular maintenance of
the data and dissemination of domestic legislation and international rules that relate
to the implementation of the Convention; organization of the technical assistance
and consultation at the request of one of the State parties for the effective implemen-
tation of the Convention and protocols to it and cooperation with other organiza-
tions of regional or international level.
The concluding part of the Framework Convention is dedicated to the issues of
amendments and the procedural rules of integrating the amendments to both the
Convention and the Protocols, resolution of disputes, ratification of the Convention
and the status of the reservations. According to Article 30 reservations are not
permitted under the Framework Convention.
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PARTICIPATION IN MULTILATERAL TREATIES*
Introduction
This section records the participation of Asian States in open multilateral lawmak-
ing treaties which mostly aim at worldwide adherence. It updates the treaty sections
of earlier volumes until 31 December 2007, unless indicated otherwise (see first note
below). New data are preceded by a reference to the most recent previous entry in the
multilateral treaties section of the Asian Yearbook of International Law. In case no
new data are available, the title of the treaty is listed with a reference to the last
Volume containing data on the treaty involved. For the purpose of this section,
States broadly situated west of Iran, north of Mongolia, east of Papua New Guinea
and south of Indonesia will not be covered.
Note:
• Where no other reference to specific sources is made, data have been derived from
Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, http://untreaty.un.org,
available as at 15 November 2007. The Editors thank the United Nations Treaty
Section for the permission to use the on-line United Nations Treaty Collection.
• Where reference is made to the Hague Conference on Private International Law,
data have been derived from http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.
listing
• Where reference is made to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
data have been derived from http://ola.iaea.org/OLA/treaties/index.asp
• Where reference is made to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO),
data have been derived from http://www.icao.int/cgi/airlaw.pl
• Where reference is made to the International Labour Organization (ILO), data
have been derived from http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm
• Where reference is made to the International Maritime Organization (IMO), data have
been derived from Status of Multilateral Conventions and Instruments in respect of
which the International Maritime Organization or its Secretary-General Performs
Depository or other Functions, as at 31 December 2007, available at http://www.imo.org
• Where reference is made to the Hague Conference on Private International Law,
data have been derived from http://www.hcch.net
* Compiled by Dr Karin Arts, Associate Professor in International Law and Development,
Institute of Social Studies, The Hague.
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• Where reference is made to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cul-
tural Organization (UNESCO), data have been derived from http://portal.
unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=12025&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_
SECTION= -471.html
• Reservations and declarations made upon signature or ratification are not
included.
• Sig. = Signature; Cons. = Consent to be bound; Eff. date = Effective date; E.i.f. =




Commercial arbitration Judicial and administrative cooperation
Cultural matters Labour
Cultural property Narcotic drugs
Development matters Nationality and statelessness
Dispute settlement Nuclear material
Environment, fauna and flora Outer space
Family matters Privileges and immunities
Finance Refugees
Health Road traffic and transport
Human rights, including women and Sea
children Sea traffic and transport





Antarctic Treaty, Washington, 1959: see Vol. 6 p. 234.
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
1958: see Vol. 12 p. 234.
CULTURAL MATTERS
Agreement for Facilitating the International Circulation of Visual and Auditory
Materials of an Educational, Scientific and Cultural Character, 1948: see Vol. 7
pp. 322–323.
Agreement on the Importation of Educational, Scientific and Cultural Materials,
1950: see Vol. 12 p. 234.
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Convention concerning the International Exchange of Publications, 1958: see Vol. 6
p. 235.
Convention concerning the International Exchange of Official Publications and
government Documents between States, 1958: see Vol. 6 p. 235.
International Agreement for the Establishment of the University for Peace, 1980:
see Vol. 6 p. 235.
Regional Convention on the Recognition of Studies, Diploma’s and Degrees in
Higher Education in Asia and the Pacific, 1983: see Vol. 11 p. 244.
CULTURAL PROPERTY
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export
and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, 1970: see Vol. 12 p. 235.
Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage,
1972: see Vol. 10 p. 267.
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict, 1954
(Continued from Vol. 12 p. 235)
(Status as provided by UNESCO)
Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict, 1954
(Continued from Vol. 12 p. 235)
(Status as provided by UNESCO)
Second Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict
The Hague, 26 March 1999
Entry into Force: 9 March 2004
(Status as provided by UNESCO)
State Sig. Cons.
Japan 10 Sept 2007
State Sig. Cons.
Japan 10 Sept 2007
State Sig. Cons. State Sig. Cons.
Iran 24 May 2005 Tajikistan 21 Feb 2006
Japan 10 Sept 2007
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Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, 2003
(Continued and corrected from Vol. 12. p. 235)
(Status as provided by UNESCO)
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the
Diversity of Cultural Expressions
Paris, 20 October 2005
Entry into Force: 18 March 2007
(Status as provided by UNESCO)
DEVELOPMENT MATTERS
Charter of the Asian and Pacific Development Centre, 1982: see Vol. 7 pp. 323–324.
Agreement to Establish the South Centre, 1994: see Vol. 7 p. 324.
Amendments to the Charter of the Asian and Pacific Development Centre, 1998:
see Vol. 10 p. 267.
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals
of Other States, 1965: see Vol. 11 p. 245.
Declarations Recognizing as Compulsory the Jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice under Article 36, paragraph 2,
of the Statute of the Court:
(Continued from Vol. 6 p. 238)
ENVIRONMENT, FAUNA AND FLORA
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, as
amended, 1954: see Vol. 6 p. 238.
International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil
Pollution Casualties, 1969: see Vol. 9 p. 284.
State Sig. Cons. State Sig. Cons.
Indonesia 15 Oct 2007 Philippines 18 Aug 2006
State Sig. Cons. State Sig. Cons.
Bangladesh 31 May 2007 Laos 5 Nov 2007
Cambodia 19 Sep 2007 Mongolia 15 Oct 2007
China 30 Jan 2007 Tajikistan 24 Oct 2007
India 15 Dec 2006 Vietnam 7 Aug 2007
State Sig. Cons.
Japan 9 Jul 2007
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International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969:
see Vol. 12 p. 236.
International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971: see Vol. 12 p. 237.
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and
Other Matter, 1972, as amended: see Vol. 7 p. 325.
Protocol Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Pollution by
Substances Other Than Oil, 1973: see Vol. 6 p. 239.
Protocol to the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage, 1976: see Vol. 10 p. 269.
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 1985: see Vol. 11 p. 246.
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 1987: see Vol. 11 p. 246.
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes
and Their Disposal, 1989: see Vol. 11 p. 247.
International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response, and Cooper-
ation, 1990: see Vol. 12 p. 237.
Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992: see Vol. 12 p. 247.
UN Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries Experiencing Serious
Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa, 1994: see Vol. 11 p. 247.
Amendment to the Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, 1995: see Vol. 12 p. 238.
Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1997: see Vol. 12 p. 238
Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as
Waterfowl Habitat, 1971
(Continued from Vol. 10 p. 269)
(Status as provided by UNESCO)
Protocol Relating to the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships, as amended, 1978
(Continued from Vol. 12 p. 237)
(Status as provided by IMO)
Protocol to amend the 1971 Convention on Wetlands of International
Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat, 1982
(Continued from Vol. 6 p. 240)
(Status as provided by UNESCO)
State Sig. Cons.











2 Nov 2006 Thailand 2 Nov 2007 III, IV and V
State Sig. Cons.
Kazakhstan 2 May 2007
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Amendments to Articles 6 and 7 of the 1971 Convention on Wetlands of
International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat, 1987
(Continued from Vol. 10 p. 270)
(Status as provided by UNESCO)
Amendment to the Montreal Protocol, 1990
(Continued from Vol. 12 p. 237)
Protocol to amend the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for
Oil Pollution Damage, 1992
(Continued from Vol. 12 p. 237)
(Status as provided by IMO)
Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992
(Continued from Vol. 12 p. 228)
Amendment to the Montreal Protocol, 1992
(Continued from Vol. 12 p. 238)
Amendment to the Montreal Protocol, 1997
(Continued from Vol. 12 p. 238)
Amendment to the Montreal Protocol, 1999
(Continued from Vol. 12 p. 239)
State Sig. Cons.
Kazakhstan 2 May 2007
State Cons.
Cambodia 31 Jan 2007
State Cons. E.i.f.
Iran 24 Oct 2007
State Sig. Cons.
Brunei 7 Aug 2007
State Cons.
Cambodia 31 Jan 2007
State Cons.
Cambodia 31 Jan 2007
State Cons. State Cons.
Cambodia 31 Jan 2007 Singapore 10 Jan 2007
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Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity
Montreal, 29 January 2000
(Continued from Vol. 12 p. 239)
Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain
Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, 1998
(Continued from Vol. 12 p. 239)
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, 2001
(Continued from Vol. 12 pp. 239–240)
FAMILY MATTERS
Convention on the Recovery Abroad of Maintenance, 1956: see Vol. 11 p. 249.
Convention on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations Towards Children,
1956: see Vol.6 p. 244.
Convention on the Conflicts of Law Relating to the Form of Testamentary Disposi-
tions, 1961: see Vol. 7 p. 327.
Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration
of Marriages, 1962: see Vol. 8 p. 178.
Convention on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations, 1973: see Vol. 6
p. 244.
Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of
Intercountry Adoption, 1993
(Continued from Vol. 12 p. 240)
(Status as provided by the Hague Conference on Private International Law)
State Sig. Cons.
Korea (DPR) 6 Sep 2000 3 Oct 2007
State Sig. Cons. State Sig. Cons.
Kazakhstan 1 Nov 2007 Vietnam 7 May 2007
Nepal 9 Feb 2007
State Sig. Cons. State Sig. Cons.
Bangladesh 23 May 2001 12 Mar 2007 Nepal 5 Apr 2002 6 Mar 2007
Kazakhstan 23 May 2001 9 Nov 2007 Tajikistan 21 May 2002 8 Feb 2007
Korea (DPR) 25 Jan 2007
State Sig. Cons.
Cambodia 6 Apr 2007
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FINANCE
Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank, 1965: see Vol. 7 p. 327.
Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, 1988:
see Vol. 12 p. 240.
HEALTH
Protocol Concerning the Office International d’Hygiène Publique, 1946: see Vol. 6
p. 245.
World Health Organization Framework Convention on
Tobacco Control, 2003
(Continued from Vol. 12 p. 241)
HUMAN RIGHTS, INCLUDING WOMEN AND CHILDREN
Convention on the Political Rights of Women, 1953: see Vol. 10 p. 273
Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, 1957: see Vol. 10 p. 274
Convention against Discrimination in Education, 1960: see Vol. 7 p. 328.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966: see Vol. 12 p. 242.
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimin-
ation, 1966: see Vol. 8 p. 179.
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
1979: see Vol. 11 p. 250.
International Convention against Apartheid in Sports, 1985: see Vol. 6 p. 248.
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989: see Vol. 11 p. 251.
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers
and Members of Their Families, 1990: see Vol. 11 p. 251.
Amendment to article 8 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1992, see Vol. 12 p. 242.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966
(Continued from Vol. 12 p. 241)
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, 1966
(Continued from Vol. 12 p. 242)
State Sig. Cons.
Kazakhstan 21 Jun 2004 22 Jan 2007
State Sig. Cons.
Laos 7 Dec 2000 13 Feb 2007
State Sig. Cons.
Kazakhstan 25 Sep 2007
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Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, 1984
(Continued from Vol. 12 p. 242)
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women, 1999
(Continued from Vol. 12 p. 242)
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, 2000
(Continued from Vol. 12 p. 243)
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, 2000
(Continued from Vol. 12 p. 243)
Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 2002
(Continued from Vol. 12 p. 243)
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
New York, 13 December 2006
Entry into Force: not yet
State Sig. Cons.
Thailand 2 Oct 2007
State Sig. Cons.
Nepal 18 Dec 2001 15 Jun 2007
State Sig. Cons.
Nepal 8 Sep 2000 3 Jan 2007
State Sig. Cons.
Iran 26 Sept 2007
State Sig. Cons. State Sig. Cons.
Cambodia 14 Sept 2005 30 Mar 2007 Kazakhstan 25 Sept 2007
State Practice 269
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities
New York, 13 December 2006
Entry into Force: not yet
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance
New York, 20 December 2006
Entry into Force: not yet
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT
International Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War, I–IV, 1949:
see Vol. 11 p. 252.
Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1977: see Vol. 12
p. 243.
Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 1977: see Vol.
12 p. 244.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 1883 as amended 1979:
see Vol. 11 p. 253.
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 1886 as amended
1979: see Vol. 12 p. 244.
State Sig. Cons. State Sig. Cons.
Bangladesh 9 May 2007 Korea (DPR) 30 Mar 2007
Cambodia 1 Oct 2007 Maldives 2 Oct 2007
China 30 Mar 2007 Philippines 25 Sept 2007
India 30 Mar 2007 1 Oct 2007 Sri Lanka 30 Mar 2007
Indonesia 30 Mar 2007 Thailand 30 Mar 2007
Japan 28 Sept 2007 Vietnam 22 Oct 2007
State Sig. Cons.
Cambodia 1 Oct 2007
State Sig. Cons. State Sig. Cons.
India 6 Feb 2007 Maldives 6 Feb 2007
Japan 6 Feb 2007 Mongolia 6 Feb 2007
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Madrid Union Concerning the International Registration of Marks, including the
Madrid Agreement 1891 as amended in 1979, and the Madrid Protocol 1989: see
Vol. 12 p. 244.
Universal Copyright Convention, 1952: see Vol. 6 p. 251.
Protocols 1, 2 and 3 annexed to the Universal Copyright Convention, 1952: see Vol.
6 p. 251.
International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phono-
grams and Broadcasting Organizations, 1961: see Vol. 12 p. 245.
Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, 1967:
see Vol. 12 p. 245.
Patent Cooperation Treaty, 1970 as amended in 1979 and modified in 1984 and 2001:
see Vol. 12 p. 245.
Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms against Unauthorized
Duplication of their Phonograms, 1971: see Vol. 12 p. 245.
Multilateral Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation of Copyright Royal-
ties, 1979: see Vol. 6 p. 252.
Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of
Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks, 1957
as amended in 1979
(Status as included in WIPO doc. 423(E) of 15 January 2008)
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES
Slavery Convention, 1926 as amended in 1953: see Vol. 7 p. 331.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948:
see Vol. 8 p. 182.
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and
Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, 1956: see Vol. 7 p. 331.
Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft,
1963: see Vol. 9 p. 289.
Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and
Crimes Against Humanity, 1968: see Vol. 6 p. 254.
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 1970: see Vol. 8
p. 289.
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Avi-
ation, 1971: see Vol. 8 p. 290.
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, 1973: see Vol. 7 p. 331.
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Plat-
forms Located on the Continental Shelf, 1988, see Vol. 12 p. 247.
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving
International Civil Aviation, Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 1988, see Vol. 12 p. 247.
State Cons. Latest Act to which State
is party
Malaysia 28 Sept 07 Geneva
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International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of
Mercenaries, 1989: see Vol. 11 p. 254.
Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, 1994:
see Vol. 11 p. 255.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons Including Diplomatic Agents, 1973
(Continued from Vol. 12 p. 246)
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, 1979
(Continued from Vol. 12 p. 246)
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation, 1988
(Continued and corrected from Vol. 12 p. 246)
(Status as provided by IMO)
Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the
Purpose of Detection, 1991
(Continued from Vol. 12 p. 247)
(Status as provided by the ICAO Secretariat)
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 1997
(Continued from Vol. 12 p. 247)
State Sig. Cons.
Thailand 23 Feb 2007
State Sig. Cons. State Sig. Cons.




Cambodia 18 Aug 2006 16 Nov 2006
State Sig. Eff. Date.
Malaysia 27 Nov 2007
State Sig. Rat.
Thailand 12 Jun 2007
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Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998
(Continued from Vol. 11 p. 255)
International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism, 1999
(Continued from Vol. 12 p. 248)
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000
(Continued from Vol. 12 p. 248)
United Nations Convention Against Corruption
New York, 31 October 2003
Entry into Force: 14 December 2005
State Sig. Rat.
Japan 17 Jul 2007
State Sig. Rat.
Malaysia 29 May 2007
State Sig. Rat.
Singapore 13 Dec 2000 28 Aug 2007
State Sig. Rat. State Sig. Rat.
Afghanistan 20 Feb 2004 Mongolia 19 Apr 2005 11 Jan 2006
Bangladesh 27 Feb 2007 Myanmar 2 Dec 2005
Bhutan 15 Sept 2005 Nepal 10 Dec 2003
Brunei 11 Dec 2003 Pakistan 9 Dec 2003 31 Aug 2007
Cambodia 5 Sept 2007 Papua New 22 Dec 2004 16 Jul 2007
China 10 Dec 2003 13 Jan 2006 Guinea
India 9 Dec 2005 Philippines 9 Dec 2003 8 Nov 2006
Indonesia 18 Dec 2003 19 Sept 2006 Singapore 11 Nov 2005
Iran 9 Dec 2003 Sri Lanka 15 Mar 2004 31 Mar 2004
Japan 9 Dec 2003 Tajikistan 25 Sept 2006
Korea (Rep) 10 Dec 2003 Thailand 9 Dec 2003
Kyrgyzstan 10 Dec 2003 16 Sept 2005 Timor-Leste 10 Dec 2003
Laos 10 Dec 2003 Turkmenistan 28 Mar 2005
Malaysia 9 Dec 2003 Vietnam 10 Dec 2003
Maldives 22 Mar 2007
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INTERNATIONAL REPRESENTATION
(see also: Privileges and Immunities)
Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations with Inter-
national Organizations of a Universal Character, 1975: see Vol. 6 p. 257.
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods, 1974:
see Vol. 6 p. 257.
UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 1980: see Vol. 11
p. 256.
UN Convention on the Liability of Operators of Transport Terminals in Inter-
national Trade, 1991: see Vol. 6 p. 257.
Convention on Transit Trade of Land-locked States, 1965
(Continued from Vol. 6 p. 257)
JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE COOPERATION
Convention Relating to Civil Procedure, 1954: see Vol. 6 p. 258.
Convention Abolishing the Requirement of Legalisation for Foreign Public Docu-
ments, 1961: see Vol. 12 p. 249.
Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil
or Commercial Matters, 1965: see Vol. 9 p. 291.
Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters,
1970: see Vol. 9 p. 292.
LABOUR
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, 1948
(ILO Conv. 87): see Vol. 9 p. 292.
Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (ILO Conv. 98):
see Vol. 10 p. 280.
Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (ILO Conv. 100): see Vol. 10 p. 281.
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (ILO Conv. 111):
see Vol. 12 p. 250.
Employment Policy Convention, 1964 (ILO Conv. 122): see Vol. 8 p. 186.
Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (ILO Conv. 138): see Vol. 11 p. 257.
Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (ILO Conv. 182): see Vol. 11 p. 257.
State Sig. Cons.
Kazakhstan 1 Nov 2007
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Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (ILO Conv. 29)
(Continued from Vol. 12 p. 249)
(Status as provided by the ILO)
Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (ILO Conv. 105)
(Continued from Vol. 12 p. 250)
(Status as provided by the ILO)
NARCOTIC DRUGS
Protocol Amending the Agreements, Conventions and Protocols on Narcotic Drugs,
concluded at The Hague on 23 January 1912, at Geneva on 11 February 1925 and 19
February 1925 and 13 July 1931, at Bangkok on 27 November 1931 and at Geneva
on 26 June 1936, 1946: see Vol. 6 p. 261.
Agreement Concerning the Suppression of the Manufacture of, Internal Trade
in, and Use of, Prepared Opium and amended by Protocol, 1925, amended 1946:
see Vol. 6 p. 261.
International Opium Convention, 1925, amended by Protocol 1946: see Vol. 7
p. 334.
Agreement Concerning the Suppression of Opium Smoking, 1931, amended by
Protocol, 1946: see Vol. 6 p. 261.
Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of
Narcotic Drugs, 1931, and amended by Protocol, 1946: see Vol. 7 p. 334.
Protocol bringing under International Control Drugs outside the Scope of the
Convention of 1931, as amended by the Protocol of 1946: see Vol. 6 p. 262.
Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs, 1936,
amended 1946: see Vol. 6 p. 262.
Protocol for Limiting and Regulating the Cultivation of the Poppy Plant, the
Production of, International and Wholesale Trade in, and Use of Opium, 1953:
see Vol. 6 p. 262.
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, as Amended by Protocol 1972:
see Vol. 12 p. 251.




Vietnam 5 Mar 2007
State Ratif.
registered
Nepal 30 Aug 2007
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Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961
(Continued from Vol. 12 p. 251)
Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971
(Continued from Vol. 9 p. 294)
United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances, 1988
(Continued from Vol. 12 p. 251)
NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS
Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, 1954: see Vol. 6 p. 264.
Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations concerning
Acquisition of Nationality, 1961: see Vol. 6 p. 265.
Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations concerning
Acquisition of Nationality, 1963: see Vol. 8 p. 187.
NUCLEAR MATERIAL
Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, 1963: see Vol. 6 p. 265.
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 1980: see Vol. 12 p. 252.
Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention (and the Paris
Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy), 1980: see Vol.
6 p. 265.
Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, 1986: see Vol. 9 p. 295.
Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological
Emergency, 1986: see Vol. 9 p. 295.
Convention on Nuclear Safety, 1994: see Vol. 12 p. 252.
Protocol to amend the Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, 1997:
see Vol. 8 p. 188.
Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, 1997: see Vol. 8
p. 189.
State Sig. Cons.
Korea (Rep.) 19 Mar 2007
State Sig. Cons. State Sig. Cons.
Korea (DRP) 19 Mar 2007 Nepal 9 Feb 2007
State Sig. Cons.
Korea (Rep.) 10 Mar 2007
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Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety
of Radioactive Waste Management, 1997
(Continued from Vol. 12 p. 252)
(Status as provided by IAEA)
OUTER SPACE
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of the States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 1967: see Vol. 6
p. 266.
Agreement governing the Activities of States on the Moon and other Celestial
Bodies, 1979: see Vol. 10 p. 284.
Convention on Registration of Objects launched into Outer Space, 1974: see Vol. 10
p. 284.
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, 1946: see Vol.
10 p. 284.
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies, 1947:
see Vol. 7 p. 338.
Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations concerning
the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, 1961: see Vol. 6 p. 269.
Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations concerning the
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, 1963: see Vol. 6 p. 269.
Convention on Special Missions, 1969: see Vol. 6 p. 269.
Optional Protocol to the Convention on Special Missions concerning the Compul-
sory Settlement of Disputes, 1969: see Vol. 6 p. 269.
United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Prop-
erty 2004: see Vol. 12 p. 253.
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961
(Continued from Vol. 12 p. 253)
State Sig. Cons.
(deposit)
Tajikistan 12 Dec 2007
State Sig. Cons.
Maldives 2 Oct 2007
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Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 1963
(Continued from Vol. 12 p. 253)
REFUGEES
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951: see Vol. 12 p. 254.
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 1967: see Vol. 12 p. 254.
ROAD TRAFFIC AND TRANSPORT
Convention on Road Traffic, 1968: see Vol. 12 p. 254.
Convention on Road Signs and Signals, 1968: see Vol. 7 p. 338.
SEA
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 1958: see Vol. 6 p. 271.
Convention on the High Seas, 1958: see Vol. 7 p. 339.
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas,
1958: see Vol. 6 p. 271.
Convention on the Continental Shelf, 1958: see Vol. 6 p. 271.
Optional Protocol of Signature concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes,
1958: see Vol. 6 p. 272.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982: see Vol. 10 p. 285.
Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, 1994: see Vol. 12 p. 255.
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea (. . .) relating to the Conservation and Management of
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 1995: see Vol. 12 p. 255.
SEA TRAFFIC AND TRANSPORT
Convention Regarding the Measurement and Registration of Vessels employed in
Inland Navigation, 1956: see Vol. 6 p. 273.
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1960: see Vol. 6 p. 273.
Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic, 1965 as amended:
see Vol. 12 p. 255.
International Convention on Load Lines, 1966: see Vol. 12 p. 256.
International Convention on Tonnage Measurement of Ships, 1969: see Vol. 6
p. 274.
Special Trade Passenger Ships Agreement, 1971: see Vol. 6 p. 275.
Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972
as amended: see Vol. 10 p. 286.
State Sig. Cons.
Sri Lanka 4 May 2006
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International Convention for Safe Containers, as amended 1972: see Vol. 10 p. 286.
Protocol on Space Requirements for Special Trade Passenger Ships, 1973: see Vol. 6
p. 275.
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as amended: see Vol. 6
p. 286.
Convention on a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences, 1974: see Vol. 6 p. 276.
Protocol Relating to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974
as amended 1978: see Vol. 12 p. 256.
UN Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, 1978: see Vol. 6 p. 276.
Protocol Relating to the International Convention on Load Lines, 1988
(Continued from Vol. 12 p. 256)
(Status as provided by IMO)
SOCIAL MATTERS
International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, 1904,
amended by Protocol 1949: see Vol. 6 p. 278.
International Convention for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, 1910,
amended by Protocol 1949: see Vol. 6 p. 278.
Agreement for the Suppression of the Circulation of Obscene Publications, 1910,
amended by Protocol 1949: see Vol. 6 p. 278.
International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children,
1921: see Vol. 6 p. 277.
Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children, 1921,
amended by Protocol in 1947: see Vol. 6 p. 277.
International Convention for the Suppression of the Circulation of and Traffic in
Obscene Publications, 1923: see Vol. 6 p. 277.
Convention for the Suppression of the Circulation of, and Traffic in, Obscene Publi-
cations, 1923, amended by Protocol in 1947: see Vol. 6 p. 277.
International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women of Full Age,
1933: see Vol. 6 p. 277.
Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women of Full Age, 1933, amended
by Protocol, 1947: see Vol. 6 p. 277.
Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of
the Prostitution of Others, 1950: see Vol. 12 p. 257.
Final Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and
of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, 1950: see Vol. 12 p. 257.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Convention on the International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT),
1976 (as amended): see Vol. 8 p. 193.
State Sig. Cons. State Sig. Cons.
Iran 31 Oct 2006 31 Jan 2007 Mongolia 19 Apr 2007 19 Jul 2007
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Amendment to Article 11, Paragraph 2(a), of the Constitution of the Asia-Pacific
Telecommunity, 1981: see Vol. 8 p. 193.
Amendments to Articles 3(5) and 9(8) of the Constitution of the Asia-Pacific
Telecommunity, 1991: see Vol. 9 p. 298.
Agreement establishing the Asia-Pacific Institute for Broadcasting Development,
1977: see Vol. 10 p. 287.
Amendments to the Agreement establishing the Asia-Pacific Institute for Broadcast-
ing Development, 1999: see Vol. 10 p. 288.
Constitution of the Asia-Pacific Telecommunity, 1976
(Continued from Vol. 8 p. 192)
Amendments to the Constitution of the Asia-Pacific Telecommunity, 2002
(Continued from Vol. 12 p. 257)
TREATIES
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organ-
izations or Between International Organizations, 1986: see Vol. 6 p. 280.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969: see Vol. 12 p. 258.
WEAPONS
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Warfare, 1925: see Vol. 6 p. 281.
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
Under Water, 1963: see Vol. 6 p. 281.
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1968: see Vol. 11 p. 262.
Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other
Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the
Subsoil Thereof, 1971: see Vol. 6 p. 282.
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use of Environ-
mental Modification Techniques, 1976: see Vol. 12 p. 258.
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons which may be Deemed Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate
Effects, and Protocols, 1980: see Vol. 11 p. 263.
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and
Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, 1993: see Vol. 12 p. 259.
State Cons.
Cambodia 5 Apr 2007
State Cons. State Cons.
China 27 Feb 2006 Maldives 19 Apr 2007
Iran 21 Jul 2006 Pakistan 18 Jun 2007
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Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 1996: see Vol. 12 p. 259.
Amendment of Article 1 of the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on
the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed Excessively
Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, 2001: see Vol. 12 p. 259.
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons
and on Their Destruction, 1972
(Continued from Vol. 12 p. 258)
(Status at 31 December 2007, http://disarmament.un.org/TreatyStatus.nsf)
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, 1997
(Continued from Vol. 12 p. 259)
State Sig. Cons.
Kazakhstan 15 Jun 2007
State Sig. Cons.





HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE CHARTER OF ASEAN (2007)
Li-ann Thio*
INTRODUCTION
Forty years after its founding, the Association for South-East Asian States
(ASEAN), on 20 November 2007, adopted the Charter of the Association of South-
east Asian Nations (“Charter”),1 after a two-and-a-half-year drafting process. It
needs to be ratified by all member countries before coming into effect.2
The Charter seeks to formalize the expanded ASEAN grouping which currently
consists of 10 Member States, excluding the South-east Asian State of Timor Leste
which attained independence from Indonesia in 2002. It signalled a maturation
of the grouping into a regional organization and the desire to fortify community
identity through a rules-based regime and to collectively secure shared objectives
through providing “an efficient structure”, as stated in the Cebu Declaration on the
Blueprint of the ASEAN Charter adopted on 13 January 2007.3
The Charter codifies ASEAN norms, rules and values and establishes the legal
and institutional framework for ASEAN with the intent to reinforce its role as the
premier regional inter-governmental organization. Article 3 of the Charter expressly
confers legal personality on the sub-regional inter-governmental body. Member
States are obliged under Article 5 to adopt “all necessary measures”, including the
enactment of domestic legislation, to effectively implement Charter provisions and
to comply with the obligations of membership.
While affirming goals such as economic progress and social stability, that
precipitated the founding of ASEAN, and underscoring the “shared destiny” of the
peoples of ASEAN nations, this formal ASEAN instrument explicitly embraces
normative aspirations for the first time, including “democracy” and “respect for and
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms” in its Preamble. This had
been identified as one of the principles to be embodied in the ASEAN Charter in the
* Ph.D. (Cambridge); LLM (Harvard); BA(Hons) (Oxford); Professor of Law, National
University of Singapore, General Editor, Asian Yearbook of International Law.
1 Text of the ASEAN Charter available at http://www.aseansec.org/21069.pdf
2 As of 18 April 2008, the ASEAN members who have ratified the Charter are Singapore
(7 January 2008, date of deposit); Brunei Darussalam (15 February 2008); Malaysia (20 February
2008); Lao PDR (20 February 2008); Vietnam (18 March 2008) and Cambodia (18 April 2008):
http://www.aseansec.org/ AC-update.pdf
3 Available at http://www.aseansec.org/19257.htm
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Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN Charter of 12
December 2005, that is, the “promotion of democracy, human rights and obliga-
tions, transparency and good governance and strengthening democratic
institutions”.4
THE FORMER MARGINALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS WITHIN ASEAN
This is significant given the reticence towards the language and agenda of “human
rights” which is woven into the fabric of other regional organizations such as the
Council of Europe,5 Organization of American States6 and African Union.7 While
securing social justice against the broader imperatives of regional peace and security
has always been an avowed objective of ASEAN, whose preferred working methods
are mediated through informal interaction and loose structures rather than
formalized proceedings, ASEAN has only warmed up gradually to the prospect of
explicitly incorporating “human rights” as a facet of its institutional agenda.
As the Singapore foreign minister stated before parliament on 9 April 2007
(Singapore Parliament Reports, 9 May 2007, Vol. 83, ASEAN Commission on the
Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children (Establishment)),
there was within ASEAN “a growing consensus of the need to protect and promote
human rights as we step up our community building efforts”. He expressed
Singapore’s support for the movement within ASEAN to raise “the general level of
awareness of human rights” which he noted was inter-related with “the rule of law
and good governance”.
Indeed, the promotion and protection of human rights did not feature in the
founding document of the Bangkok Declaration of 8 August 1967,8 issued by the
original five Member States: Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and
Thailand. Central to the organization of this sub-regional grouping, whose popula-
tion today numbers about 567.5 million, was the cardinal principle of non-
intervention in the internal affairs of Member States as declared in Article 2(c) of
the Treaty of Cooperation and Amity in South-east Asia of 24 February 1976.9
On occasion, this gave way to the operation of a “flexible engagement” approach
4 Available at http://www.aseansec.org/18030.htm
5 The members of the Council of Europe adopted the European Convention on Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms 13 UNTS 222, entered into force 3 September1953, in the belief that
this was one method of achieving greater unity amongst its members.
6 The Charter for the Organization of American States 119 UNTS 3, entered into force 13
December 1951 provides for the establishment of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights as well as an Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, which was to be adopted.
7 See Arts. 3(e), (h) and 4(m), Constitutive Act of the African Union, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/
23.15, entered into force 26 May 2001.
8 Available at http://www.aseansec.org/1212.htm
9 Available at http://www.aseansec.org/1217.htm
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towards addressing human rights issues. This called for the robust and frank
discussion of domestic issues affecting other ASEAN countries.10
While not explicitly mentioning human rights as an institutional goal, ASEAN
States frequently referred to social justice matters pertaining to the interests and
concerns of vulnerable groups such as women, children and migrant workers. For
example, the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of
Migrant Workers11 adopted in January 2007, while recognizing State sovereignty
in the formulation of migration policy, acknowledged the need for States to take
measures to protect the welfare of migrant workers. It recalled in its preamble the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,12 the Convention for the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)13 and the Convention on
the Rights of the Child (CRC),14 which treaties all ASEAN members had acceded to.
The aim of human rights is to secure human welfare, motivated by the principle
of human dignity. ASEAN shares this goal, though it has hitherto avoided the
mechanism of rights, preferring a “human development” approach by pursuing
programmes to meet these objectives, phrased in terms of State obligations rather
than individual entitlement. This maximizes State discretion and rejects any formal
mode of external accountability to monitor and evaluate the progress of each
ASEAN State in this respect. This is consonant with ASEAN’s preference for a
conciliatory working ethos and for “constructive engagement” with egregious
human rights violators like Myanmar, which was admitted to membership on 23 July
1997 and remains a perennial thorn in the flesh for ASEAN, particularly where
influential trading blocs like the European Union refuse to invite/attend meetings
where Myanmar is present.15
The 1967 Bangkok Declaration States that the aims and purposes of ASEAN
include securing “the economic growth, social progress and cultural development
in the region”. Thirty years after its inception, when ASEAN had increased its
members to nine, it issued on 15 December 1997 the ASEAN Vision 202016 which
reaffirmed its commitment to the objectives of the Bangkok Declaration. This
10 See, e.g. K. Chongkittavorn, “Asean needs ‘flexible engagement’, The Nation (Thailand),
Editorial & Opinion, 20 July 1998. See generally J. Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security
Culture: Origins, Development and Prospects (Routledge, 2002) at 165–190.
11 Available at http://www.aseansec.org/19264.htm
12 G.A. res. 217A (III), UN Doc A/810 at 71 (1948).
13 A. res. 34/180, 34 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 193, UN Doc. A/34/46, entered into force 3
September 1981.
14 G.A. res. 44/25, annex, 44 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 167, UN Doc. A/44/49 (1989), entered
into force 2 September 1990.
15 See, e.g. M. Abramowitz and B. Joseph, “An unwelcome guest : Will Europe sit down with
Myanmar?”, International Herald Tribune, 3 September 2004, at http://www.iht.com/articles/
2004/09/03/edmort_ed3_.php; and see generally “The EU’s relations with Myanmar” at http://ec.
europa.eu/external_relations/myanmar/intro/index.htm
16 Available at http://www.aseansec.org/1814.htm
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instrument noted the economic achievements of the region of 500 million people
with a gross domestic product of US$600 billion, such as “high economic growth,
stability and significant poverty alleviation”. The Vision referred to ASEAN “as a
concert of South-east Asian nations” which co-existed “in peace, stability and pros-
perity”, partnering in a process of “dynamic development” as “a community of
caring societies”. Express reference was made to a group of nations which mani-
fested “abiding respect for justice and the rule of law” and, consonant with the
goals of the United Nations Declaration on the Right to Development,17 which
sought to achieve “sustainable development” and government “with the consent
and greater participation of the people”. A vision of situated rather than autono-
mous man, consonant with a more communitarian outlook, was articulated in
urging a focus “on the welfare and dignity of the human person and the good of the
community”.
A continuing goal was to sustain ASEAN’s “high economic performance”, to
create a highly competitive ASEAN Economic Region through promoting economic
integration and a regime supportive of free trade and investment, to achieve in
solidarity the goal of narrowing the gap between the differing levels of development
among the Member States. In order to achieve a “caring” community, the aim was to
achieve “total human development” regardless of “gender, race, religion, language
or social and cultural background”. It envisaged the empowerment of civil society
which would then give “special attention to the disadvantaged, disabled and margin-
alized”, which means no welfare State is envisaged; rather, compassion is privatized.
Other specific problems which human rights instruments also address include
environmental pollution, trafficking in women and children.
SHIFTS IN ASEAN’S POLICY TOWARDS HUMAN RIGHTS
It was not until the convening in 1993 of the Vienna World Conference on Human
Rights, preceded by the regional Bangkok Conference of Asian States, that “human
rights” was formerly placed on the agenda of ASEAN. In paragraphs 16–18 of its
joint communiqué of 23–24 July 1993 issued after the 26th ASEAN ministerial
meeting,18 the foreign ministers welcomed the international consensus achieved at
the Vienna Conference, stressing the indivisibility of human rights whose promotion
and protection should not be politicized, and which should be addressed in a “bal-
anced and integrated manner” which paid “due regard for specific cultural, social,
economic and political circumstances”. In support of the Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action,19 they agreed “ASEAN should also consider the establish-
ment of an appropriate regional mechanism on human rights”. Furthermore,
17 Adopted by General Assembly resolution 41/128 of 4 December 1986.
18 Available at http://www.aseansec.org/2009.htm
19 A/CONF.157/23 (12 July 1993).
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ASEAN members like Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines also have
established national human rights institutions since the late 1980s.20
Proposals to establish an ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection
of the Rights of Women and Children, agreed to during the 10th ASEAN Summit in
November 2004 as mentioned in the Joint Communiqué issued at the 26th ASEAN
ministerial meeting, to be elaborated as noted under the Vientiane Action
Programme (2004–2010),21 have thus far produced nothing.
Nonetheless, the 2007 ASEAN Charter states in Article 14(1) that ASEAN
“shall establish an ASEAN human rights body”, which signals the intention to
create a formal institutional supranational structure dedicated to human rights pro-
motion and protection. This is significant in a region where human rights, primarily
civil-political rights, have been subject to qualification to serve the interests of secur-
ing public order, thought to be conducive to attracting foreign trade and investment,
a crucial aspect of economic development which many States consider key to nation-
building efforts. Indeed, the importance of narrowing the development gap “through
mutual assistance and cooperation” is a pervasive ASEAN priority and an express
purpose stipulated under Chapter 1, Article 1(6) of the Charter. This resonates with
the consistent assertion by ASEAN States that the right to development is a funda-
mental and inalienable human right to be secured through international cooperation
– certainly this is evident in paragraph 17 of the Final Declaration of the Regional
Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human Rights.22
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ASEAN CHARTER
The term “human rights” appears five times in the Charter, in the preamble, as an
articulated purpose (Article 1(7)), principle (Article 2(i)) and twice in relation to a
proposed ASEAN Human Rights Body. Notably, too, Article 2(e) affirms as an
ASEAN principle the “non-interference in the internal affairs of ASEAN Member
States” and the right of Member States to lead their national existence “free from
20 See, e.g. P. Eldridge, “Emerging Roles of National Human Rights Institutions in Southeast
Asia”, Pacifica Review: Peace, Security & Global Change, Vol. 14, No. 3, 1 October 2002,
pp. 209–226(18).
21 Available at http://www.aseansec.org/VAP-10th%20ASEAN%20Summit.pdf
22 A/CONF.157/PC/59. Notably the Vienna Declaration A/CONF.157/23 affirms at para. 8: that
“Democracy, development and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms are inter-
dependent and mutually reinforcing. Democracy is based on the freely expressed will of the
people to determine their own political, economic, social and cultural systems and their full
participation in all aspects of their lives. In the context of the above, the promotion and protec-
tion of human rights and fundamental freedoms at the national and international levels should
be universal and conducted without conditions attached. The international community should
support the strengthening and promoting of democracy, development and respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms in the entire world.”
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external interference, subversion and coercion” (Article 2(2)(f )); however, by charac-
terizing human rights as a purpose of the international organization, it can no
longer be taken to a matter for the exclusive determination of a particular State. The
Charter makes no reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, despite
Thai proposals that it should do so.
Human rights are now explicitly considered an integral aspect of civilized and
humane government, it being a stated principle in Article 2(h) of the Charter to act
in accordance with “adherence to the rule of law, good governance, the principles of
democracy and constitutional government”. Article 1(7) states that a purpose of a
people-oriented ASEAN is: “To strengthen democracy, enhance good governance
and the rule of law, and to promote and protect human rights and fundamental
freedoms, with due regard to the rights and responsibilities of the Member States of
ASEAN.” It is thus an express ASEAN principle for States to show “respect for
fundamental freedoms, the promotion and protection of human rights, and the
promotion of social justice” (Article 2(2)(i)).
How are the obligations in the ASEAN Charter to be enforced? In past practice,
the pacific settlement of disputes has been a key principle although no permanent
body was established in this respect. Articles 14 and 15 of the 1976 Treaty of Amity
and Cooperation provides for the constitution of a High Council staffed by minis-
terial representatives to take cognizance of disputes likely to threaten regional peace
and harmony and, where direct negotiations fail, to lend its good offices or to
constitute a committee of inquiry, mediation or conciliation and, where necessary, to
recommend appropriate measures. Article 24(2) reaffirms that disputes not concern-
ing the interpretation of any ASEAN instrument are to be peacefully resolved in
accordance with the treaty procedures laid out in the 1976 Treaty.
In relation to decision making, Article 20 of the ASEAN Charter provides that
as a “basic principle”, this is to be “based on consultation and consensus” and in the
absence of consensus, the ASEAN Summit, the supreme policy-making body of
ASEAN (Article 7(2)(a)), comprising the heads of State or government, was to
decide how a specific decision can be made (Article 20(2)). The Secretary-General is
responsible for monitoring the compliance with the recommendations and decisions
of an ASEAN dispute settlement mechanism and is to submit a report to the
ASEAN Summit. Clearly, political rather than legal mechanisms remain the pre-
ferred method of approach towards dispute settlement. The Charter does not create
any quasi-judicial dispute-handling mechanisms.
Where the common interests of ASEAN are seriously implicated, Article 2(2)(g)
provides for “enhanced consultations”. This demonstrates a realization that a blan-
ket “hands-off ” approach towards the domestic affairs of a Member State is
undesirable. Article 23(2) provides for a new initiative in relation to peaceful dispute
settlement as the ASEAN Chairman and Secretary-General can now be requested to
lend good offices, conciliation or mediation in relation to a dispute.
In relation to the proposed human rights body, Article 14(1) simply states that
“ASEAN shall establish an ASEAN human rights body” in conformity with the
purposes and principles of the ASEAN Charter relating to the promotion and pro-
tection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Charter does not suggest
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the form or nature of this proposed body, only that the body is to operate according
to the terms of reference which the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting is to deter-
mine. It does not even identify which human rights norms will inform the terms of
reference.
In short, while deeply symbolic, the ASEAN Charter at best demonstrates that
human rights concerns are a formal institutional purpose and that respect for human
rights now is clearly one of the principles of ASEAN. Being “constitutional” in
nature, the Charter itself does not provide details or stipulate an action plan for
actualizing the legal commitment to establishment of a human rights body but
defers this matter for future political decision, without a set time limit. It is unlikely
that muscular human rights protective enforcement mechanisms will be adopted;
earlier recommendations to consider sanctions, such as possible expulsion from
ASEAN, were dropped.23 Any institution is likely to be more oriented towards pro-
moting rather than protecting human rights, and certainly punitive sanctions are
extremely unlikely at this stage. Indeed, the Singapore foreign minister noted that:
“I’m not sure if it will have teeth but it will certainly have a tongue . . . It will
certainly have moral influence if nothing else.”24
Notably, paragraph 26 of the 1993 Bangkok Declaration reiterated “the need to
explore the possibilities of establishing regional arrangements for the promotion and
protection of human rights in Asia”. Similarly, paragraph 37 of the Vienna Declar-
ation and Programme of Action25 reaffirmed the “fundamental role” played by
regional arrangements in “promoting and protecting human rights” which should
reinforce rather than dilute universal human rights standards. Certainly, the ASEAN
Charter and its human rights clauses indicate the intent of South-east Asian States
to institutionalize human rights issues by creating a human rights body. It is unlikely
to be judicial in nature, given that ASEAN prefers informal methods of dispute
settlement, even in relation to institutional priorities relating to trade and regional
peace. Indeed, it has been hinted at by the Singapore government that the powers of
the body, which will evolve over time, “are more likely to be consultative than pre-
scriptive”, and that the chief focus would be to establish “something that is practical,
meaningful and has everyone’s support”.26 Subsequently, the second Singapore for-
eign minister in June 2008 suggested three criteria that should be borne in mind in
considering the form an ASEAN human rights mechanism might take: first, any
proposed institution had to have the support of all 10 ASEAN members, which
23 “ASEAN summit opens amid contention over Myanmar, snubbed UN address”, Jakarta
Post.com, 21 November 2007.
24 “Myanmar crisis to dominate ASEAN summit, but free trade, climate also high on agenda”,
International Herald Tribune, 17 November 2007 at http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/11/18/
asia/AS-GEN-ASEAN.php
25 A.CONF.157.23 (1993).
26 Second Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Raymond Lim Siang Keat, Singapore Parliament
Reports (Setting Up of ASEAN Human Rights Commission: Implications for Singapore), Vol.
83, 27 August 2007.
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necessitated a recognition of “the complex history of our region, the diversity of
political systems in ASEAN and the realities that this imposes on ASEAN in all
fields”, taking full cognisance of “ASEAN’s established traditions and procedures”.
Second, advancing the human rights agenda in ASEAN was best achieved “through
an evolutionary approach”, noting that while human rights were a universal ideal,
“the interpretation of most rights are still essentially contested concepts”. Thus, a
gradualist approach was advocated as “too much ambition can as easily scuttle this
important project as too little”. Last, the need to avoid setting “artificial deadlines”
for creating the institution for the sake of having a final product to point to; however,
being realistic in appreciating the need to establish consensus “should not be an
excuse for inaction”.27
Work on drafting the Terms of Reference of the ASEAN human rights body
was due to commence in July 2008, at the sidelines of the ASEAN Ministerial
Meeting to be held in Singapore. This marks the beginning of a process and it is
anticipated that this will proceed with deliberate caution.
It is hoped that the proposal for an ASEAN human rights mechanism will not
merely duplicate the existing State reporting obligations ASEAN States owe towards
various UN human rights treaty bodies, or that the mechanism be merely consulta-
tive or promotional in orientation. This would be cause for cynicism in the face of
egregious human rights violations.
Given the dislike of many ASEAN States for external monitoring and adver-
sarial modalities of scrutiny and critique, it is open to speculation as to whether an
inter-State or individual complaints mechanism for rights violations will be built
into the eventual ASEAN human rights regime,28 perhaps not in its first, but sub-
sequent incarnations. It is possible that ASEAN may create something entirely novel
in line with its preference for conciliation and other methods of inducing compliance
with accepted norms, in lieu of a public quasi-judicial procedure, but it is hoped that
a meaningful accountability mechanism will be established; consonant with the
declared desire to shift from a more State-centric to a more “people-oriented” con-
ception of the ASEAN community,29 non-government sectors of society should be
involved and participate in this process. The mechanism is unlikely to be suited to
addressing the problem of systemic human rights violations, such as those extant in
Myanmar, given the desire of the military junta to maintain political and military
control of the country. For this problem, political and diplomatic solutions will
continue to be sought, although ASEAN’s method of “constructive engagement”
with the military junta appears to have borne little fruit since Myanmar was
accorded ASEAN membership in 1997 in a highly criticized move. Indeed, despite
27 Speech, Mr Raymond Lim, 7th Workshop on the ASEAN Regional Mechanism on Human
Rights, 12 June 2008, available at http://app.sprinter.gov.sg/data/pr/20080612996.htm
28 See L. Thio, “Implementing Human Rights in ASEAN countries: ‘Promises to keep and miles
to go before I sleep’ ” (1999) 2 Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 1–99.
29 ASEAN Media Release, “ASEAN Leaders Sign ASEAN Charter”, Singapore, 20 November
2007, available at http://www.aseansec.org/21085.htm
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the increasing acceptance of Myanmar as a diplomatic embarrassment,30 ASEAN’s
meek attitude towards the military junta’s brutal crackdown on monk-led demon-
strations in September 2007 has been criticized as shameless kowtowing to the mili-
tary dictatorship,31 hiding behind the skirts of the principle of non-intervention in
internal affairs. This posture of seeking to keep Myanmar matters within the
ASEAN family, in the name of keeping its moral influence over Myanmar intact,32
renders ASEAN’s espoused human rights commitment somewhat suspect at best, or
reveals its weakened hand in dealing with an intransigent undemocratic military
dictatorship.
It is hoped that the human rights norms the eventual ASEAN human rights
body will espouse and implement will reflect and not dilute accepted human rights
standards; at minimum, it should be pegged at the level of the Universal Declaration
on Human Rights and treaties like the CRC and CEDAW, which all ASEAN mem-
bers are party to. The Charter itself made no reference to any UN human rights
instrument. It is likely that some concession will be given to regional particularities
as the drafters of the terms of reference of the human rights body will be instructed
by their political leadership “to take into account the history and diversity of
political systems in ASEAN”.33
Given the focus on the right to development by many ASEAN States, which has
been criticized as a statist rather than a human right, it is possible that a future
human rights body may well give concrete expression to a rights-based approach
towards development which appreciates that development goes beyond raising the
national GDP and contains elements of focus on individual welfare, political
participation in the decision-making process and equitable distribution of wealth.
Notably, the Singapore Declaration on the ASEAN Charter34 issued on the same day
as the Charter was adopted states that an abiding concern of ASEAN governments
is “to narrow the development gap and to advance ASEAN integration through the
creation of an ASEAN Community in furtherance of peace, progress and prosperity
30 W. Arnold, “Historic ASEAN charter shows division”, International Herald Tribune, 20
November 2007, at http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/11/20/asia/asean.php. Philippines President
Gloria Arroyo has warned that her legislature would be unlikely to ratify the Charter if Myanmar
did no demonstrate real human rights improvement, including a commitment to genuine dem-
ocracy and releasing opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyii from house arrest: “Burma warned
over Asean charter”, BBC News, 19 November 2007, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/
7101239.stm. Subsequently in June 2008, Arroyo urged Congress to ratify the Charter: “Arroyo
acts to get Asean Charter ratified”, Straits Times (Singapore), 7 July 2008, at 15.
31 “ASEAN dances to junta’s tune”, Bangkok Post, 22 November 2007, archived at http://
www.burmanet.org/news/2007/11/22/bangkok-post-asean-dances-to-juntas-tune-editorial/
32 Foreign Affairs Minister George Yeo, Singapore Parliament Reports (Myanmar), Vol. 83,
22 October 2007.
33 Second Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Raymond Lim Siang Keat, Singapore Parliament
Reports (Setting Up of ASEAN Human Rights Commission: Implications for Singapore),
Vol. 83, 27 August 2007.
34 Available at http//www.aseansec.org/21233.htm
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of its peoples”. This is phrased more in terms of “human development” than
“human rights” and it is hoped that consonant with the developing jurisprudence on
socio-economic rights, concrete and “measurable” methods of determining whether
socio-economic rights have been violated or whether these have been realized will be
developed, whether through indicators or a “violations” approach, to ensure that
the ASEAN human rights body transcends the symbolic and rhetorical, and
accomplishes something substantive.
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. MALER FOUNDATION
AND OTHERS: STATE IMMUNITY AND INTANGIBLE
PROPERTY
Davinia Aziz*
On 24 March 2008, the Singapore Court of Appeal delivered judgment in the case of
Republic of the Philippines v. Maler Foundation and Others.1 This appeal arose from
an application by the Republic of the Philippines (“the Republic”) to stay inter-
pleader proceedings concerning certain moneys held in the account of the Philippine
National Bank (“PNB”) at WestLB AG in Singapore (“the Funds”). The Republic
sought a stay of the interpleader, invoking State immunity in respect of the Funds.
The Singapore High Court dismissed the stay application, ruling that the Republic
had submitted to jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal dismissed the Republic’s appeal,
but disagreed with the High Court on the basis for denying the stay. The Court of
Appeal ruled that a foreign sovereign State is not entitled to invoke the doctrine of
State immunity in a case involving claims to debts or choses in action in the hands of
a third party which is not an agent or a trustee of the State. This is the first time that
a common law court has given a definitive ruling on this point.2
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The larger context to the Singapore Court of Appeal decision is a series of court
actions in multiple jurisdictions involving the Republic and various creditors of the
Estate of the former Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos. The tussle is over
assets described as “ill-gotten wealth” accumulated by Marcos, his family and his
associates during his Presidency.3 On 28 February 1986, President Corazon Aquino
* LLB (NUS), BCL (Oxon).
1 [2008] SGCA 14 (“ROP v. Maler Foundation”). As is usual in appeals from interlocutory orders,
the Court of Appeal sat as a two-judge coram consisting of Chan Sek Keong CJ and Andrew
Phang JA. The judgment of the Court of Appeal was delivered by Chan Sek Keong CJ.
2 ROP v. Maler Foundation at [33]. There are, however, obiter dicta in a number of UK House of
Lords cases. These cases are considered at some length in the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
3 ROP v. Maler Foundation at [4], citing Executive Order No. 1 (28 February 1986), online:
Supreme Court of the Philippines E-Library, http://elibrary.supremecourt.gov.ph.
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issued an Executive Order establishing the Presidential Commission on Good
government (“the PCGG”) to recover these assets, “whether located in the
Philippines or abroad”.4
The Funds that were the specific subject matter of the Singapore interpleader
proceedings were originally part of a larger pool of assets held in the Swiss bank
accounts of the Maler Foundation, the Avertina Foundation, the Palmy Founda-
tion, the Vibur Foundation and the Aguamina Corporation (collectively referred to
in the judgment of the Court of Appeal as “the Foundations”). The PCGG sought
and obtained remittance of the assets.
However, the Swiss authorities conditioned the remittance on the assets being
held on escrow pending a final and binding decision by a competent Philippine court
on their restitution or forfeiture. Under an escrow agreement concluded earlier
between the Republic and PNB, the Republic designated PNB as the escrow agent.
Once the assets were received from the Swiss authorities, PNB deposited the assets in
various banks in Singapore, including WestLB AG. One of the conditions of the
escrow agreement was that PNB undertook “not to dispose of the [assets] other than
in accordance with a final and enforceable judgment of the Sandiganbayan or any
final and enforceable judgment of any competent court in the Philippines”.5 This
condition is referred to in the judgment of the Court of Appeal as “the Escrow
Condition”.6
In 2003, the Philippine Supreme Court made a final order for the assets to be
forfeited to the Republic (“the Philippine forfeiture order”). PNB secured the
repayment of all of the assets deposited in Singapore, except for the Funds. WestLB
AG was unable to release the Funds to PNB because several other parties had
notified WestLB AG of their claims. These parties included the Foundations, and a
group of claimants who had obtained a 1996 judgment for damages in a human
rights class action against the Marcos estate in a United States District Court (“the
human rights claimants”).
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
WestLB AG filed an application for interpleader relief in the Singapore High Court,
naming PNB, the Foundations and the human rights claimants as defendants.7 By an
4 Supra, n. 4.
5 ROP v. Maler Foundation at [7]. The Sandiganbayan is a special court with jurisdiction over
“criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed
by public officers and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corpor-
ations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law”: online at Sandiganbayan, http://
sandigan.supremecourt.gov.ph/
6 Ibid.
7 WestLB AG originally named two other defendants. However, these other defendants had
withdrawn from the proceedings by the time the Republic’s stay application came to be heard in
the High Court.
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order of the High Court, the Funds were transferred to an escrow account held by
PNB’s solicitors, to be released only to the claimant found to be entitled to the
Funds.8 PNB made an unsuccessful interlocutory application for the interpleader
proceedings to be stayed on the ground of forum non conveniens. Then, about two
years after WestLB AG had first filed its application, the Republic successfully
applied to be added as a defendant to the interpleader proceedings.
About two months after it was added as a defendant, the Republic applied to
stay the interpleader proceedings pursuant to section 3 of the Singapore State
Immunity Act (“the SIA”).9 Section 3 reads:
General immunity from jurisdiction
3.—(1) A State is immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of Singapore except as
provided in the following provisions of this Part [i.e. Part II of the SIA].
(2) A court shall give effect to the immunity conferred by this section even though the
State does not appear in the proceedings in question.
In the High Court, the human rights claimants and the Foundations
(collectively, “the other claimants”) opposed the stay, arguing that: (1) the Philippine
forfeiture order did not give the Republic a sufficient interest in the Funds to assert
State immunity;10 and (2) the Republic had submitted to jurisdiction.11
On the first issue, the High Court held that it was not necessary to decide
whether the Philippine forfeiture order had the effect of vesting the beneficial
interest in the Funds in the Republic. Under the test set out by Earl Jowitt in the
Privy Council decision of Juan Ysmael & Co. Inc. v. government of the Republic of
Indonesia [1955] AC 72 (“the Juan Ysmael test”), all that the court had to consider
was whether the Republic’s claim to the funds was “not merely illusory, nor founded
on a title manifestly defective”.12 The High Court found that the Philippine forfeit-
ure order was sufficient evidence to meet this standard of proof.13 However, the High
8 ROP v. Maler Foundation at [81].
9 Cap. 313, 1985 Rev. Ed.
10 WestLB AG v. Philippine National Bank and Others [2007] 1 SLR 967 (“WestLB AG v. PNB”)
at 972.
11 Section 4(1) of the SIA states: “A State is not immune as respects proceedings in respect of
which it has submitted to the jurisdiction of the courts of Singapore.”
12 Juan Ysmael at 89–90. See WestLB AG v. Philippine National Bank and Others [2007] 1 SLR
967 at 973–4.
13 As the Court of Appeal observed (see ROP v. Maler Foundation at [25]), it is not clear whether
the High Court meant that the Republic was entitled to the stay on the ground of State immunity,
or whether the Republic only had standing to apply for the stay on the strength of the Juan
Ysmael test: see WestLB AG v. PNB at [7]–[13]. For its part, the Court of Appeal thought that
there ought not to be a difference between the interest which is sufficient to apply for a stay, and
the interest which is sufficient to grant a stay, for “[p]roof of an interest in property in the nature
of a debt or chose in action which is sufficient to apply for a stay is, in our view, sufficient to stay
the proceedings”: ROP v. Maler at [25].
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Court held against the Republic on the second issue and dismissed its application,
finding that the Republic had submitted to jurisdiction by its agent, PNB, as well as
by its own conduct. The Republic appealed.
THE COURT OF APPEAL DECISION
In the Court of Appeal, the Republic took the position that it had “possession
or control” of the Funds through PNB. Specifically, the argument was that the
Philippine forfeiture order had fulfilled the Escrow Condition, so that PNB now held
the Funds for the Republic’s account, or on trust for the Republic. In short, the
Republic maintained that it was beneficially entitled to the Funds.
The Court of Appeal began its analysis by restating the well-established
common law principle that “a foreign sovereign State is immune to the jurisdiction
of [the Singapore] courts and may not be impleaded directly or indirectly in any
action before [the Singapore] courts without its consent. The court will stay any such
action if State immunity is invoked”. This principle is encapsulated in section 3 of
the SIA. Like the UK State Immunity Act 1978,14 the SIA does not substitute the
common law of State immunity. As the Court of Appeal noted, “the common law
continues to apply to determine when a court will recognize sovereign immunity in
any particular case”.
The Court of Appeal’s examination of English precedent15 showed that the
foreign sovereign States seeking to assert immunity in those cases could prove that
the properties to which they claimed title were in the possession or control of their
agents or bailees. This case raised an entirely different question, which was whether a
foreign sovereign State with an arguable claim to an interest in property – but with-
out possession or control over the relevant property through an agent or trustee – is
entitled to assert State immunity to stay proceedings in which an adverse claim is
made against that property.
The Court then turned to consider whether the Juan Ysmael test should be
applied in this case. The Court concluded that the Juan Ysmael test was “so vague
outside the context of claims to title to tangible property that Earl Jowitt could not
have intended it to apply to intangible property, such as debts or trust funds or
moneys held in escrow”.16
According to the Court, the inadequacy of the Juan Ysmael test in the present
case was “quite evident”. The Republic had staked its claim to ownership of the
Funds on the premise that the Philippine forfeiture order had fulfilled the Escrow
14 Hazel Fox QC, The Law of State Immunity (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) (“Fox”)
at 136–7.
15 Compania Naviera Vascongado v. Steamship Cristina [1938] AC 485; United States of America
and Republic of France v. Dollfus Mieg et Cie SA and Bank of England [1952] AC 582 (“Dollfus
Mieg”); and Rahimtoola v. Nizam of Hyderabad [1958] AC 379 (“Rahimtoola”).
16 ROP v. Maler Foundation at [40].
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Condition, thereby terminating the escrow agreement. This was, in the Court’s view,
“certainly an arguable claim”. However, the other claimants had challenged the legal
effect of the Philippine forfeiture order under Singapore law. Applying the Juan
Ysmael test to stay the interpleader proceedings without determining whether the
Escrow Condition was indeed fulfilled would “merely put the cart before the horse”,
leaving the Republic’s claim to the Funds “undetermined and indeterminable” so
long as the Republic did not submit to the jurisdiction of the Singapore courts to
prove its claim. The net result of all this would be to “leave the disposal of the Funds
hanging in the air”.17
Having regard to the circumstances of the case, the Court opined that the Juan
Ysmael test should not be applied. The Court of Appeal held that the issue of
whether the Escrow Condition had been satisfied, so that the Republic was now the
beneficial owner of the funds under Singapore law, was a threshold issue that should
have been decided by the High Court. It was not a substantive issue to be left to the
interpleader proceedings.
However, the Court of Appeal did not remit the case to the High Court for the
threshold issue to be decided. The main reason for this was the Court of Appeal’s
view that the doctrine of State immunity “should not be extended to a case like
the present at all”.18 On this point, the other claimants argued that immunity did
not apply to property in the hands of a third party against whom conflicting claims
had been made, and that the Republic did not have a recognizable interest in the
funds.
After considering the English authorities at length,19 the Court distinguished
Dollfus Mieg and Rahimtoola on the basis that the foreign sovereign States in those
cases either had possession or an immediate right to possession of the disputed
property. Here, the competing claims to the Funds had already been interpleaded.
The Funds were not in the possession of an agent or trustee of the Republic, but in
the hands of PNB’s solicitors, and under the control of the Court.
The Court pointed out that the only way in which the Republic could have been
indirectly impleaded as regards the Funds was if the Funds had vested in it by virtue
of the Philippine forfeiture order, with the result that PNB was holding the Funds
for the Republic’s account or in trust for the Republic. Indeed, this was the very basis
of the Republic’s case. Yet, the Republic had not instructed PNB to object to the
interpleader. Nor did the Republic intervene at the appropriate stage of the proceed-
ings to ask for WestLB’s interpleader application to be dismissed. In the Court’s
view, this was consistent with the position that either the Republic or PNB did not
then consider that the Funds had vested in the Republic. The Republic could not
take this position now without also accepting that it had submitted to jurisdiction
through PNB.
17 Ibid.
18 ROP v. Maler Foundation at [45].
19 ROP v. Maler Foundation at [46]–[51].
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The Court was of the view that in the circumstances of this case, the doctrine of
State immunity should not be extended to a case involving debts or choses in action
in the possession or control of a third party, and in respect of which the foreign
sovereign State had yet to prove its ownership.
The Court then turned to the issue of whether the Philippine forfeiture order
conferred a recognizable interest in the Funds on the Republic insofar as that order
was evidence that the Republic’s claim to the Funds was “not merely illusory”. In
line with its earlier holding that the Juan Ysmael test for standing was not appropri-
ate in this case, the Court held that the interpleader proceedings ought not to be
stayed on the basis that the Republic’s claim premised on the Philippine forfeiture
order was “not merely illusory”. If the proceedings were stayed, and the Republic
decided not to proceed further to prove its claim, the Funds would remain in the
possession of PNB’s solicitors and under the control of the court indefinitely. This
“stalemate” was “not a result that any court [would] accept with equanimity, even
taking into account the doctrine of State immunity”. The Court held that it was
“only just and in conformity with the public policy of Singapore that [the Republic]
should submit to the jurisdiction of [the Singapore] courts if it wishe[d] to claim the
Funds on the basis that it [had] a beneficial interest in them”.20 On this ground, too,
the Court of Appeal thought that the Republic’s stay application ought to be
dismissed.
Although this was sufficient to dispose of the appeal, the Court went on to
consider the other issues raised by the Republic in the oral arguments. The Court of
Appeal reversed the High Court’s finding that PNB had acted as the Republic’s
agent in the interpleader proceedings. Consequently, the Court also reversed the
finding that the Republic had submitted to jurisdiction through PNB. However, the
Court of Appeal found that the Republic had intended to invoke the jurisdiction of
the Singapore courts by applying for the Funds to be released to the Republic. The
Republic had therefore taken a step in the proceedings for the purpose of section
4(3)(b) of the SIA,21 and was deemed to have submitted to jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
Clearly, the Court’s decision in ROP v. Maler Foundation is significant for its holding
on the novel issue of whether the doctrine of State immunity extends to a case
involving claims to debts or choses in action in the hands of a third party which is
not an agent or trustee of the foreign sovereign State seeking to invoke immunity. In
Singapore, at least, the Court’s holding makes it plain that the doctrine is not to be
extended to such cases. Given the lack of precedent on point, ROP v. Maler Founda-
20 ROP v. Maler Foundation at [59].
21 The material portions of s. 4(3)(b) of the SIA provide: “A State is deemed to have submitted
. . . if it has intervened or taken any step in the proceedings.”
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tion is likely to be considered in other Commonwealth jurisdictions where a
legislatively enacted restrictive rule of immunity prevails.22
The typical rigour of the Court’s judgment provides plenty of fertile ground for
further academic comment, but two particular aspects of the decision may be briefly
highlighted here.
First, the Court’s holding on the Juan Ysmael test (at [40]–[43] of the judgment),
as well as the Court’s subsequent comments on whether the Republic had a “recog-
nizable interest” in the Funds, raise some interesting questions about the relevance –
or otherwise – of section 8(4) of the SIA. Section 8(4), which is not referred to at all
in the judgment, provides that “[a] court may entertain proceedings against a person
other than a State notwithstanding that the proceedings relate to property . . . (b) in
which a State claims an interest . . . if the claim is neither admitted nor supported by
prima facie evidence [emphasis mine].” Conversely, then, a court may not entertain
such proceedings if prima facie evidence is admitted in support of the foreign sover-
eign State’s claim. Section 8(4) is based on section 6(4) of the UK State Immunity
Act, which, in turn, incorporates the Juan Ysmael test.23
On the face of it, the Court’s observation that “Earl Jowitt could not have
intended [the Juan Ysmael test] to apply to intangible property, such as debts or trust
funds or moneys held in escrow”24 may be taken to mean that the Juan Ysmael test
ought not apply in any case where a foreign sovereign State claims an interest in
22 The SIA is itself modelled on the UK State Immunity Act, which has influenced legislation in
Pakistan, South Africa, Canada, Malawi and Australia. Fox notes that the ILC Draft Articles on
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property (which in turn served as the basis for the
United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, G.A. Res.
A/59/38, UN GAOR, 2004, UN Doc. A/59/508 [not yet in force]), “borrow extensively” from the
provisions of the UK Act: Fox at 137. Outside the Commonwealth, the recent US Supreme Court
decision of Philippines v. Pimentel, Opinion of the Court, 12 June 2008, Case No. 06–1204,
available online at Supreme Court of the United States http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/
07pdf/06–1204.pdf (“Pimentel”), which was decided on very similar facts, provides an interesting
basis for comparison. By the time the litigation reached the Supreme Court, sovereign immunity
was no longer a live issue. However, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority of the Supreme
Court, appeared to treat immunity as a given. In fact, as Justice Kennedy noted, immunity in that
case was “uncontested.”22 Only Justice Souter – who concurred in part and dissented in part –
was of the view that the Supreme Court ought not to have given “near-dispositive effect” to the
Republic’s status as a sovereign entity. Expressing concerns similar to those that informed the
judgment of the Singapore Court of Appeal, Justice Souter noted: “I would conclude that several
facts specific to this case suggest that the Republic and the Commission’s sovereign interests
should be given less weight than in the ordinary case . . . [T]he Republic and the [PCGG] must
take affirmative steps in United States courts (or possibly invoke the assistance of the Attorney
General to do so . . .) at some point in order to recover the assets held in the United States. Thus,
the sovereign interest implicated here is not of the same magnitude as when a sovereign faces
liability; the Republic’s interest is in choosing the most convenient venue and time for the suit to
proceed.”
23 Fox at 112.
24 ROP v. Maler Foundation at [40].
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intangible property. If that is the correct reading, then the next question is whether
section 8(4) should, correspondingly, be limited only to cases involving tangible
property.
However, it is submitted that the context of the holding militates in favour of the
conclusion that the Court’s observation on the Juan Ysmael test ought not to be read
so widely. The Court’s decision was premised on the proposition that the Republic
had not, on the facts of this case, been directly or indirectly impleaded by WestLB’s
interpleader application. That being so, the general rule that the proceedings should
be stayed on the basis of State immunity did not apply. A fortiori, section 8(4), which
states an exception to the general rule, was not relevant to the Court’s reasoning on
Juan Ysmael.
Second, the Court identified two features in this case that took it outside the
parameters of the doctrine of State immunity. The first feature was that the property
in question was a debt or chose in action in the hands of a third party which was not
an agent or trustee of the foreign sovereign State. The second feature was that the
property had already been interpleaded. It is interesting to speculate on what the
outcome might have been if the Republic had indeed asserted immunity in respect of
the Funds before the Funds had been interpleaded.25 The Court did not specifically
address this in the judgment – indeed, it had no need to – and stated merely that the
Republic ought to have either intervened itself, or instructed PNB to object on its
behalf, if it considered that it had been impleaded by WestLB’s application. An
authoritative answer to this question will have to be left for another day.
25 ROP v. Maler Foundation at [52].
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MALAYSIA’S FIRST REPORT TO THE CEDAW COMMITTEE: A
LANDMARK EVENT FOR WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN MALAYSIA
Jaclyn Ling-Chien Neo*
INTRODUCTION
Almost 10 years after its accession to the Convention on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1995, Malaysia submitted its first peri-
odic report1 to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW Committee) in April 2004. This report was a combined initial and second
report; the reports were due in 1999 and 2003. Under Article 18 of CEDAW, parties
are to submit reports on the “legislative, judicial, administrative or other measures
which they have adopted to give effect to the provisions of [CEDAW] and on the
progress made” within one year of accession and thereafter at least every four years.
The CEDAW Committee considered Malaysia’s report at its 35th session in May
2006, and provided its concluding comments on 31 May 2006. Twenty-eight non-
governmental organizations submitted a joint report (NGO Shadow Report) to the
CEDAW Committee, critiquing the government’s report, identifying continuing
problems concerning gender equality in Malaysia and providing specific
recommendations for the Committee’s consideration.2
BACKGROUND
CEDAW is one of only two major human rights instruments that Malaysia has
ratified to date, the other being the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).
Malaysia acceded to both conventions in 1995,3 and made declarations and reserva-
tions to both instruments on the basis of religious and national or cultural
* LLB (Hons) (NUS); LL.M. (Yale).
1 Combined initial and second periodic reports of State parties, Committee on the Elimination
of Discrimination Against Women, 12 April 2004, CEDAW/C/MYS/1–2 (hereinafter Malaysia’s
CEDAW Report).
2 NGO Shadow Report Group, “NGO Shadow Report on the Initial and Second Periodic
Report of the government of Malaysia”, 2005, available at http://www.iwraw-ap.org/resources/
pdf/Malaysia_SR.pdf
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relativism. In relation to CEDAW, Malaysia declared that its accession is subject to
the understanding that Convention provisions do not conflict with the provisions
of Islamic Syariah law and the Federal Constitution. Muslims in multiracial and
multireligious Malaysia4 practise a limited scope of Islamic family, personal and
criminal laws administered by statutorily created Syariah courts. These religious
courts exist with the parallel common law system inherited from the British.
Malaysia considers that strictly egalitarian norms in universal human rights are
in tension with Syariah laws. Its reservations to Articles 2(f ) (on the abolishment of
discriminatory laws, customs and practices), 5(a) (modification of social and cul-
tural prejudices and stereotype), 7(b) (equal participation in public policy-making
and public office), 9 (equal nationality rights and to the nationality of their children)
and 16 (elimination of discrimination in marriage and family relations) of CEDAW
were presumably made on that basis.5 Although Malaysia also appealed to the
Constitution as justification for its declaration and reservations, it has not provided
specific details as to how the Federal Constitution, apart from its accommodation of
Syariah laws, is inconsistent with CEDAW. Notably, Malaysia’s CEDAW report
focuses only on Syariah laws as the basis for its reservations. Fortunately, the per-
ceived inconsistency is not a fixed view. In 1998, Malaysia withdrew its reservations
to Articles 2(f ), 9(1), 16(1)(b), (d), (e) and (h). In its report, Malaysia explained that
the withdrawal was inspired by the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action, adopted at the
Fourth World Conference on Women.6 Besides Articles 5(a) and 7(b), reservations
still apply in relation to the following articles: Article 9(2) providing for equal rights
to the nationality of their children, Article 16(1)(a) providing for the same right to
enter into marriage, Article 16(1)(c) on the same rights and responsibilities during
marriage and its dissolution, Article 16(1)(f ) on same rights to guardianship,
3 Malaysia acceded to the CRC in the same year as it acceded to CEDAW, that is on 17 February
1995. Malaysia acceded to CEDAW on 5 July 1995.
4 Of the three major ethnic groups in Malaysia, Malays form the majority at 54% of the popula-
tion. The two largest minorities are the Chinese and the Indians, which constitute 25% and 8% of
the population respectively. Other non-Malay indigenous groups constitute 12% the population.
See A. Badawi, “The Challenges of Multireligious, Multiethnic and Multicultural Societies”,
Asia Media Summit, 19 April 2004, available at http://www.pmo.gov.my. Note, however, that
official statistics typically combine Malays and non-Malay indigenous groups under an umbrella
definition – bumiputera (literally meaning “son of the soil”). Results of a 2000 census, for
example, state that the bumiputera population comprised 65.1% of the total population, whereas
the ethnic Chinese comprised 26% and ethnic Indians 7.7% of the population. See Department
of Statistics Malaysia, “Press Statement: Population Distribution and Basic Demographic
Characteristics Report: Population and Housing Census 2000”, 6 November 2001, available at
http://www.statistics.gov.my/ English/frameset_pressdemo.php
5 Various countries, including France and Germany, criticised Malaysia’s declaration and
reservations as being inconsistent with the object and purpose of CEDAW. See Declarations,
Reservations and Objections to CEDAW, United Nations Division for the Advancement of
Women, available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations-country.htm#N41
6 Malaysia’s CEDAW Report, supra n. 1, at 68–9.
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wardship, trusteeship and adoption of children, Article 16(1)(g) on same personal
rights as husband and wife, and Article 16(2) on nullification of child marriages (and
provision for a minimum age for marriage).
LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE PROGRESS AND SHORTFALLS
On the whole, Malaysia reports significant improvements to the status and rights of
women in Malaysia. Several laws were revised or enacted to eliminate discriminatory
provisions in conformity with Article 2 of CEDAW (prohibiting discrimination
against women in general)7 and to enhance the protection of women. These statutes
cover a broad spectrum of issues, ranging from immigration,8 to pension,9 guardian-
ship10 and intestate distribution.11 For example, the Distribution Act was amended in
1997 to repeal the distinction between wives and husbands in terms of the distribu-
tion of the estate of an intestate to the surviving spouse. Previously, a wife who
survives her husband is entitled to only one-third of her husband’s estate but
the surviving husband is entitled to his wife’s whole estate.12 These revisions are
supplemented by other amendments and enactments that serve to enhance the pro-
tection of women. For instance, the Penal Code was amended to enhance penalties
for rape and offences relating to prostitution. Malaysia also enacted the Domestic
7 Article 2 of CEDAW contains a general statement requiring State Parties to “condemn
discrimination against women in all its forms” and “agree to pursue by all appropriate means and
without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination against women”.
8 Since 1 September 2001, pursuant to an administrative order, foreign men married to
Malaysian women are allowed to stay in the country longer (one year as opposed to the previous
three months) and their social visit pass can be renewed on a year-to-year basis until they gain
employment. Also, foreign women who are divorced or separated from their Malaysian husbands
after settling in Malaysia can apply for a social visit pass on a year-to-year basis, subject to
approval by the government. Previously, they had to return to their countries once their social
visit pass expired, and apply for a new one from there. Malaysia’s CEDAW Report, supra n. 1,
73.
9 The Pensions Act 1980 was amended in January 2002 to allow widows to continue to receive
pensions even after they remarried. Malaysia’s CEDAW Report, supra n. 1, 73.
10 The Guardianship of Infants Act was amended in 1999 to give legal recognition to the parental
rights of mothers. Previously, only the father of an infant was recognized as the guardian of his/
her infant’s person and property. Malaysia’s CEDAW Report, supra n. 1, 73.
11 The Report also cites a 1975 amendment to the 1967 Income Tax Act to allow wives to elect for
separate assessment of their income for tax purposes. Previously, a wife had to be taxed jointly
with her husband. See Malaysia’s CEDAW Report, supra n. 1, 73. This amendment predates
Malaysia’s accession to CEDAW and strictly speaking does not constitute a measure giving effect
to CEDAW.
12 The Distribution Act however applies only to non-Muslims. As discussed below, intestate
distribution for Muslims still discriminates against women, in that the woman receives only half
of what the man receives.
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Violence Act in 1994 to provide protection for battered wives and other victims of
domestic violence.13
However, Malaysia’s implementation efforts before 2001 lacked an overarching
framework and direction; the measures adopted, while commendable, were tentative
and piecemeal in fashion. A more comprehensive policy towards gender equality
started to emerge after 2001, when Malaysia amended the Federal Constitution to
include gender as one of the prohibited bases of discrimination,14 and created the
Ministry of Women and Family Development to address issues of gender equality.15
Pursuant to the 2001 landmark amendment, Article 8(2) of the Federal Constitution
now reads: “Except as expressly authorized by this Constitution, there shall be no
discrimination against citizens on the ground of religion, race, descent, place of
birth and gender in any law or in the appointment to any office or employment under
a public authority or in administration of any law relating to the acquisition, holding
or disposition of any property or the establishing or carrying on any trade business,
profession, vocation or employment.”16
The Ministry of Women and Family Development was established “to educate,
create awareness, monitor and formulate policies and programmes, which are women
friendly”.17 The establishment of the ministry also meant that gender equality is
gradually becoming a focal point in governmental policy whereby the ministry has
started to work with other ministries such as the Ministry of Education and the
Ministry of Human Resources to mainstream gender issues, specifically to create
programmes to improve the status of women as well as to incorporate gender equal-
ity considerations in their policies.18 Furthermore, since 2005, a policy has been in
place where senior officers in each ministry and relevant government agencies have
been appointed as gender focal points with the primary function of overseeing
gender-related matters at the respective ministries including collection of data,
information and feedback on gender issues.19
Despite this move towards a more comprehensive approach, the success of
CEDAW implementation remains limited. The CEDAW Committee identified two
13 Malaysia’s CEDAW Report, supra n. 1, at 455–7.
14 The amendment was passed on 1 August 2001. See Malaysia’s CEDAW Report, supra n. 1, at
63.
15 The Ministry was established in January 2001. See Malaysia’s CEDAW Report, supra n. 1, at
67.
16 Malaysia placed heavy reliance on this amendment to show that there has been a significant
improvement in the rights and status of women in the country and that it has satisfied its
CEDAW obligations: see Malaysia’s CEDAW Report, supra n. 1, at 63–4 (in relation to Art. 1 of
CEDAW), 73 (Art. 2), 83 (Art. 3), 84 (Art. 4), 91 (Art. 5), 355 (Art. 15).
17 Ibid.
18 Malaysia’s Responses to the list of issues and questions for consideration of the combined
initial and second periodic report, CEDAW/C/MYS/Q/2/Add.1, 27 March 2006 (hereinafter
“Malaysia’s Responses”), at 12–3.
19 Malaysia’s Responses, ibid., at 12.
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main obstacles to full implementation of CEDAW provisions in Malaysia. First, the
non-domestication of CEDAW provisions into Malaysian law and, second, the
failure (or reluctance) to reconcile existing Syariah practices with CEDAW norms.
Other areas identified as requiring further attention include some residual discrimin-
atory laws such as citizenship laws whereby the children of a Malaysian woman do
not obtain citizenships automatically by operation of law whereas children of a
Malaysian man do.20 Some aspects of Malaysian laws still fall short of fully recogniz-
ing and protecting women as a vulnerable group. For example, marital rape is still
not a crime in Malaysia.21 Furthermore, Malaysia has focused on internal matters in
the implementation of CEDAW and less (if any) on cross-jurisdictional issues
involving non-residents/citizens such as trafficking of women and girls,22 protection
of the rights of migrant workers, particularly migrant domestic workers who are
mostly women,23 as well as for asylum-seekers and refugees which include women.24
JUDICIAL MEASURES: NON-DOMESTICATION OF CEDAW AND THE
LACK OF DIRECT ENFORCEABILITY
The specific areas of concerns that the Committee identified may be said to stem
from one overarching problem – that is the fact that CEDAW provisions are not
directly enforceable in domestic courts as part of Malaysian law.25 Malaysia’s
dualistic system follows the British practice where a legislative act is required to
20 This is in clear contravention of Art. 9(2) of CEDAW which requires State Parties to “grant
women equal rights with men with respect to the nationality of their children”. Malaysia has
however entered a reservation on this Article. See Malaysia’s Responses, at 21.
21 According to the Malaysian delegation, there are only three limited instances in which a man
who has sex with his wife can be charged for rape in Malaysia: (1) where the wife is living
separately from her husband under a decree of judicial separation or a decree nisi not made
absolute; (2) where the wife has obtained an injunction restraining her husband from having
sexual intercourse with her; and (3) in the case of a Muslim woman living separately from her
husband during the period of ’iddah which is approximately a period of three months: Malaysia’s
CEDAW Report, supra n. 1, at 453. See the Committee’s comments and criticisms in Summary
record of the 731st meeting, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,
Thirty-fifth session, CEDAW/C/SR.731 (20 June 2006), (“Summary of First Session”) at 17,
24 and 28–30. See also the Concluding comments of the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women: Malaysia, 31 May 2006, CEDAW/C/MYS/CO/2 (hereinafter
“Concluding Comments”), at 21–2.
22 There is no specialised legislation addressing trafficking of women and girls. The Committee
was especially concerned that the women and girls may instead “be punished for violation of
immigration laws and are thus revictimized.” See Concluding Comments, supra n. 21, at 23–4.
23 Concluding Comments, supra n. 21, at 25–6.
24 There is no legislation protecting the rights and status of asylum seekers and refugees.
Concluding Comments, supra n. 21, at 28–9.
25 Concluding Comments, supra n. 21, at 7.
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incorporate treaty provisions (such as CEDAW) as part of national law. Unlike other
countries such as Peru where the constitution provides for direct incorporation of
treaties into domestic law,26 the Federal Constitution does not regulate the internal
reception of treaty law in Malaysia at all. The amendment to Article 8 of the Federal
Constitution ameliorates this by providing a justiciable right against gender dis-
crimination but this horizontalization of rights is limited by the lack of a broad
definition on gender discrimination and the fact that the constitutional provision
applies only to public law or actions by public agencies. In contrast, CEDAW provi-
sions cut through this public-private divide, allowing State intervention and public
rights in matters that are conventionally considered to be within the private realm.27
The Committee highlighted the 2005 case of Beatrice a/p At Fernandez v. Sistem
Penerbangan Malaysia and Another28 (hereafter Beatrice Fernandez) as part of its
critique on the non-domestication of CEDAW into Malaysian law.29 Beatrice
Fernandez is the first reported case addressing the scope of gender discrimination
under Article 8. It is also the first reported case where CEDAW was cited before the
Malaysian courts.30 The courts, however, did not take cognizance, much less con-
sider, the potential impact of CEDAW on domestic litigation, preferring instead to
26 Article 55 of the Peruvian constitution states: “los tratados celebrados por el Estado y en vigor
forman parte del derecho nacional”. (translated as “treaties signed by the State and currently in
effect form part of the national law”). Resolución Legislativa N° 27517, 13 September 2001.
In contrast, the Cambodian constitution provides for the primacy of Cambodian sovereignty;
Art. 55 of the Cambodian constitution states: “Any treaty and agreement incompatible with
the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, neutrality and national unity of the Kingdom
of Cambodia shall be annulled.”
27 E.g. Art. 2 of CEDAW does not only require compliance in terms of non-discrimination
against women by public authorities and public institutions, but sub-provision (e) also require
State parties to ensure non-compliance by any person, organization or enterprise. It should be
noted that Malaysia has never entered a reservation to this Art. 2(e) of CEDAW. Thio argues that
the basic assumptions of public-private dichotomy is unsuited for a women’s rights framework
since “[m]uch of women’s oppression takes place within the ‘domestic’ sphere – the homes and
local communities”, which are usually considered to be part of the private domain. T. Li-ann,
“The Impact of Internationalisation on Domestic Governance: Gender Egalitarianism & the
Transformative Potential of CEDAW”, (1997) 1 Sing. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 278, at 288. See also
generally, H. Charlsworth, C. Chinkin and S. Wright, “Feminist Approaches to International
Law” (1991) 85 Am JIL 613.
28 [2005] 3 MLJ 681 (“Federal Court decision”); see also Beatrice a/p At Fernandez v. Sistem
Penerbangan Malaysia & Anor [2004] 4 MLJ 466 (“Court of Appeal decision”).
29 J. K. Bhatt, “Gender Discrimination in Employment – How far Does Article 8 of the Federal
Constitution guarantee gender equality?” (2006) 6 MLJ xliv.
30 One of the questions of law that the applicant stated that she intended to raise in her appeal to
the Federal Court was whether CEDAW is applicable to the terms and conditions of a collective
agreement. In refusing leave to appeal, the Federal Court only addressed the viability of the
questions raised under domestic law and did not address CEDAW at all. Federal Court decision,
ibid., at 11.
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focus on the interpretation of domestic law. Beatrice Fernandez involved a flight
attendant who was dismissed by her employer after she became pregnant, pursuant
to the terms of her employment contained in a collective agreement giving the
company the right to terminate her services in the event that she does not resign from
her position upon becoming pregnant. The Court of Appeal dismissed her applica-
tion for a declaration that the provisions in the collective agreement discriminated on
gender grounds and were void for contravening Article 8 of the Federal Constitu-
tion. The Federal Court affirmed the Court of Appeal’s decision, holding that Art-
icle 8 “does not extend its substantive or procedural provisions to infringements of
an individual’s legal right by another individual”,31 thus limiting the scope of Article
8’s prohibition against gender discrimination to matters involving State action. Thus
the Malaysian courts reaffirmed a public-private dichotomous approach to Article
8’s constitutional right against gender discrimination. Neither Court took cogni-
zance of the fact that the collective agreement clearly conflicts with CEDAW, specif-
ically Article 11(2)(a) which requires State parties to “prohibit . . . dismissal on the
grounds of pregnancy or of maternity leave”.32
The Beatrice Fernandez case highlights the related issue of judicial receptivity
towards treaty obligations and appreciation of Malaysia’s CEDAW obligations. Nei-
ther the Court of Appeal nor the Federal Court (the highest court of the land) took
CEDAW into consideration in its deliberations. It is perhaps no surprise therefore
that the CEDAW Committee, in its concluding comments, recommended Malaysia
“to take immediate measures to ensure that the Convention and its provisions are
incorporated into national law and become fully applicable in the domestic legal
system”,33 as well as “to ensure that the Convention and related domestic legislation
are made an integral part of legal education and the training of judicial officers,
including judges, lawyers and prosecutors, so as to establish firmly in the country a
legal culture supportive of women’s equality and non-discrimination”.34
SYARIAH EXCEPTIONALISM
One major gap remains in the move towards promoting and realizing gender equal-
ity in Malaysia: the status and rights of Islamic women in Malaysia. There has been
no similar impetus (as in general law) to reform Islamic family, inheritance and
31 Federal Court decision, ibid., at 13.
32 Relevant parts of Art. 11(2) reads: “In order to prevent discrimination against women on the
grounds of marriage or maternity and to ensure their effective right to work, States Parties shall
take appropriate measures: (a) To prohibit, subject to the imposition of sanctions, dismissal on
the grounds of pregnancy or of maternity leave and discrimination in dismissals on the basis of
marital status; (b) To introduce maternity leave with pay or with comparable social benefits
without loss of former employment, seniority or social allowances; . . . (d) To provide special
protection to women during pregnancy in types of work proved to be harmful to them.”
33 Concluding Comments, supra n. 21, at 8.
34 Concluding Comments, supra n. 21, at 12.
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marriage laws. Instead, Malaysia continues to pursue a policy of limited exceptional-
ism on the basis of Syariah laws. Remaining reservations to CEDAW are justified
primarily on the basis of Syariah laws which apply to Muslims in the area of family
relations, marriage and inheritance. These laws are administered by a parallel system
of statutorily created religious courts (Syariah courts) that exist parallel to civil
courts which apply general law. There are several inconsistencies between Syariah
laws practised in Malaysia with CEDAW. Polygamy, for example, is still practised in
Malaysia and clearly contrary to Article 16(1)(a), which provides that men and
women have the same rights relating to entry into marriage.35 Also, Syariah inherit-
ance law on estate distribution discriminates against women; a woman inherits one
half of the man’s share.36 Muslim women in Malaysia also cannot hold positions as
Syariah Court judges and religious offices like that of the Imam, Bilal and Kadi.37
In fact, the Committee noted that recent reforms to Islamic family law in
Malaysia threaten to discriminate against women further.38 The 2005 amendments to
the 1984 Islamic Family (Federal Territories) Act (hereinafter IFLA) purports to
create gender equality (in a perverse manner) by granting the husband matrimonial
property rights to a wife’s assets, the right to stop a wife from disposing of her assets
and the right to fasakh divorce (dissolution of the marriage on limited grounds
without spousal consent).39 At the same time, the IFLA amendments potentially
make it easier for Muslim men to enter into polygamous marriages, by replacing the
plain stricter requirement of “just and necessary” to “just or necessary”.40 Further-
35 The delegation also justified polygamy under Syariah law as acceptable because of the
safeguards ensuring that wives will be treated justly. Malaysia’s Responses, supra n. 18, at 5.
36 Malaysia’s Responses, ibid., at 5.
37 Malaysia’s Responses, ibid., at 6–7.
38 “List of issues and questions with regard to the consideration of an initial and periodic
report”, Pre-session working group for the 35th session, CEDAW/C/MYS/Q/2, 10 February 2006
(hereinafter “Issues and Questions”), at 29.
39 Malaysia’s Responses, supra n. 18, at Annex IX. For example, amended s. 107A provides that
“[t]he Court may, on the application of any party to a marriage . . . make an order prohibiting the
wife or husband . . . from disposing of any assets acquired by them, joint or solely”. As Sisters in
Islam, a Islamic women’s group in Malaysia, pointed out, the amendments purportedly made
to deal with changing circumstances has tended to benefit men more than women “through the
use of selective gender neutral language”. Husbands May Misuse Amendments to Islamic Family
Law Bill, Federal Territories, 2005, Sisters in Islam, 8 December 2005, available at http://
www.sistersinislam.org.my/pressstatement/08122005.htm
40 The Malaysian delegation however sought to explain that the amendment in fact sought to
enhance protection of women but that the resulting discrimination was due to poor drafting. The
delegation said: “With regard to courts granting permission for a polygamous marriage if they
were satisfied that the proposed marriage was ‘just and necessary’, the word ‘and’ had been
removed because ‘just’ was considered more stringent than ‘just and necessary’ and was therefore
more difficult to prove.” Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,
35th session, Summary record of the 732nd meeting, CEDAW/C/SR.732, 13 July 2006, at 45.
Cf. Husbands May Misuse Amendments to Islamic Family Law Bill, Federal Territories, 2005,
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more, the amendments do not extend to women the same rights as men to talaq
divorce.41 Currently, the amendments to IFLA have been suspended, following
protests from women’s groups.42 However, this suspension only applies to the
Federal Territories, and not to similar amendments to Islamic family law in other
States.43 Jurisdiction over those laws falls within State powers. The federal govern-
ment only has jurisdiction over Islamic matters in the three Federal Territories, and
not to Islamic matters within the remaining 13 States, some of which made similar
amendments to the Islamic family law of their States. In any case, even in relation to
the Federal Territories, as long as these laws remain on the books, it will continue to
be a symbolic discrimination against women that can be revived into law in future.44
The inconsistencies between Syariah law in Malaysia and CEDAW is symptom-
atic of the clash of premises between universal human rights and Islamic laws.
CEDAW, as part of the universal human rights movement, proceeds from the
assumption of equal rights and dignity for all persons regardless of race, religion
and gender, thus taking a blanket approach to equality, whereas Islamic apologists
tend to emphasize greater male responsibilities as a basis for seemingly discrimin-
atory aspects of Islamic law. Thus, Article 6 of the Cairo Declaration on Human
Rights in Islam, while emphasizing that women are equal in human dignity to men,
stops short of declaring that they have equal rights, stating instead that women have
“rights to enjoy as well as duties to perform” and that the “husband is responsible
for the support and welfare of the family”.45 It is this premise that the Malaysian
delegation appealed to in justifying to the CEDAW Committee why Muslim women
cannot become Syariah Court judges, Imam, Bilal and Kadi; according to the
delegation, persons in those positions have to solemnize marriages which is a func-
tion that women cannot perform.46 Syariah law designates the man as protector and
provider of the family, and thus it is a religious requirement that only a man can
solemnize a marriage.47 Furthermore, women are not appointed as muftis because
Sisters in Islam, 8 December 2005, available at http://www.sistersinislam.org.my/pressstatement/
08122005.htm and Women Living Under Muslim Law, “Update: Malaysia: Family law bill unjust
to Malaysian Muslim women”, available at http://www.wluml.org/english/
actionsfulltxt.shtml?cmd%5B156%5D=i-156–507410
41 Issues and Questions, supra n. 38, at 29.
42 Z. Anwar and J.S. Rumminger, “Justice and Equality in Muslim Family Laws: Challenges,
Possibilities, and Strategies for Reform”, (2007) 64 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1529, at n. 15.
43 Anwar and Rumminger, ibid.
44 For a fuller exposition on discrimination against women in Malaysia’s Islamic family laws, see
generally Anwar and Rumminger, ibid.
45 The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, 19th Islamic Conference of Foreign
Ministers in Cairo, 5 August 1990, available at http://www.religlaw.org/interdocs/docs/
cairohrislam1990.htm
46 Malaysia’s Responses, supra n. 18, at 6–7.
47 Ibid.
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they would not be able to discharge their duties properly during menstruation.48
Islam prohibits a woman from reciting or leading prayers during her
menstruation.49
Malaysia’s withdrawal of some reservations in relation to Articles 7(b)50 and
9(2),51 in particular to certain sub-provisions of Article 16, nevertheless show will-
ingness to attempt reconciliation between Syariah laws and CEDAW. At the very
least, it shows that the federal government does not view Syariah law as being
permanently incompatible with CEDAW norms. The CEDAW Committee’s benign
characterization of remaining discriminatory aspects in Malaysia’s Syariah laws as
resulting from restrictive interpretations of Syariah laws52 leaves the door open for
reform through reinterpretation of Islamic laws. Thus, the Committee appropriately
encouraged Malaysia to resort to comparative jurisprudence and legislation that
takes more progressive interpretations of Islamic law in reforming its Syariah laws.53
CONCLUSION
Malaysia’s first report to the CEDAW Committee must be recognized as a landmark
event in the women’s rights movement in the country. It is not only the contents and
promises made in the report that are significant, but the very fact that it represents
Malaysia’s engagement with the international community on women’s rights issues.
The report highlights many significant and wide-ranging improvements in the status
and rights of women in Malaysia. The 2001 constitutional amendment and the
establishment of the Ministry of Women and Family Development (renamed the
Ministry of Women, Family and Community Development in March 2004 after its
jurisdiction was expanded to include community development)54 signify a shift
towards a more comprehensive implementation of CEDAW and shows great poten-
tial in further advancing the CEDAW agenda of gender equality in Malaysia. Fur-
thermore, the involvement of civil society in the drafting and review of Malaysia’s
report to the CEDAW Committee should not be overlooked. It marks an increasing
governmental openness (in line with CEDAW) to involve women in the political
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 The Malaysian delegation agreed that the reservation could possibly be lifted. Summary of
First Session, supra n. 21, at 56.
51 The Malaysian delegation agreed with the Committee that there was “no religious hindrance to
acceptance of the clause” and that the reservation should be reviewed. Ms Belmihoub-Zerdani, a
member of the CEDAW Committee, had called the reservation to Art. 9(2) “a case of glaring
discrimination”: Summary of First Session, supra n. 21, at 60–1.
52 Concluding Comments, supra n. 21, at 13.
53 Concluding Comments, supra n. 21, at 13–4.
54 Malaysia’s Responses, supra n. 18, at 12.
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process,55 and highlights the critical role of private actors of international civil soci-
ety in promoting and protecting human rights. The Women’s Aid Organization, for
example, played an important role in disseminating information and educating
Malaysian society about Malaysia’s report to the CEDAW Committee as well as the
Committee’s comments and recommendations.56
Much remains to be done to change societal, cultural and religious norms to
improve gender equality.57 However, practical realities and ideological differences
often require human rights compliance in international law to rely on the progressive
rather than immediate realization of treaty obligations. The Malaysian example
shows why it is sometimes more desirable to allow countries to place reservations
and make declarations to their ratification or accession to human rights treaties,
than insist on immediate and complete accession. On its part, the CEDAW Commit-
tee has shown sensitivity to each country’s cultural and religious conditions in mak-
ing recommendations on compliance measures. This “velvet glove” approach is
important to ensure that countries do not see their sovereignty as being threatened
after ratifying or acceding to human rights treaties, but are given room to comply
with treaty obligations over time, thus setting an assuring example to countries that
have not, but aspire to, ratify human rights treaties.
55 Women’s groups participated in the drafting process under the auspices of the National Coun-
cil of Women’s Organizations (NCWO) and also submitted a shadow report to the CEDAW
Committee: NGO Shadow Report on the Initial and Second Periodic Report of the government
of Malaysia, available at http://www.iwraw-ap.org/resources/pdf/Malaysia_SR.pdf
56 “The government of Malaysia to be reviewed by the CEDAW Committee during the 35th
CEDAW session, 24 May 2006”, Press Statement by NGO Shadow Report Group, 5 May 2006,
available at http://www.wao.org.my/news/20060105CEDAW.htm; and “Malaysia needs new laws
aimed specifically at ending discrimination on basis of sex, gender, say committee’s expert mem-
bers”, Committee on Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 731st and 732nd and Meet-
ings, 24 May 2006, available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2006/wom1562.doc.htm
57 Sexism continues to be a problem in public and private lives in Malaysia. For example, a
woman MP was told not to be too emotional in a debate on the Immigrations Act 1963 and the
Income Tax Act 1967: see Women’s Aid Organization, Press Statement, “End All Sexism and
Gender Discrimination in parliament: JAG Demands Public Apology from Members of parlia-







Nao Seoka, Fred Grünfeld and Anke
Huijboom, The Failure to Prevent Genocide in
Rwanda: The Role of Bystanders, Transnational
Publishers, 2007, pp xxix + 299
This book addresses the genocide in Rwanda
from the perspective of whether it could have
been prevented or halted by the bystanders. In
Chapter 1 the authors present “Perpetrator –
Victim – Bystander approach” and emphasize
the role of the bystanders, particularly at the
macro level (the States and the international
political system), because after the end of the
cold war the possibility to prevent or stop gross
human rights violations is increasingly depend-
ent on the behaviour of the bystander rather
than the perpetrator and the victim.
According to the authors, the main aim of
this book is to address the fundamental prob-
lem that early warnings do not automatically
lead to early or any actions of the bystanders
and to fill the gap between early warnings and
early actions by scrutinizing the decision-
making process of the bystanders at the inter-
national level. In so doing, the authors define
the bystander as the third party that will not act
or that will not attempt to act in solidarity with
the victims of gross human rights violations. In
the definition, there is no room for another cat-
egory, such as the indifferent bystander and the
ignorant outsider, which means that the
bystanders will be evaluated afterwards either
as collaborators with the perpetrators or res-
cuers of the victims. In Chapter 2 the authors
examine the judgments of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in which the per-
sons who broadcasted the hate propaganda
prior to the genocide were convicted of geno-
cide. Here, the authors confirm the broad defin-
ition of genocide to support the views that no
bystanders should have ignored early warnings
of this kind which would amount to genocide.
After outlining colonial history of Rwanda
in Chapter 3, the authors scrutinize the early
warnings from 1991 to the time just before the
outbreak of genocide in Chapter 4 through
Chapter 12. In Chapters 4 and 5 the authors
review the Arusha Peace Accords between the
Rwandan government and the Rwandan Patri-
otic Front as well as the mandate of the United
Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda
(UNAMIR) established by the Security Council
in 1993. The authors point out that an import-
ant factor in the failure to prevent genocide in
Rwanda was already made in the making of a
weak mandate of the UNAMIR, which lacked
the authority to instruct the use of force that
had been requested by the Rwandan parties of
the peace agreement. It is also stated that the
installed 2,500 UNAMIR peacekeepers, which
mainly consisted of Belgian troops, were in all
aspects too weak.
Chapters 6 and 7 examine very carefully the
early warnings of the atrocities from 1991 to
January 1994, based on divergent sources, such
as the foreign diplomats, the human rights
organizations, the UN special rapporteur and
so on. As a result, the authors state that despite
the deteriorating situation in Rwanda no one
reacted to these outspoken warnings. In
Chapters 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 the authors focus
attention on the so-called genocide fax in Janu-
ary 1994 and then examine the negative
responses of the United Nations and Western
States. In particular, the authors note the very
clear and concrete requests from General R.
Dallaire (Canadian Force Commander of
UNAMIR) and from Belgium to New York for
a stronger and firmer broadened mandate for
UNAMIR. In this regard, the authors strongly
criticize that since the top officials in the UN
bureaucracy like K. Annan (UN Under
Secretary-General) had refused to approve any
early action to prevent the atrocities, the Secur-
ity Council was not even informed of these
early warnings. On the other hand, the authors
also indicate that even if the Security Council
had been informed, we do not know whether it
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would have taken effective decisions before the
outbreak of genocide.
Next, the authors explore the incidents just
after the outbreak of genocide in April 1994.
Describing the plane crash which was the trigger
for the following dramatic events, major West-
ern powers’ evacuation operations, and the
Belgian decision to withdraw its troops in Chap-
ters 13, 14 and 15, the authors point out that the
Western evacuation force illustrates the role of
the bystander who afterwards is criticized as a
collaborator, because the possible outcome of a
combination of the evacuation force with the
UNAMIR peacekeepers, which could have
been able to stop the chaotic killings, was not
considered in any Western capital or the UN.
The authors draw full attention to the
response of the Security Council in Chapter 16.
Discussing the various options on the future of
UNAMIR in several informal meetings, the
Security Council adopted a unanimous Reso-
lution 912 on 21 April, which stated that the
majority of peace-keepers would withdraw and
only 270 would stay to mediate between the
parties and facilitate human relief. However,
since the UN Secretary-General B. Boutros-
Ghali asked the Security Council to reconsider
its decision, it unanimously adopted a Reso-
lution 918, which established UNAMIR II, a
mission of 5,500 troops in May. But the authors
strongly criticize that no troops would become
available soon and that it would take up to
October 1994, more than three months after the
genocide ended, before UNAMIR II could be
fully employed.
After referring to the role of the Nether-
lands as an example of a bystander State in
Chapter 17, the authors argue in Chapter 18,
which is entitled “Apologies from Bystanders
Ten Years Later”, that given the apologies from
Western States and the UN, it is now almost
unanimously accepted that States and inter-
national organizations failed tremendously by
not acting to prevent or stop the Rwandan
genocide. Finally, the authors conclude that the
bystanders at the State level and the inter-
national level did not act in solidarity with the
victims and did not attempt to rescue them by
preventing or halting the genocide, and there-
fore the bystanders turned into collaborators
who facilitated the genocidaires by not acting
against continuing atrocities.
One notable feature of this work is its
strictly empirical approach in studying the role
of the bystanders regarding genocide in
Rwanda. The authors scrutinize the relevant
communications and the decision-making pro-
cesses throughout the book, i.e. who received
what message at what time, to whom the mes-
sage was forwarded and which decisions were or
were not taken in response to the early warn-
ings. Consequently, the well-documented
analysis makes the conclusion of this book very
convincing that the genocide in Rwanda could
have been prevented or halted by the bystanders.
At the same time, it also makes clear that the
bystanders, especially Western States, lacked the
political will to react to the repeated early warn-
ings on Rwanda, which resulted in setting a
double standard between the case of Rwanda
and other cases such as Kosovo.
While this book makes the important and
useful contribution to the problems of the
bystanders faced with the Rwandan genocide,
there are nonetheless some problems in the
work. Above all, it seems that the research tends
to focus on the Western States so much that it is
not always clear how the remaining bystanders,
especially permanent members with veto
powers – Russia and China – reacted or not to
the early warnings and genocide in Rwanda.
One of the reasons is probably that the authors
do not always explore some of the important
documents in which the positions of the
remaining bystanders are recorded: the Security
Council Official Records (SCOR, S/PV) and
General Assembly Official Records (GAOR, A/
PV). Given the several formal meetings of these
UN organs before and after the genocide, this
book could have given us more convincing
overall insights into the role of the bystanders if
the authors had analyzed not only the informal
meetings as in Chapter 16, but also these ver-
batim records.
Despite these minor shortcomings, how-
ever, this book is one of the most significant con-
tributions not only to the lessons of Rwandan
genocide from the perspective of the bystanders,
but also to the study of “the responsibility to
protect” of the international community.
N S
Part-time Lecturer at Doshisha University,
Japan
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Joshua Castellino and Elvira Doninguez
Redondo, Minority Rights in Asia: A
Comparative Legal Analysis, Oxford University
Press, 2006, pp 286
This book identifies and seeks to address a
“gap” in the human rights literature in relation
to the region of “Asia”, which lacks a regional
human rights mechanism. Quite rightly, the
authors do not purport to present an exhaustive
regional study which would be a Herculean
task, given both the difficulty of classifying dis-
parate Asian legal systems under a common
umbrella and the breadth of material that
would need to be covered to do justice to the
topic. Indeed, the authors draw a caveat to the
effect that the linguistic barriers in relation to
source materials commenting on minority
issues in Asia makes research on the subject
difficult.
Hence, they have chosen to examine in
detail the minority rights situation within four
specific country studies: that of India, China,
Malaysia and Singapore. The authors set four
objectives for themselves. First, to establish the
parameters within which human and minority
rights have developed in Asia. Second, to exam-
ine the applicability of international standards
relating to minority rights protection to certain
Asian countries. Third, to identify any con-
ceptual and practical particularities necessary
to understanding the context of minority issues
in Asia. Lastly, to provide a “useful compara-
tive model” (p. 3) by examining in detail how
minority interests are promoted and protected
within specific Asian domestic regimes. The
view is taken that international standards can
provide no more than “guiding principles” to
the domestic out-working of State-minorities
relations.
More modestly, the aim is to provide a
starting point for the comparative study of the
situation of minorities, and indeed, indigenous
peoples groups, in Asia, applying the analytical
framework of human and minority rights. The
authors aspire towards presenting a theoretical
and practical of the issues. Their goal is to set
out evolving principles of minority protection,
rather than to present a “definitive insight” into
a “unifying theory” (p. 3) for minority rights
protection in Asia.
Chapter 1, which is entitled “Asian States,
International Human Rights Law and Minority
Rights”, covers familiar territory. It identifies
the major international human rights instru-
ments relevant to minority protection, mention-
ing in passing the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia
and the League of Nations minorities regime. It
notes that the United Nations has failed to
“frame a specific regime” for protecting the
rights of minorities and indigenous peoples.
Indeed, all it has managed to produce was the
1992 UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and
Linguistic Minorities. In 2007, after almost a
quarter-century of protracted negotiations, the
UN General Assembly adopted a landmark
Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
The chapter raises the issue of how some
Asian States have challenged the universalist
pretensions of human rights and its Western
liberal origins, considering human rights a neo-
colonial form of discourse. The authors point
out that the “Asian values” school, of which
they identify three strains (Malaysian, Singa-
pore and Chinese), are statist in nature, not
emanating from civil society groups. Aside from
the “Asian values” school and Asian critiques
towards human rights standards based on
“Western values stressing civil liberties” (p. 24),
the chapter in seeking to ascertain “possible
Asian distinctiveness” (p. 22) in relation to
human rights provides a useful empirical analy-
sis of Asian State engagement with UN human
rights regimes based on key treaties and the UN
Charter. It then provides an overview of Asian
minorities, including their situations in coun-
tries not subject to case study. Specific reference
is made to submissions made under Articles 18
and 27 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) (on religious
freedoms and rights of persons belonging to
ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities) and
the Convention for the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination (CERD). Notably, Singapore
and Malaysia have not signed either the ICCPR
or CERD.
Chapters 2–5 deal with India, China,
Malaysia and Singapore respectively before the
book offers its conclusions.
The four country studies draw from South
Asia, South-east Asia and East Asia. India is
selected owing to the complex politics of iden-
tity characterizing its political environment as
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well as an activist Supreme Court engaged in
developing the domestic law on minority rights
within the Indian constitutional structure. The
complex issue of protecting minorities in China
given the obstacles posed by its political struc-
ture commended itself as a candidate to the
authors for study. A little more surprising is the
choice of Malaysia and Singapore as objects of
study for minority protection. The authors note
that these countries were selected given their
“vehement opposition” towards general human
rights and their vigorous espousal of an “Asian
Way” or approach towards human rights issues,
and indeed, that of human rights within devel-
opmentalist States. The “Asian values” debate
of the 1990s conducted in the rarefied circles of
diplomacy and academia did not focus on pro-
tecting minorities. Rather, it addressed matters
of cultural relativism and the prioritization of
the imperative of economic development. This
was invoked as the basis for restricting
civil-political rights in order to secure political
stability thought integral to attracting foreign
investment and trade. The authors correctly
identify the fear of inter-ethnic disharmony
which informs public order considerations
which are valorized in both South-east Asian
countries. Minority rights are but one facet of
the politics of a developmentalist State in rela-
tion to human rights concerns. Nevertheless, it
is true that the position of minorities did play
“an important role in their division into separ-
ate States” (p. 2) as the Singapore State govern-
ment championed the principle of equal rights
and meritocracy while the political leaders of
the Federation of Malaysia championed the
special rights of the majority Malays stemming
from the principle of indigeneity. Malays,
together with smaller groups like the Orang
Asli, were considered “bumiputera” or sons of
the soil. In this sense, Malaysia is a more apt
case study for how a politically dominant
majority “indigenous” group constitutionally
preserves preferential treatment and thus dis-
criminates against the Chinese and Indian
minorities.
Drawing from international standards on
minority rights in relation to norms found in
United Nations human rights treaties as well as
OSCE standards, the authors identify six key
indicators they consider to be characteristic of
a minority protection system. These indicators
provide a template of issues by which to ground
the analysis of the case studies. These are (1)
equality legislation; (2) hate speech legislation;
(3) affirmative action measures; (4) linguistic
protection measures; (5) effective political
participation, and (6) education and civil
participation.
The authors then proceed upon a detailed
inquiry into the constitutional and legal frame-
work relevant to minority groups, as well as
other vulnerable groups. Each case study is
first organized around a discussion of a his-
tory of the relevant country, contextualizing the
enquiry and attempting to identify specific fea-
tures which explain the practice of human
rights in general in that country, as well as the
treatment of minorities in particular. Relevant
features include the histories of India, Malaysia
and Singapore as former British colonies as well
as the especial concerns for maintaining State
stability to promote economic development and
social control, particularly in China and Singa-
pore. The “Asian values” challenge against the
universalist pretensions of human rights is also
raised to underscore the paramountcy accorded
to public order considerations in these Asian
States. Second, the authors delve into the issue
of identifying minorities and the problem
of definitional issues, making references to
authoritative international formulations like
that of Francisco Capotorti’s. The authors go
beyond a narrow definition of minorities in
discussing related problems like the status of
groups not officially identified as minorities
such as the Dalits in India (insofar as they are
Hindu, they are considered part of the major-
ity) or groups which do not number amongst
the 56 national minorities which China
officially recognizes. Third, the authors dis-
cuss the legal framework including institutions
dedicated to protecting minorities such as the
National Commission of Minorities in India
or the Group Representation Constituency
scheme in Singapore which guarantees minority
representation in parliament. Relevant consti-
tutional provisions and case law are also ana-
lyzed, particularly in relation to educational
rights in India. Last, the authors consider the
issue of remedies.
There is heavy reliance on secondary
literature in this book and the comparative
analysis is minimal. Some chapters read more
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like general case studies on the human rights
situation in that country rather than a focused
analysis on minority rights. This is particularly
apparent in the lengthy treatment of bumiputra
rights in Malaysia, which by the authors’ own
admission is “as much about ‘majority rights’
as ‘minority rights’ ”. One cannot help but
think that the position of the Mindanao
Muslims in the Philippines or the Pattanis in
South Thailand would have been more fruitful
to minority rights-oriented studies.
As the authors do go into the definitional
issue of minorities at some length in relation to
the Indian case study, their treatment of the
definitional issue in relation to “Malay” in
Singapore, by way of contrast with Malaysia, is
somewhat disappointing. For example, while
Article 153 of the Federation of Malaysia Con-
stitution defines “Malay” in terms of ethnicity,
religion, language and custom and thereby
“imputes” a fixed identity to Malays (a study of
the recent spate of apostasy cases where a High
Court in Malaysia stated that Malays were
Muslims until their dying day would have
enriched the discussion), Singapore adopted a
pragmatic definition of “Malay” in relation to
Article 39A of the Republic of Singapore Con-
stitution. This contains both subjective and
objective elements, in relation to identifying a
minority for purposes of contesting general
parliamentary elections as a relevant minority.
The authors’ over-reliance on secondary
sources is apparent in some patent inaccuracies.
For example, the assertion at p. 245 that the
government controls religion to prevent it from
destabilizing the multi-racial polity by “the fre-
quent use of the Maintenance of Religious
Harmony Act” is wrong. This Act allows the
government to issue restraining orders which
may “gag” a religious leader from preaching to
his congregation where religion is being stirred
for politically subversive purposes. Enacted in
1990, the government has never in the history
of the Act issued a single restraining order.
What is glaringly absent from the analysis of
the Singapore situation at least are the import-
ant parliamentary debates over minority rights
policy conducted in 1966 when the Consti-
tutional Commission was considering whether
to incorporate specific minority group rights
into the Constitution.
Nevertheless, the book provides a useful
synthesis of the existing literature and overview
of the minority situation in four Asian coun-
tries although it probably has more utility as
a general discussion of the human rights
situations in the four selected case studies.
T L-
Professor of Law, National University of
Singapore; General Editor, Asian Yearbook of
International Law
Elsa Stamatopoulou, Cultural Rights in
International Law: Article 27 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and Beyond,
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston,
2007, pp i–xvi + 1–332
Cultural Rights in International Law comes at a
timely moment. It is the second volume in
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers’ Universal
Declaration of Human Rights Series, edited by
Professor Hurst Hannum. As the publishers put
it, “[i]nspired by the fiftieth anniversary of the
Declaration, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights Series analyzes the development
of the Declaration’s norms and their status in
contemporary international law.” Indeed, it has
been almost 60 years now since the right to par-
ticipate in the cultural life of the community
was first articulated in Article 27 of the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights (“the
UDHR”), and just over 40 years since the con-
cept of cultural rights was crystallized further
in Article 27 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and Article 15 of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (“the ICESCR”).
Today, cultural rights appear, in one form
or another, in a slew of other multilateral
instruments, including the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimin-
ation, the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, and the Declaration on the Rights of
Persons Belonging to National, Ethnic,
Religious and Linguistic Minorities. Yet, the
category of cultural rights has not gained
equivalent traction in the international human
rights literature. As Mary Robinson notes in the
Foreword to this book, “[w]hile contemporary
literature on culture has been abundant in
the humanities, the coverage of culture in the
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literature of human rights law has been largely
limited to a discussion of how culture does (or
does not) clash with international human rights
standards.” In other words, discussions of cul-
tural rights have been wrongly conflated and
confused with difficult issues of culture versus
human rights. One familiar example is the way
in which the “Asian values” debate culminated
in the 1993 Final Declaration of the Regional
Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on
Human Rights, A/CONF.157/ASRM/8 (1993)
(“the Bangkok Declaration”). For the first time
in a plurilateral international instrument,
the Bangkok Declaration asserted that “while
human rights are universal in nature, they must
be considered in the context of a dynamic and
evolving process of international norm-setting,
bearing in mind the significance of national and
regional particularities and various historical,
cultural and religious backgrounds”.
More than ever, attenuating the fear
of “the other” and celebrating diversity
have become global imperatives in the world
after 11 September. In the Introduction,
Stamatopoulou explains that the aim of her
book is twofold. The first is to explore the
concept of cultural rights by reviewing inter-
national and national legal instruments, inter-
national practice and the role of UN bodies and
entities in the promotion and implementation
of those rights. The second is to demonstrate
that cultural rights are of profound moral,
political and economic significance to indi-
viduals and groups, and that they are concepts
on the basis of which moral and material claims
can be made, and solutions given to long-term
problems in societies, thus addressing past
injustices and contributing to human develop-
ment in peace. She writes: “I will situate this
primarily legal analysis within the political con-
text of current international debates on cultural
relativism, racism, dialogue among civilizations
and the post-11 September era.” These are lofty
commitments, but Stamatopoulou delivers on
all of them.
Excluding the Introduction, the book
is divided into four chapters, and ends with a
section entitled Conclusion and Recommenda-
tions. In the first chapter, Stamatopoulou deals
with the legal history of cultural rights, and sets
the contemporary context for the legal analysis
to follow. Drawing on Johannes Morink’s
account in The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights: Origins, Drafting and Intent (University
of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), she traces the
tumultuous drafting history of Article 27, and
the relatively less troubled genesis of Article 15
of the ICESCR. Next, Stamatopoulou turns
her attention to the thorny issues of cultural
relativism and identity politics. She confronts
the question of culture versus human rights
head on, arguing that “culture is the context
within which cultural rights can be understood
and implemented”. The chapter concludes with
a brief examination of Iran’s 2001 UN General
Assembly agenda item entitled “Dialogue
Among Civilizations”, which, in turn, gave rise
to General Assembly Resolution 56/6, “Global
Agenda for Dialogue Among Civilizations”.
Stamatopoulou’s assessment is that this reso-
lution became “a site of positive ideological
exchange, where implicitly the universality
element of human rights was on the table and it
survived”.
In the second chapter, Stamatopoulou
embarks on a wide-ranging survey of relevant
provisions in international legal instruments
and the practice of relevant international bod-
ies and mechanisms regarding cultural rights,
thereby setting the stage for her legal analysis of
the normative elements of cultural rights in the
third and fourth chapters. Stamatopoulou’s
survey divides into five sections, covering inter-
national instruments, the role of UN human
rights treaty bodies, the role of UN bodies
other than human rights treaty bodies, the role
of the UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights, the role of UNESCO, as well as UN
operations impacting on cultural rights in the
field.
The third and fourth chapters are the
substantive heart of the book. Stamatopoulou
opens Chapter 3 with the explanation that the
purpose of this chapter is “to State what cul-
tural rights are, i.e. to analyze the normative
content of the right to participate in cultural
life from an international law point of view”. In
Chapter 4, Stamatopoulou turns to consider
cultural rights as they relate to special groups.
In particular, she examines what she argues are
the special characteristics of cultural rights per-
taining to minorities and indigenous peoples.
Stamatopoulou devotes the final part of this
chapter to other groups in society on whom the
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human rights agenda regularly focuses. Among
these are women, children, persons with dis-
abilities and the poor. The analysis in both
chapters is always firmly anchored to a close
review of international human rights texts, gen-
eral comments of human rights treaty bodies,
international and regional jurisprudence,
including the jurisprudence of the Human
Rights Committee, the practice of international
human rights bodies and mechanisms, State
practice and the relevant academic literature.
For human rights practitioners and
policy-makers, the real value of Cultural Rights
in International Law lies in its final section:
Conclusion and Recommendations. Here,
Stamatopoulou draws together the various
threads of her study to list concrete recom-
mendations for States, the Office of the UN
High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN
human rights treaty bodies, UNESCO, UN
development programmes, funds and agencies,
other intergovernmental and non-governmental
organizations, as well as the media.
Cultural Rights in International Law is a
work of impressive reach and depth. The close
attention to legal analysis securely based in the
canon of international legal texts, jurisprudence
and practice makes this an invaluable reference
for students of international law researching the
issue of cultural rights. The practical aspects
of the book, which arise, of course, from
Stamatopoulou’s long experience within the
UN system, are useful for those working in the
field, whether within UN institutions, inter-
national organizations or elsewhere. At a uni-
versal level, Stamatopoulou’s greatest contribu-
tion with this book is captured in her closing
lines, in which she observes that although “cul-
tural rights are issues different from those that
emerge from the very familiar issue of culture vs
human rights . . . it might be worth asking
whether in any sense the protection of cultural
rights could indeed be seen as a partial solution
to the culture vs human rights problem”.
D Aziz
LLB (Hons) (NUS), BCL (Oxford)
Tullio Scovazzi and Gabriella Citroni, The
Struggle against Enforced Disappearance and the
2007 United Nations Convention, Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston, 2007, pp
xviii + 432
Enforced or involuntary disappearance by State
agents, which unfortunately exists virtually
worldwide and has acquired global dimension,1
1 On 3 October 2006, the Chairperson of the United Nations Working Group on Enforced or
Involuntary Disappearances, while presenting the 2005 Report to the newly created Human
Rights Council, observed: “Enforced disappearance had become a global problem not restricted
to a specific region. Once largely the product of military dictatorship, disappearances were now
perpetrated in complex situations of internal conflict, in regimes undergoing radical political
changes and as a means of political repression of opponents.” (United Nations, Human Rights
Council, Summary Records of the 3rd Meeting, A/HRC/2/SR.3, 3 October 2006, para. 3).
For an account of enforced disappearance in Latin America, Europe, Asia and Africa, see
T. Scovazzi and G. Citroni, The Struggle against Enforced Disappearance and the 2007 United
Nations Convention (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden-Boston, 2007), at 14–72.
It is reported that during the period between 1970 and 2000 the total number of involuntar-
ily disappeared persons was between 300,000 and 500,000. (See T. Scovazzi and G. Citroni, The
Struggle against Enforced Disappearance and the 2007 United Nations Convention, ibid., at 2.)
It is reported that at the end of 2006 the total number of cases of enforced disappearance
transmitted by the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances to govern-
ments stood at 51,236 and concerned more than 90 countries. And the total number of cases
under its active consideration stood at 41,232 and concerned 79 States. During 2006 the Working
Group transmitted 335 new cases of disappearances to the governments of Algeria, Bangladesh,
China, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, India, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Nepal, Pakistan,
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leads to one of the most serious violations of
human rights not only of those who have been
“enforced” to “disappear” but also of their rela-
tives. Enforced disappearance constitutes “an
arbitrary deprivation of freedom” and causes
“serious danger to the personal integrity, safety
and life of the victim”. It “leaves the victim
completely defenceless” and denies him the
right to liberty (even in some cases the right to
life), the right not to be subjected to torture or
inhuman treatment, the right to association,
and “the right to a fair trial, to protection
against arbitrary arrest, to due process”.2 It also
denies his family members the right to associate
with him. A prolonged isolation and depriv-
ation of communication are in themselves cruel
and inhuman to, and harmful to the psycho-
logical integrity of, both the disappeared and
his relatives. Further, a systematic widespread
enforced disappearance creates a situation of
insecurity and terror.
The book under review,3 as reflected in its
title, deals with the struggle against enforced
disappearance that ultimately culminated in the
adoption on 20 December 2006 by the UN
General Assembly of the International Conven-
tion for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance (hereinafter referred
to as the 2007 UN Convention).4
The book outlines the pre-2007 UN Con-
vention international legal framework on
enforced disappearance5 and delves into pertin-
ent legal issues arising from the 2007 UN Con-
vention.6 With a view to echoing the sufferings
of the victims of enforced disappearance and of
their relatives, it also exhaustively reports the
events of involuntary disappearance handled by
the Human Rights Committee, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights and the Human
Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina.7
Through their penetrating analysis of the
hitherto incidents of enforced disappearance by
State agents in different regions of the world,
the authors have delved deep into the so-called
purposes, rather justifications, of enforced dis-
appearance and highlighted the fallacy and
perversity of the logic behind such disappear-
ances. Enforced disappearance, according to
the authors, is carried out as: a measure against
civilian population to produce a deterrent
effect; a means to dismantle the movement of
“insurgency” or to eliminate the so-called
“internal enemies, opponents, terrorists or
subversive elements” for preserving “national
security”; a means to prevent the opposition
from growing, and a means to extract informa-
tion relevant for anti-terrorism purposes and
thereby to avert terrorism. The authors, in the
backdrop of violations of human rights of the
victims of enforced disappearance as well as of
their relatives, fail, with convincing reasons, to
see any justification for, or logic in, the ongoing
practice of enforced disappearance. Referring
the Philippines, the Russian Federation, Sri Lanka, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic and
Thailand. Of these, 79 cases were alleged to have occurred in 2006. See T. Scovazzi and
G. Citroni, The Struggle against Enforced Disappearance and the 2007 United Nations Convention,
ibid., at 62, and Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, 25
January 2007, A/HRC/4/41.
2 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Chile,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.40 doc.10, 11 February 1977.
3 T. Scovazzi and G. Citroni, The Struggle against Enforced Disappearance and the 2007 United
Nations Convention, supra n. 1.
4 The Convention has three parts. Part I sets out the main requirements that need to be addressed
in the domestic law of acceding States. Part II deals with the establishment of a Committee on
Enforced Disappearances, while Part III provides for formalities required for ratification or
accession and entry into force of the Convention. On 6 February 2007, the General Assembly,
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to the justification for enforced disappearance
premised on the “War on Terror”, they
observed:
The fight against terrorism is an urgent
need. The committing of serious com-
mon crimes by terrorist organizations,
including the indiscriminate slaughter of
people, can never be considered as a
form of political expression. States are
called upon to act against political or
paramilitary violence to safeguard the
right to life of their citizens and, more
generally, to ensure the enjoyment of
rights and democracy. Today terrorism
has become a specialized form of crim-
inality which presents various peculiar-
ities, such as its covert and trans-
national organization, its capacity to
intimidate and its sophistication. It is
fully justifiable for States to defend their
existence and their values, even if this
defence involves some limitations of
rights.
They, however, argued:
That said, the question to be addressed
is the following: can States, in the name
of “national security” and in the
accomplishment of their duties to take
protective action against activities which
seriously threaten citizens and dem-
ocracy, resort to enforced disappearance
and other gross violations of human
rights? Or, in other words, can secrete
agents and executors encroach upon
the competences which are reserved to
judiciary power? The response to both
questions can be only one: no, never.
One of the main elements of national
security itself is that enforced
disappearances do not occur.8
The authors have referred to apt resolutions of
the Security Council and of the UN General
Assembly and judicial opinions of the ICJ that
assert that the fight against terrorism by States
is required to be carried out with due respect for
basic human rights and in compliance with
their obligations under international law.
The first chapter also gives an account of
the dimension of enforced disappearances in
Latin America, Europe, Asia and Africa and
highlights the initiatives taken by some of the
States (by establishing Truth and Reconciliation
Commissions after political violence or internal
armed conflict)9 and by international com-
munity (by passing resolutions denouncing
enforced disappearance and by establishing the
United Nations Working Group on Enforced
or Involuntary Disappearances)10 to prevent
and suppress the phenomenon of enforced
disappearance.
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions,
necessitated by the need for reconciliation after
internal armed conflict or political violence,
however, were merely mandated to establish the
truth and to identify the causes of the violence
and the perpetrators. However, the authors,
without giving any reasons or justifications,
have analyzed extensively the Truth and Recon-
ciliation Commissions established in Argentina,
El Salvador and Guatemala11 and concluded
that the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions
worldwide, through their reports, have stressed
the need for appropriate changes in the respect-
ive national law and for strengthening the judi-
ciary or creating other new mechanisms for
rendering justice to the victims of enforced
8 Supra n. 1, at 59.
9 During the past more than 25 Truth and Reconciliation Commissions created worldwide. For
further details, see P.B. Hayner, “Fifteen True Commissions-1974 to 1994: A Comparative
Study”, Human Rights Quarterly 597 (1994); and H.J. Steiner and P. Alston, “Massive Human
Rights Tragedies: Prosecutions and Truth Commissions”, in H. J. Steiner & P. Alston, Inter-
national Human Rights in Context-Law, Politics, Morals (Oxford, 2000) at 1131 et seq.
10 The Working Group was established in 1980 by the Commission on Human Rights by Reso-
lution 20 (XXX/VI) of 29 February 1980. The UN General Assembly, through its Resolution 35/
193 of 15 December 1980, endorsed its creation.
11 Supra n. 1, at 75–93.
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disappearance.12 Initiatives taken at the inter-
national level, as mentioned earlier, ultimately
culminated in the adoption by the UN General
Assembly of the 2007 UN Convention.
The second chapter offers an exhaustive
and illuminating analysis of cases on enforced
disappearance handled by the Human Rights
Committee, the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, the European Court of Human
Rights and the Human Rights Chamber for
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The authors have
undertaken extensive analysis of these cases to
show their contribution in the progressive
development of international rules to fight
enforced disappearance as well as to depict the
human tragedy of the victims of involuntary
disappearance.13 However, the authors, in their
“conclusive remarks on the international case
law”, merely “subscribed” the conclusion earl-
ier reached by Manfred Nowak14 that the exist-
ing international case law “clearly reveals a gap
in the protection against enforced disappear-
ance” and his stress for an “independent and
non-derogable human right not to disappear”.15
A sketch of the pre-2007 UN Convention
“international legal framework on enforced
disappearance” reflected in the Declaration on
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance adopted on 18 December 1992
by the UN General Assembly (hereinafter
referred to as the 1992 Declaration), the 1998
Rome Statute for the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court (hereinafter
referred to as the Rome Statute) and the 1994
Inter-American Convention on Enforced
Disappearance of Persons (hereinafter referred
to as the Inter-American Convention) is
outlined in the third chapter.
The 1992 Declaration, although not bind-
ing by itself, inter alia, offered the first inter-
nationally agreed definition of the offence of
“enforced disappearance”. It required the
States, as their primary obligations, to: (1)
not practice, permit or tolerate enforced disap-
pearances;16 (2) contribute, by all means, to
the prevention and eradication of enforced
disappearances at national, regional and inter-
national level;17 and (3) take effective legisla-
tive, administrative, judicial or other measures
to prevent and terminate acts of enforced
disappearance in territory under their jurisdic-
tion.18 It also referred to as the primary
responsibility of all the States to provide for
prompt and effective remedy and judicial guar-
antees to the relatives of disappeared persons.19
Further, it declared that “no circumstances
whatsoever can be invoked” by States or State
agents to justify enforced disappearance.20
These obligations of the States, however,
did not merely remain as moral or symbolic
obligations. The Working Group, since 1993,
started reporting annually on the implementa-
tion of the Declaration and obstacles
encountered therein. It also regularly transmits
to the governments concerned a summary
of allegations received from relatives of
disappeared persons and NGOs with regard to
obstacles encountered in the implementation of
the Declaration. It has also frequently invited
relatives of disappeared persons, organizations
representing them, and human rights NGOs
to periodically inform and update it about
the steps undertaken by governments for
implementing the Declaration.
The Rome Statute added another dimen-
sion to enforced disappearance by incorporat-
12 Ibid., at 93.
13 Ibid., at 101–263.
14 United Nations, Commission on Human Rights, Report submitted by Mr Manfred Nowak,
Independent Expert Charged with Examining the Existing International Criminal and Human
Rights Framework for the Protection of Persons from Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, E/
CN.4/2002/71, 8 January 2002, para. 76.




19 Arts. 9 and 13.
20 Art. 7.
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ing in it “enforced disappearance of persons” as
“crimes against humanity” when it is “commit-
ted as part of a widespread or systematic attack
directed against any civilian population”.21
The Inter-American Convention provides
for prevention, punishment and elimination of
the phenomenon of enforced disappearance. In
fact, it goes a step ahead of the 1992 Declar-
ation by, inter alia, incorporating in it, as bind-
ing, the internationally agreed definition of
enforced disappearance (articulated in the 1992
Declaration) and qualifying the “systematic
practice of enforced disappearance” as a “crime
against humanity”. However, the present
reviewer feels that the reference to, and discus-
sion of, the Inter-American Convention, being
a regional instrument, does not thematically fit
in the third chapter devoted to “international
legal framework on enforced disappearance”.
Even its unique features, namely incorporation
of the internationally agreed definition of
enforced disappearance and perceiving a sys-
tematic practice of enforced disappearance as a
crime against humanity, and its influence in the
making of the 2007 UN Convention, do not, in
the present submission, justify it a place in the
chapter.
However, the absence of a universally
legally binding instrument against enforced dis-
appearance and the increased instances of
involuntary disappearance across the world
made the international community have, after
having deliberations and consultations for more
than 25 years after the first effort of mooting an
international instrument against enforced dis-
appearance,22 the 2007 UN Convention in the
form of a universally legally binding instrument
against enforced disappearance.
The fourth chapter offers an anatomy, with
comments, of the 2007 UN Convention and
delves deep into its main legal issues.23
The 2007 UN Convention not only
denounces the act of enforced disappearance
but also debars a State from justifying it on
“any ground whatsoever”. Article 1 proclaims:
(1) No one shall be subjected to enforced
disappearance.
(2) No exceptional circumstances whatsoever,
whether a State of war or a threat of war,
internal political instability or any other
public emergency, may be invoked as a
justification for enforced disappearance.
While Article 2 defines “enforced disappear-
ance” as:
For the purposes of this Convention,
“enforced disappearance” is considered
to be the arrest, detention, abduction or
any other form of deprivation of liberty
by agents of the State or by persons or
groups of persons acting with the
authorization, support or acquiescence
of the State, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty
or by concealment of the fate or where-
abouts of the disappeared person, which
places such a person outside the protec-
tion of law.
With a view to reflecting different legal issues
associated with the definition of “enforced dis-
appearance”, the authors have offered an
overview of different suggestions that were for-
warded while Article 2 was in the making and
concluded that the existing definition is in tune
with the definition of “enforced disappearance”
found in the most recent international judicial
practice.24 However, it is pertinent to note that
“enforced disappearance”, as articulated in Art-
icle 2 of the Convention, does not refer to
“enforced disappearance” as a “crime against
humanity” even though the Rome Statute and
judicial pronouncements of the ICTY perceive
it as a crime against humanity. In fact, the
21 Arts. 7 (1)(i) and 7(2)(i).
22 A sketch of the major steps in the direction can be found in the book under review from
pp. 255 et seq.
23 Supra n. 1, at 265–400.
24 Ibid., at 285.
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proposal by many of the Latin American and
European countries and NGOs for making the
notion of crime against humanity explicit in
Article 2 was greeted with stiff resistance by a
number of other States. The Convention, as
an outcome of the conflicting stands taken by
the States, merely makes generic mention of
“enforced disappearance” as “a crime against
humanity” in its Preamble and Article 5.25
Other legal issues discussed thoroughly
relate to, and/or revolve around:26 the States’
obligation to codify the offence of enforced
disappearance under their respective criminal
law;27 superior orders vis-à-vis enforced dis-
appearance;28 international jurisdiction and
extradition in cases of enforced disappear-
ance;29 criminal investigation over enforced
disappearances;30 statute of limitation;31
continuous nature of the offence of enforced
disappearance;32 amnesties and pardons for
perpetrators of enforced disappearances;33 the
right to obtain information about persons
deprived of their liberty;34 definition of “vic-
tims” of the offence of enforced disappear-
ance;35 the right to know the truth regarding the
circumstances of an enforced disappearance;36
the respect for human remains;37 the right to
obtain reparation and forms of reparation;38
enforced disappearances of children,39 and the
role of the Committee on Enforced Disappear-
ances as a monitoring body.40
In spite of a cluster of these pertinent legal
issues, the 2007 UN Convention is one of the
strongest human rights treaties ever adopted by
the United Nations. It aims to prevent enforced
disappearances, establish the truth when
enforced disappearance occurs, punish the
perpetrators and provide reparations to the vic-
tims of enforced disappearance and their fam-
ilies. It also recognizes the new human right of a
person not to be subjected to enforced disap-
pearance and guarantees the human right to
know the truth. No exceptional circumstance
whatsoever, not even a state of war, can be
invoked as a justification for enforced
disappearance.
The Convention, as the authors hoped,
would be a useful tool in the struggle against
enforced disappearance, provided it receives
universal acceptance and the States recognize
the competence of the Committee on Enforced
Disappearances, established thereunder, to
receive individual complaints. Let us, by
bringing the Convention into force41 and
implementing it in its letter as well as spirit,
convey a strong message to those who want to
25 Art. 5 of the Convention, which addresses to the “enforced disappearance” as a “crime against
humanity” as defined in “applicable international law”, it is argued, is applicable to situations
that fall within the 1998 Rome Statute as well as to other cases of enforced disappearance. See
S. McCrory, “The International Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced
Disappearance”, 7 Human Rights L Rev 545 (2007).
26 Supra n. 1, at 295–396.
27 Art. 5.










38 Art. 24(4) and 24(5).
39 Art. 25.
40 Arts. 26–36.
41 It requires ratification by 20 States to enter it into force. [vide Art. 39].
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exercise power and to keep it at any cost even by
making their political opponents to “involun-
tarily disappear” and keeping them “silent for-
ever”, that an act of enforced disappearance is
not merely a crime against humanity but it also
violates the right to life, liberty and security,
and the right not to be subjected to torture of
the disappeared person and that they are no
more allowed to perpetrate, with impunity, the
offence of enforced disappearance.
Authors of the book indeed deserve
unreserved appreciation and acclaim for their
deep insight into the theme of the book as well
as for impressive presentation and inimitable
penetrating analysis of the cases on enforced
disappearance and of the 2007 UN Convention
along with its main legal issues. The book
makes interesting and rewarding reading. It
is indispensable for those who are concerned
with, and sensitive to, the act of enforced
disappearance and unfortunate victims thereof.
K.I. V
Professor of Law, Addis Ababa University,
Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) and Member, Editorial
Board, Asian Yearbook of International Law
Erik André Andersen and Birgit Lindsnaes
(eds.), Towards New Global Strategies: Public
Goods and Human Rights, Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 2007
Building on a series of public seminars on
Global Public Goods and Development held in
2004, this interdisciplinary book seeks “to
investigate how we can make the world a better
place to live in”, offering a Danish contribution
to the debate on global public goods. Accessible
and broad in scope, with a palpable sense of the
authors’ enthusiasm, it presents “an experiment
and an invitation to open discussion”, explor-
ing the relationship between the emerging con-
cept of global public goods and more estab-
lished human rights norms.
The book comprizes five main sections,
beginning with a discussion of the concepts
from their origins in the European history of
philosophy to their contemporary relevance on
a global scale. The authors then explore the
relevance and significance of this conceptual
framework under three main themes of peace
and security, State and citizen and access to
information. The fifth section of the book con-
siders four examples of implementation: health,
fresh water, the international trade system and
private companies’ global responsibilities. The
concluding chapter considers the problems and
potential of global public goods, and suggests
possible means of financing initiatives.
Perhaps most promising and fascinating is
the first section, which considers the mutually
supporting concepts of public goods and
human rights, and identifies the central issues
and themes in the debate, particularly the
underlying social and political dimensions.
Andersen and Lindsnaes point out that, to
begin with, “it is in no way determined before-
hand which goods are defined as public and
which are defined as private . . . goods per se
should be understood as a social construction
established by peoples and governments
through political action, laws and regulations,
and through other actions, both collective and
private.”
While the identification of both public
goods and human rights is a normative exercise,
public goods are primarily defined by economic
criteria. Taking the definitions proffered by
Paul Samuelson in his 1954 article “The Pure
Theory of Public Expenditure”, (helpfully
included as an appendix) as well as Inge Kaul’s
interpretation and transposition of the concept
to a global scale, the authors characterize pub-
lic goods as non-exclusive and non-competitive
things we all have a common interest in having
available for public consumption, which are not
produced by and subject to market mechan-
isms. Global public goods include products,
resources, services, sets of rules and political
systems, with great external significance across
borders, dependent upon cooperation and uni-
fied action among developed and developing
countries to be produced in sufficient quantities.
The description of global public goods as
“universal and affecting all countries, people
and generations” is reminiscent of human
rights discourse, but the universal nature of
human rights is inherent in all human beings’
equal dignity, whereas the idea of global public
goods stems from the increasing economic
activity across national borders and the
consequent global public “evils”. The specific
analyses thus extend the concept of public
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goods to measures to combat public evils, for
example curbing corruption. Noting that global
public goods such as good governance, peace
and stability, trade, information technology, the
rule of law and freedom from corruption are
not concepts “wholly recognized as discrete
rights”, Lindholt and Lindsnaes argue that
global public goods, not yet being specified in
international norms, are “therefore still open to
development and definition as to their applica-
tion”. The following chapters circumscribe this
sense of optimistic possibility somewhat, but
the book’s considerable contribution is to raise
the potential role of private or corporate actors
in contributing to the provision of global public
goods as well as the advancement of the related
human rights.
Kaul and Mendoza distinguish between
three types of global public goods based on
their different public manifestations. The first is
natural, global shared goods such as the atmos-
phere and oceans to which access is usually free
but may be regulated and restricted to protect
resources. The second type comprises human-
created shared global goods like networks,
international standards, norms and knowledge.
While access to such goods as non-commercial
knowledge is often free, patents for example
limit access. Third, the adoption of global areas
of policy may take the form of initiatives to
make private goods universally accessible (such
as basic education, health and a secure food
supply).
The substantive chapters discuss particular
public goods of the second and third types,
examining each good’s regional and cross-
border aspects, its procurement and obstacles
thereto, and the financing of the good. The
analysis includes specific case studies ranging
from the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Local Committee Courts in Uganda, to the pri-
vatization of the water supply in Cochabamba,
Bolivia. This exploration results in a range of
attitudes towards global public goods: the chap-
ters on health, curbing corruption, the internet
and the international trade system view global
public goods as a functional concept of con-
structive and tangible use. Where fresh water
and good governance are concerned, the value
of global public goods depends on certain
preconditions, particularly the formation of
political communities and water management
institutions across borders. The global public
goods-human rights conceptual framework
appears least suited to analyzing or ameliorat-
ing the preservation of peace and security and
access of socially and economically vulnerable
groups to global public goods. For example,
Moller illustrates how the normative complex-
ities of “peace” and “stability” make it practic-
ally impossible to define them as public goods:
peacetime could mean absence of violence
but gross inequality, while stability does not
necessarily entail distributive justice.
It is a pity that this experiment does not
include a discussion on the first type of global
public goods, particularly environmental pro-
tection, given that the top 10 most urgently
needed global public goods named in Providing
Global Public Goods: Managing Globalisation
include “concerted management of the natural
global commons to promote their sustainable
use”. While environmental protection is not
directly identified as a human right in conven-
tions such as the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, there is
no question that it is essential to sustainable
development, which in turn is the only model
for eradicating poverty and “making the world
a better place”. Environmental protection,
including regulating pollution and monitoring
and preventing climate change, is a classic illus-
tration of the concept of public goods, and its
global nature makes it a prime area to examine
the procurement of precise public goods in rela-
tion to human rights. It would have been an
interesting experiment indeed to test what
mutual support or fresh perspective the human
rights and global dimensions would lend to an
established public goods debate, particularly
with respect to the obvious obstacles of free-
riding and the tragedy of the commons, as
well as the incentives that would encourage the
procurement of such global public goods.
Nevertheless, this book’s significant con-
tribution lies in establishing the link between
public goods and human rights by considering
the global dimension of public goods. Linds-
naes points out the strength of public goods
theory as a primarily strategic tool; given that
economic preconditions play an important role
in facilitating human rights, global public goods
should be defined not just in economic terms.
Coupling the normative discourse of human
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rights with economic efficiency arguments
(Kaul’s global public goods theory involves the
idea of preventing evils as an economic persua-
sion – it is cheaper to prevent than to cure evils
like pollution, disease, genocide) renders the
cause of eradicating poverty and improving
human welfare around the world ever more
compelling.
Furthermore, to argue that the poor of the
world have a right to certain global public
goods is to elevate the provision of such goods
from economic fact to international obligation.
This shifts the focus on States’ obligations to a
broader moral responsibility arising from the
ability of private actors and wealthier nations
and international organizations to provide par-
ticular goods, such as access to information, the
privatization of water management in Bolivia,
and more currently, even public schools in New
York. Identifying this responsibility to eradicate
poverty and prevent hunger and disease articu-
lates the humane aspect of globalization, the
duty to provide development aid in reciprocity
to trade.
The question of how global public goods
can be advanced from a human rights perspec-
tive might alternatively be framed as to what
extent human rights norms inform the provi-
sion of global public goods. While Andersen
and Lindsnaes identify the connecting point
between human rights and global public goods
as the democratic decision-making process, the
role for non-governmental actors presents the
greatest potential: there is a place for civil soci-
ety and corporations not only in providing and
financing public goods, but perhaps also in
overcoming international relations politics
transposed to a global scale as successful
regional institutional frameworks exemplified
in some instances by the European Union.
By identifying which global public goods
are best suited to analysis from a human rights
perspective, and which human rights can be
advanced by the concept of global public
goods, this book suggests new strategic tools
to combat poverty and inequality. It is an invita-
tion to discussion worth accepting in earnest.
T L Y
Tutor (part time), Faculty of Law,
National University of Singapore
Justice Law Clerk, Supreme Court of Singapore
European Centre for Minority Issues and The
European Academy Bozen/Bolzano, European
Yearbook of Minority Issues, Vol. 5, 2005/2006,
(ed.), Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/
Boston, 2007, pp 647
The European Yearbook of Minority Issues
(hereinafter the Yearbook) is a critical and
timely review of contemporary developments
about majority-minority relations in Europe.
Since 2003, five volumes of the Yearbook have
been published, overpoweringly enriching the
knowledge-bank on this issue. The current vol-
ume (Vol. 5) is another collection of outstanding
articles relating to the subject. The Yearbook is
divided into two parts; the first part consists of
three sections and the first section consists of
six articles dealing with general policy and link-
ages between ethnic relation and conflict in
Europe. The articles in the second section
expound on the concept of “nation”. The five
articles in the third section are analyses of inter-
ethnic relationship in the Balkans. The second
part of the Yearbook consists of international
(Section A) and national (Section B) develop-
ment reports. The articles in Section A are
mainly focused on issues affecting Europe as a
whole. On the other hand, the articles in Section
B elaborate on specific national and regional
developments in the Slovak Republic, Hungary,
Poland, Catalonia and Belgium. The aptness of
the Yearbook is brilliantly exemplified by its
outstanding contents, analyses, explanations
and critical insights on the minority-majority
issues in Europe.
Conders, Lubbers and Scheepers in the art-
icle on “Resistance to Immigrants and Asylum
Seekers . . .” analyze the reasons of the resist-
ance to migration, immigrants and asylum
seekers as a dimension of ethnic exclusion
(p. 23). On one hand, the resistance is closely
linked with national demographic and eco-
nomic conditions, and on the other hand, it is
linked with public mood (p. 6). In short, they
have found that the lower the GDP per capita,
the stronger the resistance to immigrants. Inter-
estingly, the resistance strongly prevails among
the underprivileged and self-employed people,
especially among distrustful people, and those
overestimating the presence of out-groups in
their country and people perceiving a threat
(p. 5).
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David Smallbone’s article “Ethnic Minor-
ity Entrepreneurship . . .” highlights how entre-
preneurship plays a central role in economic
development, and supports the proposition that
how ethnic diversity as such is a potential
source of competitiveness and entrepreneur-
ship. Furthermore, Smallbone argues that the
ability of European economies to be entre-
preneurial depends upon their ability to
encourage and support entrepreneurship in all
sections of society, including ethnic minorities
(p. 35). He suggests that an ethnically diverse
society is potentially stronger economically
than a less diverse one, due to opportunity for
potential welfare gains for the population as a
whole (p. 36). This perspective might aptly suit
the condition of the UK and some other Euro-
pean countries; however, if we look at ethnic
conflicts in other parts of the world, we can
notice that perhaps they deviate from Small-
bone’s theory. For example, in Nepal there are
more than 60 ethnic groups with repute of rec-
ognized entrepreneurship; nevertheless, the
economy is exceedingly weak. In addition, the
ethnic diversity has hardly turned into com-
petitiveness. With some scepticism, Smallbone
concludes that ethnic diversity might be a
potential asset for competitiveness. However,
before any significant public policy resources
are committed to seeking enhancements in this
matter, his conclusions must be defended with
stronger evidence.
The statement, “We are becoming more
unequal by ethnicity” in Nick Johnson’s article
on “Social inclusion and ethnic minorities from
the perspective of UK . . .” may startle the
readers. He considers issues like increased
immigration and changed dynamics of race and
culture as challenges (p. 53). According to his
article, equality cannot exist in a segregated
society due to the fact that people from such
societies focus on what divides them, rather
than what unites them. Furthermore, the
author strongly argues that diversity should
lead to equality, and true equality in a diverse
society depends on successful integration (p. 54).
The author further elaborates on the difficulties
of a multicultural society associated with inte-
gration. Integration is not a concept of assimi-
lation but a concept of citizenship, based on
core values of equality, democracy and free-
dom. The author emphasizes that when a con-
flict arises between cultural/ethnic values and
legally defined core values, the latter values
must win for integration of diversity and multi-
culturalism. The author also explains that in a
society of multicultural, integrated and citi-
zenry values gaining access to a service, acquir-
ing a job or achieving educational success is
unrelated to an individual’s race or other ethnic
characteristics; instead, it is related to his/her
talent, ambition and desire (p. 55). The concept
of multiculturalism, integration and citizenry
values is not important only to the UK but
equally valid and important to other societies
that are grappling with managing multicultural-
ism. According to the author, the best and the
fairest society is the one in which people share
experiences and common ambitions, regardless
of their racial, religious or cultural back-
grounds. In essence, everyone is expected to
reassert the need for a society based on solidar-
ity in which everyone’s life chances are
unaffected by their birth; this is what true
integration should mean (p. 66).
Kristin Henrard’s article on ethnic
policing analyzes the 2006 recommendations of
the High Commissioner in National Minorities
that was established by the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
with a view to helping prevent ethnic conflicts
largely in reaction to the situation in the former
Yugoslavia, which some feared would be
repeated elsewhere in Europe. According to the
author the policing recommendations were
strikingly different from the previous ones,
especially about the meaning of the concept of
“national minority”. The term “national minor-
ities” encompasses a wide range of minority
groups, including religious, linguistic and cul-
tural as well as ethnic minorities (p. 85). The
author assesses the shift of the focus of the
policing recommendations from the earlier ones
mainly on integration rather than promotion of
a separate identity of the minority (p. 86). A
broader social integration of minorities
enhancing their feeling of belongingness with
opportunity in police service would be one of
the tools of integration (p. 88). The idea of
“engaging with ethnic communities” takes up
the theme of integration again and acknow-
ledges the importance of symbolism attached to
having mechanisms in place to ensure com-
munication and cooperation with minorities
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(p 89). On the whole, the outstanding merit of
the policing recommendations lies in its focus
on respect of differences with inclusion of
minorities into mainstream society rather than
promotion of a minority identity (p. 97).
In another article titled “Complexities of
conflict prevention and resolution in the post-
soviet space . . .” Olga Kamenchuk analyzes
ethnic conflict exposed in different shapes and
forms in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Geor-
gia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova,
Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. One of the
sources of the complexities for prevention of
the conflict was associated with the overriding
tendency to choosing between “Wider Russia”
and “Wider Europe”, coupled with Russian ini-
tiated reintegration plan versus the Western
orientation. For example, Moldova moving
towards the path of pro-Western orientation
denied autonomy to Transdniestriant, despite
an overwhelming decision in frequent refer-
endums to be integrated with Russia (pp. 104–
105). Similar to the conflict between Moldova
and Transdniestriant, the reasons for conflict
between Georgia and South Ossetia were also
fraught with language and integration issues. In
most of those countries, after getting independ-
ence from the former USSR, a surge encapsu-
lated in autonomy resulted in ethnic intoler-
ance, violence and armed conflict further aggra-
vated by the presence of Russia, the EU and the
US. Kamenchuk’s article analyzes ethnic con-
flicts in Europe which offer beneficial lessons to
other nations that are struggling to manage
ethnic relations, in particular identity issues.
Jorgen Kibal’s article, “Sustainable Peace
and Cooperation in Borderlands: The Danish-
German Bonn-Copenhagen Declarations
1955–2005”, examines how the German gov-
ernment dealt with Dutch minorities holding
German citizenship. It also looks at how Den-
mark coped with German minorities holding
Dutch citizenship and residing in Denmark.
Denmark and Germany had entered into a
peace agreement (Declarations) in 1955 on
managing minorities. The Declarations were
derived from a decade of tension, uncertainty
and conflict in the Danish-German border
regions, characterized by the temporary mass-
mobilization and separatist aspirations of the
Danish minority in Germany and the process of
legal reckoning towards the German minority
in Denmark following disloyalty and collabor-
ation during Germany’s occupation of Den-
mark during the Second World War (p. 119).
With a view to resolving the conflict, the Dec-
larations had guaranteed 12 different rights
of the minorities. The Declarations were
founded on three main principles – civic rights
and responsibilities, equality, and non-
discrimination between majority and minority
(p. 126). Both Denmark and Germany have suc-
cessfully managed the acute and inflated prob-
lems by agreeing on the terms of minority pol-
icy that the minorities had no free scope for cre-
ating conflict. But the success had no linear
process. It has been accompanied by both the
positive development and enhancement of the
frameworks in one hand, and on the other hand
it has come with occasional and temporary set-
backs, friction, irritation and even frustrations
in the coexistence between minority and major-
ity (p. 125). Nevertheless, it took almost 50
years for the minorities to have a political par-
ticipation at local and regional level following
the revision of the Declarations in 2005 (pp.
133–34). Although the spirit and positive inten-
tions of the Bonn-Copenhagen Declarations
were challenged in 2005, the symbolic and
actual importance of the Declarations did not
suffer harm. Indeed the Declarations served as
a term of reference, even a code of conduct,
when both minorities and national govern-
ments, in spite of the sometimes heated public
discourse, underlined the status and equal
rights of the national minorities. In this respect,
the Declarations of 1955 were strengthened by
the public discourse, not because of the
national media in both Denmark and Germany,
but also because foreign media actually dis-
covered the Declarations and the virtues of sus-
tainable minority regulations. Furthermore, it is
clearly known that minority regulations and
sustainable regimes should be constantly main-
tained (p. 140).
The concept of “nation” is topically
important in the context of the adoption of
Recommendation 1735 by the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe. Three art-
icles have critically analyzed the debate between
the cultural or ethnic nation, on the one hand,
and the civic nation on the other.
Professor Joseph Marko in his article on
“The Concept of Nation” points out that the
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fall of communism in Central and Eastern
Europe followed by a revival of the nationality
question caused the Constitution to define the
terms “nation” and or “national” or “ethnic
minorities”. But the definitions did not coincide
with each other (p. 143). In this context, Rec-
ommendation 1735 provides some normative
guidance. First, it observes minority issues in
the context of the general trend of the evolution
of nation-State from ethnic or ethnocentric
State into a civic State, and from a civic State
into a multicultural State, where individual
rights of each citizen are guaranteed and also
both collective and individual rights of ethnic
communities and their members are guaran-
teed. Second, organization of territory and
administration of a State on an ethnic basis are
denied with an exception of affirmative rights
and measures. Third, governments are encour-
aged to integrate all citizens irrespective of eth-
nic or cultural backgrounds into a civic and
multicultural entity stopping defining and
organizing exclusively as ethnic or civic States
(p. 144). However, on the question of providing
a clear definition of the term (concept) “minor-
ity”, according to the author, different stake-
holders including High Commissioner on
National Minorities have either failed or
declined. Nevertheless, in most of the cases,
laws have often offered a definition of the term
but due to dogmatic approach legal definitions
have invariably failed. It is not because of dif-
ficulty in defining “object” but because of the
difficulty in defining who has legal standing
before a court and what sort of claim would be
possible. In fact, the foremost character of a
right is that it is enforceable, therefore no
unenforceable claim can be treated as a right. In
this context, according to the author, for the
protection of ethnic rights it is very important
to deconstruct the dichotomy between indi-
vidual and collective rights (pp. 145–46).
Bogdan Aurescu has forcefully analyzed
the concept of “Cultural Nation versus Civic
Nation” in light of the path of development
and understanding of the concept “nation” in
Europe. According to the author two major
approaches have shaped the concept of nation
in Europe. One of the dominating approaches is
linked with the idea of French Revolution that
flourished civic/political nation, which believes
that all citizens in a State are equal and form a
single indivisible nation irrespective of culture,
religion, origin, language or other primordial
identities transforming the idea of nation and
nationality into citizen and citizenship (p. 148).
On the other hand, the equally influential idea
of “nation” resulted from German political
doctrine in an attempt of critical reaction to the
French Revolution, which explains nation in
terms of cultural and or ethnic origins. For this
a nation is a collective entity with a specific lan-
guage, culture and specific traditions (p. 149). In
the history of European States these two con-
cepts have heavily influenced the whole nation-
building process. According to the author Rec-
ommendation 1735 has made an effort to make
a compromise between these two concepts.
Doing this, the Recommendation has succeeded
in clarifying some aspects of the debate on
nation but has also caused confusion on some
important ideas (p. 153). The Recommendation
clarifies that a nation State in its cultural under-
standing becomes a subject of law only if it
organizes itself as a State which is internation-
ally recognized. Further, it reinforces that
minorities or ethnic rights are not territorial
rights or connected to territory and therefore
they cannot be legal subject having authority to
enter into contract or covenants (p. 153). The
Recommendation has not given any specific def-
inition of the concept of “nation” but the
author thinks that the real issue behind the
debate about a possible twenty-first century
concept of nation is not the definition itself.
Besides, to certain extent the Recommendation
has recognized the collective rights of minor-
ities that the author considers as one of the
problems of the Recommendation (p. 154). Fur-
thermore, subscribing the idea of the Venice
Commission the author emphasizes that there is
no internationally accepted model of cultural
autonomy for national minorities because
international standards and principles are
somewhat missing in this matter. Based on these
propositions, the author comes to the conclu-
sion that territorial autonomy cannot be per-
mitted on an ethnic basis (p. 155). One of the
most important innovation of the Recom-
mendation is that it asks all the Member States
to bring their Constitutions into contemporary
European democratic standards by integrating
citizens irrespective of their ethno-cultural
backgrounds within a civic and multicultural
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entity and to stop defining and organizing
themselves as exclusively ethnic or exclusively
civic States (p. 157). The author forcefully
argues that once the modern theories regarding
minority protection appeared, along with the
trend of consolidation of the culture of respect
and social, ethnic and cultural tolerance for
each other, these civic nations naturally become
multicultural. Of course, multiculturalism is a
positive tendency, because it allows coexistence
of identities – the identity of majority with the
identity of minority and the identities of minor-
ities amongst themselves. It also allows for the
preservation of these identities; it works against
their dilution, assimilation or disappearance. In
comparison with the pure civism of nation-
States, multiculturalism is certainly a progress.
But in no way can it constitute the final goal or
point of progress. The simple coexistence of
various identities cannot be satisfactory in and
of itself. The author thinks that the true finality
is interculturalism, the result of complex inter-
action between the culture of the majority and
that of the minority, which enrich each other.
The separate cultural diversity may be an inter-
esting theoretical concept, but is practically
impossible and socially undesirable. Those cul-
tures that isolate themselves cannot progress at
all (pp. 157–58). In short, it can be observed that
whatever the words – either “multiculturalism”
and or “interculturalism” is used – above all the
most important issue is to achieve a goal of
harmony, coexistence and respect between
majority and minority upholding the funda-
mental values of justice, civic culture and
democracy.
Tove H. Malloy, analyzing the historical
development of the concept of nation in the
article on “Deconstructing the Nation for the
21st Century . . .” describes that in the eight-
eenth and nineteenth centuries the concept of
nation was used as a principle to unite large
populations around socio-politico goals. In the
twentieth century, the concept of nation is
metamorphosed into a view of liberal ideology
of democratization based on universal values
such as human rights. As a result, in this sup-
posedly global view, the concept of nation has
become coterminous with the State (p. 162). The
author says defining the concept of “nation” is
difficult because it is a very dynamic idea like a
daily plebiscite. Nevertheless, it is an idea by
which we construct and reconstruct our society,
debating and contesting as a process. In this
context, PACE studied the legal texts of 35
Member States and heard academic experts in
the field before concluding that it was virtually
impossible to arrive at a common definition of
the concept of “nation”. This was specifically
due to varied usages of the word, the problem
of translation of the concept, and variation in
theoretical and philosophical compositions (p.
164). On the whole, Recommendation 1735 of
2006 analyzes the process of nation building
either in terms of civic notion of liberal dem-
ocracy based on self-determination or in terms
of a linguistic notion of patriotic community
(p. 165). The author further provides that the
civic notion of nation building is a concept of
self-determination represented in the American
and French revolutions whereas the linguistic
notion of nation building is inspired by the idea
of German nation building. The German lan-
guage was thus the cultural force that legitim-
ized statehood, and hence the cultural force that
legitimized statehood and what the PACE terms
the two traditional definitions of the concept of
the nation, the French and the German, or the
civic and the cultural, existed side by side for
two centuries. Today these two conceptions of
the nation are seen as developing from a purely
ethnic or ethnocentric State transforming into a
civic State which develops into a purely civic
State in order to transform eventually into a
multicultural State in which specific rights are
recognized for individuals and groups. The civic
notion of the nation is, furthermore, a legal
concept because it is the social basis for the
State, and it is given rather than constructed,
because the State is given (p. 165). The author
further examines that today the German notion
of nation is erroneously contributing to the pic-
ture of cultural nation as a negative notion,
with the notion of culture based on ethnicity
rather than civic values (p. 169). The author
argues that multiculturalism is not a justice
concept because it conflicts with the aspirations
of national minorities who claim a right to pol-
itical autonomy resulting into segregation. In
this scenario, the author suggests intercultural-
ism as an alternative for inter-group relations in
societies where minority groups live together
but do not wish to be integrated (p. 173). In
short, Recommendation 1735 provides that
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national minorities do not constitute nation
because they are not State (p. 174).
Five articles with special focus on the Bal-
kan region analyze minority issues in the
region. When Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (SFRY) dissolved into six different
States (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kos-
ovo, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia) post-
1990, this period was engulfed by violence and
instability. For this Dmitriy I. Polyvyannyy
points out three important factors – the relation
between State and minority as a “zero-sum
game”, minorities’ disloyalty to their State, and
treatment of minorities in terms of national
security (p. 192). In the beginning of 1992, Bos-
nia and Herzegovina got their independence
from SFRY. Following independence, ethnic
conflict and violence erupted in the region lead-
ing to war, crimes against humanity and geno-
cide. In short, the transition progressed into
ethnocracy instead of democracy (p. 196). Dino
Abazovic, in his article on “Bosnia and Herze-
govina . . .” states that the post-war condition
closely resembles the pre-war period and is still
witnessing the endurance of three key political,
administrative, economic and cultural centres
that reveal incompatibility of the current
framework of institutionalizing ethnic differ-
ences. Thus Sarajevo, Banja Luka and Mostar –
the three centres – are decidedly active,
independent of one another and aspiring in
their own specific way to be the paradigm for
the potential evolution of the situation towards
a final solution of the so-called Bosnian prob-
lem (p. 197). The author further states that the
1995 involvement of the international com-
munity in Bosnia-Herzegovina with the Dayton
Peace Agreement (DPA) is largely coupled with
uncritical application and poor understanding
of the DPA (p. 206). The author subscribes that
incorporation of the European values as the
values of Bosnia and Herzegovina might be a
solution to the ethnic problems. In other words,
broader or holistic values might provide a
recipe to local problems including ethnic ones.
Joseph Marko’s article on “Constitutional
Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)
2005–06” evaluates the reasons for the failure
of ethnocentric constitution of BiH. When the
Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) concluded in
1995, initiated by NATO allied force led by the
US, had also provided HiB constitution in its
Annex-IV. There were many important issues
regarding the legal system and hierarchy of
laws, nevertheless more interesting was the sys-
tem of governance. HiB itself was divided into
10 cantons (States). The constitution of HiB
was a federal constitution and all other cantons
were eligible to adopt their own constitutions.
Cantons were delineated on the basis of eth-
nicity. At the federal level, governance decisions
had to be taken by consensus of three major
ethnic representatives – Serbs, Croats and Bos-
niaks. Any ethnic group could block the deci-
sion by casting a negative vote. In this context,
the author says that the entire constitutional
framework was written primarily as an instru-
ment to stop the war, and not as a foundation
for the creation of a functioning State (p. 208).
All State institutions, including the Presidency,
the House of People and Council of Ministers
plus the Constitutional Court were established
on an ethnic basis. Moreover, the Consti-
tutional Court was composed of six ethnically
elected judges and three nominated foreign
judges. This institutional structure based on an
ethnic citadel easily started to disintegrate and,
as a result, the BiH stood as a weak and “failing
State” in the heart of Europe (p. 213). After 10
years of experimentation, both the domestic
stakeholders and experts, and the international
community, came to realize that either the DPA
had to be revised thoroughly or had to be
formed as a Dayton II Agreement (p. 121). Once
again, the US-led reform initiative, with the
support of the EU, brokered a reform package
with the leaders of the six major political par-
ties in the Bosnian parliament. The package
was tabled before parliament for voting in April
2006 but it failed by two votes (p. 213). At pres-
ent, the international agencies are trying for
incremental reform but the local experts are in
favour of major changes in the existing insti-
tutional structure for a centrally more effective
State.
In another article on Kosovo, author
Joseph Marko analyzes the ethnic conflict
between the Kosovo Albanian community and
the Kosovo Serb community. Kosovo is one of
the prominent examples of ethnic conflict
between Serbs and Albanian communities. Dur-
ing SFRY rule Kosovo continuously demanded
to be the seventh republic but the demand was
suppressed. When SFRY was dissolved into six
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different States, Kosovo belonged to Serbia.
Kosovo resisted and denied it was a part of Ser-
bia. Two major ethnic communities in Kosovo,
the Albanian majority and Serb minority,
engaged in an ethnic conflict. The Albanian
ethnic majority wanted Kosovo to be a separate
State. The conflict between the Albanian and
Serb communities plunged into its nadir. Serbs
were expelled from Kosovo. But when Milosevic
came to power in Serbia, the autonomous sta-
tus of Kosovo was not only completely denied
but his government started ethnic cleansing of
the Albanian community. Led by the US,
NATO forces bombed Serbia and Kosovo in
1999 for 79 days, and Milosevic was defeated.
Consequently, the UN Security Council, by
Resolution 1244, established the United
Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and
took interim administration of Kosovo into its
hands until the status of Kosovo was deter-
mined. When the status talks failed by the end
of 2006, Kosovo once again was unilaterally
declared as an integral part of Serbia by the
Kostunica government. Marko analyzes that
the ethnic conflict in Kosovo as an aftermath of
a precarious nation-building process in a
severely divided society, where the civic concept
of nation was almost alien, left the entire
economy in a shambles (p. 241).
Florian Bieber explores majority-minority
issues in Serbia as a troubled issue, mainly
because of an unconsolidated democracy with
anti-democratic and anti-reform feelings. The
author further discusses that State-building in
Serbia from symbolic acts such as adopting a
new flag and hymn to the new constitution was
imposed from outside, be it the referendum on
independence for Montenegro or the status of
Kosovo. The author comes to the conclusion
that the Serbia that is emerging from this pro-
cess, without a union with Montenegro and
probably without Kosovo, is not Serbia (p. 243).
Along with these thought-provoking
articles that provide deep analyses and explan-
ations for the majority-minority issues and
ethnic relationship in Europe, Part III of the
volume extensively discusses the development
of international law in the European context
and national developments in the Slovak
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Catalonia,
Belgium and Ukraine.
In conclusion, this book is precisely linked
with the majority-minority issues of Europe.
Regrettably, it does not provide a comparative
analysis of the majority-minority issues in
Europe in reference to the development of
international law and other relevant global
experiences. Nevertheless, this volume is an
indispensable reference and an enlightening
guide, not only to European countries, but also
to all countries across the globe grappling with
managing ethnic issues in a multicultural soci-
ety. Additionally, this book is an invaluable
knowledge bank and can truly benefit anyone
interested in ethnic issues: scholars, political
leaders, policy makers, lawyers, judges, civil
society organizations, ethnic organizations,
researchers and students. In brief, for societies
that aspire for efficient management of minor-
ity or ethnic issues in today’s world rife with
cultural and ethnic conflicts, this book is a
valuable source of lessons from European
experiences, benchmarks and contemporary
developments.
S B
Faculty at Tribhuvan University,
Nepal Law Campus, Kathmandu
Armin von Bogdandy and Rudiger Wolfrum
(eds.), Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations
Law, Vol. 11, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
Leiden/Boston, 2007, pp xix + 491
Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law,
with its previous 10 volumes, has secured a
well-earned place among the prominent Inter-
national Law Yearbooks of today. The reviewer
is glad to note that the eleventh volume has not
disappointed scholars of international law.
The Yearbook under review comprises nine
essays, four selected papers presented at a Max
Planck Expert Seminar on “How to Speed up
Implementation of the Right to Adequate Food
at the international Level?”, an LLM Thesis
and two book reviews. The Max Planck Con-
ference Papers on the Right to Adequate Food
are extremely important, particularly from the
viewpoint of the developing countries, but they
deserve not just a brief mention but an elabor-
ate comment, which the reviewer shall not
attempt at this juncture.
The nine essays included in the Yearbook
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are on diverse themes – the NAM and the
reform of international relations, the recent ses-
sions of the International Seabed Authority, the
“Second” Lebanon War and the rule of pro-
portionality, Standards of review of the acts of
the Security Council, the UN and information
society, Conference of parties to the Bio-
diversity Convention, Islam and origins of
Hawala, and the Rome Conference on the Rule
of Law in Afghanistan. Of these, the reviewer
would, in the interests of space, select three for
purposes of review – those on the NAM, the
“Second” Lebanon war and the review of acts
of the Security Council.
I
Professor Hennie Strydom’s “The Non-Aligned
Movement and the Reform of International
Relations” is an extensive review of the NAM
as it stands today. The relevance of NAM has
been the focus of a continuing debate in India,
since 1990, reflecting a clash of ideas and
ideologies between protagonists and critics of
NAM – one finds it rather surprising that Stry-
dom has totally ignored the relevance of this
debate taking place in one of the founding
“fathers” of the Movement.
To understand and appreciate the under-
currents of any international groupings of
States, one needs to have a sociological percep-
tion of the international society and the centri-
fugal and centripetal forces at work at any point
in time (as is the case with a pluralistic national
society as well). All grouping is issue-based.
And so has been the NAM. The NAM has
never been a formal “organization”, it has been
a common platform shared by States for certain
purposes. It is a broad foreign policy stance,
and, as a policy stance, it must change in its
nuances as it responds to changing inter-
national milieu. It is true that the members of
the “original” NAM, as a movement in inter-
national relations, highlighted non-
entanglement with military alliances and power
blocs of the cold war era, and a strong advocacy
of decolonization (in the context of salt-water
colonialism). It is wrong to say that as it has
been groping for a rationale for its continued
existence past 1990, it has now turned towards
international economic issues. By the mid-
1960s NAM had already assumed a strident
manifestation of confrontation on international
economic issues – and hence the call for a New
International Economic Order and the Charter
of Economic Rights and Duties of 1974, and
the Decades of International Development
(whereby the developed States initially pledged
2% of their GNP and later 0.7% for inter-
national developmental aid). One could argue
whether this “trade unionism” was desirable in
the long run. But NAM always had an eco-
nomic agenda, and it did not adopt it only after
1990 – in fact to a hardcore Nehruvian, one is
only saddened by the patent lack of unanimity
today among the developing countries on many
international economic issues such as those
stemming from processes of globalization and
liberalization that have broadened and
strengthened the “sovereignties” of a few eco-
nomically powerful States and correspondingly
weakened those of the many developing coun-
tries. In this context, it is meaningless to talk of
how much sovereignty a country should have to
have a say in international relations.
On the plank of human rights, pray, which
country is fully human rights compliant? Have
a look at Amnesty International’s Reports.
Relating a country’s foreign policy state-
ments with its performance on the ground and
highlighting the hiatus is an old easy technique
to discredit it. Professor Strydom has shown
technical perfection in this art to discredit
NAM countries and NAM’s relevance today. In
fact, Judge (then Professor) Sir Kenneth Keith
performed a far better, and technically superb,
job in his critique of Asian States in Australian
Year Book of International Law 1966 – one does
not come across any reference in this essay
under review.
The major contribution of NAM to
international relations has been chiefly norma-
tive – it introduced a new orientation to the
perception of international problems and
underscored multilateralism – not the “collect-
ive unilateralism” of the type we have witnessed
since 1990 – as we search for solutions.
II
Professor Andreas Zimmermann’s comprehen-
sive study of “The Second Lebanon War” is
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well researched and quite enlightening. It high-
lights the international community’s concern
for respect for International Humanitarian
Law, so well underscored in the concluding part
of the essay. But one is bewildered by the term
“Second Lebanon War.” When was the first?
What about more than half a dozen wars/crises
that intervened? Be that as it may, Professor
Zimmermann must be congratulated for his
elaborate analysis of a wide variety of issues –
justifications for use of force, defining “armed
attack”, attribution of acts of Hezbullah to
Lebanon, and several issues of IHL. There is
one area that should invite further study. Given
the context of the “Second War”, what could
Lebanon have possibly done to assert its juris-
diction and control over the strife-torn part of
its territory, and perhaps to protect itself from
the Corfu Channel dictum – that every State
shall ensure that its territory shall not be used
to the detriment of other States? Would its con-
duct amount to acquiescence to Hezbullah
actions? Or could the principle of self-
determination apply in aid of Lebanon’s
conduct?
III
Professor Alexander Orakhelashvili’s legal
analysis of the Acts of the Security Council
makes interesting reading. He divides his essay
into six parts – the general framework of the
Security Council’s interface (one is uncomfort-
able with the word “interference”) with inter-
national law, the impact of Article 103 of the
UN Charter, interpretation of Security Coun-
cil’s resolutions, standards of review of the
Security Council’s resolutions, remedies and
conclusions.
The issue of legality of the Security Coun-
cil’s resolutions has arisen in the past in a wide
variety of political contexts. These include the
cold war contexts (Admission cases, Korea), the
Suez Canal crisis, and the Namibia case. In the
context of the Suez Canal crisis, Egypt clearly
went on record to the effect that the Security
Council decisions would be binding under
Article 25 of the Charter, only if they were in
accordance with the Charter. However, the issue
has come in sharper relief after the cold war
ended in 1990. This is understandable, because
during the Cold War the Security Council
could rarely be used in furtherance of the inter-
ests of a super power, but after the Cold War
things changed.
Is the Security Council constitutionally
empowered to legislate international law? One
would argue that though Article 24 of the UN
Charter very broadly refers to the purposes of
the Charter, Article 39 clothes the Council with
a rather limited competence – evaluation of
whether a situation amounts to a threat to
peace, breach of peace or act of aggression and
taking action in respect of it. None of the ensu-
ing provisions in Chapter VII confers upon the
Council legislative or judicial powers. The
travaux preparatoires of the Charter manifest
the intention of the makers of the Charter not
to empower any one organ with any clear man-
date to make international law. Reading Art-
icles 24, 48 and 103 together, one could cleverly
argue that the “law” being made by the Security
Council would only be the “internal” law, just
to be confined to the members of the organiza-
tion. If it is “internal” law of the organization,
it would still have to be in conformity with the
provisions of the treaty, i.e. the Charter and the
Council’s vires will be questioned. This reviewer
is one of the few who would question the vires
of the Security Council decision establishing
the Yugoslavia Tribunal. If it is “outside” the
treaty, the Security Council’s “law” should be
tested by the rules of jus cogens, as Professor
Orakhelashvili rightly points out.
The learned professor also discusses the
relationship between the Security Council’s
decisions and the European regional law. While
trying to locate jus cogens among human rights
he rightly suggests that Article 4(2) of ICCPR
should hold the key – although one may find
divergences in State practice. The Indian
Supreme Court has, in a series of trend-setting
rulings since 1977, found the right to equality
and the right to life and personal liberty to be
the bedrocks of most fundamental human
rights. Could these two precepts then be
deemed jus cogens of human rights?
IV
Volume 11 of the Max Planck Yearbook of
United Nations, like its predecessors, is indeed a
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most welcome addition to the modern literature
in International law.
While many of the essays and papers
brought together in this tome are erudite and
well reasoned, what strikes the reviewer most is
the intellectual eclecticism of most authors in
selection and analysis of almost exclusively
Western source materials, particularly Western
writings, to the exclusion of non-Western. He
would therefore through this review register his
strong protest to this growing trend in Western
literature to ignore Asian contributions to the
jurisprudence of International Law, even when
they happen to be in the English language.
The assumption that intellectual excellence is
the monopoly of the West should not go
unchallenged.
V.S. M
Professor, School of Law and Governance,
Jaipur National University, Jaipur
L.G. Louciades, The European Convention on
Human Rights, Nijhoff, Boston, 2007, pp 273
It is without doubt that the Strasbourg organs,
specially the European Court on Human
Rights, have trail-blazed human rights dis-
course and given a strong “elan” towards the
protection and promotion of human rights not
only to the European continent but to the
whole world. It is in that context that the
author Judge LG Louciade intends to suggest
how the European Court can improve to be a
better model for the world of human rights. For
this purpose, judges have special roles and must
be subject to periodic review. He says: “Judges
cannot claim to be entitled to special deference
that stifles free discussions or strong criticism
of their decisions. They are not infallible . . .
Judges are human and as such have the same
shortcomings as everyone else. People should
be free to point out what they believe to be
mistakes in a judgment and to disagree with the
effects, provided they do so in good faith and
recognize the binding nature of judicial
decisions”.
This emphasis on the fallibility of judges is
a commendable perspective upon which to
review the performance of the Strasbourg
organ. Hence, one must be constantly vigilant
in accepting common European human rights
standards set out by the Court.
This book is a collection of essays, and not
a thesis or a text book. Hence, while there is a
common focus, namely the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights and the role of the
Court, the selected topics are multifaceted.
Thus our review is premised on the disparate
nature of the topics. Doubtless, the editor has
chosen a practical approach rather than one of
a pure speculative abstraction. Each chapter
provides a summary of the legal arguments.
This is a good pedagogical tool.
Chapter 1 – Rules of Interpretation of the
European Convention of Human Rights: The
choice of the very topic shows the author’s
intent of practicality. The primary function of a
court is interpreting the source documents. He
dwells on the outlook the Court had and
continues to have, namely “to give effective
enforcement to protection of individual rights”
(p. 5). In the light of this overarching objective,
the Court has resorted to the general principle
of interpretation as provided in Article 31 of
the Vienna Convention on Treaties.
To elucidate the Court’s philosophy, the
author has rightly dwelt on the landmark case,
Golder v. UK. While involving international law
principles, the Court has not always adhered
strictly to the rules of interpretation, where they
conflict with the common European Standard,
which essentially link up with “ideals and
values of a democratic society” (p. 9). Thus the
Court refused to accept the permissible limits
of reservations as found in the Vienna Conven-
tion. Similarly, to maintain this common Euro-
pean standard, the Court, while looking at the
national laws of Member States, stands its own
ground while allowing a “margin of appreci-
ation” to the States (p. 12).
One other attitude the Court adopted in
interpreting the Convention was to consider
it as the “living instrument”. Thus, the Court
considers both the relatives balanced by the
absolutes (p. 14).
Chapter 2 – Continuing Violation of
Human Rights: For the purpose of the
Stasbourg organs, an application must be
forwarded within six months although this
limitation ratione tempore does not apply to
continuing, as opposed to instantaneous, viola-
tions such as causing death, injury or destroying
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property. To the first category belongs illegal
possession of weapons, illegal detention or
retention of stolen property.
Although, superficially, the instantaneous
acts are distinguishable from continuing viola-
tion, in reality it is not that simple. The com-
plexities were visible in the De Becker case
(p. 23). The applicant was convicted for treason
in 1944 (long before the Convention came into
force). His death sentence was commuted to life
imprisonment subject to further abridgment of
certain Convention rights such as freedom of
expression. The Commission found that this is
“continuing violation”. This case was dis-
tinguished in X v. Belgium (p. 24). In the former,
the Court found that forfeitures resulting from
a judicial decision were discretionary and not
systemic and linked up with legislation did not
amount to a continuing violation. The Court
also found that a wife who is deprived of visit-
ing her husband resulting from expulsion is
faced with a continuing violation (X v. Switzer-
land p. 26). Having dealt with de jure confisca-
tion of property following a person’s conviction
as an instantaneous act, the author traverses the
uncertainty surrounding de facto expropriation,
whether it is a continuing violation or not
(pp. 28–29). These uncertainties in interpreting
“continuing violation” is smoothened out by
the author in concluding: “. . . for a violation to
be continuous . . . it is necessary that the inter-
ference subsists as a result of continuing oper-
ation of the initial act or the maintenance of its
effects through relevant involvement or conduct
of the State” (p. 30).
Chapter 3 – Dealing with Rule of Law and
Human Rights with Special Reference to Juris-
prudence of the ECHR: The author wrests with
immutable principles of justice and equity as
proposed by the great philosophers such as
Aristotle and Solon. He discusses the Diceyan
model of the Rule of Law and how this prin-
ciple has been treated in Strasbourg juris-
prudence. The author recalls Golder v. UK
(p. 38) where the courts found that while article
6(1) of the Convention provided for fair trial,
this could not be achieved without having
“access to lawyers (p. 39). As the rule of law
bears a close affinity to democracy, it required
the bridling of dictatorial regimes (p. 42).
Wire-tapping was identified as an instance of
the violation of the rule of law (Malone v. UK
p. 43). At all times rule of law is threatened
by retrospective criminal legislation and to a
certain extent in the case of civil retrospective
legislation (Stran Greek Refineries case, p. 45).
Other violations of the rule of law relate to a
wide array of rights, including freedom of
speech, the presumption of innocence and free-
dom from inhumane treatment. The chapter
remarkably concludes that the rule of law is not
purely procedural (in the Diceyan sense) but
substantive as well: “. . . Rule of law . . . is based
on the recognition and full acceptance of the
supreme value of the human personality.”
Chapter 4 – Prohibition of Discrimination
under Protocol 12 of European Convention on
Human Rights: Although non-discrimination
has received universal acceptance as a human
right, the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR) did not provide for a free-
standing right until the adoption 12th Protocol
to the ECHR on 26 June 2000. Article 14 of the
Convention forbade discrimination only to the
extent that such treatment deprived an indi-
vidual of enjoying rights guaranteed under the
Convention. The zest towards this free-standing
right was spearheaded by the interest generated
in Europe against discrimination of women and
people of different races.
The 12th Protocol makes provision for
positive discrimination (or reverse discrimin-
ation) so that past culpability of discrimination
may be obviated by specialized treatment of the
marginalized. What is commendable in the 12th
Protocol is that positive discrimination applies
not only to civil and political rights but to eco-
nomic and social rights as well (p. 60). This
facilitates healthy economic standards across
the board of society at large and also improves
the enjoyment of welfare benefits. Article 1 of
the 12th Protocol provides for protection to the
individuals against direct and indirect dis-
criminations and de jure (unjustified laws), as
well as de facto (through circular jurisdiction)
violations. Interpreting the 12th Protocol, the
Court is guided by the jurisprudence of Article
14 of the Convention as well as of other coun-
tries such as the US. The basic principle in non-
discrimination is that “likes must be treated
likely, dislikes must be treated dislikely”. To
do the contrary would require a rational or
reasonable justification. For instance in Canea
Catholic Church v. Greece (p. 64), to treat the
Literature 341
applicant differently from the Orthodox
Church or Jewish community was found to be
discriminatory since there is no rational or rea-
sonable justification. Discrimination may result
in degrading treatment (Cyprus v. Turkey –
p. 65). The Protocol confined itself to discrim-
ination as set out in the existing international
convention, such as that dealing with dis-
crimination based on sex, race, colour and
religion and so on, leaving out additional
grounds (such as disabilities, sexual orientations
and age) within its scope.
The Protocol protects individuals from
discrimination by public authorities. Hence dis-
crimination caused by private individuals is not
caught up within the new regime. Selective
justice does not always violate the Protocol 12.
The author sees certain anomalies in these two
situations. The chapter concludes in under-
scoring two primary points: first, under the
Protocol, the rule of the Court could grant in
the case of a violation only in providing com-
pensation and not suggesting law reforms;
second, since non-discrimination is an evolving
concept, the number of those who seek relief
under this provision is increasing. The court
should devise a mechanism to meet the
exploding number of applications.
Chapter 5 – Determining the Extra-
Territorial Effects of the European Convention:
Facts, Jurisprudence and Bankovic Case: In the
Bankovic case (p. 80) the European Court found
the NATO forces which bombed Kosovo (then
part of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) were
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Euro-
pean Court, although the NATO forces were
manned by Convention States.
This decision drew serious criticisms. The
author, who agrees with critics of the Bankovic
decision, says that in the light of the object and
purpose clause in Article 31 of the Vieanna
Convention on Treaties, the court seems to have
forgotten the raison d’etre of the European
Convention on Human Rights, whose purpose
was the prevention of State oppression of
individuals (Jews and Gypsies) by Hitler’s
Germany. Thus what matters in human rights
violation is to discern whether the State has vio-
lated human rights within or without its terri-
torial jurisdiction. If such violations have taken
place, the Court would be seized with com-
petence and jurisdiction, even though the acts
or omissions have taken place outside its/their
territory.
The author rightly contends that the
Court’s view that extra-territorial jurisdiction is
exceptional is quite contrary to the spirit of the
ECHR and departs from its own previous case
law. Lord Sedley, who had to enforce the Bank-
ovic case within the UK, observed: “Bankovic
appears for the present to constitute a road
block . . . an obstacle to the solution” (p. 98).
The author cites the deficiencies found in
the Bankovic case and refers to two previous
judgments given by the Court itself (Anandize
v. Georgia and the Ilascu case).
In fairness to the author’s academic
honesty, one finds that he forcefully presents the
views of jurists who acknowledged the legitim-
acy of Bankovic, including McGoldrick and
Bajele. According to the former, “Bankovic was
clearly a political case . . . A decision the other
way would have raised additional questions . . .
and court exercise of review of military actions
by individual States or by the NATO . . .”
Chapter 6 – The European Convention on
Human Rights and the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities: As regards disabled persons, the
Convention will take into consideration the
special circumstances of such persons to ensure
effective enjoyment of their rights. However,
whether it would positively discriminate in
favour of disabled persons is a moot point.
Since the Convention is a “living instru-
ment” one would observe that Strasbourg
organs have tended to advance affirmative
action or positive discrimination in favour of
the disabled. Article 3 (prohibiting torture,
inhuman and degrading treatment) benefits
were afforded to a severely disabled woman who
was detained in a prison. Similarly Article 5
(liberty and security) benefits were construed
stringently to protect individuals having psychi-
atric conditions. In the case of deaf, dumb and/
or blind accused, fair trial (Article 6) demands
that they be assisted to follow the judicial
proceedings.
In very controversial issues relating to
euthanasia (mercy killing), the Court, without
denying the sanctity and dignity of human life,
permitted the husband of a terminally ill wife to
disconnect the life support system (Pretty v.
UK). Under Article 2 of Protocol 1 pertaining
to the rights of education, children with dis-
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abilities may be taught in regular schools. Those
with severe disabilities must be educated in
special schools.
Under Article 14 (non-discrimination) a
disabled adult, although not a national, was
deemed to be eligible for special allowances
because of his disability. The Convention con-
tains no free-standing right in favour of dis-
abled persons. However, the Strasbourg organs
were “particularly sensitive to human problems
. . . The Convention cannot . . . solve all prob-
lems of disabled persons but it can certainly
contribute greatly to their alleviation”.
Chapter 7 – The Judgment of the European
Court of Human Rights in the Case of Cyprus
v. Turkey: The inter-State application by Cyprus
against Turkey in May 2001 is a landmark deci-
sion, where the Court for the first time found
that a State was liable for grave human rights
violations under various Convention provisions
to a large number of citizens. The violations
amounted to the following: (1) refusing to allow
Greek-Cypriots to return to Cyprus as a viola-
tion of Article 8 (right to family life); (2) depriv-
ing Greek-Cypriots of their right to enjoy their
property as a violation of Article 1 of the 1st
Protocol; (3) failure on the part of Turkey to
investigate the disappearances of Greek-
Cypriots in violation of Article 2 (right to life
and liberty) and Article 5 (legitimate detention);
(4) in respect of item (3) above, the relatives of
the remaining persons were denied the right of
humane treatment. The first inter-State applica-
tion of UK v. Ireland is only a minor violator
when compared with giant Turkey.
The background to this application is the
continuous political instability that persists in
Cyprus. Cypriots of Greek origin and Turkish
origin are strange bed-fellows. The UN in
Security Council Resolution 541 (1983) ruled
that the declaration of independence of Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) was
illegal. In 1974, the European Commission on
Human Rights found Turkey violated Articles
2, 3, 5, 8, 13 and 14 of the Convention and
Article 1 of the 1st Protocol. It was only on 22
January 1990 that Turkey acceded to the ECHR
and recognized the Court’s competence. It was
in this context that the present decision was
rendered by the Court in 2001.
The Court’s rulings were directed mainly
to Greek-Cypriots living in the Karpas area.
The series of violations of many Convention
provisions was found to be administratively
master-minded. This violation was found to be
directed along ethnic, religious and racial lines.
As regards Gypsies in northern Turkey, the
Court did not find any systematic grave viola-
tions by Turkey, except the legislative practice
of authorizing trials of civilians by military
tribunals.
On the procedural side, the Court closely
followed the 11th Protocol, where the standard
of proof is beyond reasonable doubt. At the
preliminary stage both the Commission and
later the Court found: (1) Turkey is the lawful
government and the TRNC is only a domestic
entity like any other individual citizen; (2)
Turkey is responsible if the TRNC or its mem-
bers violated the Convention rights of other
citizens.
Apart from Judge Fuad, who disagreed
with all the findings of the majority, there were
only a few dissenting voices (Judge Costa, who
disagreed that there is a violation on grounds of
religious discrimination; and Judge Marcus-
Helmons found that there were further viola-
tions of Article 2 (right to life), Article 9 and
Article 14 (non-discrimination)). Judge Fuad’s
dissent went into the heart of Greek-Cypriot
politics in asserting that the Court was not the
proper forum to address all these issues.
It is our view, while conceding Judge
Fuad’s concerns respecting the complexities of
long-running historical antipathies, that indi-
viduals who are subjected to human rights
violations cannot wait until the final resolution
of all political disputes. Thus it is our view that
the Court has struck a fair balance between
politics and law.
Chapter 8 – The Protection of the Right to
Property in Occupied Territories: As the author
points out in the introduction, the right to
property has acquired special importance as a
human right, consonant with liberal European
human rights theory.
However, the view that people in occupied
territories have rights, including the right to
property, is a recent development in human
rights. The author highlights the “paradoxical”
feature that the protection of the right to prop-
erty in occupied territories is founded in rules
of military codes and the principles and laws of
war, which restrict the harm the military is
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allowed to inflict on civilian property under
occupation. The condemnation of destruction
and unjustifiable appropriation of property as a
war crime has since been accepted as punishable
by tribunals including Nuremberg, the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia and now the International Criminal
Court. It is interesting that there is no reference
to decolonization and withdrawal of occupa-
tion from former European territories in Asia,
Africa and Latin America in relation to the
development of the European jurisprudence.
Protocol 1 of the European Convention on
Human Rights provides a legal basis for the
protection of a person’s right to property along
with an effective mechanism for the enforce-
ment of the right. The author highlights that it
goes beyond other humanitarian law and inter-
national law protections which depend far more
upon the political will of States and that it pro-
vides a remedy to the victim where international
criminal law would provide only for individual
criminal responsibility. However, even with this
advantage, the actual implementation of the
rights continues to be impeded by States in
many instances.
In the analysis of the case law under the
ECHR, the author focuses on the cases involv-
ing Turkey and Cyprus regarding Greek-
Cypriots whose property rights were denied by
the Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus.
Following the Turkish acceptance of the juris-
diction of the ECHR, the Court found that
there was and continues to be a breach of the
rights under the Convention. In the landmark
Loizidou case, the Court awarded both pecuni-
ary and non-pecuniary damages to the com-
plainants as well as costs and expenses. But the
attitude of Turkey towards the implementation
of the decisions of the Court and the non-
acceptance of the reports of the Commission
are deplored by the author. The author also
mentions the continuing rights issues regarding
expropriations in the Soviet occupied zone of
Germany following the Second World War,
which exposes the fact that issues regarding
unlawful dispossession may carry on for years,
decades, even generations without sufficient
redress.
The complication of situations of dispos-
session due to subsequent possession of these
properties by third parties, some of whom are
perhaps also persons displaced due to violence
or natural disasters, is also raised, with brief
mention of the Pinheiro Principles. This part of
the chapter could have been expanded as it
raises interesting issues of the balancing of
rights of the original property owners and the
procedural rights of secondary occupants not
to be disposed in violation of their human
rights. The position of the ECHR (if any) in
this regard is not made clear.
The support provided by principles of
international law and the jus cogens status of
many of these principles, which is supported by
many international law jurists, is also discussed
by the author, with the chapter ending on a
pragmatic yet hopeful note. The author rightly
notes that there are “. . . beautiful rules, excel-
lent judgements, clearly defined human rights,
impartial courts . . .” but that the actual
implementation of rights and effectiveness in
facing breaches of the law depends on the atti-
tudes towards international law, justice, rights
and dignity of all held by both persons and
States.
In the light of continuing violations of the
right to property in situations such as the occu-
pied territories of Israel (whose importance is
briefly mentioned by the author) and more
recently the situation of the US occupation of
Iraq, this issue will continue to be a significant
one in international law. The jurisprudence of
the ECHR will no doubt nourish international
law and further strengthen the jus cogens
standpoint. This article illuminates the main
issues in a succinct manner, giving a good
understanding of the development of this area
of the law. The addition of a discussion of the
State response to the ECHR decisions would
give the reader a clearer view of the actual (lack
of ) implementation of the well-developed law
with regard to the right to property in occupied
territories.
Chapter 9 – Freedom of Expression and the
Right to Reputation: Freedom of expression is
jealously guarded in democratic societies with
both civilian and common law traditions. The
US First Amendment guarantees the right. The
US case of New York Times v. Sulliven (p. 144)
held that the common law remedy of libel
(defence of truth) is narrowly constructed in
favour of the speaker when he is criticizing a
public official and more so a political person. It
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is malice on the part of the speaker alone that
makes him liable for defamation or liable. The
media personnel are providing a public service.
Hence the common law presumption of defam-
ation does not apply to media personnel. The
American case law has adopted a distinction
between facts and opinions. Truth or falsity of
opinions are not capable of proof and hence
enjoy immunity from liability.
There is a tendency to be critical of courts
which tend to over-protect the journalist, which
was mitigated in Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc. (p.
145). The Court was hesitant to allow character
assassination. It stated: “New York Times
undervalues the individual’s interest in reputa-
tion. Article 10 of the European Convention
protects the individual’s right to expression.
Starting from the land mark cases delivered by
the European Court” (Sunday Times and
Handyside (p. 150), Strasbourg institutions have
held that this right may only be abridged if
“necessary in a democratic society.”
Chapter 10 – Environmental Protection
through the Jurisprudence of the European
Convention of Human Rights: In the context
of increasing concern with regard to environ-
mental issues, a chapter on the environmental
jurisprudence that has emerged from the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights is very
necessary to this publication. The author points
out in the introduction that the environment
was not one of the values that were intended to
be protected at the time of the drafting of the
Convention. This is made clear by the early
decisions of the Commission and Court, which
had a conservative and narrow view of indi-
vidual human rights protection and showed an
unwillingness to extend existing rights to
environmental protection through creative
interpretation. But as the interpretation of the
Convention evolved according to the changing
values and conceptions of European societies,
the original reluctance has given way to recog-
nising the importance of the environment and
has given birth to decisions where ECHR
individual rights afford some protection to the
environment, through the legitimate restriction
of individual rights in favour of the
environment.
The individual rights that have been
extended to cover environmental issues include
the right to life, the right to respect for private
life and home and the right to property. How-
ever, the author points out that complaints
under the Convention can be entertained only
when a violation has already taken place or
when it can be established that there is a real
probability or a specific and imminent danger
of it taking place. A reference to the pre-
cautionary principle in international environ-
mental law could have added value to the
discussion at this point.
The author also discusses the approach of
the Court with regard to balancing the interests
of the individuals and groups affected by
environmental damage or pollution and the
economic wellbeing of the community as a
whole. The outcomes with regard to this bal-
ancing are mixed and there have been some
steps backwards as well as steps forward. The
author notes that there is reluctance on the part
of the Court to find “considered governmental
policies” and big projects for which the “eco-
nomic wellbeing of the community” is
invoked, incompatible with obligations under
the Convention. Yet the author also notes
decisions where legislative measures concerning
land use that limited private property owner-
ship rights were upheld due to the fact that they
were for environmental and ecological protec-
tion. A mention of whether the principle of
sustainable development has been accepted by
the Court would have been helpful for the
reader.
The author gives a commendable overview
of the environmental jurisprudence under the
European Convention on Human Rights,
referring to a number of interesting and
important cases and analyzing several in some
depth. This gives the reader a good under-
standing of the attitude of the Courts to these
issues over a long period as well as enabling the
reader to grasp quickly the facts and argu-
ments of the most relevant cases. However,
there is no comparative evaluation of devel-
opments in international environmental law
and in other jurisdictions, so the chapter does
not give a reader an understanding of where
the European Court is situated internationally
in terms of progressive interpretation of indi-
vidual human rights for the protection of the
environment. Furthermore, the connection
with principles of international environmental
law that have been developed since the
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Stockholm Declaration of 1972 and the Rio
Declaration of 1992 alongside the case law
would have enriched the commentary. Such
additional information and analysis would
show that the developments in the European
context were not happening in isolation and
that there is an increasing worldwide interest in
the protection of the environment and increas-
ing promotion of the linkage of human rights
and environmental issues.
Chapter 11 – Questions of Fair Trial under
European Convention on Human Rights: The
issues surrounding fair trial being extensive, the
author has justifiably treated various aspects of
the right to fair trial selectively.
Chapter 12 – The Right of Access to a
Court and the Doctrine of Political Acts: In the
common law tradition, acts of governments are
distinguished as administrative and political.
Administrative acts are subjected to judicial
review, whereas the latter are not.
Unfortunately there is no definition or descrip-
tion of what the political acts are. In almost
every country with a written constitution, there
is a provision which declares that political acts
are not subject to judicial review. The absence
of clear definition of political acts endangers
the rule of law and a threat to equal protection
of citizens under the law. The case is similar in
civil law countries. The equivalent of acts of
State is conseil d’etat. The judicial review of
conseil d’etat as distinguished from actes de
gouvernement is not consistent in the civil law
countries.
There was a notable shift of emphasis with
the House of Lord’s decision in GCHQ case
(p. 228). Lord Roskill identified certain acts of
the government as non justiciable (e.g. treaty
making, prerogative of mercy, etc.). Apart from
these obvious political acts, others are
justiciable.
In the climate of a pattern of governance
where more and more in-roads are made into
arbitrariness of State activities, there is juristic
opinion to the effect that even in foreign rela-
tions, there ought to be consistency (p. 232).
However, the courts are still wary in making
bold decisions to review political acts, as seen in
Ange v. Bush (in this case the court refrained
from challenging the President’s decision to
deploy forces in the Persian gulf ). Dutch courts
followed a similar line.
The author rightly contends that political
acts of State should not altogether be immune,
though a broader leverage could be given to
policy matters. But when individuals are
affected, for instance by negligent military
action, State immunity should cease. The
author also contends that immunity should be
limited when it concerns “access to justice”.
Thus the UK decision in Osman v. UK is good
law.
The European Court had occasion to
review the issues surround State immunity in
the case of Markovic v. Italy (p. 239), where the
Court found (10:7) that Article 6 of the Con-
vention (fair trial) was not violated. In this case,
the European Court found that the Italian
court has justifiably held that the alleged dam-
age emerged from a foreign policy decision
which was not justiciable.
The author espousing the minority view,
with which we agree, challenges the majority
view of the European Court on the premise that
conceding absolute immunity to political acts
to the extent where individuals’ substantial
rights are absolutely eroded is dangerous
(p. 242).
Chapter 13 – The Right to Return: This
chapter deals with the right of refugees and
internally displaced persons (IDPs) to return to
their homes and properties after their forcible
displacement. The author explains the legal
provisions applicable to this area and substanti-
ates his arguments using relevant case law
authorities and provisions of both international
and regional legal instruments. Initially, there
were no legal principles formulated in inter-
national law on the subject. Therefore, the
writer describes some important Resolutions
passed by the UN General Assembly and the
Security Council calling upon States which were
responsible for the displacement of large num-
bers of people to allow their safe return to
home countries and places of habitual
residence.
The writer clearly explains several reasons
for the delay or for the refusal of some coun-
tries to carry out their obligations affirming this
right, and describes relevant provisions of some
important international and regional instru-
ments, especially the contribution made by the
European Convention on Human Rights to the
development of the legal principles relating to
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the right of return. Significant cases on the
theme, i.e. those of Cyprus v. Turkey, Dogan and
Others v. Turkey, the Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey
case are critically examined.
The author devotes much attention to
the increase in the efforts for an effective
protection of displaced persons and mainly
highlights the significance of the Pinheiro Prin-
ciples in relation to the protection of displaced
persons. It would have been better if the writer
could have addressed the underlying reasons
for the reluctance of the international com-
munity to develop any hard law instrument in
relation to the right to return of displaced per-
sons. In my opinion, he would have discussed
and analyzed the conflict between the sover-
eignty of States and the significance of the
international scrutiny of the status of human
rights of people living in those States. How-
ever, this is a well-researched work and pro-
vides a great amount of information. It
includes critical arguments.
Conclusion
The author, to our knowledge, has accom-
plished his objective of making those who are
interested in promoting a common European
standard and making the European Convention
on Human Rights a “living instrument” com-
fortable. His candid criticism of the judgments
of the Court are based on sound logic and
couched in a sincere tone. This work is a useful
guide on European Court standards, which
influence the jurisprudence of human rights
worldwide.
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